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Submitted by: Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 #endif
127
128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
129 tls1_enc,
130 tls1_mac,
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_alert_code,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
141 };
142
143 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
144 {
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
147 return(60*60*2);
148 }
149
150 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
151 {
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
154 return(1);
155 }
156
157 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 {
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 {
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 }
164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
165 ssl3_free(s);
166 }
167
168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 {
170 ssl3_clear(s);
171 s->version = s->method->version;
172 }
173
174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
175
176 static int nid_list[] =
177 {
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 };
204
205
206 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
207 {
208 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
209 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
211 };
212
213 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
214 {
215 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
216 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
217 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
218 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
219 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
220 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
221 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
222 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
223 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
224 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
225 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
226 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
227 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
228 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
229 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
230 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
231 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
232 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
233 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
234 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
235 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
236 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
237 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 };
241
242 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
243 {
244 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
245 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
246 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
247 return 0;
248 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
249 }
250
251 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
252 {
253 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
254 switch (nid)
255 {
256 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
257 return 1;
258 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
259 return 2;
260 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
261 return 3;
262 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
263 return 4;
264 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
265 return 5;
266 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
267 return 6;
268 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
269 return 7;
270 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
271 return 8;
272 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
273 return 9;
274 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
275 return 10;
276 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 return 11;
278 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
279 return 12;
280 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
281 return 13;
282 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
283 return 14;
284 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
285 return 15;
286 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
287 return 16;
288 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
289 return 17;
290 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
291 return 18;
292 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
293 return 19;
294 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
295 return 20;
296 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
297 return 21;
298 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
299 return 22;
300 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
301 return 23;
302 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
303 return 24;
304 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
305 return 25;
306 default:
307 return 0;
308 }
309 }
310 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
311 * preferred list
312 */
313 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
314 const unsigned char **pcurves,
315 size_t *pcurveslen)
316 {
317 if (sess)
318 {
319 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
320 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
321 }
322 else
323 {
324 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
325 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
326 }
327 /* If not set use default: for now static structure */
328 if (!*pcurves)
329 {
330 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
331 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
332 }
333 }
334
335 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
336 * matches.
337 */
338
339 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
340 {
341 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
342 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
343 int k;
344 /* Can't do anything on client side */
345 if (s->server == 0)
346 return -1;
347 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
348 &supp, &supplen);
349 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
350 &pref, &preflen);
351 preflen /= 2;
352 supplen /= 2;
353 k = 0;
354 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
355 {
356 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
357 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
358 {
359 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
360 {
361 if (nmatch == k)
362 {
363 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
364 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
365 }
366 k++;
367 }
368 }
369 }
370 if (nmatch == -1)
371 return k;
372 return 0;
373 }
374
375 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
376 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
377 {
378 unsigned char *clist, *p;
379 size_t i;
380 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
381 * while curve ids < 32
382 */
383 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
384 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
385 if (!clist)
386 return 0;
387 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
388 {
389 unsigned long idmask;
390 int id;
391 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
392 idmask = 1L << id;
393 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
394 {
395 OPENSSL_free(clist);
396 return 0;
397 }
398 dup_list |= idmask;
399 s2n(id, p);
400 }
401 if (*pext)
402 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
403 *pext = clist;
404 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
405 return 1;
406 }
407
408 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
409
410 typedef struct
411 {
412 size_t nidcnt;
413 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
414 } nid_cb_st;
415
416 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
417 {
418 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
419 size_t i;
420 int nid;
421 char etmp[20];
422 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
423 return 0;
424 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
425 return 0;
426 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
427 etmp[len] = 0;
428 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
429 if (nid == NID_undef)
430 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
431 if (nid == NID_undef)
432 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
434 return 0;
435 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
436 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
437 return 0;
438 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
439 return 1;
440 }
441 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
442 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
443 const char *str)
444 {
445 nid_cb_st ncb;
446 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
447 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
448 return 0;
449 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
450 }
451 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
452 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
453 EC_KEY *ec)
454 {
455 int is_prime, id;
456 const EC_GROUP *grp;
457 const EC_POINT *pt;
458 const EC_METHOD *meth;
459 if (!ec)
460 return 0;
461 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
462 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
463 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
464 if (!grp || !pt)
465 return 0;
466 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
467 if (!meth)
468 return 0;
469 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
470 is_prime = 1;
471 else
472 is_prime = 0;
473 /* Determine curve ID */
474 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
475 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
476 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
477 if (id)
478 {
479 curve_id[0] = 0;
480 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
481 }
482 else
483 {
484 curve_id[0] = 0xff;
485 if (is_prime)
486 curve_id[1] = 0x01;
487 else
488 curve_id[1] = 0x02;
489 }
490 if (comp_id)
491 {
492 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
493 {
494 if (is_prime)
495 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
496 else
497 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
498 }
499 else
500 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
501 }
502 return 1;
503 }
504 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
505 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
506 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
507 {
508 const unsigned char *p;
509 size_t plen, i;
510 int j;
511 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
512 * is supported (see RFC4492).
