2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
34 tls1_export_keying_material
,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
37 tls_close_construct_packet
,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
51 tls1_export_keying_material
,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
54 tls_close_construct_packet
,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
68 tls1_export_keying_material
,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
72 tls_close_construct_packet
,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
79 tls13_setup_key_block
,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
86 tls13_export_keying_material
,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
89 tls_close_construct_packet
,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
112 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
114 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
123 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
124 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
126 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list
[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
168 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X448 (30) */
171 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
177 /* The default curves */
178 static const uint16_t eccurves_default
[] = {
179 29, /* X25519 (29) */
180 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
182 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
183 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
191 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id
)
193 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
194 if (group_id
< 1 || group_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
))
196 return &nid_list
[group_id
- 1];
199 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
202 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
203 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
204 return (uint16_t)(i
+ 1);
210 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
211 * the number of groups supported.
213 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
217 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
218 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
219 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
220 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
221 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
224 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
225 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
230 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
235 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
236 *pgroups
= eccurves_default
;
237 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default
);
239 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
240 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
246 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
247 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t curve
, int op
)
249 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*cinfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(curve
);
250 unsigned char ctmp
[2];
254 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
255 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
258 ctmp
[0] = curve
>> 8;
259 ctmp
[1] = curve
& 0xff;
260 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)ctmp
);
263 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
264 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
267 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
274 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
275 * if there is no match.
276 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
277 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
278 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
280 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
282 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
283 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
286 /* Can't do anything on client side */
290 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
292 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
293 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
295 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
297 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
298 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
299 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
300 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
301 /* Should never happen */
304 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
308 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
309 * otherwise peer decides.
311 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
312 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
313 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
315 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
316 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
319 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
320 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
322 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
323 || !tls_curve_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
331 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
335 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
336 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
341 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
344 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
346 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
350 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
351 unsigned long idmask
;
353 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
354 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
356 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
369 # define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
373 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
376 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
378 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
384 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
386 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
388 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
390 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
391 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
392 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
393 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
394 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
395 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
397 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
398 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
400 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
404 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
405 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
409 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
413 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
415 /* Return group id of a key */
416 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
418 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
423 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
424 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
));
427 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
428 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
432 unsigned char comp_id
;
435 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
436 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
438 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
439 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
441 /* Get required compression id */
442 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
443 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
444 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
446 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
451 int field_type
= EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
));
453 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
454 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
455 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
456 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
461 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
462 * supported (see RFC4492).
464 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
== NULL
)
467 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
468 if (s
->session
->ext
.ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
474 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
475 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
477 const uint16_t *groups
;
483 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
484 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
485 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
487 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
488 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
490 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
491 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
494 /* Should never happen */
499 if (check_own_groups
) {
500 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
501 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
502 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
506 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
509 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
513 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
514 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
517 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
518 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
519 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
520 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
524 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
527 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
531 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
533 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
534 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
535 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
537 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
538 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
540 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
542 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
547 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
548 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
550 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
554 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
557 /* If not EC nothing to do */
558 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
560 /* Check compression */
561 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
563 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
565 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
568 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
571 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
574 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
579 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
580 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
581 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
582 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
583 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
585 return 0; /* Should never happen */
586 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
587 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
596 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
598 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
600 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
601 * is compatible with the client extensions.
603 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
605 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
607 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
609 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
611 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
614 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
615 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
616 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
617 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
629 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
631 /* Default sigalg schemes */
632 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
634 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
635 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
636 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
637 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
641 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
642 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
643 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
644 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
646 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
659 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
663 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
664 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
667 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
674 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
680 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
682 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
683 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
684 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
685 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
686 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
687 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
688 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
689 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
690 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
691 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
692 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
693 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
694 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
695 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
696 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
697 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
698 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
699 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
},
700 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
701 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
702 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
704 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
705 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
706 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
707 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
708 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
709 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
710 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
711 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
712 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
713 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
714 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
715 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
716 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
717 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
718 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
719 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
720 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
721 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
722 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
723 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
724 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
725 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
726 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
727 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
728 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
729 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
730 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
731 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
732 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
733 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
734 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
735 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
736 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
738 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
739 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
740 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
741 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
742 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
743 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
744 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
745 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
746 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
747 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
748 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
749 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
750 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
751 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
752 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
755 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
756 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
757 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
758 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
759 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
760 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
761 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
762 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
763 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
766 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
769 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
770 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
771 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
772 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
773 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
778 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
779 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
781 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
782 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
783 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
784 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
785 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
786 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
787 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
788 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
789 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
790 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
793 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
794 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
797 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
799 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
801 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
806 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
807 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
812 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
813 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
816 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
826 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
828 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
829 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
830 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
832 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
833 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA
*rsa
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
839 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
841 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
847 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
848 * is fixed by the certificate type.
