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1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
128 #endif
129
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
131 tls1_enc,
132 tls1_mac,
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_alert_code,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 0,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
146 ssl3_handshake_write
147 };
148
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
150 tls1_enc,
151 tls1_mac,
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
160 tls1_alert_code,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 ssl3_handshake_write
166 };
167
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
169 tls1_enc,
170 tls1_mac,
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
179 tls1_alert_code,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS,
182 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
183 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
184 ssl3_handshake_write
185 };
186
187 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 {
189 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
190 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
191 return(60*60*2);
192 }
193
194 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
195 {
196 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
198 return(1);
199 }
200
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
202 {
203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
204 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
205 {
206 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
207 }
208 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
209 ssl3_free(s);
210 }
211
212 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
213 {
214 ssl3_clear(s);
215 s->version = s->method->version;
216 }
217
218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
219
220 static int nid_list[] =
221 {
222 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
225 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
226 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
227 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
229 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
230 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
231 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
232 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
233 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
234 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
235 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
236 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
237 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
238 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
239 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
240 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
241 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
242 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
243 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
244 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
245 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
246 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
247 };
248
249
250 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
251 {
252 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
253 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
254 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
255 };
256
257 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
258 {
259 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
260 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
261 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
262 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
263 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
264 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
265 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
266 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
268 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
270 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
271 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
272 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
273 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
274 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
275 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
276 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
277 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
278 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
279 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
280 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
281 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
282 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
283 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
284 };
285
286 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
287 {
288 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
289 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
290 };
291
292 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
293 {
294 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
295 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
296 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
297 return 0;
298 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
299 }
300
301 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
302 {
303 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
304 switch (nid)
305 {
306 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
307 return 1;
308 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
309 return 2;
310 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
311 return 3;
312 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
313 return 4;
314 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
315 return 5;
316 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
317 return 6;
318 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
319 return 7;
320 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
321 return 8;
322 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
323 return 9;
324 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
325 return 10;
326 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
327 return 11;
328 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
329 return 12;
330 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
331 return 13;
332 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
333 return 14;
334 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
335 return 15;
336 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
337 return 16;
338 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
339 return 17;
340 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
341 return 18;
342 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
343 return 19;
344 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
345 return 20;
346 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
347 return 21;
348 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
349 return 22;
350 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
351 return 23;
352 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
353 return 24;
354 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
355 return 25;
356 default:
357 return 0;
358 }
359 }
360 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
361 * preferred list
362 */
363 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
364 const unsigned char **pcurves,
365 size_t *pcurveslen)
366 {
367 if (sess)
368 {
369 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
370 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
371 return;
372 }
373 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
374 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
375 {
376 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
377 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
378 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
379 break;
380
381 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
382 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
383 *pcurveslen = 2;
384 break;
385
386 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
387 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
388 *pcurveslen = 2;
389 break;
390 default:
391 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
392 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
393 }
394 if (!*pcurves)
395 {
396 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
397 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
398 }
399 }
400 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
401 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
402 {
403 const unsigned char *curves;
404 size_t curveslen, i;
405 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
406 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
407 return 0;
408 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
409 if (suiteb_flags)
410 {
411 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
412 if (p[1])
413 return 0;
414 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
415 {
416 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
417 return 0;
418 }
419 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
420 {
421 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
422 return 0;
423 }
424 else /* Should never happen */
425 return 0;
426 }
427 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
428 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
429 {
430 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
431 return 1;
432 }
433 return 0;
434 }
435
436 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
437 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
438 * an EC tmp key.
439 */
440
441 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
442 {
443 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
444 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
445 int k;
446 /* Can't do anything on client side */
447 if (s->server == 0)
448 return -1;
449 if (nmatch == -2)
450 {
451 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
452 {
453 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
454 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
455 * checks.
456 */
457 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
458 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
459 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
460 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
461 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
462 /* Should never happen */
463 return NID_undef;
464 }
465 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
466 nmatch = 0;
467 }
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
469 &supp, &supplen);
470 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
471 &pref, &preflen);
472 preflen /= 2;
473 supplen /= 2;
474 k = 0;
475 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
476 {
477 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
478 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
479 {
480 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
481 {
482 if (nmatch == k)
483 {
484 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
485 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
486 }
487 k++;
488 }
489 }
490 }
491 if (nmatch == -1)
492 return k;
493 return 0;
494 }
495
496 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
497 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
498 {
499 unsigned char *clist, *p;
500 size_t i;
501 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
502 * while curve ids < 32
503 */
504 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
505 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
506 if (!clist)
507 return 0;
508 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
509 {
510 unsigned long idmask;
511 int id;
512 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
513 idmask = 1L << id;
514 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
515 {
516 OPENSSL_free(clist);
517 return 0;
518 }
519 dup_list |= idmask;
520 s2n(id, p);
521 }
522 if (*pext)
523 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
524 *pext = clist;
525 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
526 return 1;
527 }
528
529 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
530
531 typedef struct
532 {
533 size_t nidcnt;
534 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
535 } nid_cb_st;
536
537 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
538 {
539 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
540 size_t i;
541 int nid;
542 char etmp[20];
543 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
544 return 0;
545 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
546 return 0;
547 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
548 etmp[len] = 0;
549 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
550 if (nid == NID_undef)
551 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
552 if (nid == NID_undef)
553 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
554 if (nid == NID_undef)
555 return 0;
556 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
557 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
558 return 0;
559 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
560 return 1;
561 }
562 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
563 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
564 const char *str)
565 {
566 nid_cb_st ncb;
567 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
568 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
569 return 0;
570 if (pext == NULL)
571 return 1;
572 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
573 }
574 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
575 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
576 EC_KEY *ec)
577 {
578 int is_prime, id;
579 const EC_GROUP *grp;
580 const EC_POINT *pt;
581 const EC_METHOD *meth;
582 if (!ec)
583 return 0;
584 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
585 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
586 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
587 if (!grp || !pt)
588 return 0;
589 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
590 if (!meth)
591 return 0;
592 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
593 is_prime = 1;
594 else
595 is_prime = 0;
596 /* Determine curve ID */
597 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
598 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
599 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
600 if (id)
601 {
602 curve_id[0] = 0;
603 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
604 }
605 else
606 {
607 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
608 if (is_prime)
609 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
610 else
611 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
612 }
613 if (comp_id)
614 {
615 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
616 {
617 if (is_prime)
618 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
619 else
620 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
621 }
622 else
623 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
624 }
625 return 1;
626 }
627 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
628 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
629 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
630 {
631 const unsigned char *p;
632 size_t plen, i;
633 int j;
634 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
635 * is supported (see RFC4492).