513 */
514 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
515 {
516 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
517 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
518 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
519 {
520 if (*comp_id == *p)
521 break;
522 }
523 if (i == plen)
524 return 0;
525 }
526 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
527 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
528 {
529 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
530 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
531 {
532 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
533 break;
534 }
535 if (i == plen)
536 return 0;
537 }
538 return 1;
539 }
540 /* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions */
541 int tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s)
542 {
543 int rv;
544 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC;
545 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
546 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
547 if (!cpk->x509 || !cpk->privatekey)
548 return 0;
549 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509);
550 if (!pkey)
551 return 0;
552 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
553 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
554 if (!rv)
555 return 0;
556 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
557 }
558 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
559 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
560 {
561 unsigned char curve_id[2];
562 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
563 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
564 {
565 /* Need a shared curve */
566 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
567 return 1;
568 else return 0;
569 }
570 if (!ec)
571 {
572 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
573 return 1;
574 else
575 return 0;
576 }
577 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
578 return 1;
579 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
580 }
581
582 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
583
584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
585
586 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
587 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
588 */
589
590 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
591 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
592 #else
593 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
594 #endif
595
596 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
597 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
598 #else
599 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
600 #endif
601
602 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
603 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
604 #else
605 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
606 #endif
607
608 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
609 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
610 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
611 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
612
613 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
615 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
616 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
617 #endif
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
619 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
620 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
621 #endif
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
623 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
624 #endif
625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
626 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
627 #endif
628 };
629
630 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
631 {
632 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
633 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
634 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
635 if (FIPS_mode())
636 slen -= 2;
637 #endif
638 if (p)
639 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
640 return (int)slen;
641 }
642
643 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
644 {
645 int extdatalen=0;
646 unsigned char *ret = p;
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
648 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
649 int using_ecc = 0;
650 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
651 {
652 int i;
653 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
654 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
655
656 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
657 {
658 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
659
660 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
661 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
662 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
663 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
664 {
665 using_ecc = 1;
666 break;
667 }
668 }
669 }
670 #endif
671
672 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
673 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
674 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
675 return p;
676
677 ret+=2;
678
679 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
680
681 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
682 {
683 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
684 unsigned long size_str;
685 long lenmax;
686
687 /* check for enough space.
688 4 for the servername type and entension length
689 2 for servernamelist length
690 1 for the hostname type
691 2 for hostname length
692 + hostname length
693 */
694
695 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
696 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
697 return NULL;
698
699 /* extension type and length */
700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
701 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
702
703 /* length of servername list */
704 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
705
706 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
707 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
708 s2n(size_str,ret);
709 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
710 ret+=size_str;
711 }
712
713 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
714 if (s->renegotiate)
715 {
716 int el;
717
718 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
719 {
720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
721 return NULL;
722 }
723
724 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
725
726 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
727 s2n(el,ret);
728
729 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
730 {
731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
732 return NULL;
733 }
734
735 ret += el;
736 }
737
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
739 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
740 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
741 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
742
743 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
744 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
745 {
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
747 return NULL;
748 }
749
750 /* check for enough space.
751 4 for the srp type type and entension length
752 1 for the srp user identity
753 + srp user identity length
754 */
755 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
756
757 /* fill in the extension */
758 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
759 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
760 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
761 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
762 ret+=login_len;
763 }
764 #endif
765
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 if (using_ecc)
768 {
769 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
770 long lenmax;
771 const unsigned char *plist;
772 size_t plistlen;
773 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
774 * use default */
775 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
776 if (plist)
777 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
778 else
779 {
780 plist = ecformats_default;
781 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
782 }
783
784 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
785 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
786 if (plistlen > 255)
787 {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
789 return NULL;
790 }
791
792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
793 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
794 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
795 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
796 ret+=plistlen;
797
798 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
799 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
800 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
801
802 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
803 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
804 if (plistlen > 65532)
805 {
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
807 return NULL;
808 }
809
810 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
811 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
812
813 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
814 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
815 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
816 * resolves this to two bytes.