850 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
856 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
857 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
858 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
860 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
867 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
869 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
872 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
874 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
881 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
884 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
886 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
887 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
889 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
893 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
895 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
896 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
899 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
901 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
903 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
906 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
910 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
913 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
917 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
918 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
919 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
920 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
922 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
923 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
926 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
927 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
932 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
933 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
934 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
936 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
937 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
938 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
939 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
940 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
941 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
943 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
944 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
949 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
950 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
953 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
955 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
956 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
958 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
959 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
960 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
962 /* Should never happen */
965 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
966 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
967 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
968 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
969 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
972 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
973 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
974 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
976 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
978 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
979 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
982 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
983 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
984 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
985 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
986 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
990 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
992 /* Check point compression is permitted */
993 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
994 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
995 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
996 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1000 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1001 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1002 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
1003 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
1005 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1006 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1007 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1011 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1012 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1013 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1014 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1015 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1018 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1019 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1020 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1021 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1022 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1023 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1024 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1029 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1030 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1031 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1036 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1037 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1038 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1039 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1042 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1043 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1044 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1045 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1046 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1049 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
1050 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1051 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1056 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1057 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1059 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1060 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1061 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1062 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
1063 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1064 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1065 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1069 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1070 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1074 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1076 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1078 *pnid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1083 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1084 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1085 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1087 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1090 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1092 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1094 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1095 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1096 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1097 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
,
1098 &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
) != 0)
1100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1101 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1102 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1103 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1104 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1106 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1108 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1109 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1110 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1117 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1118 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1119 * @c: cipher to check
1120 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1121 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1123 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1125 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1127 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
1128 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
1130 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1132 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1133 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1136 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1137 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1139 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1140 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1141 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1143 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
))
1146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
1147 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
1150 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1153 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1155 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1157 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1160 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1164 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1165 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
1166 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1167 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1168 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1169 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1170 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1172 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1173 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1175 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1176 && s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1177 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1178 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1180 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1181 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1186 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1187 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1188 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1189 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1197 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1198 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1199 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1202 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1205 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1206 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1207 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1212 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1214 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1215 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1216 * point to the resulting session.
1218 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1222 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1225 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1228 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1229 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1232 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1233 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1235 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1236 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1237 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1239 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1241 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1242 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1246 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1248 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1249 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1250 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1251 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1254 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1255 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1256 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1257 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1258 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1259 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1261 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1262 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1263 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1264 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1265 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1266 * point to the resulting session.
1268 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1269 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1270 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1272 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1273 unsigned char *sdec
;
1274 const unsigned char *p
;
1275 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1276 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1278 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1279 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1280 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1281 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1283 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1285 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1286 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1288 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1291 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1293 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1294 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1295 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1296 * calculate the master secret later.
1298 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1302 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1303 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1304 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1308 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1309 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1311 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1314 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1316 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1319 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1320 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1321 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1322 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1325 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1329 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1335 /* Check key name matches */
1336 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1337 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1338 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1341 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1342 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1343 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1344 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1345 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1346 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1347 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1350 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1354 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1357 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1359 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1363 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1365 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1366 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1370 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1371 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1372 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1373 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1377 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1378 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1381 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1382 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1383 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1384 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1385 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1386 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1387 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1389 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1392 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1394 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1400 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1404 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1406 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1408 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1412 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1413 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1414 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1418 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1419 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1422 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1424 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1429 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1431 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1434 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1435 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1438 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1439 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1440 * performs any action
1442 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1443 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1444 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1445 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1446 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1447 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1450 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1451 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1452 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1454 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1456 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1457 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1460 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1461 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1462 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1466 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1467 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1468 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1469 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1470 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1474 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
1475 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
1476 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1477 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
1478 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1479 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
1480 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1482 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1486 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1490 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1492 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1493 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1494 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
1495 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1504 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1505 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1507 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1510 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1511 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
1513 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1514 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1516 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1517 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
1518 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1519 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1520 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
1523 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1524 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
1527 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1528 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1529 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
1530 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1531 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1534 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1535 && s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1537 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1540 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1541 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1542 * ciphersuites enabled.
