2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *tick
, size_t ticklen
,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id
, size_t sesslen
,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL
*s
);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
39 tls1_export_keying_material
,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
42 tls_close_construct_packet
,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
56 tls1_export_keying_material
,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
59 tls_close_construct_packet
,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
73 tls1_export_keying_material
,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
77 tls_close_construct_packet
,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
91 tls1_export_keying_material
,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
95 tls_close_construct_packet
,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
);
116 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
118 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_session_ticket
);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
125 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
126 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION
;
128 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid
; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits
; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags
; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list
[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default
[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all
[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves
[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id
, unsigned int *pflags
)
234 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id
< 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
238 cinfo
= nid_list
+ curve_id
- 1;
240 *pflags
= cinfo
->flags
;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid
)
247 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
); i
++) {
248 if (nid_list
[i
].nid
== nid
)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL
*s
, int sess
,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves
, size_t *num_curves
)
269 size_t pcurveslen
= 0;
271 *pcurves
= s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
272 pcurveslen
= s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
277 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
278 pcurveslen
= sizeof(suiteb_curves
);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
282 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
287 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
+ 2;
291 *pcurves
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
292 pcurveslen
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
;
295 *pcurves
= eccurves_default
;
296 pcurveslen
= sizeof(eccurves_default
);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen
& 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
306 *num_curves
= pcurveslen
/ 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *curve
, int op
)
314 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
317 if ((curve
[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve
[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
319 cinfo
= &nid_list
[curve
[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
324 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)curve
);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *p
, size_t len
)
330 const unsigned char *curves
;
331 size_t num_curves
, i
;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
333 if (len
!= 3 || p
[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
340 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
341 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
343 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
344 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &curves
, &num_curves
))
351 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, curves
+= 2) {
352 if (p
[1] == curves
[0] && p
[2] == curves
[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s
, p
+ 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
367 const unsigned char *pref
, *supp
;
368 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
, j
;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
380 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1
; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
383 return NID_secp384r1
; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s
, (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0, &supp
,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s
, !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
), &pref
, &num_pref
))
401 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0) {
409 num_supp
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref
== 0 &&
411 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) == 0) {
413 num_pref
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
417 for (i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++, pref
+= 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp
= supp
;
419 for (j
= 0; j
< num_supp
; j
++, tsupp
+= 2) {
420 if (pref
[0] == tsupp
[0] && pref
[1] == tsupp
[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pref
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
424 int id
= (pref
[0] << 8) | pref
[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id
, NULL
);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
438 int *curves
, size_t ncurves
)
440 unsigned char *clist
, *p
;
443 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
446 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
447 clist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves
* 2);
450 for (i
= 0, p
= clist
; i
< ncurves
; i
++) {
451 unsigned long idmask
;
453 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves
[i
]);
455 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
464 *pextlen
= ncurves
* 2;
468 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
472 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
475 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
477 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
483 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
485 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
487 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
489 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
490 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
491 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
492 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
493 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
494 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
496 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
497 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
499 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
503 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
504 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
, const char *str
)
508 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
512 return tls1_set_curves(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
515 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
516 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
,
523 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
524 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
527 /* Determine curve ID */
528 id
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
529 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id
);
530 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
534 curve_id
[1] = (unsigned char)id
;
536 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec
) == NULL
)
538 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
539 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
541 if ((nid_list
[id
- 1].flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME
)
542 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
544 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
550 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
551 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL
*s
,
552 unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
)
554 const unsigned char *pformats
, *pcurves
;
555 size_t num_formats
, num_curves
, i
;
558 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
559 * supported (see RFC4492).
