2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
21 #include "ssl_local.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
26 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
30 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
31 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
32 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
33 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
34 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
36 tls1_export_keying_material
,
38 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
39 tls_close_construct_packet
,
43 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
47 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
48 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
49 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
50 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
51 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
53 tls1_export_keying_material
,
54 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
55 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
56 tls_close_construct_packet
,
60 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
64 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
65 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
66 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
67 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
68 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
70 tls1_export_keying_material
,
71 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
72 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
73 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
74 tls_close_construct_packet
,
78 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
81 tls13_setup_key_block
,
82 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
83 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
84 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
85 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
86 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
88 tls13_export_keying_material
,
89 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
90 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
91 tls_close_construct_packet
,
95 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
98 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
99 * http, the cache would over fill
101 return (60 * 60 * 2);
108 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
114 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
116 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
120 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
125 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
126 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
128 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
134 * Table of group information.
136 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
137 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list
[] = {
138 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
139 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME
, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM
, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
168 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM
, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
169 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
170 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
171 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
172 {NID_ffdhe2048
, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
173 {NID_ffdhe3072
, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
174 {NID_ffdhe4096
, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
175 {NID_ffdhe6144
, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
176 {NID_ffdhe8192
, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3
, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
177 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
182 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
183 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
184 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
185 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
187 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
189 /* The default curves */
190 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
191 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
192 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
193 29, /* X25519 (29) */
194 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
196 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
197 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
200 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
201 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
202 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
203 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
204 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
207 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
210 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
216 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id
)
218 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
221 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
222 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
223 if (nid_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
226 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
230 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
231 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
)
233 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id
);
235 return ginf
== NULL
? NID_undef
: ginf
->nid
;
238 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
242 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
243 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
244 return nid_list
[i
].group_id
;
248 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
251 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
252 * the number of groups supported.
254 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
257 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
258 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
259 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
260 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
261 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
262 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
263 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
266 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
267 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
271 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
272 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
278 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
279 *pgroups
= supported_groups_default
;
280 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
);
282 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
283 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
290 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
293 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int version
)
295 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id
);
297 if (version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
298 if ((ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3
) != 0)
304 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
305 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
307 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(group
);
308 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
312 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
313 if (ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2
)
317 if (ginfo
->flags
& TLS_GROUP_FFDHE
)
320 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
321 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
322 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
, ginfo
->nid
, (void *)gtmp
);
325 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
326 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
329 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
336 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
337 * if there is no match.
338 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
339 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
340 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
342 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
344 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
345 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
348 /* Can't do anything on client side */
352 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
354 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
355 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
357 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
359 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
360 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
361 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
362 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
363 /* Should never happen */
366 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
370 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
371 * otherwise peer decides.
373 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
374 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
375 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
377 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
378 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
381 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
382 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
384 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
385 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
393 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
397 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
398 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
400 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
404 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
405 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
407 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
408 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
409 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
415 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
419 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
420 unsigned long idmask
;
422 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
423 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
425 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
426 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
427 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
441 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
444 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
445 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
449 int nid_arr
[MAX_GROUPLIST
];
452 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
454 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
460 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_GROUPLIST
)
462 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
464 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
466 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
467 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
469 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
470 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
471 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
472 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
473 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
475 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
476 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
478 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
481 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
483 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
484 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
486 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
489 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
493 return tls1_set_groups(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
499 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
500 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
502 const uint16_t *groups
;
508 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
509 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
510 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
512 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
513 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
515 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
516 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
519 /* Should never happen */
524 if (check_own_groups
) {
525 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
526 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
527 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
531 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
534 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
538 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
539 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
542 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
543 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
544 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
545 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
549 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
553 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
557 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
559 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
560 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
561 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
563 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
564 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
566 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
568 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
572 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
573 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
577 unsigned char comp_id
;
580 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
581 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
583 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
584 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
586 /* Get required compression id */
587 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
588 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
589 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
591 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
596 int field_type
= EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
));
598 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
599 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
600 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
601 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
606 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
607 * supported (see RFC4492).
609 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
612 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
613 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
619 /* Return group id of a key */
620 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
622 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
627 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
628 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
));
632 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
633 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
635 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
639 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
642 /* If not EC nothing to do */
643 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
645 /* Check compression */
646 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
648 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
650 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
653 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
656 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
659 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
663 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
664 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
665 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
666 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
667 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
669 return 0; /* Should never happen */
670 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
671 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
680 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
682 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
684 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
685 * is compatible with the client extensions.