817 */
818 s2n(plistlen, ret);
819 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
820 ret+=plistlen;
821 }
822 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
823
824 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
825 {
826 int ticklen;
827 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
828 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
829 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
830 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
831 {
832 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
833 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
834 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
835 return NULL;
836 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
837 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
838 ticklen);
839 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
840 }
841 else
842 ticklen = 0;
843 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
844 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
845 goto skip_ext;
846 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
847 * rest for ticket
848 */
849 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
850 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
851 s2n(ticklen,ret);
852 if (ticklen)
853 {
854 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
855 ret += ticklen;
856 }
857 }
858 skip_ext:
859
860 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
861 {
862 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
863 return NULL;
864 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
865 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
866 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
867 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
868 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
869 }
870
871 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
872 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
873 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
874 {
875 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
876
877 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
878 return NULL;
879 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
880 return NULL;
881
882 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
883 s2n(col + 2, ret);
884 s2n(col, ret);
885 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
886 ret += col;
887 }
888 #endif
889
890 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
891 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
892 {
893 int i;
894 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
895 OCSP_RESPID *id;
896
897 idlen = 0;
898 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
899 {
900 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
901 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
902 if (itmp <= 0)
903 return NULL;
904 idlen += itmp + 2;
905 }
906
907 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
908 {
909 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
910 if (extlen < 0)
911 return NULL;
912 }
913 else
914 extlen = 0;
915
916 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
917 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
918 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
919 return NULL;
920 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
921 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
922 s2n(idlen, ret);
923 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
924 {
925 /* save position of id len */
926 unsigned char *q = ret;
927 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
928 /* skip over id len */
929 ret += 2;
930 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
931 /* write id len */
932 s2n(itmp, q);
933 }
934 s2n(extlen, ret);
935 if (extlen > 0)
936 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
937 }
938
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
940 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
941 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
942 s2n(1,ret);
943 /* Set mode:
944 * 1: peer may send requests
945 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
946 */
947 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
948 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
949 else
950 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
951 #endif
952
953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
954 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
955 {
956 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
957 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
958 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
959 return NULL;
960 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
961 s2n(0,ret);
962 }
963 #endif
964
965 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
966 {
967 int el;
968
969 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
970
971 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
972
973 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
974 s2n(el,ret);
975
976 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
977 {
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
979 return NULL;
980 }
981 ret += el;
982 }
983
984 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
985 return p;
986
987 s2n(extdatalen,p);
988 return ret;
989 }
990
991 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
992 {
993 int extdatalen=0;
994 unsigned char *ret = p;
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
996 int next_proto_neg_seen;
997 #endif
998
999 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1000 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1001 return p;
1002
1003 ret+=2;
1004 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1005
1006 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1007 {
1008 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1009
1010 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1011 s2n(0,ret);
1012 }
1013
1014 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1015 {
1016 int el;
1017
1018 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1019 {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1021 return NULL;
1022 }
1023
1024 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1025
1026 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1027 s2n(el,ret);
1028
1029 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1030 {
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1032 return NULL;
1033 }
1034
1035 ret += el;
1036 }
1037
1038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1039 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1040 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1041 {
1042 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1043 long lenmax;
1044
1045 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1046 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1047 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1048 {
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1050 return NULL;
1051 }
1052
1053 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1054 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1055 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1056 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1057 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1058
1059 }
1060 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1061 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1062
1063 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1064 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1065 {
1066 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1067 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1068 s2n(0,ret);
1069 }
1070
1071 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1072 {
1073 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1074 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1075 s2n(0,ret);
1076 }
1077
1078 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1079 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1080 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1081 {
1082 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1083
1084 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1085 return NULL;
1086 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1087 return NULL;
1088
1089 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1090 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
1091 s2n(sol, ret);
1092 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1093 ret += sol;
1094 }
1095 #endif
1096
1097 if(s->srtp_profile)
1098 {
1099 int el;
1100
1101 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1102
1103 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1104
1105 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1106 s2n(el,ret);
1107
1108 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1109 {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 return NULL;
1112 }
1113 ret+=el;
1114 }
1115
1116 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1117 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1118 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1119 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1120 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1121 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1122 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1123 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1124 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1125 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1126 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1127 ret+=36;
1128
1129 }
1130
1131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1132 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1133 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1134 {
1135 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1136 s2n(1,ret);
1137 /* Set mode:
1138 * 1: peer may send requests
1139 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1140 */
1141 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1142 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1143 else
1144 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1145
1146 }
1147 #endif
1148
1149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1150 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1151 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1152 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1153 {
1154 const unsigned char *npa;
1155 unsigned int npalen;
1156 int r;
1157
1158 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1159 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1160 {
1161 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1163 s2n(npalen,ret);
1164 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1165 ret += npalen;
1166 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1167 }
1168 }
1169 #endif
1170
1171 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1172 return p;
1173
1174 s2n(extdatalen,p);
1175 return ret;
1176 }
1177
1178 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1179 {
1180 unsigned short type;
1181 unsigned short size;
1182 unsigned short len;
1183 unsigned char *data = *p;
1184 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1185 int sigalg_seen = 0;
1186
1187 s->servername_done = 0;
1188 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1190 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1191 #endif
1192
1193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1194 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1195 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1196 #endif
1197
1198 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1199 goto ri_check;
1200 n2s(data,len);
1201
1202 if (data > (d+n-len))
1203 goto ri_check;
1204
1205 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1206 {
1207 n2s(data,type);
1208 n2s(data,size);
1209
1210 if (data+size > (d+n))
1211 goto ri_check;
1212 #if 0
1213 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1214 #endif
1215 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1216 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1217 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1218 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1219
1220 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1221 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1222 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1223 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1224 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1225 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1226 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1227 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1228 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1229 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1230 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1231 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1232 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1233 the value of the Host: field.