636 */
637 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
638 {
639 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
640 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
641 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
642 {
643 if (*comp_id == *p)
644 break;
645 }
646 if (i == plen)
647 return 0;
648 }
649 if (!curve_id)
650 return 1;
651 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
652 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
653 {
654 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
655 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
656 {
657 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
658 break;
659 }
660 if (i == plen)
661 return 0;
662 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
663 if (!s->server)
664 return 1;
665 }
666 return 1;
667 }
668
669 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
670 size_t *pformatslen)
671 {
672 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
673 * use default */
674 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
675 {
676 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
677 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
678 }
679 else
680 {
681 *pformats = ecformats_default;
682 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
683 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
684 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
685 else
686 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
687 }
688 }
689
690 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
691 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
692 */
693 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
694 {
695 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
696 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
697 int rv;
698 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
699 if (!pkey)
700 return 0;
701 /* If not EC nothing to do */
702 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
703 {
704 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
705 return 1;
706 }
707 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
708 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
709 if (!rv)
710 return 0;
711 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
712 * supported curves extension.
713 */
714 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
715 if (!rv)
716 return 0;
717 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
718 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
719 */
720 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
721 {
722 int check_md;
723 size_t i;
724 CERT *c = s->cert;
725 if (curve_id[0])
726 return 0;
727 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
728 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
729 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
730 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
731 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
732 else
733 return 0; /* Should never happen */
734 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
735 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
736 break;
737 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
738 return 0;
739 if (set_ee_md == 2)
740 {
741 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
742 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
743 else
744 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
745 }
746 }
747 return rv;
748 }
749 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
750 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
751 {
752 unsigned char curve_id[2];
753 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
754 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
755 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
756 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
757 return 1;
758 #endif
759 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
760 * no other curves permitted.
761 */
762 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
763 {
764 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
765 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
766 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
767 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
768 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
769 else
770 return 0;
771 curve_id[0] = 0;
772 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
773 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
774 return 0;
775 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
776 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
777 return 1;
778 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
779 else
780 {
781 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
782 if (!ec)
783 return 0;
784 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
785 return 0;
786 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
787 return 1;
788 return 0;
789 }
790
791 }
792 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
793 {
794 /* Need a shared curve */
795 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
796 return 1;
797 else return 0;
798 }
799 if (!ec)
800 {
801 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
802 return 1;
803 else
804 return 0;
805 }
806 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
807 return 0;
808 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
809 #if 0
810 return 1;
811 #else
812 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
813 #endif
814 }
815
816 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
817
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
819
820 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
821 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
822 */
823
824 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
825 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
826 #else
827 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
828 #endif
829
830 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
831 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
832 #else
833 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
834 #endif
835
836 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
837 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
838 #else
839 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
840 #endif
841
842 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
843 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
846
847 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
849 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
851 #endif
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
853 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
854 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
855 #endif
856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
857 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
858 #endif
859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
860 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
861 #endif
862 };
863
864 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
866 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
867 };
868
869 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
870 {
871 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
872 * preferences.
873 */
874 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
875 {
876 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
877 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
878 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
879
880 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
881 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
882 return 2;
883
884 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
885 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
886 return 2;
887 }
888
889 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
890 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
891 {
892 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
893 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
894 }
895 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
896 {
897 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
898 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
899 }
900 else
901 {
902 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
903 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
904 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
905 if (FIPS_mode())
906 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
907 else
908 #endif
909 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
910 }
911 }
912 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
913 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
914 */
915 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
916 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
917 {
918 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
919 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
920 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
921 /* Should never happen */
922 if (sigalg == -1)
923 return -1;
924 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
925 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
926 {
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
928 return 0;
929 }
930 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
931 {
932 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
933 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
934 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
935 return 0;
936 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
937 {
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
939 return 0;
940 }
941 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
942 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
943 {
944 if (curve_id[0])
945 return 0;
946 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
947 {
948 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
949 {
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
951 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
952 return 0;
953 }
954 }
955 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
956 {
957 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
958 {
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
960 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
961 return 0;
962 }
963 }
964 else
965 return 0;
966 }
967 }
968 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
969 return 0;
970
971 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
972 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
973 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
974 {
975 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
976 break;
977 }
978 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
979 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
980 {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
982 return 0;
983 }
984 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
985 if (*pmd == NULL)
986 {
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
988 return 0;
989 }
990 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
991 * wish.
992 */
993 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
994 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
995 return 1;
996 }
997 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
998 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
999 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1000 * session and not global settings.
1001 *
1002 */
1003 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1004 {
1005 CERT *c = s->cert;
1006 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1007 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1008 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1009 c->mask_a = 0;
1010 c->mask_k = 0;
1011 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
1012 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1013 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1014 else
1015 c->mask_ssl = 0;
1016 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1017 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1018 * TLS 1.2.
1019 */
1020 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1021 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1022 {
1023 switch(sigalgs[1])
1024 {
1025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1026 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1027 have_rsa = 1;
1028 break;
1029 #endif
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1031 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1032 have_dsa = 1;
1033 break;
1034 #endif
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1036 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1037 have_ecdsa = 1;
1038 break;
1039 #endif
1040 }
1041 }
1042 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1043 * signature algorithms.
1044 */
1045 if (!have_rsa)
1046 {
1047 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1048 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1049 }
1050 if (!have_dsa)
1051 {
1052 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1053 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1054 }
1055 if (!have_ecdsa)
1056 {
1057 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1058 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1059 }
1060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1061 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1062 {
1063 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1064 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1065 }
1066 #endif
1067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1068 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1069 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1070 {
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1073 }
1074 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1075 c->valid = 1;
1076 }
1077
1078 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1079 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1080 {
1081 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1082 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1083
1084 if (a > b)
1085 return 1;
1086 else if (a < b)
1087 return -1;
1088 return 0;
1089 }
1090
1091 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1092 {
1093 int extdatalen=0;
1094 unsigned char *ret = p;
1095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1096 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1097 int using_ecc = 0;
1098 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1099 {
1100 int i;
1101 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1102 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1103
1104 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1105 {
1106 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1107
1108 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1109 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1110 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1111 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1112 {
1113 using_ecc = 1;
1114 break;
1115 }
1116 }
1117 }
1118 #endif
1119
1120 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1121 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1122 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1123 return p;
1124
1125 ret+=2;
1126
1127 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1128
1129 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1130 {
1131 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1132 unsigned long size_str;
1133 long lenmax;
1134
1135 /* check for enough space.
1136 4 for the servername type and entension length
1137 2 for servernamelist length
1138 1 for the hostname type
1139 2 for hostname length
1140 + hostname length
1141 */
1142
1143 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1144 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1145 return NULL;
1146
1147 /* extension type and length */
1148 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1149 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1150
1151 /* length of servername list */
1152 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1153
1154 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1155 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1156 s2n(size_str,ret);
1157 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1158 ret+=size_str;
1159 }
1160
1161 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1162 if (s->renegotiate)
1163 {
1164 int el;
1165
1166 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1167 {
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 return NULL;
1170 }
1171
1172 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1173
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1175 s2n(el,ret);
1176
1177 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1178 {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1180 return NULL;
1181 }
1182
1183 ret += el;
1184 }
1185
1186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1187 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1188 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1189 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1190
1191 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1192 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1193 {
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 return NULL;
1196 }
1197
1198 /* check for enough space.
