2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include "quic/quic_local.h"
28 #include <openssl/ct.h>
30 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
31 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
33 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
35 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
36 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
37 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
38 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
39 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
41 tls1_export_keying_material
,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
44 tls_close_construct_packet
,
48 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
56 tls1_export_keying_material
,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
59 tls_close_construct_packet
,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
71 tls1_export_keying_material
,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
75 tls_close_construct_packet
,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
80 tls13_setup_key_block
,
81 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
82 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
83 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
84 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
85 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
87 tls13_export_keying_material
,
88 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
89 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
90 tls_close_construct_packet
,
94 OSSL_TIME
tls1_default_timeout(void)
97 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
98 * http, the cache would over fill
100 return ossl_seconds2time(60 * 60 * 2);
107 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
113 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
115 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
120 OPENSSL_free(sc
->ext
.session_ticket
);
124 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
126 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
134 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
135 sc
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
137 sc
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
142 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
147 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
148 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
149 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
150 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
151 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
152 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
153 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
154 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
155 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
156 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
157 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
158 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
159 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
160 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
161 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
162 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
163 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
164 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
165 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
166 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
167 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
168 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
169 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
170 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
171 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
172 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
173 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
174 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
175 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
176 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
177 {NID_brainpoolP256r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1_tls13
},
178 {NID_brainpoolP384r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1_tls13
},
179 {NID_brainpoolP512r1tls13
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1_tls13
},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
},
187 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
188 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
189 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
190 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
191 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
194 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
195 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
196 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
197 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
200 /* The default curves */
201 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
202 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
, /* X25519 (29) */
203 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, /* secp256r1 (23) */
204 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
, /* X448 (30) */
205 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
, /* secp521r1 (25) */
206 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, /* secp384r1 (24) */
207 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256A
, /* GC256A (34) */
208 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256B
, /* GC256B (35) */
209 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256C
, /* GC256C (36) */
210 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc256D
, /* GC256D (37) */
211 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512A
, /* GC512A (38) */
212 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512B
, /* GC512B (39) */
213 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_gc512C
, /* GC512C (40) */
214 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
215 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
216 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
217 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
218 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
221 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
222 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
,
223 OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
,
226 struct provider_ctx_data_st
{
228 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
231 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
232 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
233 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
235 struct provider_ctx_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
236 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
237 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
239 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
240 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
242 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
245 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
246 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
248 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
249 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
250 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
252 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
253 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
254 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
255 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
258 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
259 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
261 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
262 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
265 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
267 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
268 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
269 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
272 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
273 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
)
276 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
277 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
278 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
281 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
282 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
)
285 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
286 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
287 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
290 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
292 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
293 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
297 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
298 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
)
301 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
302 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
303 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
307 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
308 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
309 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
312 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
314 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
315 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
316 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
320 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
321 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
322 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
326 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
327 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
328 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
332 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
333 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
334 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
338 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
339 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
340 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
345 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
346 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
348 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
349 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
351 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
352 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
353 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
354 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
355 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
356 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
359 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
360 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
361 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
364 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
371 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
