2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/provider.h>
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/evp.h"
27 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
28 #include "ssl_local.h"
29 #include <openssl/ct.h>
31 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER
)
33 DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME
)
35 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
36 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
38 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
42 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
43 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
44 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
45 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
46 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
48 tls1_export_keying_material
,
50 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
51 tls_close_construct_packet
,
55 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
59 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
60 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
61 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
62 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
63 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
65 tls1_export_keying_material
,
66 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
67 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
68 tls_close_construct_packet
,
72 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
76 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
77 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
78 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
79 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
80 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
82 tls1_export_keying_material
,
83 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
84 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
85 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
86 tls_close_construct_packet
,
90 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
93 tls13_setup_key_block
,
94 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
95 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
96 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
97 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
98 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
100 tls13_export_keying_material
,
101 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
102 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
103 tls_close_construct_packet
,
107 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
110 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
111 * http, the cache would over fill
113 return (60 * 60 * 2);
120 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
126 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
128 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
132 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
137 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
138 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
140 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
145 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
146 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
151 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
152 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
153 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
154 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
155 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
156 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
157 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
158 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
159 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
160 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
161 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
162 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
163 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
164 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
165 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
166 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
167 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
168 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
169 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
170 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
171 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
172 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
173 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
174 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
175 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
176 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
177 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
178 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
179 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
180 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, 0x0022},
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, 0x0023},
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, 0x0024},
184 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, 0x0025},
185 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, 0x0026},
186 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, 0x0027},
187 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, 0x0028},
188 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
189 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
190 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
191 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
192 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
197 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
198 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
200 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
202 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
204 /* The default curves */
205 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
206 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
207 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
208 29, /* X25519 (29) */
209 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
211 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
214 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
215 34, /* GC256A (34) */
216 35, /* GC256B (35) */
217 36, /* GC256C (36) */
218 37, /* GC256D (37) */
219 38, /* GC512A (38) */
220 39, /* GC512B (39) */
221 40, /* GC512C (40) */
223 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
224 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
225 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
226 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
227 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
228 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
231 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
234 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
240 struct provider_group_data_st
{
242 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
245 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
246 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
247 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
249 struct provider_group_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
250 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
251 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
253 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
254 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
258 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
259 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
261 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
262 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
263 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
265 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
266 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
267 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
268 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
270 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
273 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
274 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
276 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
277 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
280 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
282 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
283 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
284 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
287 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
288 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
) {
289 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
293 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
294 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
295 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
298 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
299 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
) {
300 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
304 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
305 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
306 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
309 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
311 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
312 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
313 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
316 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
317 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
) {
318 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
322 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
323 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
324 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
328 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
329 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
330 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
334 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
335 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
336 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
340 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
341 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
342 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
346 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
347 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
348 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
352 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
353 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
354 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
358 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
359 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
361 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
362 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
364 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
365 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
366 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
367 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
368 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
369 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
372 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
373 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
374 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
377 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
381 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
382 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
383 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
384 ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
389 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
391 struct provider_group_data_st pgd
;
394 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
395 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
396 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
399 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
401 return OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
);
404 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
409 /* See if we can identify a nid for this name */
410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
411 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(name
);
413 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
414 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(name
);
415 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
416 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(name
);
418 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
419 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
421 && nid
== tls1_group_id2nid(ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
,
423 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
429 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
433 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
434 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
435 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
441 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
442 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
450 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
451 * work for groups we don't know about.
453 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
455 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
456 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
458 if (!include_unknown
)
460 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
463 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
468 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
469 * work for groups we don't know about.
471 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
473 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
474 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
479 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
482 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
483 * the number of groups supported.
485 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
488 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
489 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
490 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
491 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
492 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
493 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
494 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
497 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
498 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
502 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
503 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
509 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
510 *pgroups
= supported_groups_default
;
511 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
);
513 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
514 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
521 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
524 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int minversion
, int maxversion
)
526 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group_id
);
532 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
533 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
535 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
538 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
539 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
540 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
542 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
544 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
547 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
548 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
549 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
555 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
556 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
558 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group
);
559 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
564 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
565 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
566 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
567 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
570 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
571 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
574 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
581 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
582 * if there is no match.