1199 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1200 1 for the srp user identity
1201 + srp user identity length
1202 */
1203 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1204
1205 /* fill in the extension */
1206 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1207 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1208 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1209 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1210 ret+=login_len;
1211 }
1212 #endif
1213
1214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1215 if (using_ecc)
1216 {
1217 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1218 long lenmax;
1219 const unsigned char *plist;
1220 size_t plistlen;
1221
1222 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1223
1224 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1225 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > 255)
1227 {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 return NULL;
1230 }
1231
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1233 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1234 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1235 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1236 ret+=plistlen;
1237
1238 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1239 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1240 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1241
1242 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1243 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > 65532)
1245 {
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 return NULL;
1248 }
1249
1250 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1251 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1252
1253 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1254 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1255 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1256 * resolves this to two bytes.
1257 */
1258 s2n(plistlen, ret);
1259 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1260 ret+=plistlen;
1261 }
1262 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1263
1264 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1265 {
1266 int ticklen;
1267 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1268 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1269 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1270 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1271 {
1272 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1273 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1274 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1275 return NULL;
1276 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1277 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1278 ticklen);
1279 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1280 }
1281 else
1282 ticklen = 0;
1283 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1284 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1285 goto skip_ext;
1286 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1287 * rest for ticket
1288 */
1289 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1290 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1291 s2n(ticklen,ret);
1292 if (ticklen)
1293 {
1294 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1295 ret += ticklen;
1296 }
1297 }
1298 skip_ext:
1299
1300 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1301 {
1302 size_t salglen;
1303 const unsigned char *salg;
1304 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1305 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1306 return NULL;
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1308 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1309 s2n(salglen, ret);
1310 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1311 ret += salglen;
1312 }
1313
1314 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1315 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1316 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1317 {
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1319
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1321 return NULL;
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1323 return NULL;
1324
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1326 s2n(col + 2, ret);
1327 s2n(col, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1329 ret += col;
1330 }
1331 #endif
1332
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1334 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1335 {
1336 int i;
1337 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1338 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1339
1340 idlen = 0;
1341 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 {
1343 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1344 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1345 if (itmp <= 0)
1346 return NULL;
1347 idlen += itmp + 2;
1348 }
1349
1350 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 {
1352 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1353 if (extlen < 0)
1354 return NULL;
1355 }
1356 else
1357 extlen = 0;
1358
1359 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1360 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1361 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 return NULL;
1363 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1364 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 s2n(idlen, ret);
1366 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 {
1368 /* save position of id len */
1369 unsigned char *q = ret;
1370 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1371 /* skip over id len */
1372 ret += 2;
1373 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1374 /* write id len */
1375 s2n(itmp, q);
1376 }
1377 s2n(extlen, ret);
1378 if (extlen > 0)
1379 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1380 }
1381
1382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1383 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1385 s2n(1,ret);
1386 /* Set mode:
1387 * 1: peer may send requests
1388 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 */
1390 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1391 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 else
1393 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1394 #endif
1395
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1397 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 {
1399 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1400 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1401 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1404 s2n(0,ret);
1405 }
1406 #endif
1407
1408 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1409 {
1410 int el;
1411
1412 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1413
1414 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1415
1416 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1417 s2n(el,ret);
1418
1419 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1420 {
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 return NULL;
1423 }
1424 ret += el;
1425 }
1426
1427 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1428 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1429 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1430 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1431 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1432 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1433 {
1434 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1435 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1436
1437 if (limit < ret + 6)
1438 return NULL;
1439
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1441 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1442 s2n(ext_len, ret);
1443 *(ret++) = list_len;
1444 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1445 }
1446
1447 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1448 return p;
1449
1450 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1451 return ret;
1452 }
1453
1454 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1455 {
1456 int extdatalen=0;
1457 unsigned char *ret = p;
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1459 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1460 #endif
1461 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1462 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1463 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1464 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1465
1466 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1467 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1468 return p;
1469
1470 ret+=2;
1471 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1472
1473 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1474 {
1475 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1476
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1478 s2n(0,ret);
1479 }
1480
1481 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1482 {
1483 int el;
1484
1485 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1486 {
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1488 return NULL;
1489 }
1490
1491 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1492
1493 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1494 s2n(el,ret);
1495
1496 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1497 {
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 return NULL;
1500 }
1501
1502 ret += el;
1503 }
1504
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1506 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1507 {
1508 const unsigned char *plist;
1509 size_t plistlen;
1510 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1511 long lenmax;
1512
1513 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1514
1515 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1516 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1517 if (plistlen > 255)
1518 {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1520 return NULL;
1521 }
1522
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1524 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1525 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1526 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1527 ret+=plistlen;
1528
1529 }
1530 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1531 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1532
1533 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1534 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1535 {
1536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1538 s2n(0,ret);
1539 }
1540
1541 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1542 {
1543 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1544 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1545 s2n(0,ret);
1546 }
1547
1548 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1549 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1550 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1551 {
1552 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1553
1554 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1555 return NULL;
1556 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1557 return NULL;
1558
1559 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1560 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1561 s2n(sol, ret);
1562 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1563 ret += sol;
1564 }
1565 #endif
1566
1567 if(s->srtp_profile)
1568 {
1569 int el;
1570
1571 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1572
1573 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1574
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1576 s2n(el,ret);
1577
1578 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1579 {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1581 return NULL;
1582 }
1583 ret+=el;
1584 }
1585
1586 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1587 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1588 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1589 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1590 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1591 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1592 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1593 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1594 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1595 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1596 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1597 ret+=36;
1598
1599 }
1600
1601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1602 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1603 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1604 {
1605 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1606 s2n(1,ret);
1607 /* Set mode:
1608 * 1: peer may send requests
1609 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1610 */
1611 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1612 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1613 else
1614 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1615
1616 }
1617 #endif
1618
1619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1620 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1621 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1622 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1623 {
1624 const unsigned char *npa;
1625 unsigned int npalen;
1626 int r;
1627
1628 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1629 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1630 {
1631 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1632 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1633 s2n(npalen,ret);
1634 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1635 ret += npalen;
1636 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1637 }
1638 }
1639 #endif
1640
1641 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1642 * to it. */
1643 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1644 {
1645 size_t authz_length;
1646 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1647 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1648 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1649 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1650 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1651 size_t i;
1652 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1653
1654 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1655 * uint8_t authz_type
1656 * uint16_t length
1657 * uint8_t data[length]
1658 *
1659 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1660 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1661 {
1662 unsigned short length;
1663 unsigned char type;
1664
1665 type = *(authz++);
1666 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1667 type,
1668 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1669 authz_count++;
1670
1671 n2s(authz, length);
1672 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1673 i += 2;
1674 authz += length;
1675 i += length;
1676 }
1677
1678 if (authz_count)
1679 {
1680 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1681 * 2 bytes for extension type
1682 * 2 bytes for extension length
1683 * 1 byte for the list length
1684 * n bytes for the list */
1685 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1686
1687 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1689 s2n(ext_len, ret);
1690 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1691 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1692 }
1693
1694 authz = orig_authz;
1695 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1696 {
1697 unsigned short length;
1698 unsigned char type;
1699
1700 authz_count++;
1701 type = *(authz++);
1702 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1703 type,
1704 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1705 *(ret++) = type;
1706 n2s(authz, length);
1707 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1708 i += 2;
1709 authz += length;
1710 i += length;
1711 }
1712 }
1713
1714 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1715 return p;
1716
1717 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1718 return ret;
1719 }
1720
1721 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1722 {
1723 unsigned short type;
1724 unsigned short size;
1725 unsigned short len;
1726 unsigned char *data = *p;
1727 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1728 size_t i;
1729
1730 s->servername_done = 0;
1731 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1733 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1734 #endif
1735
1736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1737 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1738 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1739 #endif
1740 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1741 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1742 {
1743 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1744 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1745 }
1746 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1747 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1748 {
1749 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1750 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1751 }
1752 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1753 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1754 {
1755 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1756 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1757 }
1758
1759 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1760 goto ri_check;
1761 n2s(data,len);
1762
1763 if (data > (d+n-len))
1764 goto ri_check;
1765
1766 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1767 {
1768 n2s(data,type);
1769 n2s(data,size);
1770
1771 if (data+size > (d+n))
1772 goto ri_check;
1773 #if 0
1774 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1775 #endif
1776 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1777 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1778 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1779 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1780
1781 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1782 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1783 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1784 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1785 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1786 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1787 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1788 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1789 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1790 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1791 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1792 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1793 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1794 the value of the Host: field.