372 ginf
->algorithm
= ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
377 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
379 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd
;
382 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
383 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
384 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
387 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
389 size_t i
, j
, num_deflt_grps
= 0;
390 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups
[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
)];
392 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
))
395 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
); i
++) {
396 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->group_list_len
; j
++) {
397 if (ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
== supported_groups_default
[i
]) {
398 tmp_supp_groups
[num_deflt_grps
++] = ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
;
404 if (num_deflt_grps
== 0)
407 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
408 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps
);
410 if (ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
== NULL
)
413 memcpy(ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
,
415 num_deflt_grps
* sizeof(tmp_supp_groups
[0]));
416 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
= num_deflt_grps
;
421 #define TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
422 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_sigalgs
;
423 static int add_provider_sigalgs(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
425 struct provider_ctx_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
426 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
427 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
429 TLS_SIGALG_INFO
*sinf
= NULL
;
430 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
432 unsigned int code_point
= 0;
435 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
== ctx
->sigalg_list_len
) {
436 TLS_SIGALG_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
438 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
== 0)
439 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
)
440 * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
442 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->sigalg_list
,
443 (ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
444 + TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
445 * sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
));
448 ctx
->sigalg_list
= tmp
;
449 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
, 0,
450 sizeof(TLS_SIGALG_INFO
) * TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
451 ctx
->sigalg_list_max_len
+= TLS_SIGALG_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
454 sinf
= &ctx
->sigalg_list
[ctx
->sigalg_list_len
];
456 /* First, mandatory parameters */
457 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_NAME
);
458 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
459 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
462 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_name
);
463 sinf
->sigalg_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
464 if (sinf
->sigalg_name
== NULL
)
467 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_IANA_NAME
);
468 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
469 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
472 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->name
);
473 sinf
->name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
474 if (sinf
->name
== NULL
)
477 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
,
478 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_CODE_POINT
);
480 || !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &code_point
)
481 || code_point
> UINT16_MAX
) {
482 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
485 sinf
->code_point
= (uint16_t)code_point
;
487 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
,
488 OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SECURITY_BITS
);
489 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &sinf
->secbits
)) {
490 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
494 /* Now, optional parameters */
495 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_OID
);
497 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= NULL
;
498 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
501 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_oid
);
502 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
503 if (sinf
->sigalg_oid
== NULL
)
507 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_NAME
);
509 sinf
->sig_name
= NULL
;
510 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
513 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_name
);
514 sinf
->sig_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
515 if (sinf
->sig_name
== NULL
)
519 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_SIG_OID
);
521 sinf
->sig_oid
= NULL
;
522 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
525 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_oid
);
526 sinf
->sig_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
527 if (sinf
->sig_oid
== NULL
)
531 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_NAME
);
533 sinf
->hash_name
= NULL
;
534 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
537 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_name
);
538 sinf
->hash_name
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
539 if (sinf
->hash_name
== NULL
)
543 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_HASH_OID
);
545 sinf
->hash_oid
= NULL
;
546 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
549 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_oid
);
550 sinf
->hash_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
551 if (sinf
->hash_oid
== NULL
)
555 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE
);
557 sinf
->keytype
= NULL
;
558 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
561 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype
);
562 sinf
->keytype
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
563 if (sinf
->keytype
== NULL
)
567 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_KEYTYPE_OID
);
569 sinf
->keytype_oid
= NULL
;
570 } else if (p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
573 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype_oid
);
574 sinf
->keytype_oid
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
575 if (sinf
->keytype_oid
== NULL
)
579 /* The remaining parameters below are mandatory again */
580 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MIN_TLS
);
581 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &sinf
->mintls
)) {
582 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
585 if ((sinf
->mintls
!= 0) && (sinf
->mintls
!= -1) &&
586 ((sinf
->mintls
< TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
587 /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
592 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_SIGALG_MAX_TLS
);
593 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &sinf
->maxtls
)) {
594 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
597 if ((sinf
->maxtls
!= 0) && (sinf
->maxtls
!= -1) &&
598 ((sinf
->maxtls
< sinf
->mintls
))) {
599 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
602 if ((sinf
->maxtls
!= 0) && (sinf
->maxtls
!= -1) &&
603 ((sinf
->maxtls
< TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
604 /* ignore this sigalg as this OpenSSL doesn't know how to handle it */
610 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
611 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
612 * successfully processed this signature, even though we may decide not to
617 keytype
= (sinf
->keytype
!= NULL
619 : (sinf
->sig_name
!= NULL
621 : sinf
->sigalg_name
));
622 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, keytype
, ctx
->propq
);
623 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
625 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
626 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
628 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
629 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
630 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
631 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
632 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
633 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
636 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_get0_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
638 * We have a match - so we could use this signature;
639 * Check proper object registration first, though.
640 * Don't care about return value as this may have been
641 * done within providers or previous calls to
642 * add_provider_sigalgs.
644 OBJ_create(sinf
->sigalg_oid
, sinf
->sigalg_name
, NULL
);
645 /* sanity check: Without successful registration don't use alg */
646 if ((OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
) == NID_undef
) ||
647 (OBJ_nid2obj(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
)) == NULL
)) {
648 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
651 if (sinf
->sig_name
!= NULL
)
652 OBJ_create(sinf
->sig_oid
, sinf
->sig_name
, NULL
);
653 if (sinf
->keytype
!= NULL
)
654 OBJ_create(sinf
->keytype_oid
, sinf
->keytype
, NULL
);
655 if (sinf
->hash_name
!= NULL
)
656 OBJ_create(sinf
->hash_oid
, sinf
->hash_name
, NULL
);
657 OBJ_add_sigid(OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->sigalg_name
),
658 (sinf
->hash_name
!= NULL
659 ? OBJ_txt2nid(sinf
->hash_name
)
661 OBJ_txt2nid(keytype
));
662 ctx
->sigalg_list_len
++;
665 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
670 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->name
);
672 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_name
);
673 sinf
->sigalg_name
= NULL
;
674 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sigalg_oid
);
675 sinf
->sigalg_oid
= NULL
;
676 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_name
);
677 sinf
->sig_name
= NULL
;
678 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->sig_oid
);
679 sinf
->sig_oid
= NULL
;
680 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_name
);
681 sinf
->hash_name
= NULL
;
682 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->hash_oid
);
683 sinf
->hash_oid
= NULL
;
684 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype
);
685 sinf
->keytype
= NULL
;
686 OPENSSL_free(sinf
->keytype_oid
);
687 sinf
->keytype_oid
= NULL
;
692 static int discover_provider_sigalgs(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
694 struct provider_ctx_data_st pgd
;
697 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
698 OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-SIGALG",
699 add_provider_sigalgs
, &pgd
);
701 * Always OK, even if provider doesn't support the capability:
702 * Reconsider testing retval when legacy sigalgs are also loaded this way.