561 if (comp_id
&& s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
) {
562 pformats
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
563 num_formats
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
;
564 for (i
= 0; i
< num_formats
; i
++, pformats
++) {
565 if (*comp_id
== *pformats
)
568 if (i
== num_formats
)
573 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
574 for (j
= 0; j
<= 1; j
++) {
575 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, j
, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
577 if (j
== 1 && num_curves
== 0) {
579 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
580 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
581 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
582 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
583 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
587 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
588 if (pcurves
[0] == curve_id
[0] && pcurves
[1] == curve_id
[1])
593 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
600 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
604 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
606 if (s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
) {
607 *pformats
= s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
608 *num_formats
= s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
;
610 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
611 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
613 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
615 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
620 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
621 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
623 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
625 unsigned char comp_id
, curve_id
[2];
628 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
631 /* If not EC nothing to do */
632 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) != EVP_PKEY_EC
)
634 rv
= tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
));
638 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
641 rv
= tls1_check_ec_key(s
, s
->server
? curve_id
: NULL
, &comp_id
);
645 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
646 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
648 if (set_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
654 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
655 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
656 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
657 else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
658 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
660 return 0; /* Should never happen */
661 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
662 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
664 if (i
== c
->shared_sigalgslen
)
666 if (set_ee_md
== 2) {
667 if (check_md
== NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
668 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha256();
670 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha384();
676 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
678 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
680 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
682 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
683 * is compatible with the client extensions.
685 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
687 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
690 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
693 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
694 unsigned char curve_id
[2];
695 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
696 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
697 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
698 else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
699 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
703 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
704 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, NULL
))
708 /* Need a shared curve */
709 if (tls1_shared_curve(s
, 0))
713 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
717 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
722 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
725 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
726 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
729 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
732 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
735 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
738 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
742 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
744 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
747 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
748 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
752 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
753 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512
)
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384
)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256
)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224
)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1
)
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
759 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
,
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
766 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
767 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256
)
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384
)
771 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **psigs
)
774 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
778 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
779 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
780 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
781 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs
);
783 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
784 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
787 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
788 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 2;
792 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
793 if (s
->server
&& s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
) {
794 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
795 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
796 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
797 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
798 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
800 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
801 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs
);
806 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
807 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
809 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD
**pmd
, SSL
*s
,
810 const unsigned char *sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
812 const unsigned char *sent_sigs
;
813 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
814 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
815 /* Should never happen */
818 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
819 if (sigalg
!= (int)sig
[1]) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
824 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
825 unsigned char curve_id
[2], comp_id
;
826 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey
)))
829 if (!s
->server
&& !tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, &comp_id
)) {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
833 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
834 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
837 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
) {
838 if (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256
) {
839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
840 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
843 } else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
) {
844 if (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384
) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
846 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
852 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
856 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
857 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sent_sigs
);
858 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
+= 2, sent_sigs
+= 2) {
859 if (sig
[0] == sent_sigs
[0] && sig
[1] == sent_sigs
[1])
862 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
863 if (i
== sent_sigslen
864 && (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
865 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
869 *pmd
= tls12_get_hash(sig
[0]);
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
874 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
875 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
876 EVP_MD_size(*pmd
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd
), (void *)sig
)) {
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
881 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
883 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_md
= *pmd
;
888 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
889 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
890 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
892 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
895 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
897 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
899 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
900 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
901 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
902 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
);
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
904 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
905 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
906 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
907 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
909 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
911 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
912 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
913 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
919 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
920 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
921 * @c: cipher to check
922 * @op: Security check that you want to do
924 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
926 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
)
928 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
929 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
931 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
933 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ((c
->min_tls
> s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
934 || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
936 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
937 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
)))
940 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
943 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
945 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
)
947 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
950 static int compare_uint(const void *p1
, const void *p2
)
952 unsigned int u1
= *((const unsigned int *)p1
);
953 unsigned int u2
= *((const unsigned int *)p2
);
963 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
964 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
965 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
966 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
967 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
970 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET
*packet
)
972 PACKET extensions
= *packet
;
973 size_t num_extensions