583 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
584 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
585 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
587 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
589 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
590 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
593 /* Can't do anything on client side */
597 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
599 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
600 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
602 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
604 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
605 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
606 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
607 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
608 /* Should never happen */
611 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
615 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
616 * otherwise peer decides.
618 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
619 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
620 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
622 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
623 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
626 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
627 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
629 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
630 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
638 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
642 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
643 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
645 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
649 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
650 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
652 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
653 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
654 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
660 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
664 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
665 unsigned long idmask
;
667 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
668 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
670 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
671 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
672 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
686 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
689 /* TODO(3.0): An arbitrary amount for now. Take another look at this */
690 # define MAX_GROUPLIST 40
695 uint16_t gid_arr
[MAX_GROUPLIST
];
698 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
700 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
707 if (garg
->gidcnt
== MAX_GROUPLIST
)
709 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
711 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
714 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
717 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
718 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
720 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
724 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
725 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
733 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
739 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
742 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
746 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
750 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
751 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
753 const uint16_t *groups
;
759 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
760 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
761 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
763 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
764 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
766 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
767 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
770 /* Should never happen */
775 if (check_own_groups
) {
776 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
777 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
778 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
782 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
785 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
789 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
790 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
793 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
794 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
795 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
796 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
800 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
804 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
808 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
810 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
811 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
812 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
814 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
815 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
817 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
819 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
823 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
824 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
828 unsigned char comp_id
;
831 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
832 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
834 ec
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
);
835 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
837 /* Get required compression id */
838 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
839 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
840 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
842 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
847 int field_type
= EC_GROUP_get_field_type(grp
);
849 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
850 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
851 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
852 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
857 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
858 * supported (see RFC4492).
860 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
863 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
864 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
870 /* Return group id of a key */
871 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
873 int curve_nid
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey
);
875 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
877 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
881 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
882 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
884 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
888 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
891 /* If not EC nothing to do */
892 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
894 /* Check compression */
895 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
897 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
899 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
902 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
905 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
908 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
912 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
913 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
914 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
915 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
916 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
918 return 0; /* Should never happen */
919 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
920 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
929 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
931 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
933 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
934 * is compatible with the client extensions.
936 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
938 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
940 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
942 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
944 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
947 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
948 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
949 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
950 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
957 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
962 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
964 /* Default sigalg schemes */
965 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
967 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
968 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
969 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
970 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
974 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
975 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
976 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
977 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
979 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
981 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
982 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
983 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
986 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
990 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
997 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1000 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1003 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1009 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1010 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1015 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1017 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1018 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1019 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1020 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1021 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1022 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1023 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1024 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1025 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1026 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1027 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1028 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1029 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1030 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1031 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1032 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1033 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1034 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1035 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1036 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1037 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1039 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1040 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1041 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1042 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1043 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1044 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1045 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1046 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1047 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1048 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1049 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1050 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1051 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1052 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1053 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1054 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1055 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1056 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1057 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1058 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1059 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1060 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1061 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1062 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1063 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1064 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1065 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1066 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1067 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1068 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1069 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1070 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1071 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1073 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1074 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1075 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1076 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1077 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1078 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1079 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1080 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1081 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1082 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1083 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1084 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1085 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1086 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1087 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1090 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1091 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1092 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1093 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1094 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1095 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1096 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1097 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1098 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1099 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1100 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1101 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1102 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1103 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1104 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1105 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1106 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1107 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1108 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1109 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1112 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1113 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1114 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1115 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1116 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1117 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1121 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1122 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1124 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1125 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1126 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1127 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1128 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1129 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1130 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1131 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1132 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1133 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1136 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1139 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1140 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
1141 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu
) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
));
1142 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1145 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1149 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1150 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1156 * Check hash is available.