1795 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1796 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1797 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1798 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1799
1800 */
1801
1802 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1803 {
1804 unsigned char *sdata;
1805 int servname_type;
1806 int dsize;
1807
1808 if (size < 2)
1809 {
1810 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1811 return 0;
1812 }
1813 n2s(data,dsize);
1814 size -= 2;
1815 if (dsize > size )
1816 {
1817 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1818 return 0;
1819 }
1820
1821 sdata = data;
1822 while (dsize > 3)
1823 {
1824 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1825 n2s(sdata,len);
1826 dsize -= 3;
1827
1828 if (len > dsize)
1829 {
1830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1831 return 0;
1832 }
1833 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1834 switch (servname_type)
1835 {
1836 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1837 if (!s->hit)
1838 {
1839 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1840 {
1841 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1842 return 0;
1843 }
1844 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1845 {
1846 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1847 return 0;
1848 }
1849 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1850 {
1851 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1852 return 0;
1853 }
1854 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1855 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1856 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1857 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1858 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1859 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1860 return 0;
1861 }
1862 s->servername_done = 1;
1863
1864 }
1865 else
1866 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1867 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1868 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1869
1870 break;
1871
1872 default:
1873 break;
1874 }
1875
1876 dsize -= len;
1877 }
1878 if (dsize != 0)
1879 {
1880 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1881 return 0;
1882 }
1883
1884 }
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1886 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1887 {
1888 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1889 {
1890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1891 return 0;
1892 }
1893 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1894 {
1895 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1896 return 0;
1897 }
1898 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1899 return -1;
1900 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1901 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1902
1903 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1904 {
1905 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1906 return 0;
1907 }
1908 }
1909 #endif
1910
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1912 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1913 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1914 {
1915 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1916 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1917
1918 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1919 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1920 {
1921 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1922 return 0;
1923 }
1924 if (!s->hit)
1925 {
1926 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1927 {
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1929 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1930 }
1931 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1932 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1933 {
1934 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1935 return 0;
1936 }
1937 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1938 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1939 }
1940 #if 0
1941 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1942 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1943 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1944 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1945 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1946 #endif
1947 }
1948 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1949 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1950 {
1951 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1952 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1953 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1954
1955 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1956 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1957 {
1958 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1959 return 0;
1960 }
1961 if (!s->hit)
1962 {
1963 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1964 {
1965 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1966 return 0;
1967 }
1968 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1969 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1970 {
1971 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1972 return 0;
1973 }
1974 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1975 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1976 }
1977 #if 0
1978 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1979 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1980 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1981 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1982 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1983 #endif
1984 }
1985 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1986 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1987 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1988 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1989 {
1990 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1991
1992 if (size < 2)
1993 {
1994 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1995 return 0;
1996 }
1997 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1998 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1999 {
2000 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2001 return 0;
2002 }
2003
2004 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2005 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2006 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2007 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2008 else
2009 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2010 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2011 {
2012 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2013 return 0;
2014 }
2015 }
2016 #endif
2017 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2018 {
2019 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2020 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2021 {
2022 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2023 return 0;
2024 }
2025 }
2026 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2027 {
2028 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2029 return 0;
2030 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2031 }
2032 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2033 {
2034 int dsize;
2035 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2036 {
2037 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2038 return 0;
2039 }
2040 n2s(data,dsize);
2041 size -= 2;
2042 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2043 {
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2045 return 0;
2046 }
2047 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2048 {
2049 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2050 return 0;
2051 }
2052 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2053 * error.
2054 */
2055 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2056 {
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2058 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2059 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2060 return 0;
2061 }
2062 }
2063 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2064 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2065 {
2066
2067 if (size < 5)
2068 {
2069 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2070 return 0;
2071 }
2072
2073 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2074 size--;
2075 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2076 {
2077 const unsigned char *sdata;
2078 int dsize;
2079 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2080 n2s(data,dsize);
2081 size -= 2;
2082 if (dsize > size )
2083 {
2084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2085 return 0;
2086 }
2087 while (dsize > 0)
2088 {
2089 OCSP_RESPID *id;
2090 int idsize;
2091 if (dsize < 4)
2092 {
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2094 return 0;
2095 }
2096 n2s(data, idsize);
2097 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2098 size -= 2 + idsize;
2099 if (dsize < 0)
2100 {
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 return 0;
2103 }
2104 sdata = data;
2105 data += idsize;
2106 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2107 &sdata, idsize);
2108 if (!id)
2109 {
2110 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2111 return 0;
2112 }
2113 if (data != sdata)
2114 {
2115 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 return 0;
2118 }
2119 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2120 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2121 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2122 {
2123 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2124 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2125 return 0;
2126 }
2127 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2128 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2129 {
2130 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2131 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2132 return 0;
2133 }
2134 }
2135
2136 /* Read in request_extensions */
2137 if (size < 2)
2138 {
2139 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 return 0;
2141 }
2142 n2s(data,dsize);
2143 size -= 2;
2144 if (dsize != size)
2145 {
2146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 return 0;
2148 }
2149 sdata = data;
2150 if (dsize > 0)
2151 {
2152 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2153 {
2154 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2155 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2156 }
2157
2158 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2159 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2160 &sdata, dsize);
2161 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2162 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2163 {
2164 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2165 return 0;
2166 }
2167 }
2168 }
2169 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2170 * so ignore it.