= 0, i
= 0;
974 unsigned int *extension_types
= NULL
;
977 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
978 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions
) > 0) {
981 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions
, &type
) ||
982 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions
, &extension
)) {
988 if (num_extensions
<= 1)
991 extension_types
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions
);
992 if (extension_types
== NULL
) {
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
997 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
998 extensions
= *packet
;
999 for (i
= 0; i
< num_extensions
; i
++) {
1001 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions
, &extension_types
[i
]) ||
1002 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions
, &extension
)) {
1003 /* This should not happen. */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1009 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions
) != 0) {
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1013 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1014 qsort(extension_types
, num_extensions
, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint
);
1015 for (i
= 1; i
< num_extensions
; i
++) {
1016 if (extension_types
[i
- 1] == extension_types
[i
])
1021 OPENSSL_free(extension_types
);
1025 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1028 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1030 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1032 unsigned long alg_k
, alg_a
;
1033 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *cipher_stack
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
1035 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack
); i
++) {
1036 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack
, i
);
1038 alg_k
= c
->algorithm_mkey
;
1039 alg_a
= c
->algorithm_auth
;
1040 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
))
1041 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)) {
1049 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1050 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1051 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
)
1052 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1053 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
,
1054 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
)
1055 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1060 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1061 if (s
->client_version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1064 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
!= NULL
) {
1065 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1066 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1067 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1068 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1069 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1070 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1071 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
)
1072 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->tlsext_hostname
,
1073 strlen(s
->tlsext_hostname
))
1074 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1075 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1081 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1082 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
!= NULL
) {
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
)
1084 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1086 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1087 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1088 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
1089 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->srp_ctx
.login
,
1090 strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1102 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1104 const unsigned char *pcurves
, *pformats
;
1105 size_t num_curves
, num_formats
;
1108 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &pformats
, &num_formats
);
1110 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
)
1111 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1112 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1113 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, pformats
, num_formats
)
1114 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1120 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1122 pcurves
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
1123 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1128 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves
)
1129 /* Sub-packet for curves extension */
1130 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1131 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1135 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1136 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
1137 if (tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurves
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1138 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, pcurves
[0])
1139 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, pcurves
[1])) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
,
1141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1146 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1151 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1153 if (tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1155 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
&& s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
1156 ticklen
= s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
;
1157 else if (s
->session
&& s
->tlsext_session_ticket
&&
1158 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
) {
1159 ticklen
= s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->length
;
1160 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1161 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
) {
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1165 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
,
1166 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
, ticklen
);
1167 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1170 if (ticklen
== 0 && s
->tlsext_session_ticket
&&
1171 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
== NULL
)
1174 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
)
1175 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
,
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1183 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1185 const unsigned char *salg
;
1187 salglen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &salg
);
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
)
1190 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1191 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1192 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1193 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1194 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, salg
, salglen
)
1195 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1196 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1202 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
== TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1205 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
)
1206 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1207 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1208 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
1209 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1214 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
); i
++) {
1215 unsigned char *idbytes
;
1219 id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, i
);
1220 idlen
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
1222 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1223 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, idlen
, &idbytes
)
1224 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &idbytes
) != idlen
) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1229 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1230 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1234 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
) {
1235 unsigned char *extbytes
;
1236 int extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
, NULL
);
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1242 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, extlen
, &extbytes
)
1243 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
, &extbytes
)
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1249 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1256 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1261 * 1: peer may send requests
1262 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1264 if (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS
)
1265 mode
= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
1267 mode
= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
1269 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
)
1270 /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */
1271 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1272 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, mode
)
1273 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1281 if (s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb
&& !s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
) {
1283 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1284 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1286 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
)
1287 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1295 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1296 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1297 * (see longer comment below)
1299 if (s
->alpn_client_proto_list
&& !s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
) {
1300 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
,
1301 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
)
1302 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1303 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1304 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->alpn_client_proto_list
,
1305 s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
)
1306 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1310 s
->s3
->alpn_sent
= 1;
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1313 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
)) {
1314 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
1315 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
;
1318 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
)
1319 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1320 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1321 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1322 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1326 ct
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
);
1327 for (i
= 0; i
< ct
; i
++) {
1328 prof
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
1329 if (prof
== NULL
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, prof
->id
)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1334 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1335 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1336 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
1337 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1343 custom_ext_init(&s
->cert
->cli_ext
);
1344 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1345 if (!custom_ext_add(s
, 0, pkt
, al
)) {
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1350 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)) {
1351 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
1352 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1359 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
