2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
42 tls1_export_keying_material
,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
45 tls_close_construct_packet
,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
59 tls1_export_keying_material
,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
62 tls_close_construct_packet
,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
76 tls1_export_keying_material
,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
80 tls_close_construct_packet
,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
87 tls13_setup_key_block
,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
94 tls13_export_keying_material
,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
97 tls_close_construct_packet
,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
120 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
122 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
131 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
132 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
134 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
145 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
146 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
147 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
148 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
149 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
150 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
151 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
152 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
153 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
154 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
155 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
156 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
157 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
158 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
159 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
160 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
161 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
163 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
164 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
165 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
167 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
168 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, 0x0022},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, 0x0023},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, 0x0024},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, 0x0025},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, 0x0026},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, 0x0027},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, 0x0028},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
189 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
192 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
196 /* The default curves */
197 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
198 29, /* X25519 (29) */
199 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
203 34, /* GC256A (34) */
204 35, /* GC256B (35) */
205 36, /* GC256C (36) */
206 37, /* GC256D (37) */
207 38, /* GC512A (38) */
208 39, /* GC512B (39) */
209 40, /* GC512C (40) */
210 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
211 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
212 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
213 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
214 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
218 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
224 struct provider_group_data_st
{
226 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
229 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
230 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
231 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
233 struct provider_group_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
234 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
235 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
237 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
238 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
240 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
243 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
244 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
246 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
247 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
248 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
250 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
251 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
252 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
253 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
255 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
258 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
259 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
261 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
262 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
265 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
267 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
268 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
269 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
272 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
273 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
) {
274 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
278 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
279 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
280 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
283 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
284 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
) {
285 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
289 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
290 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
291 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
294 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
296 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
297 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
298 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
301 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
302 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
) {
303 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
307 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
308 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
309 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
313 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
314 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
315 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
318 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
320 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
321 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
322 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
326 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
327 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
328 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
332 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
333 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
334 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
338 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
339 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
340 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
344 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
345 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
346 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
350 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
351 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
353 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
354 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
356 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
357 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
358 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
359 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
360 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
361 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
364 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
365 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
366 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
369 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
373 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
374 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
375 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
376 ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
381 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
383 struct provider_group_data_st pgd
;
386 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
387 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
388 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
391 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
393 size_t i
, j
, num_deflt_grps
= 0;
394 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups
[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
)];
396 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
))
399 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
); i
++) {
400 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->group_list_len
; j
++) {
401 if (ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
== supported_groups_default
[i
]) {
402 tmp_supp_groups
[num_deflt_grps
++] = ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
;
408 if (num_deflt_grps
== 0)
411 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
412 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps
);
414 if (ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
== NULL
) {
415 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
419 memcpy(ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
,
421 num_deflt_grps
* sizeof(tmp_supp_groups
[0]));
422 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
= num_deflt_grps
;
427 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
432 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
434 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(name
);
436 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
437 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(name
);
438 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
439 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(name
);
441 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
442 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
443 || strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].realname
, name
) == 0)
444 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
450 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
454 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
455 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
456 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
462 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
470 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
471 * work for groups we don't know about.
473 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
475 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
476 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
478 if (!include_unknown
)
480 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
483 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
488 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
489 * work for groups we don't know about.
491 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
493 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
494 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
501 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
502 * the number of groups supported.
504 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
507 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
508 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
509 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
510 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
511 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
512 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
515 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
516 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
520 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
521 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
527 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
528 *pgroups
= s
->ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
;
529 *pgroupslen
= s
->ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
;
531 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
532 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
538 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int minversion
, int maxversion
,
539 int isec
, int *okfortls13
)
541 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group_id
);
544 if (okfortls13
!= NULL
)
550 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
551 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
553 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
556 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
557 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
558 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
560 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
562 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
565 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
566 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
567 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
568 if (ret
&& okfortls13
!= NULL
&& maxversion
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
569 *okfortls13
= (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
570 || (ginfo
->maxtls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
);
573 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "EC") == 0
574 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X25519") == 0
575 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X448") == 0;
580 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
581 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
583 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group
);
584 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
589 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
590 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
591 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
592 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
595 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
596 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
599 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
606 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
607 * if there is no match.