2171 */
2172 else
2173 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2174 }
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2176 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2177 {
2178 switch(data[0])
2179 {
2180 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2181 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2182 break;
2183 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2184 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2185 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2186 break;
2187 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2188 return 0;
2189 }
2190 }
2191 #endif
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2193 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2194 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2195 {
2196 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2197 * renegotiation.
2198 *
2199 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2200 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2201 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2202 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2203 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2204 * anything like that, but this might change).
2205
2206 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2207 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2208 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2209 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2210 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2211 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2212 }
2213 #endif
2214
2215 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2216 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2217 {
2218 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2219 al))
2220 return 0;
2221 }
2222
2223 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2224 {
2225 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2226 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2227
2228 if (size == 0)
2229 {
2230 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2231 return 0;
2232 }
2233
2234 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2235
2236 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2237 {
2238 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 return 0;
2240 }
2241
2242 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2243 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2244 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2245 if (!s->hit)
2246 {
2247 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2248 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2249 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2250 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2251 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2252 {
2253 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2254 return 0;
2255 }
2256
2257 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2258 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2259 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2260 sdata,
2261 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2262
2263 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2264 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2265 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2266 1 /* element size */,
2267 byte_compare);
2268
2269 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2270 {
2271 if (i > 0 &&
2272 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2273 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2274 {
2275 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2276 return 0;
2277 }
2278 }
2279 }
2280 }
2281
2282 data+=size;
2283 }
2284
2285 *p = data;
2286
2287 ri_check:
2288
2289 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2290
2291 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2292 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2293 {
2294 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2296 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2297 return 0;
2298 }
2299 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2300 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2301 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2302
2303 return 1;
2304 }
2305
2306 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2307 {
2308 int al = -1;
2309 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2310 {
2311 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2312 return 0;
2313 }
2314
2315 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2316 {
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2318 return 0;
2319 }
2320 return 1;
2321 }
2322
2323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2324 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2325 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2326 * the length of the block. */
2327 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2328 {
2329 unsigned int off = 0;
2330
2331 while (off < len)
2332 {
2333 if (d[off] == 0)
2334 return 0;
2335 off += d[off];
2336 off++;
2337 }
2338
2339 return off == len;
2340 }
2341 #endif
2342
2343 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2344 {
2345 unsigned short length;
2346 unsigned short type;
2347 unsigned short size;
2348 unsigned char *data = *p;
2349 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2350 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2351
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2353 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2354 #endif
2355
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2357 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2358 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2359 #endif
2360
2361 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2362 goto ri_check;
2363
2364 n2s(data,length);
2365 if (data+length != d+n)
2366 {
2367 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 return 0;
2369 }
2370
2371 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2372 {
2373 n2s(data,type);
2374 n2s(data,size);
2375
2376 if (data+size > (d+n))
2377 goto ri_check;
2378
2379 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2380 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2381 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2382
2383 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2384 {
2385 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2386 {
2387 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2388 return 0;
2389 }
2390 tlsext_servername = 1;
2391 }
2392
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2394 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2395 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2396 {
2397 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2398 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2399
2400 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2401 {
2402 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2403 return 0;
2404 }
2405 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2406 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2407 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2408 {
2409 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2410 return 0;
2411 }
2412 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2413 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2414 #if 0
2415 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2416 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2417 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2418 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2419 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2420 #endif
2421 }
2422 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2423
2424 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2425 {
2426 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2427 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2428 {
2429 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2430 return 0;
2431 }
2432 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2433 || (size > 0))
2434 {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2436 return 0;
2437 }
2438 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2439 }
2440 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2441 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2442 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2443 {
2444 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2445
2446 if (size < 2)
2447 {
2448 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2449 return 0;
2450 }
2451 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2452 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2453 {
2454 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2455 return 0;
2456 }
2457
2458 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2459 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2460 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2461 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2462 else
2463 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2464
2465 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2466 {
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2468 return 0;
2469 }
2470 }
2471 #endif
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2473 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2474 {
2475 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2476 * a status request message.
2477 */
2478 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2479 {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2481 return 0;
2482 }
2483 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2484 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2485 }
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2487 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2488 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2489 {
2490 unsigned char *selected;
2491 unsigned char selected_len;
2492
2493 /* We must have requested it. */
2494 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2495 {
2496 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2497 return 0;
2498 }
2499 /* The data must be valid */
2500 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2501 {
2502 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2503 return 0;
2504 }
2505 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2506 {
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2508 return 0;
2509 }
2510 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2511 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2512 {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2514 return 0;
2515 }
2516 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2517 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2518 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2519 }
2520 #endif
2521 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2522 {
2523 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2524 return 0;
2525 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2526 }
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2528 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2529 {
2530 switch(data[0])
2531 {
2532 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2533 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2534 break;
2535 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2536 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2537 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2538 break;
2539 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2540 return 0;
2541 }
2542 }
2543 #endif
2544 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2545 {
2546 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2547 al))
2548 return 0;
2549 }
2550
2551 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2552 {
2553 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2554 * an authz hello extension if the client
2555 * didn't request a proof. */
2556 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2557 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2558
2559 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2560 {
2561 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2562 return 0;
2563 }
2564
2565 if (!size)
2566 {
2567 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 return 0;
2569 }
2570
2571 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2572 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2573 {
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 return 0;
2576 }
2577
2578 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2579 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2580 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2581 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2582 {
2583 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2584 return 0;
2585 }
2586
2587 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2588 }
2589
2590 data += size;
2591 }
2592
2593 if (data != d+n)
2594 {
2595 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2596 return 0;
2597 }
2598
2599 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2600 {
2601 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2602 {
2603 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2604 {
2605 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2606 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2607 {
2608 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2609 return 0;
2610 }
2611 }
2612 else
2613 {
2614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2615 return 0;
2616 }
2617 }
2618 }
2619
2620 *p = data;
2621
2622 ri_check:
2623
2624 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2625 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2626 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2627 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2628 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2629 * absence on initial connect only.
2630 */
2631 if (!renegotiate_seen
2632 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2633 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2634 {
2635 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2637 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2638 return 0;
2639 }
2640
2641 return 1;
2642 }
2643
2644
2645 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2646 {
2647
2648 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2649 {
2650 int r = 1;
2651
2652 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2653 {
2654 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2655 if (!r)
2656 return -1;
2657 }
2658
2659 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2660 {
2661 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2662 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2663
2664 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2665 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2666 else
2667 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2668 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2669 {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2671 return -1;
2672 }
2673 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2674 }
2675
2676 if (r == 2)
2677 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2678 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2679 }
2680 #endif
2681
2682 return 1;
2683 }
2684
2685 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2686 {
2687 return 1;
2688 }
2689
2690 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2691 {
2692 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2693 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2694
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2696 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2697 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2698 */
2699 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2700 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2701 */
2702 #endif
2703
2704 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2705 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2706 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2707 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2708
2709 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2710 {
2711 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2712 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2713 * so this has to happen here in
2714 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2715
2716 int r = 1;
2717
2718 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2719 {
2720 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2721 if (!r)
2722 {
2723 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2724 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2725 goto err;
2726 }
2727 }
2728
2729 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2730 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2731 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2732
2733 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2734 {
2735 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2736 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2737 {
2738 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2739 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2740
2741 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2742 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2743 else
2744 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2745 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2746 {
2747 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2748 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2749 goto err;
2750 }
2751 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2752 }
2753 }
2754
2755 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2756 {
2757 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2758 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2759 * abort the handshake.