707 int ssl_load_sigalgs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
712 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_sigalgs
, ctx
))
715 /* now populate ctx->ssl_cert_info */
716 if (ctx
->sigalg_list_len
> 0) {
717 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(lu
) * ctx
->sigalg_list_len
);
718 if (ctx
->ssl_cert_info
== NULL
)
720 for(i
= 0; i
< ctx
->sigalg_list_len
; i
++) {
721 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
[i
].nid
= OBJ_txt2nid(ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
].sigalg_name
);
722 ctx
->ssl_cert_info
[i
].amask
= SSL_aANY
;
727 * For now, leave it at this: legacy sigalgs stay in their own
728 * data structures until "legacy cleanup" occurs.
734 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
738 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
739 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
740 || strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].realname
, name
) == 0)
741 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
747 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
751 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
752 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
753 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
759 const char *tls1_group_id2name(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
761 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls_group_info
= tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx
, group_id
);
763 if (tls_group_info
== NULL
)
766 return tls_group_info
->tlsname
;
769 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
777 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
778 * work for groups we don't know about.
780 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
782 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
783 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
785 if (!include_unknown
)
787 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
790 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
795 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
796 * work for groups we don't know about.
798 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
800 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
801 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
808 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
809 * the number of groups supported.
811 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
814 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
816 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
817 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
818 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
819 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
820 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
823 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
824 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
828 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
829 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
834 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
835 *pgroups
= sctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
;
836 *pgroupslen
= sctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
;
838 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
839 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
845 int tls_valid_group(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
,
846 int minversion
, int maxversion
,
847 int isec
, int *okfortls13
)
849 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
),
853 if (okfortls13
!= NULL
)
859 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
860 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
862 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
865 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
866 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
867 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
869 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
871 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
874 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
875 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
876 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
877 if (ret
&& okfortls13
!= NULL
&& maxversion
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
878 *okfortls13
= (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
879 || (ginfo
->maxtls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
);
882 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "EC") == 0
883 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X25519") == 0
884 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X448") == 0;
889 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
890 int tls_group_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
892 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
),
894 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
899 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
900 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
901 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
902 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
905 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
906 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
909 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
916 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
917 * if there is no match.
918 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
919 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
920 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
922 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int nmatch
)
924 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
925 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
927 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
929 /* Can't do anything on client side */
933 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
935 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
936 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
938 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
940 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
941 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
;
942 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
943 return OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
;
944 /* Should never happen */
947 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
951 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
952 * otherwise peer decides.
954 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
955 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
956 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
958 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
959 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
962 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
963 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
964 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*inf
;
966 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
967 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
969 inf
= tls1_group_id_lookup(ctx
, id
);
970 if (!ossl_assert(inf
!= NULL
))
972 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
973 if (inf
->maxdtls
== -1)
975 if ((inf
->mindtls
!= 0 && DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->version
, inf
->mindtls
))
976 || (inf
->maxdtls
!= 0
977 && DTLS_VERSION_GT(s
->version
, inf
->maxdtls
)))
980 if (inf
->maxtls
== -1)
982 if ((inf
->mintls
!= 0 && s
->version
< inf
->mintls
)
983 || (inf
->maxtls
!= 0 && s
->version
> inf
->maxtls
))
993 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
997 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
998 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
1003 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
1004 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
1006 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
1007 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
1008 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
1011 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1014 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
)
1016 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
1017 unsigned long idmask
;
1019 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
1020 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
1022 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
1023 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
1024 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
1026 *dup_list
|= idmask
;
1029 OPENSSL_free(*pext
);
1034 OPENSSL_free(glist
);
1038 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
1039 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
1047 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
1049 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
1052 char etmp
[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH
];
1056 if (garg
->gidcnt
== garg
->gidmax
) {
1058 OPENSSL_realloc(garg
->gid_arr
, garg
->gidmax
+ GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
);
1061 garg
->gidmax
+= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
1062 garg
->gid_arr
= tmp
;
1064 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
1066 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
1069 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
1071 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
,
1072 "group '%s' cannot be set", etmp
);
1075 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
1076 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
1078 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
1082 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
1083 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
1091 gcb
.gidmax
= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
1092 gcb
.gid_arr
= OPENSSL_malloc(gcb
.gidmax
* sizeof(*gcb
.gid_arr
));
1093 if (gcb
.gid_arr
== NULL
)
1096 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
1104 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
1107 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
1110 OPENSSL_free(*pext
);
1112 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
1115 OPENSSL_free(gcb
.gid_arr
);
1119 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
1120 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t group_id
,
1121 int check_own_groups
)
1123 const uint16_t *groups
;
1129 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
1130 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
1131 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
1133 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
1134 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
1136 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
1137 if (group_id
!= OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
1140 /* Should never happen */
1145 if (check_own_groups
) {
1146 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
1147 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
1148 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
1152 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
1155 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
1159 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
1160 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
1163 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
1164 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
1165 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
1166 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
1168 if (groups_len
== 0)
1170 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
1173 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
1174 size_t *num_formats
)
1177 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
1179 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
1180 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
1181 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
1183 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
1184 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
1186 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
1188 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
1192 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
1193 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1195 unsigned char comp_id
;
1199 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
1200 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
1204 /* Get required compression id */
1205 point_conv
= EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey
);
1206 if (point_conv
== 0)
1208 if (point_conv
== POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
1209 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
1210 } else if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1212 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
1217 int field_type
= EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey
);
1219 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
1220 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
1221 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
1222 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
1227 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
1228 * supported (see RFC4492).