687 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
689 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
691 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
693 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
695 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
698 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
699 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
700 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
701 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
708 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
713 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
715 /* Default sigalg schemes */
716 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
718 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
719 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
720 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
721 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
726 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
727 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
728 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
729 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
733 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
737 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
740 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
741 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
742 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
743 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
746 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
747 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
748 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
752 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
753 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
758 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
759 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
760 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
764 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
766 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
767 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
768 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
},
769 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
770 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
771 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
},
772 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
773 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
774 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
},
775 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
776 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
777 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
778 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
779 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
780 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
781 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
782 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
783 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
},
784 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
785 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
786 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
},
788 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
789 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
790 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
791 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
792 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
793 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
794 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
795 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
796 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
797 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
798 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
799 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
800 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
801 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
802 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
803 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
804 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
805 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
806 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
807 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
808 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
809 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
810 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
811 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
812 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
813 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
814 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
815 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
816 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
817 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
818 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
819 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
820 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
},
821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
822 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
823 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
824 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
},
825 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
826 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
827 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
828 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
829 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
830 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
831 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
832 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
833 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
834 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
835 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
836 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
},
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
839 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
840 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
841 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
842 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
843 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
844 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
845 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
846 NID_undef
, NID_undef
},
847 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
848 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
849 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
850 NID_undef
, NID_undef
}
853 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
854 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
855 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
856 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
857 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
862 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
863 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
865 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
866 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
867 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
868 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
869 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
870 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
871 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
872 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
873 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
874 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
877 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
878 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg
)
881 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
883 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
885 if (s
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
890 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
891 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
896 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
897 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
900 md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
910 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
912 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
913 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
914 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
916 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
917 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA
*rsa
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
923 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
925 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
931 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
932 * is fixed by the certificate type.
934 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
940 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
941 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
942 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
944 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
951 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
953 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
956 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
958 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
965 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
968 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
970 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
971 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
973 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
977 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
979 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
980 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
983 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
985 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
987 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
990 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
994 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
997 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1001 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1002 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1003 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1004 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1006 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1007 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1010 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1011 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1016 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1017 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1018 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1020 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1021 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1022 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1023 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1024 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1025 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1027 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1028 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1034 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1035 * specified EC curve.
1037 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1039 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1042 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1043 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1044 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1046 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1047 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1050 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1051 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs
[i
]);
1055 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1056 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1057 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1066 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1067 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1070 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1072 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1073 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1075 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1076 int pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1077 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1079 /* Should never happen */
1082 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1083 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1084 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1086 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1089 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1090 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1091 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1093 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig
);
1095 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1096 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1099 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1100 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1101 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1102 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1103 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1106 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1107 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1108 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1110 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1115 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1117 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1118 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1119 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1120 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1121 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1125 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1126 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1127 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
1128 int curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
1130 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1131 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1132 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1136 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1137 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1138 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1139 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1140 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1143 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1144 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1145 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1146 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1147 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1148 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1149 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1154 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1155 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1156 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1161 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1162 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1163 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1164 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1167 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1168 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1169 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1170 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1171 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1174 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
1175 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1176 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1181 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1182 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1184 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1185 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1186 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1187 EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md
),
1188 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1189 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1190 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1194 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1195 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1199 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1201 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1203 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1207 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1209 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1211 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1216 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1217 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1218 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1220 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1223 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1225 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1227 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1228 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1229 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1230 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1231 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1234 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1235 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1236 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1237 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1239 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1241 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1242 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1243 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1250 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1251 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1252 * @c: cipher to check
1253 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1254 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1256 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1258 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1260 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1261 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1263 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1265 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1266 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1269 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1270 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1272 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1273 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1274 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1276 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1279 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1280 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1283 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1286 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1288 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1290 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1293 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1297 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1298 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1299 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1300 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1301 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1302 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1303 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1305 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1306 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1308 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1309 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1310 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1311 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1313 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1314 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1319 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1320 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1321 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1322 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1330 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1332 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1335 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1338 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1339 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1340 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1345 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1347 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1348 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1349 * point to the resulting session.
1351 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1355 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1358 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1361 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1362 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1365 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1366 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1368 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1369 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1370 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1372 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1374 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1375 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1379 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1381 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1382 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1383 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1384 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1387 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1388 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1389 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1390 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1391 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1392 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1394 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1395 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1396 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1397 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1398 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1399 * point to the resulting session.