1234 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1235 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1236 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1237 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1238
1239 */
1240
1241 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1242 {
1243 unsigned char *sdata;
1244 int servname_type;
1245 int dsize;
1246
1247 if (size < 2)
1248 {
1249 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1250 return 0;
1251 }
1252 n2s(data,dsize);
1253 size -= 2;
1254 if (dsize > size )
1255 {
1256 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1257 return 0;
1258 }
1259
1260 sdata = data;
1261 while (dsize > 3)
1262 {
1263 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1264 n2s(sdata,len);
1265 dsize -= 3;
1266
1267 if (len > dsize)
1268 {
1269 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1270 return 0;
1271 }
1272 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1273 switch (servname_type)
1274 {
1275 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1276 if (!s->hit)
1277 {
1278 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1279 {
1280 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1281 return 0;
1282 }
1283 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1284 {
1285 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1286 return 0;
1287 }
1288 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1289 {
1290 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1291 return 0;
1292 }
1293 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1294 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1295 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1296 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1297 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1298 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1299 return 0;
1300 }
1301 s->servername_done = 1;
1302
1303 }
1304 else
1305 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1306 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1307 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1308
1309 break;
1310
1311 default:
1312 break;
1313 }
1314
1315 dsize -= len;
1316 }
1317 if (dsize != 0)
1318 {
1319 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1320 return 0;
1321 }
1322
1323 }
1324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1325 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1326 {
1327 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1328 {
1329 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1330 return 0;
1331 }
1332 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1333 {
1334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1335 return 0;
1336 }
1337 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1338 return -1;
1339 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1340 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1341
1342 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1343 {
1344 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1345 return 0;
1346 }
1347 }
1348 #endif
1349
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1351 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1352 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1353 {
1354 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1355 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1356
1357 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1358 {
1359 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1360 return 0;
1361 }
1362 if (!s->hit)
1363 {
1364 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1365 {
1366 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1367 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1368 }
1369 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1370 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1371 {
1372 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1373 return 0;
1374 }
1375 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1376 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1377 }
1378 #if 0
1379 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1380 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1381 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1382 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1383 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1384 #endif
1385 }
1386 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1387 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1388 {
1389 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1390 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1391 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1392
1393 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1394 {
1395 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1396 return 0;
1397 }
1398 if (!s->hit)
1399 {
1400 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1401 {
1402 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1403 return 0;
1404 }
1405 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1406 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1407 {
1408 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1409 return 0;
1410 }
1411 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1412 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1413 }
1414 #if 0
1415 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1416 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1417 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1418 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1419 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1420 #endif
1421 }
1422 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1423 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1424 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1425 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1426 {
1427 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1428
1429 if (size < 2)
1430 {
1431 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1432 return 0;
1433 }
1434 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1435 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1436 {
1437 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1438 return 0;
1439 }
1440
1441 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1442 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1443 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1444 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1445 else
1446 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1447 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1448 {
1449 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1450 return 0;
1451 }
1452 }
1453 #endif
1454 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1455 {
1456 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1457 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1458 {
1459 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1460 return 0;
1461 }
1462 }
1463 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1464 {
1465 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1466 return 0;
1467 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1468 }
1469 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1470 {
1471 int dsize;
1472 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1473 {
1474 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1475 return 0;
1476 }
1477 sigalg_seen = 1;
1478 n2s(data,dsize);
1479 size -= 2;
1480 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1481 {
1482 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1483 return 0;
1484 }
1485 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1486 {
1487 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1488 return 0;
1489 }
1490 }
1491 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1492 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1493 {
1494
1495 if (size < 5)
1496 {
1497 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1498 return 0;
1499 }
1500
1501 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1502 size--;
1503 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1504 {
1505 const unsigned char *sdata;
1506 int dsize;
1507 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1508 n2s(data,dsize);
1509 size -= 2;
1510 if (dsize > size )
1511 {
1512 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1513 return 0;
1514 }
1515 while (dsize > 0)
1516 {
1517 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1518 int idsize;
1519 if (dsize < 4)
1520 {
1521 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1522 return 0;
1523 }
1524 n2s(data, idsize);
1525 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1526 size -= 2 + idsize;
1527 if (dsize < 0)
1528 {
1529 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1530 return 0;
1531 }
1532 sdata = data;
1533 data += idsize;
1534 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1535 &sdata, idsize);
1536 if (!id)
1537 {
1538 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1539 return 0;
1540 }
1541 if (data != sdata)
1542 {
1543 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1544 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1545 return 0;
1546 }
1547 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1548 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1549 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1550 {
1551 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1552 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1553 return 0;
1554 }
1555 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1556 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1557 {
1558 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1559 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1560 return 0;
1561 }
1562 }
1563
1564 /* Read in request_extensions */
1565 if (size < 2)
1566 {
1567 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1568 return 0;
1569 }
1570 n2s(data,dsize);
1571 size -= 2;
1572 if (dsize != size)
1573 {
1574 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1575 return 0;
1576 }
1577 sdata = data;
1578 if (dsize > 0)
1579 {
1580 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1581 {
1582 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1583 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1584 }
1585
1586 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1587 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1588 &sdata, dsize);
1589 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1590 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1591 {
1592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1593 return 0;
1594 }
1595 }
1596 }
1597 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1598 * so ignore it.