1230 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
1233 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
1234 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
1240 /* Return group id of a key */
1241 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1243 int curve_nid
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1245 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
1247 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
1251 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
1252 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
1254 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
1258 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1261 /* If not EC nothing to do */
1262 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
1264 /* Check compression */
1265 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
1267 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
1269 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
1272 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
1275 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
1278 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1282 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
1283 if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
)
1284 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
1285 else if (group_id
== OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
)
1286 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
1288 return 0; /* Should never happen */
1289 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1290 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
1299 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
1300 * @s: SSL connection
1301 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
1303 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
1304 * is compatible with the client extensions.
1306 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
1308 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
1310 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
1311 if (!tls1_suiteb(s
))
1312 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
1314 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
1317 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
1318 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
, 1);
1319 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
1320 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
, 1);
1325 /* Default sigalg schemes */
1326 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
1327 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1328 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1329 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1330 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1331 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1332 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1333 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1334 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1336 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1337 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1338 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1339 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1340 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1341 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1343 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1344 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1345 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1347 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1348 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1350 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1351 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1353 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1354 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1356 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1357 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1358 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1361 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1362 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1363 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1364 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1365 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1370 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1371 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1372 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1375 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1376 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1377 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1378 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1379 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1380 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1381 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1382 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1383 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1384 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1385 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1386 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1387 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1388 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1389 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1390 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1391 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1392 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1393 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1394 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1395 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1396 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1397 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1_sha256
,
1398 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1399 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 1},
1400 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1_sha384
,
1401 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1402 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 1},
1403 {"ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1_sha512
,
1404 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1405 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 1},
1406 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1407 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1408 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1409 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1410 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1411 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1412 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1413 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1414 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1415 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1416 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1417 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1418 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1419 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1420 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1421 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1422 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1423 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1424 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1425 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1426 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1427 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1428 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1429 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1430 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1431 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1432 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1433 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1434 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1435 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1436 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1437 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1438 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1439 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1440 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1441 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1442 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1443 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1444 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1445 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1446 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1447 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1448 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1449 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1450 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1451 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1452 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1453 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1455 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1456 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1457 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1458 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1459 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1460 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1461 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1462 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1463 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1464 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1465 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1466 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1467 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1468 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1469 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1470 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1471 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1472 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1473 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1474 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1477 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1478 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1479 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1480 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1481 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1482 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1486 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1487 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1489 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1490 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1491 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1492 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1493 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1494 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1495 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1496 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1497 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1498 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1501 int ssl_setup_sigalgs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1503 size_t i
, cache_idx
, sigalgs_len
;
1504 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1505 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
= NULL
;
1506 uint16_t *tls12_sigalgs_list
= NULL
;
1507 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1513 sigalgs_len
= OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
) + ctx
->sigalg_list_len
;
1515 cache
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
) * sigalgs_len
);
1516 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1519 tls12_sigalgs_list
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * sigalgs_len
);
1520 if (tls12_sigalgs_list
== NULL
)
1524 /* First fill cache and tls12_sigalgs list from legacy algorithm list */
1525 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1526 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1530 tls12_sigalgs_list
[i
] = tls12_sigalgs
[i
];
1533 * Check hash is available.