1360 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
)
1361 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1368 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
1369 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1375 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1376 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1377 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1380 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
) {
1381 unsigned char *padbytes
;
1384 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &hlen
)) {
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1389 if (hlen
> 0xff && hlen
< 0x200) {
1390 hlen
= 0x200 - hlen
;
1396 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
)
1397 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, hlen
, &padbytes
)) {
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1401 memset(padbytes
, 0, hlen
);
1409 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1412 int next_proto_neg_seen
;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1415 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1416 unsigned long alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1417 int using_ecc
= (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
);
1418 using_ecc
= using_ecc
&& (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
);
1421 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1422 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH
)) {
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1427 if (s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1428 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, pkt
)) {
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1433 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1434 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1437 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->servername_done
== 1
1438 && s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
!= NULL
) {
1439 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1440 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1447 const unsigned char *plist
;
1450 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1452 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &plist
, &plistlen
);
1454 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
)
1455 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1456 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, plist
, plistlen
)
1457 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1463 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1466 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1468 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
&& tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1469 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
)
1470 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1476 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1479 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1482 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
1483 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
)
1484 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1490 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->srtp_profile
) {
1491 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
)
1492 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1493 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 2)
1494 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->srtp_profile
->id
)
1495 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
1496 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1503 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
& 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1504 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
& 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1505 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG
)) {
1506 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext
[36] = {
1507 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1508 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1509 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1510 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1511 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1512 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1514 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, cryptopro_ext
, sizeof(cryptopro_ext
))) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1520 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1521 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
)) {
1525 * 1: peer may send requests
1526 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1528 if (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS
)
1529 mode
= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
1531 mode
= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
1533 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
)
1534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1535 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, mode
)
1536 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1545 next_proto_neg_seen
= s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
;
1546 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
1547 if (next_proto_neg_seen
&& s
->ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb
) {
1548 const unsigned char *npa
;
1549 unsigned int npalen
;
1552 r
= s
->ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb(s
, &npa
, &npalen
,
1554 ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg
);
1555 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1556 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
)
1557 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, npa
, npalen
)) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1561 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
1565 if (!custom_ext_add(s
, 1, pkt
, al
)) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1570 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
) {
1572 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1573 * for other cases too.
1575 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
== SSL_AEAD
1576 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_RC4
1577 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1578 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
)
1579 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
1581 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
1582 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1588 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
) {
1589 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
1590 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1596 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
1597 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
,
1598 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
)
1599 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1600 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1601 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
,
1602 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
)
1603 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1604 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1611 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1619 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1620 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1621 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1622 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1624 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1626 PACKET protocol_list
, save_protocol_list
, protocol
;
1628 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &protocol_list
)
1631 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list
) < 2) {
1635 save_protocol_list
= protocol_list
;
1637 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1638 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list
, &protocol
)
1639 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol
) == 0) {
1642 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list
) != 0);
1644 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list
,
1645 &s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
, &s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
)) {
1646 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1654 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1655 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1656 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1658 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1660 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
1661 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
1663 if (s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
1664 int r
= s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
1665 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
,
1666 (unsigned int)s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
,
1667 s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb_arg
);
1669 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1670 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1671 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
1672 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1673 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1676 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1679 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
1682 *al
= SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
;
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1692 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1693 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1694 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1699 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1700 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1701 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1702 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1704 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1710 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1711 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1712 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1713 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1714 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1715 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1716 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1718 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1719 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1720 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1721 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1722 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1723 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1724 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1725 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1726 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1727 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1728 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1729 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1730 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1733 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1734 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1736 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1738 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1739 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1740 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1744 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1747 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1748 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1750 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1753 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1756 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1757 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1759 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1760 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1763 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1764 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1766 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, int *al