1599 */
1600 else
1601 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1602 }
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1604 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1605 {
1606 switch(data[0])
1607 {
1608 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1609 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1610 break;
1611 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1612 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1613 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1614 break;
1615 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1616 return 0;
1617 }
1618 }
1619 #endif
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1621 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1622 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1623 {
1624 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1625 * renegotiation.
1626 *
1627 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1628 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1629 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1630 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1631 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1632 * anything like that, but this might change).
1633
1634 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1635 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1636 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1637 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1638 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1639 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1640 }
1641 #endif
1642
1643 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1644 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1645 {
1646 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1647 al))
1648 return 0;
1649 }
1650
1651 data+=size;
1652 }
1653
1654 *p = data;
1655
1656 ri_check:
1657
1658 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1659
1660 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1661 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1662 {
1663 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1665 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1666 return 0;
1667 }
1668
1669 return 1;
1670 }
1671
1672 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
1673 {
1674 int al = -1;
1675 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
1676 {
1677 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1678 return 0;
1679 }
1680
1681 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1682 {
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1684 return 0;
1685 }
1686 return 1;
1687 }
1688
1689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1690 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1691 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1692 * the length of the block. */
1693 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1694 {
1695 unsigned int off = 0;
1696
1697 while (off < len)
1698 {
1699 if (d[off] == 0)
1700 return 0;
1701 off += d[off];
1702 off++;
1703 }
1704
1705 return off == len;
1706 }
1707 #endif
1708
1709 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1710 {
1711 unsigned short length;
1712 unsigned short type;
1713 unsigned short size;
1714 unsigned char *data = *p;
1715 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1716 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1717
1718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1719 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1720 #endif
1721
1722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1723 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1724 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1725 #endif
1726
1727 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1728 goto ri_check;
1729
1730 n2s(data,length);
1731 if (data+length != d+n)
1732 {
1733 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1734 return 0;
1735 }
1736
1737 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1738 {
1739 n2s(data,type);
1740 n2s(data,size);
1741
1742 if (data+size > (d+n))
1743 goto ri_check;
1744
1745 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1746 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1747 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1748
1749 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1750 {
1751 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1752 {
1753 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1754 return 0;
1755 }
1756 tlsext_servername = 1;
1757 }
1758
1759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1760 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1761 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1762 {
1763 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1764 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1765
1766 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1767 {
1768 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1769 return 0;
1770 }
1771 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1772 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1773 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1774 {
1775 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1776 return 0;
1777 }
1778 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1779 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1780 #if 0
1781 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1782 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1783 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1784 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1785 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1786 #endif
1787 }
1788 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1789
1790 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1791 {
1792 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1793 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1794 {
1795 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1796 return 0;
1797 }
1798 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1799 || (size > 0))
1800 {
1801 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1802 return 0;
1803 }
1804 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1805 }
1806 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1807 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1808 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1809 {
1810 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1811
1812 if (size < 2)
1813 {
1814 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1815 return 0;
1816 }
1817 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1818 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1819 {
1820 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1821 return 0;
1822 }
1823
1824 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1825 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1826 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1827 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1828 else
1829 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1830
1831 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1832 {
1833 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1834 return 0;
1835 }
1836 }
1837 #endif
1838 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1839 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1840 {
1841 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1842 * a status request message.
1843 */
1844 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1845 {
1846 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1847 return 0;
1848 }
1849 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1850 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1851 }
1852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1853 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1854 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1855 {
1856 unsigned char *selected;
1857 unsigned char selected_len;
1858
1859 /* We must have requested it. */
1860 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1861 {
1862 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1863 return 0;
1864 }
1865 /* The data must be valid */
1866 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1867 {
1868 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1869 return 0;
1870 }
1871 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1872 {
1873 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1874 return 0;
1875 }
1876 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1877 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1878 {
1879 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1880 return 0;
1881 }
1882 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1883 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1884 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1885 }
1886 #endif
1887 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1888 {
1889 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1890 return 0;
1891 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1892 }
1893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1894 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1895 {
1896 switch(data[0])
1897 {
1898 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1899 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1900 break;
1901 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1902 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1903 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1904 break;
1905 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1906 return 0;
1907 }
1908 }
1909 #endif
1910 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1911 {
1912 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1913 al))
1914 return 0;
1915 }
1916
1917 data+=size;
1918 }
1919
1920 if (data != d+n)
1921 {
1922 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1923 return 0;
1924 }
1925
1926 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1927 {
1928 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1929 {
1930 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1931 {
1932 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1933 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1934 {
1935 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1936 return 0;
1937 }
1938 }
1939 else
1940 {
1941 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1942 return 0;
1943 }
1944 }
1945 }
1946
1947 *p = data;
1948
1949 ri_check:
1950
1951 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1952 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1953 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1954 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1955 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1956 * absence on initial connect only.