1534 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1535 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1536 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1537 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1538 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1540 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1541 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1542 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1546 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1547 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1550 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1551 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1553 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1554 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1557 /* Now complete cache and tls12_sigalgs list with provider sig information */
1558 cache_idx
= OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1559 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->sigalg_list_len
; i
++) {
1560 TLS_SIGALG_INFO si
= ctx
->sigalg_list
[i
];
1561 cache
[cache_idx
].name
= si
.name
;
1562 cache
[cache_idx
].sigalg
= si
.code_point
;
1563 tls12_sigalgs_list
[cache_idx
] = si
.code_point
;
1564 cache
[cache_idx
].hash
= si
.hash_name
?OBJ_txt2nid(si
.hash_name
):NID_undef
;
1565 cache
[cache_idx
].hash_idx
= ssl_get_md_idx(cache
[cache_idx
].hash
);
1566 cache
[cache_idx
].sig
= OBJ_txt2nid(si
.sigalg_name
);
1567 cache
[cache_idx
].sig_idx
= i
+ SSL_PKEY_NUM
;
1568 cache
[cache_idx
].sigandhash
= OBJ_txt2nid(si
.sigalg_name
);
1569 cache
[cache_idx
].curve
= NID_undef
;
1570 /* all provided sigalgs are enabled by load */
1571 cache
[cache_idx
].enabled
= 1;
1575 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1576 ctx
->tls12_sigalgs
= tls12_sigalgs_list
;
1577 ctx
->tls12_sigalgs_len
= sigalgs_len
;
1579 tls12_sigalgs_list
= NULL
;
1583 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1584 OPENSSL_free(tls12_sigalgs_list
);
1585 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1589 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1590 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1594 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1596 for (i
= 0, lu
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1597 i
< SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1599 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
) {
1607 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1608 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1614 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1615 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1618 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1628 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1630 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1631 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1632 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1634 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_get_size(md) + 2)
1635 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1636 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1642 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1644 if (EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1650 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1651 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1652 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1653 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1654 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1656 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1663 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1664 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++) {
1665 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
1666 = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
1670 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1677 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1679 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1682 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1684 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1691 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1692 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1694 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1697 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1699 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1706 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1709 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1712 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1713 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1717 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
, NULL
))
1719 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1723 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1725 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1727 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1728 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1731 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1733 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
1735 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1738 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1742 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1745 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1748 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1749 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1750 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1751 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1753 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1754 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1757 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1758 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1762 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1763 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1764 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1766 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1767 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1768 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1769 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1770 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1771 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1773 *psigs
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs
;
1774 return SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1779 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1780 * specified EC curve.
1782 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int curve
)
1784 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1787 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1788 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1789 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1791 sigs
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs
;
1792 siglen
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->tls12_sigalgs_len
;
1795 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1796 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1800 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1801 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1802 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1810 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1813 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1815 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1818 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1822 int md_type
= EVP_MD_get_type(md
);
1824 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1825 secbits
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
) * 4;
1827 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1828 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1829 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1831 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1832 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1833 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1834 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1836 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1838 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1840 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1843 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1844 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1846 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1850 * For provider-based sigalgs we have secbits information available
1851 * in the (provider-loaded) sigalg_list structure
1853 if ((secbits
== 0) && (lu
->sig_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_NUM
)
1854 && ((lu
->sig_idx
- SSL_PKEY_NUM
) < (int)ctx
->sigalg_list_len
)) {
1855 secbits
= ctx
->sigalg_list
[lu
->sig_idx
- SSL_PKEY_NUM
].secbits
;
1861 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1862 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1865 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1867 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1868 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1870 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1872 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1875 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
);
1877 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1878 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1879 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1880 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1883 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1884 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1885 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1887 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1888 /* if this sigalg is loaded, set so far unknown pkeyid to its sig NID */
1889 if ((pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_KEYMGMT
) && (lu
!= NULL
))
1892 /* Should never happen */
1897 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1898 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1901 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1902 && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1903 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1904 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1905 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1908 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1909 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(
1910 (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) ? EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey
) : pkeyid
,
1911 &cidx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
))
1912 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1913 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1917 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1919 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1920 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1921 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1922 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1926 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1927 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1928 int curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1930 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1931 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1935 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1936 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1937 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1941 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1942 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1943 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1944 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1945 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1946 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1951 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1952 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1956 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1957 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1958 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1959 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1962 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1963 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1964 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1965 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1968 if (!tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
, &md
)) {
1969 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1973 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1974 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1976 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1977 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1978 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
);
1980 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1981 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_get_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1982 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1983 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1986 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1987 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1991 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1993 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
1998 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
2000 *pnid
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
2004 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
2006 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
2011 if (sc
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
2013 *pnid
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
2018 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
2019 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
2020 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
2022 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
2025 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
2027 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2029 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
2030 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
2031 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
2032 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
2033 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2036 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
2037 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
2038 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
2039 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
2041 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2043 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2044 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
2045 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
2052 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
2053 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
2054 * @c: cipher to check
2055 * @op: Security check that you want to do
2056 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
2058 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
2060 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
,
2063 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
2064 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
2066 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
2069 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s
))
2070 /* For QUIC, only allow these ciphersuites. */
2071 switch (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
)) {
2072 case TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
:
2073 case TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
:
2074 case TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
:
2080 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2081 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
2084 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
2085 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
2087 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
2088 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
2089 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
2091 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
2094 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2095 && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
2096 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
2099 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
2102 int tls_use_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2104 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
2106 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
2109 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2113 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2114 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2115 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2116 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2118 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2119 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
)
2120 memset(s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
, 0, s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2122 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
= OPENSSL_zalloc(s
->ssl_pkey_num
* sizeof(uint32_t));
2123 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
== NULL
)
2126 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
2127 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
2129 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
2130 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
2131 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2132 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2134 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++) {
2135 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
2140 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
2141 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
2142 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
2143 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2151 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2152 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2155 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
2158 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
2159 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2160 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
2165 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2167 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2168 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2169 * point to the resulting session.