)
1769 int renegotiate_seen
= 0;
1771 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1772 s
->servername_done
= 0;
1773 s
->tlsext_status_type
= -1;
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1775 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
1778 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1779 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= NULL
;
1780 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= 0;
1781 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
);
1782 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
= NULL
;
1783 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
= 0;
1784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1785 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
&= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
|
1786 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
);
1789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1790 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1791 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, hello
);
1792 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1794 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1795 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
1796 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1797 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
1799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1800 OPENSSL_free(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
1801 s
->srp_ctx
.login
= NULL
;
1804 s
->srtp_profile
= NULL
;
1807 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1808 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1811 for (loop
= 0; loop
< hello
->num_extensions
; loop
++) {
1812 RAW_EXTENSION
*currext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[loop
];
1814 if (s
->tlsext_debug_cb
)
1815 s
->tlsext_debug_cb(s
, 0, currext
->type
,
1816 PACKET_data(&currext
->data
),
1817 PACKET_remaining(&currext
->data
),
1818 s
->tlsext_debug_arg
);
1820 if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
) {
1821 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
,
1822 &currext
->data
, al
))
1824 renegotiate_seen
= 1;
1825 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
1828 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1830 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1831 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1832 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1833 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1834 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1835 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1836 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1837 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1838 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1839 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1840 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1841 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1842 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1843 * the value of the Host: field.
1844 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1845 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1846 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1848 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1852 else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
) {
1853 unsigned int servname_type
;
1854 PACKET sni
, hostname
;
1856 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext
->data
, &sni
)
1857 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1858 || PACKET_remaining(&sni
) == 0) {
1863 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1864 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1865 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1867 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1868 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1869 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1871 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1872 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1874 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni
, &servname_type
)
1875 || servname_type
!= TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1876 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni
, &hostname
)) {
1881 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname
) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name
) {
1882 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1886 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname
)) {
1887 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1891 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname
, &s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
)) {
1892 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1896 s
->servername_done
= 1;
1899 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1900 * fall back to a full handshake.
1902 s
->servername_done
= s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
1903 && PACKET_equal(&hostname
, s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
,
1904 strlen(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
));
1907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1908 else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
) {
1911 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext
->data
, &srp_I
))
1914 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I
))
1918 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1919 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1921 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I
, &s
->srp_ctx
.login
)) {
1922 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1929 else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
) {
1930 PACKET ec_point_format_list
;
1932 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext
->data
,
1933 &ec_point_format_list
)
1934 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list
) == 0) {
1939 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list
,
1940 &s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
,
1942 session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
)) {
1943 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1947 } else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves
) {
1948 PACKET elliptic_curve_list
;
1950 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1951 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext
->data
,
1952 &elliptic_curve_list
)
1953 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list
) == 0
1954 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list
) % 2) != 0) {
1959 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list
,
1960 &s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
,
1962 session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
)) {
1963 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1968 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1969 else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
1970 if (s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb
&&
1971 !s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s
,
1972 PACKET_data(&currext
->data
),
1973 PACKET_remaining(&currext
->data
),
1974 s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg
)) {
1975 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1978 } else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
) {
1979 PACKET supported_sig_algs
;
1981 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext
->data
,
1982 &supported_sig_algs
)
1983 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs
) % 2) != 0
1984 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs
) == 0) {
1989 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs
),
1990 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs
))) {
1994 } else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
) {
1995 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext
->data
,
1996 (unsigned int *)&s
->tlsext_status_type
)) {
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2000 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
== TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2001 const unsigned char *ext_data
;
2002 PACKET responder_id_list
, exts
;
2003 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2004 (&currext
->data
, &responder_id_list
))
2008 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2009 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2011 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
,
2013 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list
) > 0) {
2014 s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2015 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
== NULL
) {
2016 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2020 s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
= NULL
;
2023 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list
) > 0) {
2025 PACKET responder_id
;
2026 const unsigned char *id_data
;
2028 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list
,
2030 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id
) == 0) {
2034 id_data
= PACKET_data(&responder_id
);
2035 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2036 id
= d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL
, &id_data
,
2037 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id
));
2041 if (id_data
!= PACKET_end(&responder_id
)) {
2042 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
2046 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, id
)) {
2047 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
2048 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2053 /* Read in request_extensions */
2054 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2055 &currext
->data
, &exts
))
2058 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts
) > 0) {
2059 ext_data
= PACKET_data(&exts
);
2060 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
,
2061 X509_EXTENSION_free
);
2062 s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
=
2063 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL
, &ext_data
,
2064 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts
));
2065 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
== NULL
2066 || ext_data
!= PACKET_end(&exts
)) {
2074 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2076 s
->tlsext_status_type
= -1;
2079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2080 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
) {
2081 unsigned int hbtype
;
2083 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext
->data
, &hbtype
)
2084 || PACKET_remaining(&currext
->data
)) {
2085 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2089 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2090 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2092 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2093 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2094 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
2097 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2103 else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2104 && s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0) {
2106 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2109 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2110 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2111 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2112 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2113 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2114 * anything like that, but this might change).