1401 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1402 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1403 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1405 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1406 unsigned char *sdec
;
1407 const unsigned char *p
;
1408 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1409 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1411 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1412 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
1413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1414 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1416 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1418 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1419 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1421 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1424 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1426 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1427 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1428 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1429 * calculate the master secret later.
1431 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1435 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1436 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1437 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1441 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1442 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
1444 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1447 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1449 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1452 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
1453 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1454 int rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1455 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1458 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1462 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1468 /* Check key name matches */
1469 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1470 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1471 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1474 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1475 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1476 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
1477 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
1478 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1479 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1480 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1483 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1487 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1490 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
1492 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1496 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1498 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1499 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1503 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1504 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1505 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
1506 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1510 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1511 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1514 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1515 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1516 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1517 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1518 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1519 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1520 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1522 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1525 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1527 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1533 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1537 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1539 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1541 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1545 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1546 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1547 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1551 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1552 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1555 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1557 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1562 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1564 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1567 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1568 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
1571 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1572 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1573 * performs any action
1575 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1576 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1577 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1578 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1579 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1580 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1583 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1584 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1585 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1587 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1589 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1590 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1593 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1594 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1595 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1599 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1600 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1601 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1602 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1603 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1607 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
1608 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
1609 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1610 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
1611 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1612 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
1613 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1615 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1619 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1623 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1625 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
1626 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
1627 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
1628 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1637 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1638 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1640 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
1643 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1644 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
1646 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1647 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1649 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1650 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
1651 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1652 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1653 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
1656 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1657 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
1660 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1661 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1662 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
1663 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1664 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1667 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1668 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1670 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1673 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1674 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1675 * ciphersuites enabled.
1678 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1681 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
1682 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
1683 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
1684 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1686 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
1687 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1688 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
1691 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kGOST
) != 0)
1699 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
)
1701 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1702 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
)) * 4;
1703 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1704 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
1705 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
1706 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
1710 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1711 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1715 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
1717 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
1718 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
1719 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
1721 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1724 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
1725 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
1726 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs
);
1727 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1732 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
1736 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1737 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
1738 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
1739 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
1741 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
1744 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1745 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
1750 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
1751 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1753 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1755 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
1758 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1759 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1761 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1762 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
1763 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1764 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
1772 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1773 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
1774 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
1775 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
1777 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
1778 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
1779 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
1780 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp
);
1782 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1783 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
1785 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
1786 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
1797 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1798 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1800 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
1801 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
1803 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
1805 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
1807 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1808 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1809 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1810 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1811 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1812 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
1813 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
1814 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
1815 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
1816 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1818 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
1819 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
1822 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1823 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1827 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1828 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1830 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1832 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
1833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1836 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
1840 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
1841 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
1845 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
1851 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1853 /* Invalid data length */
1854 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
1859 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1863 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
1871 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
1878 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
1880 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1881 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1883 /* Should never happen */
1884 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
1888 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
1889 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
1891 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
1892 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
1896 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1898 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1901 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
1903 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
1906 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1909 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
1910 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
1911 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
1913 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1914 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1916 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1917 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
1918 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1923 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1924 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1925 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1927 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
1928 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
1929 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
1932 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1934 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
1938 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
1940 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
1941 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig
);
1943 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
1945 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
1946 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1947 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
1949 return (int)numsigalgs
;
1952 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
1953 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
1954 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
1956 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
1957 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
1959 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
1960 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
1962 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
1964 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
1966 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
1967 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
1968 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
1970 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
1972 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
1973 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
1976 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1977 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1981 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1982 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
1985 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
1987 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
1988 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
1989 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
1990 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1991 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
1992 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
1993 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1994 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
1996 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
1997 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
1998 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2001 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2002 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2004 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2006 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2008 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2009 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2010 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2013 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2015 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2017 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2019 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2021 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2022 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2023 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2024 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2025 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2026 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2030 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2032 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2033 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2037 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2044 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2045 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2046 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2048 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2050 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2051 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2055 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2059 /* Reject duplicates */
2060 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2061 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2070 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2071 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2073 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2077 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2081 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2084 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2089 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2093 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2096 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2097 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2098 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2100 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2101 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2102 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2108 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2110 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2115 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2119 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2121 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2122 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2123 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2125 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2127 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2128 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2133 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2138 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2139 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2140 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2142 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2143 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2144 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2150 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2154 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2156 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2158 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2160 if (default_nid
== -1)
2162 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2164 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2166 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2168 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2169 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2170 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2172 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2175 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2177 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2178 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2179 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2180 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2181 if (sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2187 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2188 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2192 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2193 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2194 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2201 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2202 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2203 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2204 * attempting to use them.