2171 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2172 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
2176 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
2179 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2182 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
2183 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2186 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
2187 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2189 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
2190 if (!ticketext
->present
)
2191 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2193 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
2195 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
2196 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
2200 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2202 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
2203 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
2204 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
2205 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
2208 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2209 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2210 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2211 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2212 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2213 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
2215 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2216 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2217 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2218 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2219 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2220 * point to the resulting session.
2222 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2223 const unsigned char *etick
,
2225 const unsigned char *sess_id
,
2226 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
2228 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
2229 unsigned char *sdec
;
2230 const unsigned char *p
;
2231 int slen
, ivlen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
2232 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2234 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2235 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
2236 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
2237 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
2238 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2240 if (eticklen
== 0) {
2242 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2243 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
2245 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
2248 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
2250 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2251 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2252 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2253 * calculate the master secret later.
2255 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2259 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
2260 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
2261 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2265 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2266 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
2268 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
2271 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2273 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
2276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2277 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
2279 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
2282 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
2285 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
2286 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), nctick
,
2287 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
2289 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
2291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
2292 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
2293 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
2294 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), nctick
,
2295 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
2296 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
2299 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2303 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2309 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
2311 /* Check key name matches */
2312 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
2313 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
2314 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2318 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
2320 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
2321 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
2322 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
2324 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
2325 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
2326 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
2327 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
2328 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2331 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
2332 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
2336 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2339 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
2341 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2345 ivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx
);
2347 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2351 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
2352 if (eticklen
<= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
+ mlen
) {
2353 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2357 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2358 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
2359 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
2360 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2364 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
2365 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2368 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2369 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2370 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
;
2371 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ ivlen
;
2372 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
2373 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
2374 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
2376 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2379 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
2381 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2387 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL
, &p
, slen
, sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
);
2391 /* Some additional consistency checks */
2393 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2395 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2399 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
2400 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
2401 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
2405 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
2406 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
2409 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2411 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2416 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
2418 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
2422 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
2425 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
2426 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
2427 * performs any action
2429 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
2430 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
2431 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
2432 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2433 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
2434 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
2437 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
2438 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
2439 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2440 sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
2442 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
2444 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
2445 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2448 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
2449 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
2450 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2454 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
2455 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
2456 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2457 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2458 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2462 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2463 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2464 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2465 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2466 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2467 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2468 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2470 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2474 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2478 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2480 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2481 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2482 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2483 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2492 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2493 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
,
2494 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2496 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2499 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2501 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2502 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2505 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2508 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
2509 && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2510 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2511 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2512 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2515 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2516 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
->sig_idx
))
2519 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2520 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2521 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2522 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2523 if (s
->server
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
2526 && SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2527 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2529 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2532 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2533 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2534 * ciphersuites enabled.