1957 */
1958 if (!renegotiate_seen
1959 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1960 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1961 {
1962 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1964 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1965 return 0;
1966 }
1967
1968 return 1;
1969 }
1970
1971
1972 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1973 {
1974
1975 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1976 {
1977 int r = 1;
1978
1979 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1980 {
1981 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1982 if (!r)
1983 return -1;
1984 }
1985
1986 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1987 {
1988 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1989 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1990
1991 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1992 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1993 else
1994 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1995 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1996 {
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1998 return -1;
1999 }
2000 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2001 }
2002
2003 if (r == 2)
2004 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2005 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2006 }
2007 #endif
2008
2009 return 1;
2010 }
2011
2012 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2013 {
2014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2015 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2016 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2017 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2018 */
2019
2020 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2021 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2022 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2023 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2024
2025 if (using_ecc)
2026 {
2027 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2028 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2029 {
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2031 return -1;
2032 }
2033 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2034 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2035 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2036 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2037 }
2038 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2039
2040 return 1;
2041 }
2042
2043 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2044 {
2045 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2046 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2047
2048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2049 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2050 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2051 */
2052 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2053 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2054 */
2055 #endif
2056
2057 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2058 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2059 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2060 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2061
2062 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2063 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2064 * the certificate has changed.
2065 */
2066 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2067 {
2068 int r;
2069 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2070 switch (r)
2071 {
2072 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2073 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2074 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2075 break;
2076 /* status request response should be sent */
2077 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2078 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2079 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2080 else
2081 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2082 break;
2083 /* something bad happened */
2084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2085 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2086 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 goto err;
2088 }
2089 }
2090 else
2091 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2092
2093 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2094 {
2095 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2096 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2097 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
2098
2099 int r = 1;
2100
2101 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2102 {
2103 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2104 if (!r)
2105 {
2106 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2107 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 goto err;
2109 }
2110 }
2111
2112 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2113 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2114 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2115
2116 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2117 {
2118 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2119 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2120 {
2121 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2122 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2123
2124 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2125 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2126 else
2127 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2128 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2129 {
2130 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2131 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2132 goto err;
2133 }
2134 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2135 }
2136 }
2137
2138 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2139 {
2140 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2141 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2142 * abort the handshake.
2143 */
2144 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2145 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2146 }
2147 }
2148
2149 #endif
2150 err:
2151 switch (ret)
2152 {
2153 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2154 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2155 return -1;
2156
2157 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2158 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2159 return 1;
2160
2161 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2162 s->servername_done=0;
2163 default:
2164 return 1;
2165 }
2166 }
2167
2168 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2169 {
2170 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2171 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2172
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2174 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2175 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2176 * it must contain uncompressed.
2177 */
2178 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2179 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2180 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2181 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2182 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2183 {
2184 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2185 size_t i;
2186 unsigned char *list;
2187 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2188 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2189 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2190 {
2191 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2192 {
2193 found_uncompressed = 1;
2194 break;
2195 }
2196 }
2197 if (!found_uncompressed)
2198 {
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2200 return -1;
2201 }
2202 }
2203 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2204 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2205
2206 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2207 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2208 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2209 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2210
2211 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2212 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2213 {
2214 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2215 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2216
2217 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2218 {
2219 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2220 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2221 }
2222
2223 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2224 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2225 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2226 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2227 {
2228 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2229 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2230 }
2231 }
2232 #endif
2233
2234 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2235 * tell the callback
2236 */
2237 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2238 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2239 {
2240 int r;
2241 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2242 * there is no response.
2243 */
2244 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2245 {
2246 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2247 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2248 }
2249 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2250 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2251 if (r == 0)
2252 {
2253 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2254 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2255 }
2256 if (r < 0)
2257 {
2258 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2259 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2260 }
2261 }
2262
2263 switch (ret)
2264 {
2265 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2266 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2267 return -1;
2268
2269 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2270 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2271 return 1;
2272
2273 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2274 s->servername_done=0;
2275 default:
2276 return 1;
2277 }
2278 }
2279
2280 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2281 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2282 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2283 *
2284 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2285 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2286 * extension, if any.
2287 * len: the length of the session ID.
2288 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2289 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2290 * point to the resulting session.