608 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
609 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
610 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
612 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
614 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
615 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
618 /* Can't do anything on client side */
622 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
624 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
625 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
627 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
629 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
630 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
631 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
632 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
633 /* Should never happen */
636 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
640 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
641 * otherwise peer decides.
643 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
644 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
645 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
647 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
648 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
651 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
652 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
654 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
655 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
663 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
667 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
668 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
673 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
674 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
676 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
677 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
678 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
681 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
684 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
685 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
688 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
689 unsigned long idmask
;
691 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
692 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
694 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
695 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
696 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
710 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
711 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
716 uint16_t gid_arr
[MAX_GROUPLIST
];
719 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
721 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
728 if (garg
->gidcnt
== MAX_GROUPLIST
)
730 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
732 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
735 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
738 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
739 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
741 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
745 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
746 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
754 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
760 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
763 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
767 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
771 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
772 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
774 const uint16_t *groups
;
780 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
781 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
782 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
784 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
785 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
787 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
788 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
791 /* Should never happen */
796 if (check_own_groups
) {
797 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
798 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
799 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
803 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
806 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
810 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
811 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
814 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
815 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
816 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
817 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
821 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
829 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
831 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
832 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
833 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
835 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
836 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
838 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
840 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
844 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
845 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
847 unsigned char comp_id
;
851 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
852 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
856 /* Get required compression id */
857 point_conv
= EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey
);
860 if (point_conv
== POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
861 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
862 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
864 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
869 int field_type
= EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey
);
871 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
872 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
873 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
874 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
879 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
880 * supported (see RFC4492).
882 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
885 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
886 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
892 /* Return group id of a key */
893 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
895 int curve_nid
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
897 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
899 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
903 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
904 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
906 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
910 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
913 /* If not EC nothing to do */
914 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
916 /* Check compression */
917 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
919 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
921 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
924 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
927 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
930 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
934 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
935 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
936 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
937 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
938 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
940 return 0; /* Should never happen */
941 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
942 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
951 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
953 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
955 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
956 * is compatible with the client extensions.
958 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
960 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
962 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
964 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
966 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
969 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
970 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
971 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
972 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
979 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
984 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
986 /* Default sigalg schemes */
987 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1008 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1009 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1012 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1014 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1015 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1017 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1018 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1019 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1022 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1023 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1024 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1025 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1026 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1031 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1032 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1033 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1037 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1039 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1040 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1041 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1042 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1043 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1044 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1045 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1046 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1047 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1048 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1049 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1050 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1051 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1052 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1053 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1054 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1055 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1056 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1057 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1058 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1059 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1061 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1062 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1063 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1064 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1065 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1066 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1067 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1068 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1069 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1070 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1071 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1072 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1073 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1074 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1075 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1076 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1077 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1078 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1079 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1080 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1081 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1082 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1083 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1084 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1085 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1086 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1087 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1088 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1089 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1090 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1091 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1092 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1093 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1095 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1096 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1097 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1098 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1099 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1100 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1101 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1102 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1103 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1104 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1105 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1106 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1107 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1108 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1109 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1112 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1113 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1114 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1115 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1116 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1117 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1118 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1119 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1120 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1121 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1122 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1123 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1124 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1125 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1126 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1127 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1128 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1129 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1130 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1131 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1134 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1135 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1136 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1137 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1138 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1139 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1143 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1144 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1146 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1147 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1148 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1149 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1150 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1151 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1152 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1153 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1154 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1155 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1158 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1161 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1162 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
1163 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu
) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
));
1164 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1167 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1171 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1172 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1178 * Check hash is available.