1157 * TODO(3.0): This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1158 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1159 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1160 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1161 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1163 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1164 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1165 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1169 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1170 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1173 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1174 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1176 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1177 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1180 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1185 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1186 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1190 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1191 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, uint16_t sigalg
)
1194 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1196 for (i
= 0, lu
= s
->ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1197 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1198 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1200 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
)
1205 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1206 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1211 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1212 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1215 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1225 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1227 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1228 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1229 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1231 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1232 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1233 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1239 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1241 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1247 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1248 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1249 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1250 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1251 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1253 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
1259 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1260 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1261 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
1263 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1270 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1272 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1275 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1277 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1284 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1285 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1287 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1290 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1292 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1299 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1302 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1304 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1305 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1307 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
1309 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1313 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1315 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1317 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1318 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1321 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1323 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
1325 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1328 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1332 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1335 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1339 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1340 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1341 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1342 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1345 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1348 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1349 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1354 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1355 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1356 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1358 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1359 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1360 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1361 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1362 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1363 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1365 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1366 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1372 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1373 * specified EC curve.
1375 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1377 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1380 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1381 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1382 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1384 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1385 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1388 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1389 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1393 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1394 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1395 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1404 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1407 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1409 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1412 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1416 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1417 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
1419 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1420 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1422 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1429 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1430 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1433 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1435 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1436 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1438 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1440 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1443 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1444 /* Should never happen */
1447 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1448 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1449 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1450 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1451 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1454 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1455 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1456 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1458 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1460 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1461 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1464 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1465 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1466 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1467 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1468 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1471 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1472 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1473 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1474 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1475 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1480 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1482 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1483 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1484 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1485 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1486 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1490 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1491 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1492 int curve
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey
);
1494 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1496 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1500 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1501 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1502 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1504 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1507 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1508 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1509 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1510 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1511 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1512 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1513 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1518 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1519 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1520 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1525 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1526 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1527 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1528 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1531 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1532 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1533 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1535 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1538 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
1539 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1540 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1544 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1545 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1547 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1548 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1549 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
1551 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1552 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1553 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1555 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1558 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1559 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1563 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1565 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1567 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1571 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1573 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1575 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1580 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1581 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1582 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1584 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1587 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1589 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1591 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1592 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1593 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1594 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1595 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1598 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1599 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1600 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1601 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1603 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1605 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1606 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1607 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1614 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1615 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1616 * @c: cipher to check
1617 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1618 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1620 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1622 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1624 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1625 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1627 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1629 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1630 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1633 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1634 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1636 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1637 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1638 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1640 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1643 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1644 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1647 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1650 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1652 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1654 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1657 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1661 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1662 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1663 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1664 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1665 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1666 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1667 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1669 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1670 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1672 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1673 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1674 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1675 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1677 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1678 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1683 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1684 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1685 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1686 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1694 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1695 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1696 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1699 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1702 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1703 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
1704 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1709 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1711 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1712 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1713 * point to the resulting session.
1715 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1719 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1722 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1725 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1726 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1729 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1730 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1732 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1733 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1734 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1736 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1738 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1739 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1743 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1745 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1746 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1747 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1748 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1751 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1752 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1753 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1754 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1755 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1756 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1758 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1759 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1760 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1761 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1762 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1763 * point to the resulting session.
1765 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1766 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1767 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1769 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1770 unsigned char *sdec
;
1771 const unsigned char *p
;
1772 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1773 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1775 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1776 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1777 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1778 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1780 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1782 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1783 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1785 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1788 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1790 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1791 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1792 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1793 * calculate the master secret later.
1795 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1799 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1800 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1801 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1805 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1806 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1808 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1811 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1813 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1817 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1819 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1822 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1825 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1826 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, nctick
,
1827 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1829 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1832 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1833 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1834 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1835 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1836 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1839 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1843 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1849 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
1851 /* Check key name matches */
1852 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1853 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1854 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1858 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
1860 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
1861 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1862 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1864 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
1865 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1866 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1867 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1868 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1871 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1872 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1876 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1879 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1881 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1885 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1887 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1888 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1892 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1893 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1894 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
1895 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1899 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1900 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1903 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1904 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1905 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1906 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1907 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1908 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1909 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1911 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1914 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1916 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1922 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1926 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1928 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1930 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1934 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1935 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1936 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1940 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1941 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1944 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1946 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1951 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1953 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1956 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1957 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
1960 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1961 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1962 * performs any action
1964 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1965 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1966 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1967 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1968 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1969 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1972 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1973 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1974 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1976 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1978 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1979 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1982 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1983 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1984 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1988 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1989 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1990 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1991 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1992 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1996 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
1997 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
1998 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1999 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2000 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2001 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2002 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2004 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2008 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2012 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2014 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2015 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2016 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2017 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2026 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2027 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2029 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2032 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2034 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2035 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2037 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
2038 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2039 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2040 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2041 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2044 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2045 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu
->sig_idx
))
2048 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2049 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2050 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2051 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2052 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
2055 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2056 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2058 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2061 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2062 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2063 * ciphersuites enabled.