2291 *
2292 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2293 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2294 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2295 *
2296 * Returns:
2297 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2298 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2299 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2300 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2301 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2302 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2303 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2304 *
2305 * Side effects:
2306 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2307 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2308 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2309 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2310 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2311 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2312 */
2313 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2314 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2315 {
2316 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2317 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2318 unsigned short i;
2319
2320 *ret = NULL;
2321 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2322
2323 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2324 * to permit stateful resumption.
2325 */
2326 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2327 return 0;
2328 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2329 return 0;
2330 if (p >= limit)
2331 return -1;
2332 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2333 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2334 {
2335 i = *(p++);
2336 p+= i;
2337 if (p >= limit)
2338 return -1;
2339 }
2340 /* Skip past cipher list */
2341 n2s(p, i);
2342 p+= i;
2343 if (p >= limit)
2344 return -1;
2345 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2346 i = *(p++);
2347 p += i;
2348 if (p > limit)
2349 return -1;
2350 /* Now at start of extensions */
2351 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2352 return 0;
2353 n2s(p, i);
2354 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2355 {
2356 unsigned short type, size;
2357 n2s(p, type);
2358 n2s(p, size);
2359 if (p + size > limit)
2360 return 0;
2361 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2362 {
2363 int r;
2364 if (size == 0)
2365 {
2366 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2367 * currently have one. */
2368 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2369 return 1;
2370 }
2371 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2372 {
2373 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2374 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2375 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2376 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2377 * calculate the master secret later. */
2378 return 2;
2379 }
2380 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2381 switch (r)
2382 {
2383 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2384 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2385 return 2;
2386 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2387 return r;
2388 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2389 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2390 return 3;
2391 default: /* fatal error */
2392 return -1;
2393 }
2394 }
2395 p += size;
2396 }
2397 return 0;
2398 }
2399
2400 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2401 *
2402 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2403 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2404 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2405 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2406 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2407 * point to the resulting session.
2408 *
2409 * Returns:
2410 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2411 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2412 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2413 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2414 */
2415 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2416 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2417 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2418 {
2419 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2420 unsigned char *sdec;
2421 const unsigned char *p;
2422 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2423 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2424 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2425 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2426 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2427 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2428 if (eticklen < 48)
2429 return 2;
2430 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2431 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2432 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2433 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2434 {
2435 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2436 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2437 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2438 if (rv < 0)
2439 return -1;
2440 if (rv == 0)
2441 return 2;
2442 if (rv == 2)
2443 renew_ticket = 1;
2444 }
2445 else
2446 {
2447 /* Check key name matches */
2448 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2449 return 2;
2450 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2451 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2452 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2453 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2454 }
2455 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2456 * integrity checks on ticket.
2457 */
2458 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2459 if (mlen < 0)
2460 {
2461 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2462 return -1;
2463 }
2464 eticklen -= mlen;
2465 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2466 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2467 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2468 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2469 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2470 return 2;
2471 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2472 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2473 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2474 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2475 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2476 if (!sdec)
2477 {
2478 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2479 return -1;
2480 }
2481 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2482 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2483 return 2;
2484 slen += mlen;
2485 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2486 p = sdec;
2487
2488 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2489 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2490 if (sess)
2491 {
2492 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2493 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2494 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2495 * as required by standard.
2496 */
2497 if (sesslen)
2498 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2499 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2500 *psess = sess;
2501 if (renew_ticket)
2502 return 4;
2503 else
2504 return 3;
2505 }
2506 ERR_clear_error();
2507 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2508 * ticket. */
2509 return 2;
2510 }
2511
2512 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2513
2514 typedef struct
2515 {
2516 int nid;
2517 int id;
2518 } tls12_lookup;
2519
2520 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2521 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2522 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2523 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2524 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2525 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2526 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2527 };
2528
2529 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2530 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2531 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2532 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2533 };
2534
2535 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2536 {
2537 size_t i;
2538 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2539 {
2540 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2541 return table[i].id;
2542 }
2543 return -1;
2544 }
2545
2546 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2547 {
2548 size_t i;
2549 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2550 {
2551 if ((table[i].id) == id)
2552 return table[i].nid;
2553 }
2554 return NID_undef;
2555 }
2556
2557 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2558 {
2559 int sig_id, md_id;
2560 if (!md)
2561 return 0;
2562 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2563 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2564 if (md_id == -1)
2565 return 0;
2566 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2567 if (sig_id == -1)
2568 return 0;
2569 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2570 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2571 return 1;
2572 }
2573
2574 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2575 {
2576 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2577 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2578 }
2579
2580 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2581 {