1179 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1180 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1181 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1182 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1183 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1185 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1186 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1187 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1191 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1192 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1195 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1196 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1198 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1199 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1202 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1207 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1208 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1212 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1213 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, uint16_t sigalg
)
1216 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1218 for (i
= 0, lu
= s
->ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1219 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1220 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1222 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
1227 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1228 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1233 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1234 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1237 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1247 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1249 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1250 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1251 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1253 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1254 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1255 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1261 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1263 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1269 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1270 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1271 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1272 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1273 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1275 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
1281 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1282 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1283 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
1285 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1292 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1294 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1297 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1299 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1306 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1307 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1309 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1312 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1314 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1321 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1324 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1326 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1327 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1329 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
1331 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1335 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1337 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1339 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1340 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1343 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1345 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
1347 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1350 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1354 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1357 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1361 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1362 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1363 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1364 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1366 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1367 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1370 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1371 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1376 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1377 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1378 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1380 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1381 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1382 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1383 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1384 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1385 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1387 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1388 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1394 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1395 * specified EC curve.
1397 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1399 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1402 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1403 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1404 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1406 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1407 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1410 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1411 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1415 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1416 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1417 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1426 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1429 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1431 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1434 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1438 int md_type
= EVP_MD_type(md
);
1440 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1441 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
1443 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1444 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1445 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1447 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1448 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1449 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1450 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1452 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1454 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1456 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1459 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1460 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1462 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1469 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1470 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1473 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1475 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1476 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1478 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1480 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1483 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1484 /* Should never happen */
1487 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1488 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1489 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1493 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1494 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1495 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1497 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1499 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1500 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1503 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1504 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1505 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1506 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1509 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1510 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1511 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1517 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1519 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1520 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1521 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1522 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1526 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1527 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1528 int curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1530 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1531 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1535 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1536 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1537 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1538 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1541 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1542 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1543 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1544 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1545 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1546 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1551 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1552 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1557 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1558 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1559 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1560 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1563 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1564 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1565 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1566 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1569 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
1570 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1574 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1575 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1577 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1578 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1579 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
1581 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1582 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1583 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1584 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1587 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1588 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1592 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1594 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1596 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1600 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1602 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1604 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1609 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1610 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1611 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1613 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1616 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1618 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1620 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1621 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1622 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1623 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1624 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1627 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1628 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1629 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1630 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1632 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1634 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1635 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1636 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1643 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1644 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1645 * @c: cipher to check
1646 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1647 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1649 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1651 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1653 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1654 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1656 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1658 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1659 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1662 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1663 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1665 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1666 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1667 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1669 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1672 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1673 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1676 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1679 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1681 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1683 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1686 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1690 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1691 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1692 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1693 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1694 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1695 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1696 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1698 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1699 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1701 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1702 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1703 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1704 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1706 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1707 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1712 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1713 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1714 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1715 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1723 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1724 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1727 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1730 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1731 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1732 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1737 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1739 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1740 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1741 * point to the resulting session.
1743 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1747 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1750 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1753 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1754 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1757 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1758 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1760 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1761 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1762 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1764 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1766 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1767 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1771 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1773 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1774 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1775 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1776 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1779 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1780 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1781 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1782 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1783 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1784 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1786 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1787 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1788 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1789 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1790 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1791 * point to the resulting session.
1793 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1794 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1795 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1797 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1798 unsigned char *sdec
;
1799 const unsigned char *p
;
1800 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1801 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1803 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1804 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1805 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1806 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1808 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1810 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1811 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1813 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1816 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1818 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1819 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1820 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1821 * calculate the master secret later.
1823 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1827 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1828 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1829 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1833 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1834 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1836 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1839 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1841 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1845 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1847 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1850 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1853 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1854 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, nctick
,
1855 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1857 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1860 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1861 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1862 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1863 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1864 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1867 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1871 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1877 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
1879 /* Check key name matches */
1880 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1881 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1882 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1886 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
1888 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
1889 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1890 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1892 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
1893 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1894 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1895 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1896 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1899 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1900 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1904 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1907 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1909 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1913 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1915 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1916 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1920 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1921 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1922 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
1923 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1927 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1928 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1931 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1932 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1933 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1934 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1935 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1936 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1937 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1939 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1942 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1944 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1950 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1954 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1956 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1958 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1962 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1963 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1964 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1968 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1969 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1972 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1974 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1979 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1981 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1984 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1985 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
1988 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1989 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1990 * performs any action
1992 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1993 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1994 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1995 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1996 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1997 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
2000 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
2001 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
2002 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
2004 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
2006 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
2007 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2010 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
2011 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2012 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2016 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
2017 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
2018 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2019 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2020 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2024 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2025 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2026 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2027 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2028 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2029 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2030 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2032 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2036 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2040 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2042 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2043 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2044 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2045 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2054 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2055 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2057 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2060 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2062 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2063 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2066 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2069 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2070 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2071 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2072 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2075 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2076 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s
->ctx
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2079 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2080 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2081 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2082 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2083 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
2086 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2087 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2089 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2092 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2093 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2094 * ciphersuites enabled.