2760 */
2761 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2762 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2763 }
2764 }
2765
2766 err:
2767 #endif
2768 switch (ret)
2769 {
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2771 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2772 return -1;
2773
2774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2775 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2776 return 1;
2777
2778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2779 s->servername_done=0;
2780 default:
2781 return 1;
2782 }
2783 }
2784
2785 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2786 {
2787 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2788 int al;
2789
2790 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2791 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2792 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2793 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2794 */
2795 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2796 {
2797 int r;
2798 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2799 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2800 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2801 if (certpkey == NULL)
2802 {
2803 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2804 return 1;
2805 }
2806 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2807 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2808 */
2809 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2810 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2811 switch (r)
2812 {
2813 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2814 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2815 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2816 break;
2817 /* status request response should be sent */
2818 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2819 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2820 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2821 else
2822 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2823 break;
2824 /* something bad happened */
2825 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2826 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2827 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2828 goto err;
2829 }
2830 }
2831 else
2832 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2833
2834 err:
2835 switch (ret)
2836 {
2837 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2838 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2839 return -1;
2840
2841 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2842 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2843 return 1;
2844
2845 default:
2846 return 1;
2847 }
2848 }
2849
2850 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2851 {
2852 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2853 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2854
2855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2856 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2857 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2858 * it must contain uncompressed.
2859 */
2860 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2861 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2862 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2863 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2864 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2865 {
2866 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2867 size_t i;
2868 unsigned char *list;
2869 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2870 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2871 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2872 {
2873 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2874 {
2875 found_uncompressed = 1;
2876 break;
2877 }
2878 }
2879 if (!found_uncompressed)
2880 {
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2882 return -1;
2883 }
2884 }
2885 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2886 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2887
2888 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2889 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2890 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2891 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2892
2893 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2894 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2895 {
2896 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2897 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2898
2899 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2900 {
2901 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2902 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2903 }
2904
2905 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2906 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2907 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2908 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2909 {
2910 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2911 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2912 }
2913 }
2914 #endif
2915
2916 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2917 * tell the callback
2918 */
2919 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2920 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2921 {
2922 int r;
2923 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2924 * there is no response.
2925 */
2926 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2927 {
2928 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2929 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2930 }
2931 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2932 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2933 if (r == 0)
2934 {
2935 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2936 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2937 }
2938 if (r < 0)
2939 {
2940 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2942 }
2943 }
2944
2945 switch (ret)
2946 {
2947 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2948 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2949 return -1;
2950
2951 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2952 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2953 return 1;
2954
2955 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2956 s->servername_done=0;
2957 default:
2958 return 1;
2959 }
2960 }
2961
2962 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2963 {
2964 int al = -1;
2965 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2966 return 1;
2967 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2968 {
2969 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2970 return 0;
2971 }
2972
2973 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2974 {
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2976 return 0;
2977 }
2978 return 1;
2979 }
2980
2981 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2982 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2983 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2984 *
2985 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2986 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2987 * extension, if any.
2988 * len: the length of the session ID.
2989 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2990 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2991 * point to the resulting session.
2992 *
2993 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2994 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2995 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2996 *
2997 * Returns:
2998 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2999 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3000 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3001 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3002 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3003 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3004 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3005 *
3006 * Side effects:
3007 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3008 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3009 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3010 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3011 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3012 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3013 */
3014 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3015 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3016 {
3017 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3018 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3019 unsigned short i;
3020
3021 *ret = NULL;
3022 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3023
3024 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3025 * to permit stateful resumption.
3026 */
3027 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3028 return 0;
3029 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3030 return 0;
3031 if (p >= limit)
3032 return -1;
3033 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3034 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3035 {
3036 i = *(p++);
3037 p+= i;
3038 if (p >= limit)
3039 return -1;
3040 }
3041 /* Skip past cipher list */
3042 n2s(p, i);
3043 p+= i;
3044 if (p >= limit)
3045 return -1;
3046 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3047 i = *(p++);
3048 p += i;
3049 if (p > limit)
3050 return -1;
3051 /* Now at start of extensions */
3052 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3053 return 0;
3054 n2s(p, i);
3055 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3056 {
3057 unsigned short type, size;
3058 n2s(p, type);
3059 n2s(p, size);
3060 if (p + size > limit)
3061 return 0;
3062 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3063 {
3064 int r;
3065 if (size == 0)
3066 {
3067 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3068 * currently have one. */
3069 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3070 return 1;
3071 }
3072 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3073 {
3074 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3075 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3076 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3077 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3078 * calculate the master secret later. */
3079 return 2;
3080 }
3081 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3082 switch (r)
3083 {
3084 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3085 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3086 return 2;
3087 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3088 return r;
3089 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3090 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3091 return 3;
3092 default: /* fatal error */
3093 return -1;
3094 }
3095 }
3096 p += size;
3097 }
3098 return 0;
3099 }
3100
3101 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3102 *
3103 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3104 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3105 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3106 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3107 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3108 * point to the resulting session.
3109 *
3110 * Returns:
3111 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3112 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3113 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3114 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3115 */
3116 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3117 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3118 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3119 {
3120 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3121 unsigned char *sdec;
3122 const unsigned char *p;
3123 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3124 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3125 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3126 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3127 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3128 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3129 if (eticklen < 48)
3130 return 2;
3131 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3132 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3133 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3134 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3135 {
3136 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3137 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3138 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
3139 if (rv < 0)
3140 return -1;
3141 if (rv == 0)
3142 return 2;
3143 if (rv == 2)
3144 renew_ticket = 1;
3145 }
3146 else
3147 {
3148 /* Check key name matches */
3149 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3150 return 2;
3151 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3152 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3153 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3154 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3155 }
3156 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3157 * integrity checks on ticket.
3158 */
3159 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3160 if (mlen < 0)
3161 {
3162 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3163 return -1;
3164 }
3165 eticklen -= mlen;
3166 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3167 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3168 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3169 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3170 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3171 return 2;
3172 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3173 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3174 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3175 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3176 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3177 if (!sdec)
3178 {
3179 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3180 return -1;
3181 }
3182 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3183 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3184 return 2;
3185 slen += mlen;
3186 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3187 p = sdec;
3188
3189 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3190 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
3191 if (sess)
3192 {
3193 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3194 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3195 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3196 * as required by standard.