2066 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2069 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
2070 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2071 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2072 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2074 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2075 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2076 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2079 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2087 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2088 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
2089 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2090 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2091 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2095 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2096 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2100 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
2102 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2103 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2104 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2106 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2109 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2110 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2111 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2112 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2117 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
2121 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2122 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2123 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2124 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2126 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2129 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2130 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2135 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2136 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2138 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2140 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2143 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2144 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2146 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2147 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2148 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2149 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2157 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2158 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2159 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2160 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2162 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2163 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2164 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2165 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2167 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2168 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2170 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2171 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2182 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2183 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2185 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2186 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2188 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2190 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2192 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2193 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2194 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2195 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2196 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2197 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2198 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2199 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2200 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2201 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2203 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2204 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2207 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2208 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2212 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2213 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2215 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2217 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2221 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2225 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2226 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2230 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2236 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2238 /* Invalid data length */
2239 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2244 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2248 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2256 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2263 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2265 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2266 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2268 /* Should never happen */
2269 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2273 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2274 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2276 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2277 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2281 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2283 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2286 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2288 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2291 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2294 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2295 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2296 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2298 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2299 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2301 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2302 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx
))
2303 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2308 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2309 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2310 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2312 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2313 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2314 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2317 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2319 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2323 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2325 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2326 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2328 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2330 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2331 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2332 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2334 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2337 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2338 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2339 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2341 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2342 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2344 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
2345 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2347 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2349 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2351 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2352 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2353 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2355 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2357 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2358 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2361 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2362 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2366 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2367 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2370 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2372 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2373 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2374 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2375 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2376 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2377 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2378 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2379 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2381 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2382 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2383 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2386 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2387 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2389 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2391 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2393 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2394 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2395 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2398 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2400 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2402 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2404 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2406 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2407 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2408 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2409 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2410 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2411 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2415 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2417 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2418 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2422 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2429 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2430 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2431 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2433 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2435 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2436 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2440 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2444 /* Reject duplicates */
2445 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2446 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2455 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2456 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2458 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2462 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2466 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2469 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2474 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2478 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2481 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2482 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2483 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2485 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2486 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2487 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2493 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2495 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2500 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2504 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2506 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2507 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2508 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2510 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2512 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2513 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2518 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2523 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2524 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2525 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2527 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2528 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2529 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2535 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2539 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2541 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2543 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2545 if (default_nid
== -1)
2547 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2549 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2551 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2553 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2554 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2555 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2557 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2560 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2562 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2563 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2564 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2565 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2566 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2572 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2573 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2575 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
2577 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2578 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2579 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2586 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2587 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2588 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2589 * attempting to use them.
2592 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2594 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2595 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2596 /* Strict mode flags */
2597 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2598 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2599 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2601 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2606 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2607 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2610 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2611 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2613 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2616 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2618 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2619 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2621 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2623 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2624 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2633 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2636 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2638 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2639 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2641 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2648 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2649 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2650 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2651 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2652 else if (!check_flags
)
2657 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2658 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2660 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2663 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2664 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2666 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2670 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2671 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2674 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2675 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2676 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2680 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2681 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2684 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2685 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2686 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2689 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2690 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2691 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2694 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2695 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2696 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2705 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2706 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2708 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2710 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2711 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2712 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
2714 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2717 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2724 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2725 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2727 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2728 * so check_flags is always set.