2097 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2100 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
2101 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2102 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2103 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2105 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2106 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2107 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2110 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2118 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2119 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
2120 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2121 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2122 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2126 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2127 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2131 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
2133 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2134 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2135 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2137 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2140 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2141 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2142 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2143 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2148 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
2152 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2153 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2154 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2155 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2157 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2160 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2161 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2166 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2167 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2169 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2171 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2174 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2175 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2177 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2178 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2179 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2180 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2184 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2188 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2189 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2190 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2191 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2193 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2194 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2195 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2196 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2198 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2199 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2201 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2202 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2213 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2214 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2216 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2217 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2219 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2221 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2223 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2224 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2225 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2226 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2227 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2228 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2229 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2230 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2231 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2232 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2234 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2235 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2238 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2239 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2243 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2244 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2246 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2248 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
2249 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2252 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2256 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2257 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2261 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2267 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2269 /* Invalid data length */
2270 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2275 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
2276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2279 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2287 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2294 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2296 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2297 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2299 /* Should never happen */
2300 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2304 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2305 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2307 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2308 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2312 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2314 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2317 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2319 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2322 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2325 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2326 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2327 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2329 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2330 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2332 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2333 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s
->ctx
, idx
))
2334 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2339 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2340 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2341 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2343 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2344 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2345 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2348 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2350 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2354 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2356 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2357 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2359 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2361 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2362 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2363 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2365 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2368 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2369 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2370 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2372 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2373 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2375 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
2376 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2378 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2380 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2382 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2383 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2384 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2386 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2388 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2389 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2392 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2393 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2397 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2398 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2401 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2403 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2404 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2405 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2406 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2407 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2408 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2409 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2410 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2412 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2413 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2414 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2417 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2418 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2420 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2422 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2424 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2425 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2426 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2429 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2431 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2433 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2435 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2437 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2438 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2439 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2440 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2441 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2442 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2446 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2448 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2449 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2453 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2460 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2461 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2462 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2464 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2466 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2467 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2471 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2475 /* Reject duplicates */
2476 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2477 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2486 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2487 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2489 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2493 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2497 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2500 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2505 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2506 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2509 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2512 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2513 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2514 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2516 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2517 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2518 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2524 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2526 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2531 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2532 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2535 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2537 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2538 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2539 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2541 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2543 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2544 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2549 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2554 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2555 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2556 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2558 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2559 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2560 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2566 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2570 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2572 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2574 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2576 if (default_nid
== -1)
2578 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2580 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2582 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2584 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2585 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2586 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2588 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2591 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2593 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2594 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2595 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2596 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2597 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2603 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2604 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2606 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
2608 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2609 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2610 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2617 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2618 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2619 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2620 * attempting to use them.
2623 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2625 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2626 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2627 /* Strict mode flags */
2628 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2629 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2630 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2632 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2637 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2638 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2641 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2642 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2644 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2647 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2649 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2650 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2652 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2654 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2655 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2664 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2667 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2669 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2670 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2672 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2679 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2680 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2681 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2682 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2683 else if (!check_flags
)
2688 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2689 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2691 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2694 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2695 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2697 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2701 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2702 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2705 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2706 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2707 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2711 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2712 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2715 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2716 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2717 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2720 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2721 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2722 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2725 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2726 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2727 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2736 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2737 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2739 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2741 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2742 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2743 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
2745 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2748 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2755 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2756 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2758 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2759 * so check_flags is always set.