1545 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1548 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
1549 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
1550 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
1551 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1553 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1554 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1555 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
1558 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kGOST
) != 0)
1566 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
)
1568 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1569 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1570 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1571 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
1572 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
1573 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1577 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1578 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1582 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1584 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1585 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1586 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
1588 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1591 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1592 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1593 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs
);
1594 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1599 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
1603 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1604 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
1605 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
1606 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
1608 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
1611 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1612 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1617 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1618 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1620 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1622 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1625 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1626 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1628 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1629 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
1630 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1631 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
1639 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1640 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1641 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1642 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1644 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1645 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1646 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1647 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1649 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1650 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
1652 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1653 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1664 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1665 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1667 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1668 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1670 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1672 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1674 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
1675 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1676 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1677 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1678 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1679 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1680 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1681 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1682 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1683 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1685 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1686 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1689 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1690 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1694 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1695 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1697 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1699 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1703 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1707 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1708 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1712 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
1718 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1720 /* Invalid data length */
1721 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
1726 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1730 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1738 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
1745 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
1747 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1748 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1750 /* Should never happen */
1751 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
1755 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
1756 &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
1758 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
1759 &s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
1763 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1765 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1768 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
1771 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1774 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1777 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1778 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1779 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
1781 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1782 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1784 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1785 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
1786 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1791 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1792 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1793 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1795 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1796 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1797 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1800 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1802 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1806 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1808 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1809 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1811 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1813 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1814 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1815 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1817 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1820 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1821 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1822 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1824 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1825 if (s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1827 || idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
1828 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1830 shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1832 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1834 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1835 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1836 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1838 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
1840 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1841 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1844 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1845 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1849 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1850 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
1853 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1855 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1856 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1857 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
1858 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1859 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1860 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1861 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1862 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1864 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1865 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1866 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
1869 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1870 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1872 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1874 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
1876 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
1877 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
1878 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
1881 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
1883 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1885 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1887 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
1889 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1890 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1891 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1892 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1893 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1894 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1898 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1900 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
1901 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
1905 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1912 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
1913 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
1914 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
1916 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1918 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
1919 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
1923 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
1927 /* Reject duplicates */
1928 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
1929 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
1938 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1939 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1941 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
1945 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
1949 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
1952 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
1957 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
1958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1961 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
1964 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
1965 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1966 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1968 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
1969 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
1970 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
1976 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
1978 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
1983 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1987 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
1989 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
1990 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1991 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
1993 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1995 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
1996 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2001 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2006 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2007 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2008 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2010 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2011 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2012 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2018 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2022 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2026 if (default_nid
== -1)
2028 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2030 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2031 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
2032 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
2037 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2038 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2042 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2043 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2044 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2051 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2052 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2053 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2054 * attempting to use them.
2057 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2059 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2060 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2061 /* Strict mode flags */
2062 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2063 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2064 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2066 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2071 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2072 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2075 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2076 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2078 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2081 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2083 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2084 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2086 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2088 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2089 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2098 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2101 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2103 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2104 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2106 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2113 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2114 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2115 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2116 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2117 else if (!check_flags
)
2122 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2123 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2125 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2128 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2129 || s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2131 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2135 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2136 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2139 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2140 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2141 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2145 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2146 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2149 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2150 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2151 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2154 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2155 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2156 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2159 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2160 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2161 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2170 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2171 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2173 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2175 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2176 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2177 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
2179 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2182 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2189 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2190 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2194 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2195 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2196 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2197 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2199 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2206 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2207 else if (check_flags
)
2208 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2210 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2211 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2212 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2213 else if (!check_flags
)
2216 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2217 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2218 else if (strict_mode
) {
2219 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2220 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2221 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2222 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2224 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2231 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2232 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2234 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2236 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2239 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2242 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2246 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
2249 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2250 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2251 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2255 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2258 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2261 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2263 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2264 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2266 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2267 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2268 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2270 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2271 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2272 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2273 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2274 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2279 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2282 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2284 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2285 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2289 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2290 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2292 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2295 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2299 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2302 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2303 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2310 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2311 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2313 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2314 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2315 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2316 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2317 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2318 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2319 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2320 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2321 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2324 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2325 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2327 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2331 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2333 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2334 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2335 return DH_get_1024_160();
2336 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2337 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2342 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2344 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2347 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2353 if (g
== NULL
|| !BN_set_word(g
, 2)) {
2358 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2359 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2361 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2362 if (p
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2370 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2371 return DH_get_2048_224();
2372 return DH_get_1024_160();
2376 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2379 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2382 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2383 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2384 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2385 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2387 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2390 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2392 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2395 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2397 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2398 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2399 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2400 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2402 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2404 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2405 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2408 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2410 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2413 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2416 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2418 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2419 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2421 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2422 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2424 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2425 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2430 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2431 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2432 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2435 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2437 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2439 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2444 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2448 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2449 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2450 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2458 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2459 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2462 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2464 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2465 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
2467 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2468 if (clu
== NULL
|| !(clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
))
2471 return s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
2475 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2476 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2477 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2478 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2479 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2481 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
2483 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2487 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2490 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
2492 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2493 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2494 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
2496 || !X509_get_signature_info(s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
, &mdnid
,
2497 &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
2500 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2501 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2502 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2503 * signing certificate.
2505 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
2514 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2515 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2517 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2518 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2520 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2521 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2522 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2524 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
2526 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2529 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
2530 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
2532 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2538 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2539 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2540 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2543 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2544 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
2545 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
2546 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
2547 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2549 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2550 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
) || !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
2552 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2555 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2557 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2559 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
2564 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2565 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2568 pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2569 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2574 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2577 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2578 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2582 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2583 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
2585 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
2588 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2590 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2594 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2595 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
2596 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2597 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2604 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2607 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2608 lu
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2611 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
2614 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
2616 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2617 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
2620 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2621 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
2623 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2624 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2625 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2627 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2631 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
2635 if (i
== s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2639 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2644 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2646 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2647 size_t sent_sigslen
;
2649 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2652 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2653 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2657 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2658 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2659 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
2660 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
2661 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2664 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
2667 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2668 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2669 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2674 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2677 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2684 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2685 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
2686 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
2687 s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
2691 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
2693 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2694 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2696 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2700 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2704 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
2706 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2707 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2709 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2713 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2717 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
2719 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;