2207 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2209 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2210 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2211 /* Strict mode flags */
2212 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2213 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2214 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2216 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2221 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2222 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2225 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2226 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2228 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2231 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2233 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2234 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2236 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2238 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2239 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2248 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2251 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2253 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2254 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2256 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2263 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2264 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2265 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2266 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2267 else if (!check_flags
)
2272 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2273 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2275 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2278 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2279 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2281 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2285 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2286 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2289 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2290 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2291 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2295 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2296 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2299 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2300 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2301 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2304 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2305 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2306 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2309 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2310 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2311 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2320 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2321 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2323 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2325 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2326 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2327 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p
);
2329 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2332 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2339 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2340 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2342 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2343 * so check_flags is always set.
2345 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2346 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2347 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2351 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2352 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2353 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2354 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2356 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2363 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2364 else if (check_flags
)
2365 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2367 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2368 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2369 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2370 else if (!check_flags
)
2373 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2374 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2375 else if (strict_mode
) {
2376 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2377 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2378 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2379 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2381 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2388 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2389 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2391 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
2393 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2396 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2399 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2403 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2406 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2407 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2408 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2412 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2415 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2418 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2420 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2421 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2423 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2424 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2425 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2427 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2428 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2429 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2430 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2431 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2436 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2439 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2441 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2442 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2446 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2447 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2449 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2452 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2456 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2459 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2460 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2467 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2468 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2470 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2471 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2472 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2473 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2474 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2475 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2476 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2477 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2478 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2481 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2482 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2484 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2488 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2490 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2491 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
2492 return DH_get_1024_160();
2493 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2494 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2499 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2501 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2504 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
2510 if (g
== NULL
|| !BN_set_word(g
, 2)) {
2515 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2516 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2518 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2519 if (p
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2527 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2528 return DH_get_2048_224();
2529 return DH_get_1024_160();
2533 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2536 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2539 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2540 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2541 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2542 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2544 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2547 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2549 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2552 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2554 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2555 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2556 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2557 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2559 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2561 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2562 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2565 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2567 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2570 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2573 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2575 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2576 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2578 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2579 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2581 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2582 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2587 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2588 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2589 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2592 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2594 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2596 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2601 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2605 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2606 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2607 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2615 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2616 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2619 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2621 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2622 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
2624 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2626 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
2627 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2628 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
2631 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
2635 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2636 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2638 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2640 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
2643 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2644 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
2648 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
2649 * the answer is simply 'no'.
2652 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey
, sig
->hash
);
2658 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
2659 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
2661 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2662 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
2664 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2665 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
2670 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2671 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2672 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2673 * signing certificate.
2675 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
2682 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
2683 * a viable public key is permitted.
2689 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2690 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2691 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2692 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2693 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2695 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
2697 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2700 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
2703 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
2704 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
2708 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2709 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2711 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
2716 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
2719 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2720 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
2723 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
2727 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2728 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2729 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2731 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
2733 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2740 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2741 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2742 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2744 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2745 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
2746 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
2747 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
2748 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2750 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2751 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu
, NULL
))
2753 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
2754 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
2757 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
2758 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2760 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2763 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey
);
2764 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2766 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
2771 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2772 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2773 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey
), lu
))
2779 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
2786 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2787 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2789 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2790 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2792 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2793 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2794 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2796 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
2798 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
2801 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
2802 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
2804 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2805 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
2809 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2810 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2814 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2815 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
2817 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
2820 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2822 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2826 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2827 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
2828 EC_KEY
*ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
2829 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
));
2836 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2839 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2840 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2843 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
2846 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
2848 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2849 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
2852 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2853 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
2855 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2856 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2857 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
2859 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey
), lu
))
2862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2863 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
2867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2869 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2870 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2871 * we have to assume GOST support.
2873 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
2874 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2877 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2878 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2879 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2883 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2887 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
2890 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2891 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2892 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2897 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2899 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
2900 size_t sent_sigslen
;
2902 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2905 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2906 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2910 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2911 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
2912 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
2913 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
2914 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2917 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
2920 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
2921 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2922 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
2927 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
2930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
2931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2937 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
2938 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
2939 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
2940 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
2944 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
2946 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2947 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2949 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2953 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2957 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
2959 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2960 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
2962 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
2966 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
2970 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
2972 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;