2761 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2762 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2763 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2767 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2768 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2769 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2770 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2772 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2779 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2780 else if (check_flags
)
2781 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2783 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2784 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2785 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2786 else if (!check_flags
)
2789 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2790 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2791 else if (strict_mode
) {
2792 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2793 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2794 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2795 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2797 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2804 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2805 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2808 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
2809 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2810 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
2811 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2812 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
2813 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2816 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2819 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2820 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2821 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2825 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2828 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2831 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2833 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2834 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2836 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2837 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2838 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2840 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2841 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2842 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2843 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2844 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2849 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2852 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2854 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2855 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2859 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2860 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2862 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2865 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2869 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2872 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2873 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2880 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2881 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2883 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2884 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2885 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2886 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2887 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2888 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2889 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2890 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2891 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2894 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2895 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2897 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2900 EVP_PKEY
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2902 EVP_PKEY
*dhp
= NULL
;
2904 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2905 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2906 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
2907 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
2909 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
2910 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2911 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2916 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2918 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2922 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2923 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2924 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
2925 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
2926 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
2927 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2928 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2929 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
2931 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
2935 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "DH", s
->ctx
->propq
);
2937 || EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_init(pctx
) != 1)
2940 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2942 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
2943 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, 2))
2946 params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
);
2947 if (params
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &dhp
, params
) != 1)
2951 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params
);
2952 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
2953 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2958 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2961 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2964 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2965 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2966 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2967 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2969 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2972 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2974 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2977 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2979 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2980 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2981 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2982 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2984 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2986 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2987 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2990 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2992 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2995 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2998 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
3000 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
3001 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3003 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
3004 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3006 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
3007 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
3012 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3013 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3014 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3017 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
3019 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
3021 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
3026 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3030 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3031 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3032 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3040 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3041 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3044 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3046 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3047 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
3049 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3051 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3052 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3053 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3056 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3060 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3061 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3063 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3065 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3068 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3069 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3073 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3074 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3077 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey
, sig
->hash
);
3083 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3084 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3086 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3087 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3089 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3090 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3095 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3096 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3097 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3098 * signing certificate.
3100 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3107 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3108 * a viable public key is permitted.
3114 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3115 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3116 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3117 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3118 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3120 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3122 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3125 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3128 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3129 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3133 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3134 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3136 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3141 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
3144 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3145 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3148 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3152 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3153 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3154 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3156 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3158 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3163 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3164 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3165 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3167 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3168 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3169 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3170 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3171 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3173 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3174 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3176 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3177 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3180 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3181 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3183 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3185 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3186 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3188 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3189 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3190 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3196 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3203 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3204 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3206 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3207 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3209 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3210 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3211 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3213 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3215 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3218 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3219 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3221 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3222 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3226 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3227 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3231 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3232 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3234 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3237 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3239 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3242 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3244 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3248 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3251 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3252 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3255 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3258 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3260 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3261 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3264 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3265 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3267 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3268 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3269 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3271 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3274 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3279 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3280 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3281 * we have to assume GOST support.
3283 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
3284 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3287 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3288 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3292 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3296 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3299 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3300 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3305 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3307 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3308 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3310 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3313 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3314 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3318 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3319 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3320 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3321 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3322 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3325 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3328 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
3329 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3334 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3337 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3338 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3344 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3345 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3346 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3347 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3351 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3353 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3354 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3355 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3359 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3363 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3365 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3366 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3367 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3371 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3375 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3377 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3381 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3383 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3385 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3386 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3391 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3392 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3393 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3398 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3399 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3404 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3410 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3413 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3415 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3421 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3426 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3428 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
3430 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3431 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3432 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY
, key
, len
);
3433 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3434 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx
->ctx
, params
) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
))
3437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3438 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3439 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3444 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3446 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3447 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3449 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3450 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
3455 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3458 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3459 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3461 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3462 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
3467 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3469 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3470 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3472 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3473 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);
3478 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3480 char gname
[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE
];
3482 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, gname
, sizeof(gname
), NULL
) > 0)
3483 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname
);