3197 */
3198 if (sesslen)
3199 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3200 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3201 *psess = sess;
3202 if (renew_ticket)
3203 return 4;
3204 else
3205 return 3;
3206 }
3207 ERR_clear_error();
3208 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3209 * ticket. */
3210 return 2;
3211 }
3212
3213 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3214
3215 typedef struct
3216 {
3217 int nid;
3218 int id;
3219 } tls12_lookup;
3220
3221 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3222 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3223 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3224 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3225 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3226 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3227 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3228 };
3229
3230 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3231 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3232 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3233 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3234 };
3235
3236 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3237 {
3238 size_t i;
3239 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3240 {
3241 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3242 return table[i].id;
3243 }
3244 return -1;
3245 }
3246
3247 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3248 {
3249 size_t i;
3250 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3251 {
3252 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3253 return table[i].nid;
3254 }
3255 return NID_undef;
3256 }
3257
3258 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3259 {
3260 int sig_id, md_id;
3261 if (!md)
3262 return 0;
3263 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3264 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3265 if (md_id == -1)
3266 return 0;
3267 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3268 if (sig_id == -1)
3269 return 0;
3270 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3271 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3272 return 1;
3273 }
3274
3275 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3276 {
3277 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3278 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3279 }
3280
3281 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3282 {
3283 switch(hash_alg)
3284 {
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3286 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3287 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
3288 if (FIPS_mode())
3289 return NULL;
3290 #endif
3291 return EVP_md5();
3292 #endif
3293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3294 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3295 return EVP_sha1();
3296 #endif
3297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3298 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3299 return EVP_sha224();
3300
3301 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3302 return EVP_sha256();
3303 #endif
3304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3305 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3306 return EVP_sha384();
3307
3308 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3309 return EVP_sha512();
3310 #endif
3311 default:
3312 return NULL;
3313
3314 }
3315 }
3316
3317 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3318 {
3319 switch(sig_alg)
3320 {
3321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3322 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3323 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3324 #endif
3325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3326 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3327 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3328 #endif
3329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3330 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3331 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3332 #endif
3333 }
3334 return -1;
3335 }
3336
3337 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3338 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3339 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3340 {
3341 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3342 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3343 return;
3344 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3345 {
3346 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3347 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3348 if (phash_nid)
3349 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3350 }
3351 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3352 {
3353 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3354 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3355 if (psign_nid)
3356 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3357 }
3358 if (psignhash_nid)
3359 {
3360 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3361 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3362 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3363 else
3364 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3365 }
3366 }
3367 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3368 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3369 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3370 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3371 {
3372 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3373 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3374 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3375 {
3376 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3377 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3378 continue;
3379 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3380 continue;
3381 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3382 {
3383 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3384 {
3385 nmatch++;
3386 if (shsig)
3387 {
3388 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3389 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3390 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3391 &shsig->sign_nid,
3392 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3393 ptmp);
3394 shsig++;
3395 }
3396 break;
3397 }
3398 }
3399 }
3400 return nmatch;
3401 }
3402
3403 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3404 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3405 {
3406 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3407 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3408 size_t nmatch;
3409 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3410 CERT *c = s->cert;
3411 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3412 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3413 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3414 {
3415 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3416 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3417 }
3418 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3419 {
3420 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3421 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3422 }
3423 else
3424 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3425 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3426 {
3427 pref = conf;
3428 preflen = conflen;
3429 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3430 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3431 }
3432 else
3433 {
3434 allow = conf;
3435 allowlen = conflen;
3436 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3437 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3438 }
3439 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3440 if (!nmatch)
3441 return 1;
3442 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3443 if (!salgs)
3444 return 0;
3445 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3446 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3447 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3448 return 1;
3449 }
3450
3451
3452 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3453
3454 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3455 {
3456 int idx;
3457 size_t i;
3458 const EVP_MD *md;
3459 CERT *c = s->cert;
3460 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3461 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3462 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3463 return 1;
3464 /* Should never happen */
3465 if (!c)
3466 return 0;
3467
3468 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3469 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3470 return 0;
3471 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3472 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3473
3474 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3475
3476 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3477 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3478 {
3479 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3480 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3481 */
3482 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3483 if (s->server)
3484 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3485 else
3486 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3487 if (sigs)
3488 {
3489 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3490 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3491 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3492 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3493 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3494 {
3495 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3496 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3497 }
3498 }
3499 }
3500 #endif
3501
3502 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3503 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3504 {
3505 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3506 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3507 {
3508 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3509 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3510 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3511 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3512 {
3513 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3514 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3515 }
3516 }
3517
3518 }
3519 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3520 * use the certificate for signing.
3521 */
3522 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3523 {
3524 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3525 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3526 */
3527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3528 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3529 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3530 #endif
3531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3532 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3533 {
3534 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3535 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3536 }
3537 #endif
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3539 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3540 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3541 #endif
3542 }
3543 return 1;
3544 }
3545
3546
3547 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3548 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3549 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3550 {
3551 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3552 if (psig == NULL)
3553 return 0;
3554 if (idx >= 0)
3555 {
3556 idx <<= 1;
3557 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3558 return 0;
3559 psig += idx;
3560 if (rhash)
3561 *rhash = psig[0];
3562 if (rsig)
3563 *rsig = psig[1];
3564 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3565 }
3566 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3567 }
3568
3569 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3570 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3571 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3572 {
3573 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3574 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3575 return 0;
3576 shsigalgs += idx;
3577 if (phash)
3578 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3579 if (psign)
3580 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3581 if (psignhash)
3582 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3583 if (rsig)
3584 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3585 if (rhash)
3586 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3587 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3588 }
3589
3590
3591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3592 int
3593 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3594 {
3595 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3596 unsigned short hbtype;
3597 unsigned int payload;
3598 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3599
3600 /* Read type and payload length first */
3601 hbtype = *p++;
3602 n2s(p, payload);
3603 pl = p;
3604
3605 if (s->msg_callback)
3606 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3607 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3608 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3609
3610 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3611 {
3612 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3613 int r;
3614
3615 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3616 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3617 * payload, plus padding
3618 */
3619 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3620 bp = buffer;
3621
3622 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3623 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3624 s2n(payload, bp);
3625 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3626 bp += payload;
3627 /* Random padding */
3628 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3629
3630 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3631
3632 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3633 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3634 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3635 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3636
3637 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3638
3639 if (r < 0)
3640 return r;
3641 }
3642 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3643 {
3644 unsigned int seq;
3645
3646 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3647 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3648 * sequence number */
3649 n2s(pl, seq);
3650
3651 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3652 {
3653 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
3654 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3655 }
3656 }
3657
3658 return 0;
3659 }
3660
3661 int
3662 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3663 {
3664 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3665 int ret;
3666 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3667 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3668
3669 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3670 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3671 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3672 {
3673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3674 return -1;
3675 }
3676
3677 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3678 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3679 {
3680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3681 return -1;
3682 }
3683
3684 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3685 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3686 {
3687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3688 return -1;
3689 }
3690
3691 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3692 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3693 */
3694 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3695
3696 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3697 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3698 * some random stuff.