2537 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2540 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
2541 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2542 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2543 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2545 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2546 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2547 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2550 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2558 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2559 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), lu
);
2560 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2561 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2562 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2566 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2567 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2571 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int op
)
2573 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2574 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2575 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2577 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2580 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2581 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2582 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2583 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2588 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
,
2589 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
2593 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2594 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2595 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2596 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2598 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2601 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2602 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2607 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2608 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2611 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2613 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2616 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2617 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2619 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2620 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2621 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2622 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2626 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2630 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2631 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2632 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2633 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2634 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2636 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2637 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2638 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2639 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2641 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2643 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2645 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2646 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2657 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2658 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2660 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2661 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2663 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2665 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2667 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2668 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2669 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2670 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2671 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2672 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2673 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2674 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2675 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2676 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2678 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2679 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2682 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2683 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2687 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2688 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2690 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2692 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
)
2694 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2698 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2699 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2703 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2709 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2711 /* Invalid data length */
2712 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2717 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
)
2719 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2727 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2734 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2736 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2737 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2739 /* Should never happen */
2740 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2744 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2745 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2747 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2748 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2752 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2754 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2757 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2759 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2762 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ssl_pkey_num
; i
++)
2765 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2766 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2767 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2769 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2770 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2772 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2773 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0
2774 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
), idx
))
2775 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2780 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2781 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2782 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2786 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
2791 psig
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2792 numsigalgs
= sc
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2794 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2797 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2799 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2803 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2805 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2806 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sc
, *psig
);
2808 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2810 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2811 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2812 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2814 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2817 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2818 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2819 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2821 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2822 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
2827 if (sc
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2829 || idx
>= (int)sc
->shared_sigalgslen
2830 || sc
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2832 shsigalgs
= sc
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2834 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2836 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2837 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2838 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2840 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2842 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2843 return (int)sc
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2846 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2847 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2851 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2852 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2855 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2857 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2858 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2859 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2860 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2861 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2862 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2863 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2864 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2866 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2867 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2868 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2871 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2872 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2874 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2876 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2878 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2879 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2880 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2883 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2885 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2887 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2889 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2891 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2892 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2893 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2894 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2895 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2896 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2900 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2902 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2903 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2907 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2914 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2915 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2916 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2918 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2920 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2921 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2925 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2929 /* Reject duplicates */
2930 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2931 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2940 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2941 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2943 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2947 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2951 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2954 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2959 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
)
2961 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2964 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2965 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2966 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2968 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2969 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2970 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2976 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2978 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2983 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
)
2985 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2987 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2988 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2989 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2991 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2993 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2994 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2999 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
3004 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
3005 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3006 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
3008 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
3009 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3010 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
3016 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
3020 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
3022 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
3024 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
3027 if (default_nid
== -1)
3029 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
3031 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
3033 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3035 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
3036 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
3037 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
3039 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
3042 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
3044 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3045 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
3046 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
3047 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3048 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
3054 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3055 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
3057 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
3059 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
3060 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
3061 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
3068 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3069 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3070 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3071 * attempting to use them.
3074 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
3076 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3077 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3078 /* Strict mode flags */
3079 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3080 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3081 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3083 int tls1_check_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
,
3084 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
, int idx
)
3088 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
3089 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
3092 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3096 * idx == -1 means SSL_check_chain() invocation
3097 * idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains
3098 * idx >= 0 means checking SSL_PKEY index
3100 * For RPK, where there may be no cert, we ignore -1
3105 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
3107 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
3108 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3110 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
3112 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
3113 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s
, idx
)) {
3114 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC") && !tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pk
))
3116 *pvalid
= rv
= CERT_PKEY_RPK
;
3119 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3120 if (x
== NULL
|| pk
== NULL
)
3125 if (x
== NULL
|| pk
== NULL
)
3128 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
,
3129 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
3132 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3134 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
3135 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
3137 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
3144 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3145 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
3146 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
3147 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3148 else if (!check_flags
)
3153 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3154 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3156 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
3161 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
3162 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3164 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3168 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
3169 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
3172 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
3173 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
3174 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
3178 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
3179 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
3182 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
3183 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
3184 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
3187 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
3188 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
3189 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
3192 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
3193 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
3194 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
3203 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3204 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3206 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
3208 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3209 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
3210 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
3212 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
3215 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
3222 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3223 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3225 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
3226 * so check_flags is always set.