2730 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2731 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2732 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2736 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2737 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2738 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2739 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2741 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2748 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2749 else if (check_flags
)
2750 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2752 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2753 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2754 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2755 else if (!check_flags
)
2758 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2759 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2760 else if (strict_mode
) {
2761 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2762 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2763 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2764 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2766 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2773 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2774 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2777 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
2778 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2779 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
2780 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2781 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
2782 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2785 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2788 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2789 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2790 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2794 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2797 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2800 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2802 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2803 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2805 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2806 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2807 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2809 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2810 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2811 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2812 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2813 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2818 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2821 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2823 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2824 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2828 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2829 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2831 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2834 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2838 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2841 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2842 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2849 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2850 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2852 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2853 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2854 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2855 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2856 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2857 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2858 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2859 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2860 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2863 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2864 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2866 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2869 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2870 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2874 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2875 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
2876 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2877 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2882 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2884 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2892 if (g
== NULL
|| !BN_set_word(g
, 2)) {
2897 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2898 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2899 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
2900 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
2901 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
2902 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2903 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2904 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
2906 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
2907 if (p
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2917 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2920 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2923 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2924 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2925 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2926 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2928 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2931 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2933 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2936 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2938 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2939 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2940 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2941 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2943 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2945 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2946 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2949 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2951 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2954 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2957 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2959 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2960 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2962 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2963 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2965 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2966 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2971 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2972 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2973 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2976 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
2978 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
2980 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
2985 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
2989 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
2990 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
2991 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
2999 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3000 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3003 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3005 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3006 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
3008 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3010 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3011 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3012 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3015 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3019 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3020 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3022 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3024 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3027 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3028 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3032 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3033 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3036 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey
, sig
->hash
);
3042 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3043 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3045 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3046 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3048 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3049 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3054 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3055 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3056 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3057 * signing certificate.
3059 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3066 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3067 * a viable public key is permitted.
3073 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3074 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3075 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3076 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3077 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3079 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3081 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3084 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3087 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3088 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3092 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3093 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3095 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3100 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
3103 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3104 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3107 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3111 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3112 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3113 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3115 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3117 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3124 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3125 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3126 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3128 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3129 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3130 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3131 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3132 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3134 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3135 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3137 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3138 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3141 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3142 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3144 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3147 curve
= evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3148 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3153 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3154 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3155 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3161 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3168 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3169 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3171 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3172 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3174 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3175 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3176 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3178 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3180 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3183 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3184 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3186 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3187 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3192 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3196 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3197 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3199 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3202 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3204 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3208 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3211 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3216 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3219 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3220 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3223 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3226 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3228 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3229 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3232 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3233 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3235 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3236 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3237 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3239 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3242 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3243 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3249 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3250 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3251 * we have to assume GOST support.
3253 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
3254 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3257 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3258 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3259 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3263 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3267 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3270 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3271 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3272 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3277 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3279 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3280 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3282 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3285 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3286 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3290 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3291 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3292 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3293 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3294 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3297 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3300 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
3301 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3302 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3307 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG
,
3311 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3317 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3318 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3319 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3320 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3324 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3326 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3327 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
3329 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3333 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3337 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3339 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3340 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
,
3342 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3346 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3350 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3352 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3356 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3358 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3360 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3361 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3366 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3367 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3368 ret
->old_ctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3369 if (ret
->old_ctx
== NULL
)
3374 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", NULL
);
3375 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_new_ctx(mac
)) == NULL
)
3380 EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ret
->ctx
);
3386 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3389 EVP_MAC_free_ctx(ctx
->ctx
);
3390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3391 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx
->old_ctx
);
3397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3398 HMAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3400 return ctx
->old_ctx
;
3404 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3409 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3411 OSSL_PARAM params
[3], *p
= params
;
3413 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3414 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3415 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY
, key
, len
);
3416 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3417 if (EVP_MAC_set_ctx_params(ctx
->ctx
, params
) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
))
3420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3421 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3422 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx
->old_ctx
, key
, len
,
3423 EVP_get_digestbyname(md
), NULL
);
3428 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3430 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3431 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3433 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3434 return HMAC_Update(ctx
->old_ctx
, data
, len
);
3439 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3442 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3443 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3445 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
) {
3448 if (HMAC_Final(ctx
->old_ctx
, md
, &l
) > 0) {
3458 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3460 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3461 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3463 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3464 return HMAC_size(ctx
->old_ctx
);