3699 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3700 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3701 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3702 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3703 * - Padding
3704 */
3705 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3706 p = buf;
3707 /* Message Type */
3708 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3709 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3710 s2n(payload, p);
3711 /* Sequence number */
3712 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3713 /* 16 random bytes */
3714 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3715 p += 16;
3716 /* Random padding */
3717 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3718
3719 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3720 if (ret >= 0)
3721 {
3722 if (s->msg_callback)
3723 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3724 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3725 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3726
3727 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3728 }
3729
3730 OPENSSL_free(buf);
3731
3732 return ret;
3733 }
3734 #endif
3735
3736 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3737
3738 typedef struct
3739 {
3740 size_t sigalgcnt;
3741 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3742 } sig_cb_st;
3743
3744 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3745 {
3746 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3747 size_t i;
3748 char etmp[20], *p;
3749 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3750 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3751 return 0;
3752 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3753 return 0;
3754 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3755 etmp[len] = 0;
3756 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3757 if (!p)
3758 return 0;
3759 *p = 0;
3760 p++;
3761 if (!*p)
3762 return 0;
3763
3764 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3765 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3766 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3767 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3768 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3769 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3770 else return 0;
3771
3772 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3773 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3774 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3775 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3776 return 0;
3777
3778 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3779 {
3780 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3781 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3782 return 0;
3783 }
3784 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3785 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3786 return 1;
3787 }
3788
3789 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3790 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3791 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3792 {
3793 sig_cb_st sig;
3794 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
3795 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3796 return 0;
3797 if (c == NULL)
3798 return 1;
3799 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3800 }
3801
3802 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3803 {
3804 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3805 int rhash, rsign;
3806 size_t i;
3807 if (salglen & 1)
3808 return 0;
3809 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3810 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3811 return 0;
3812 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3813 {
3814 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3815 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3816 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3817 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3818
3819 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3820 goto err;
3821 *sptr++ = rhash;
3822 *sptr++ = rsign;
3823 }
3824
3825 if (client)
3826 {
3827 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3828 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3829 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3830 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3831 }
3832 else
3833 {
3834 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3835 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3836 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3837 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3838 }
3839
3840 return 1;
3841
3842 err:
3843 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3844 return 0;
3845 }
3846
3847 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3848 {
3849 int sig_nid;
3850 size_t i;
3851 if (default_nid == -1)
3852 return 1;
3853 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3854 if (default_nid)
3855 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3856 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3857 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3858 return 1;
3859 return 0;
3860 }
3861 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3862 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3863 {
3864 X509_NAME *nm;
3865 int i;
3866 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3867 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3868 {
3869 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3870 return 1;
3871 }
3872 return 0;
3873 }
3874
3875 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3876 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3877 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3878 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3879 */
3880
3881 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3882
3883 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3884 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3885 /* Strict mode flags */
3886 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3887 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3888 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3889
3890 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3891 int idx)
3892 {
3893 int i;
3894 int rv = 0;
3895 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3896 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3897 CERT *c = s->cert;
3898 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3899 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3900 if (idx != -1)
3901 {
3902 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3903 if (idx == -2)
3904 {
3905 cpk = c->key;
3906 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3907 }
3908 else
3909 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3910 x = cpk->x509;
3911 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3912 chain = cpk->chain;
3913 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3914 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3915 if (!x || !pk)
3916 goto end;
3917 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3918 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3919 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3920 {
3921 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3922 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3923 return rv;
3924 }
3925 #endif
3926 }
3927 else
3928 {
3929 if (!x || !pk)
3930 goto end;
3931 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3932 if (idx == -1)
3933 goto end;
3934 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3935 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3936 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3937 else
3938 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3939 strict_mode = 1;
3940 }
3941
3942 if (suiteb_flags)
3943 {
3944 int ok;
3945 if (check_flags)
3946 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3947 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3948 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3949 {
3950 if (check_flags)
3951 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3952 else
3953 goto end;
3954 }
3955 }
3956
3957 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3958 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3959 * and strict mode.
3960 */
3961 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3962 {
3963 int default_nid;
3964 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3965 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3966 default_nid = 0;
3967 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3968 else
3969 {
3970 switch(idx)
3971 {
3972 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3973 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3974 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3975 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3976 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3977 break;
3978
3979 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3980 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3981 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3982 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3983 break;
3984
3985 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
3986 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3987 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3988 break;
3989
3990 default:
3991 default_nid = -1;
3992 break;
3993 }
3994 }
3995 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3996 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3997 * sha1.
3998 */
3999 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4000 {
4001 size_t j;
4002 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4003 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4004 {
4005 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4006 break;
4007 }
4008 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4009 {
4010 if (check_flags)
4011 goto skip_sigs;
4012 else
4013 goto end;
4014 }
4015 }
4016 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4017 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4018 {
4019 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4020 }
4021 else
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4023 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4024 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4025 {
4026 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4027 default_nid))
4028 {
4029 if (check_flags)
4030 {
4031 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4032 break;
4033 }
4034 else
4035 goto end;
4036 }
4037 }
4038 }
4039 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4040 else if(check_flags)
4041 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4042 skip_sigs:
4043 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4044 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4045 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4046 else if (!check_flags)
4047 goto end;
4048 if (!s->server)
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4050 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4051 else if (strict_mode)
4052 {
4053 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4054 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4055 {
4056 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4057 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4058 {
4059 if (check_flags)
4060 {
4061 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4062 break;
4063 }
4064 else
4065 goto end;
4066 }
4067 }
4068 }
4069 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4070 {
4071 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4072 int check_type = 0;
4073 switch (pk->type)
4074 {
4075 case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
4076 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4077 break;
4078 case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
4079 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4080 break;
4081 case EVP_PKEY_EC:
4082 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4083 break;
4084 case EVP_PKEY_DH:
4085 case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
4086 {
4087 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4088 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4089 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4090 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4091 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4092 }
4093 }
4094 if (check_type)
4095 {
4096 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4097 int ctypelen;
4098 if (c->ctypes)
4099 {
4100 ctypes = c->ctypes;
4101 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4102 }
4103 else
4104 {
4105 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4106 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4107 }
4108 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4109 {
4110 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4111 {
4112 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4113 break;
4114 }
4115 }
4116 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4117 goto end;
4118 }
4119 else
4120 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4121
4122
4123 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4124
4125 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4126 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4127
4128 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4129 {
4130 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4131 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4132 }
4133 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4134 {
4135 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4136 {
4137 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4138 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4139 {
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4141 break;
4142 }
4143 }
4144 }
4145 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4146 goto end;
4147 }
4148 else
4149 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4150
4151 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4152 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4153
4154 end:
4155
4156 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4157 {
4158 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4159 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4160 else if (cpk->digest)
4161 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4162 }
4163 else
4164 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4165
4166 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4167 * if the chain is invalid.
4168 */
4169 if (!check_flags)
4170 {
4171 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4172 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4173 else
4174 {
4175 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4176 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4177 return 0;
4178 }
4179 }
4180 return rv;
4181 }
4182
4183 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4184 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4185 {
4186 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4187 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4188 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4189 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4190 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4191 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4192 }
4193 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4194 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4195 {
4196 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4197 }
4198
4199 #endif
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