3228 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
3229 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
3230 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
3234 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
3235 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3236 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3237 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
3239 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3246 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3247 else if (check_flags
)
3248 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3250 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3251 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
3252 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
3253 else if (!check_flags
)
3256 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3257 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3258 else if (strict_mode
) {
3259 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3260 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3261 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
3262 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
3264 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3271 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
3272 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
3275 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
3276 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
3277 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
3278 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
3279 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
3280 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
3283 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
3286 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
3287 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
3288 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3292 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
3295 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3298 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
3301 || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
) == 0
3302 || ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
3303 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3305 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3306 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
3308 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
3309 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3314 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
3317 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3319 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
3320 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
3324 if (TLS1_get_version(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3325 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
3327 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3330 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3334 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
3337 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3338 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
3345 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3346 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3348 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
3349 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
3350 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
3351 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
3352 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
3353 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
3354 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
3355 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
3356 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
3359 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
3360 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
3362 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
3367 return tls1_check_chain(sc
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
3370 EVP_PKEY
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3372 EVP_PKEY
*dhp
= NULL
;
3374 int dh_secbits
= 80, sec_level_bits
;
3375 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3376 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
3377 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
3378 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3380 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
3381 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
3382 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
3387 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
3389 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
3393 /* Do not pick a prime that is too weak for the current security level */
3394 sec_level_bits
= ssl_get_security_level_bits(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
3396 if (dh_secbits
< sec_level_bits
)
3397 dh_secbits
= sec_level_bits
;
3399 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
3400 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
3401 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
3402 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
3403 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
3404 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
3405 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
3406 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
3408 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
3412 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx
->libctx
, "DH", sctx
->propq
);
3414 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) != 1)
3417 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
3419 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
3420 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, 2))
3423 params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
);
3425 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &dhp
, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS
, params
) != 1)
3429 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
3430 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
3431 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3436 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
,
3440 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
3444 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3445 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3446 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3447 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3449 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkey
);
3452 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3454 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3457 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
,
3460 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
3461 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
3463 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
3464 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
3466 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
3468 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
3469 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
3472 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3474 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
3477 int ssl_security_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
,
3481 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
3483 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
3484 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3486 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
3487 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
3489 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
3490 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
3495 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
3496 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
3497 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3500 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
,
3503 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
3506 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
3508 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3513 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3517 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3518 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3519 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3527 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3528 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3531 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3532 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3534 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3535 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
,
3536 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
));
3538 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3540 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3541 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3542 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3545 /* If doing RPK, the CERT_PKEY won't be "valid" */
3546 if (tls12_rpk_and_privkey(s
, sig_idx
))
3547 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_RPK
? sig_idx
: -1;
3549 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3553 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3554 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3556 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3558 static int check_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
,
3559 X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3561 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3562 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3564 const char *mdname
= NULL
;
3565 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3568 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot support signing with this digest,
3569 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3571 if (sig
->hash
!= NID_undef
)
3572 mdname
= OBJ_nid2sn(sig
->hash
);
3573 supported
= EVP_PKEY_digestsign_supports_digest(pkey
, sctx
->libctx
,
3580 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3581 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3583 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3584 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3586 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3587 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3592 * This does not differentiate between the
3593 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3594 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3595 * signing certificate.
3597 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3604 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3605 * a viable public key is permitted.
3611 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3612 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3613 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3614 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3615 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3617 static int has_usable_cert(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3619 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3622 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3625 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3626 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3630 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3631 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3633 static int is_cert_usable(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3638 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
, SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)) == NULL
)
3641 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3642 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3645 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3649 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3650 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3651 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3653 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
*x
,
3656 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3660 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3662 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3663 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3664 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3666 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3667 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3668 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3669 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3670 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3672 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3673 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3675 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3676 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3679 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3680 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3682 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3684 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3685 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3687 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3688 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3689 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3695 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3702 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3703 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3705 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3706 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3708 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3709 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3710 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3712 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3714 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3717 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3718 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3720 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3721 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3725 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3726 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3730 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3731 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3733 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3736 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3738 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3740 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3742 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3744 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3748 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3751 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3752 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3755 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3758 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3760 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3761 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3764 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3765 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3767 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3768 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3769 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3771 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(sctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3774 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3779 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3780 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3781 * we have to assume GOST support.
3783 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
3784 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
3785 & (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) != 0) {
3786 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3789 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3790 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3794 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3798 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3801 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3802 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3807 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3809 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3810 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3812 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3816 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3820 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3821 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3822 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3823 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3824 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3827 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3830 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3831 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3836 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3839 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3840 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3846 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3847 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3848 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3849 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3853 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3855 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3856 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3857 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3861 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3865 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3867 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl
);
3870 || (IS_QUIC(ssl
) && mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
))
3873 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3874 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3875 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3879 sc
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3883 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3885 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3889 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3891 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3893 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3894 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3899 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3900 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3901 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3906 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3907 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3912 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3918 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3921 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3923 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3929 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3934 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3936 OSSL_PARAM params
[2], *p
= params
;
3938 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3939 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3940 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3941 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
, key
, len
, params
))
3944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3945 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3946 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3951 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3953 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3954 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3956 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3957 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
3962 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3965 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3966 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3968 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3969 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
3974 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3976 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3977 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3979 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3980 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);
3985 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3987 char gname
[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE
];
3989 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, gname
, sizeof(gname
), NULL
) > 0)
3990 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname
);
3995 __owur
int tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
3996 const unsigned char *enckey
,
3999 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "DH")) {
4000 int bits
= EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pkey
);
4002 if (bits
<= 0 || enckeylen
!= (size_t)bits
/ 8)
4003 /* the encoded key must be padded to the length of the p */
4005 } else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC")) {
4006 if (enckeylen
< 3 /* point format and at least 1 byte for x and y */
4007 || enckey
[0] != 0x04)
4011 return EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(pkey
, enckey
, enckeylen
);