2582 switch(hash_alg)
2583 {
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2585 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2586 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
2587 if (FIPS_mode())
2588 return NULL;
2589 #endif
2590 return EVP_md5();
2591 #endif
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2593 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2594 return EVP_sha1();
2595 #endif
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2597 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2598 return EVP_sha224();
2599
2600 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2601 return EVP_sha256();
2602 #endif
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2604 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2605 return EVP_sha384();
2606
2607 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2608 return EVP_sha512();
2609 #endif
2610 default:
2611 return NULL;
2612
2613 }
2614 }
2615
2616 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2617
2618 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2619 {
2620 int i, idx;
2621 const EVP_MD *md;
2622 CERT *c = s->cert;
2623 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
2624 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2625 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2626 return 1;
2627 /* Should never happen */
2628 if (!c)
2629 return 0;
2630
2631 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2632 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2633 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2634 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2635
2636 if (c->sigalgs)
2637 OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
2638 c->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((dsize/2) * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
2639 if (!c->sigalgs)
2640 return 0;
2641 c->sigalgslen = dsize/2;
2642
2643 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->sigalgs; i < dsize; i += 2, sigptr++)
2644 {
2645 sigptr->rhash = data[i];
2646 sigptr->rsign = data[i + 1];
2647 sigptr->hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rhash, tls12_md,
2648 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2649 sigptr->sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rsign, tls12_sig,
2650 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2651 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&sigptr->signandhash_nid,
2652 sigptr->hash_nid,
2653 sigptr->sign_nid))
2654 sigptr->signandhash_nid = NID_undef;
2655 switch(sigptr->rsign)
2656 {
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2658 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2659 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2660 break;
2661 #endif
2662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2663 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2664 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2665 break;
2666 #endif
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2668 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2669 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2670 break;
2671 #endif
2672 default:
2673 continue;
2674 }
2675
2676 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2677 {
2678 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
2679 if (md)
2680 {
2681 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2682 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2683 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2684 }
2685 }
2686
2687 }
2688
2689
2690 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2691 * supported it stays as NULL.
2692 */
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2694 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2695 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2696 #endif
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2698 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2699 {
2700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2701 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2702 }
2703 #endif
2704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2705 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2706 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
2707 #endif
2708 return 1;
2709 }
2710
2711 #endif
2712
2713 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2714 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash,
2715 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2716 {
2717 if (s->cert->sigalgs == NULL)
2718 return 0;
2719 if (idx >= 0)
2720 {
2721 TLS_SIGALGS *psig;
2722 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->sigalgslen)
2723 return 0;
2724 psig = s->cert->sigalgs + idx;
2725 if (psign)
2726 *psign = psig->sign_nid;
2727 if (phash)
2728 *phash = psig->hash_nid;
2729 if (psignandhash)
2730 *psignandhash = psig->signandhash_nid;
2731 if (rsig)
2732 *rsig = psig->rsign;
2733 if (rhash)
2734 *rhash = psig->rhash;
2735 }
2736 return s->cert->sigalgslen;
2737 }
2738
2739
2740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2741 int
2742 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2743 {
2744 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2745 unsigned short hbtype;
2746 unsigned int payload;
2747 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2748
2749 /* Read type and payload length first */
2750 hbtype = *p++;
2751 n2s(p, payload);
2752 pl = p;
2753
2754 if (s->msg_callback)
2755 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2756 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2757 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2758
2759 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2760 {
2761 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2762 int r;
2763
2764 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2765 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2766 * payload, plus padding
2767 */
2768 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2769 bp = buffer;
2770
2771 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2772 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2773 s2n(payload, bp);
2774 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2775 bp += payload;
2776 /* Random padding */
2777 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2778
2779 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2780
2781 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2782 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2783 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2784 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2785
2786 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2787
2788 if (r < 0)
2789 return r;
2790 }
2791 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2792 {
2793 unsigned int seq;
2794
2795 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2796 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2797 * sequence number */
2798 n2s(pl, seq);
2799
2800 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2801 {
2802 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
2803 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2804 }
2805 }
2806
2807 return 0;
2808 }
2809
2810 int
2811 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2812 {
2813 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2814 int ret;
2815 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2816 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2817
2818 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2819 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2820 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2821 {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2823 return -1;
2824 }
2825
2826 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2827 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2828 {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2830 return -1;
2831 }
2832
2833 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2834 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2835 {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2837 return -1;
2838 }
2839
2840 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2841 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2842 */
2843 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2844
2845 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2846 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2847 * some random stuff.
2848 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2849 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2850 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2851 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2852 * - Padding
2853 */
2854 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2855 p = buf;
2856 /* Message Type */
2857 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2858 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2859 s2n(payload, p);
2860 /* Sequence number */
2861 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2862 /* 16 random bytes */
2863 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2864 p += 16;
2865 /* Random padding */
2866 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2867
2868 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2869 if (ret >= 0)
2870 {
2871 if (s->msg_callback)
2872 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2873 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2874 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2875
2876 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
2877 }
2878
2879 OPENSSL_free(buf);
2880
2881 return ret;
2882 }
2883 #endif
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