2116 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2117 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2118 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2119 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2120 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2122 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
2126 else if (currext
->type
2127 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2128 && s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0) {
2129 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s
,
2130 &currext
->data
, al
))
2134 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2136 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
)
2137 && currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
) {
2138 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s
,
2139 &currext
->data
, al
))
2143 else if (currext
->type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2144 && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
))
2145 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2147 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2148 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2152 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2153 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2154 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2155 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2156 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2159 if (custom_ext_parse(s
, 1, currext
->type
,
2160 PACKET_data(&currext
->data
),
2161 PACKET_remaining(&currext
->data
), al
) <= 0)
2166 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2168 if (!renegotiate_seen
&& s
->renegotiate
&&
2169 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
2170 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2172 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
2177 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2178 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2179 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2180 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2185 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
2188 custom_ext_init(&s
->cert
->srv_ext
);
2189 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s
, hello
, &al
) <= 0) {
2190 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2193 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s
) <= 0) {
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2202 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2203 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2204 * fill the length of the block.
2206 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET
*pkt
)
2208 PACKET tmp_protocol
;
2210 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2211 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &tmp_protocol
)
2212 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol
) == 0)
2220 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2222 unsigned int length
, type
, size
;
2223 int tlsext_servername
= 0;
2224 int renegotiate_seen
= 0;
2226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2227 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
2229 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
2231 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2232 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= NULL
;
2233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2234 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
&= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
|
2235 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
);
2238 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2240 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
2242 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &length
))
2245 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != length
) {
2246 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2250 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt
)) {
2251 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2255 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &type
) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &size
)) {
2256 const unsigned char *data
;
2259 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, size
)
2260 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt
, &data
, size
))
2263 if (s
->tlsext_debug_cb
)
2264 s
->tlsext_debug_cb(s
, 1, type
, data
, size
, s
->tlsext_debug_arg
);
2266 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
) {
2267 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, &spkt
, al
))
2269 renegotiate_seen
= 1;
2270 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2271 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
) {
2272 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
== NULL
|| size
> 0) {
2273 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2276 tlsext_servername
= 1;
2278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2279 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
) {
2280 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length
;
2281 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &ecpointformatlist_length
)
2282 || ecpointformatlist_length
!= size
- 1) {
2283 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2287 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
= 0;
2288 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
);
2289 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
=
2290 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length
)) == NULL
) {
2291 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2294 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
=
2295 ecpointformatlist_length
;
2296 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt
,
2297 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
,
2298 ecpointformatlist_length
)) {
2299 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2305 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2307 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
2308 if (s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb
&&
2309 !s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s
, data
, size
,
2310 s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg
))
2312 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2315 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
) || (size
> 0)) {
2316 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2319 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
2320 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
) {
2322 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2325 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
== -1) || (size
> 0)) {
2326 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2329 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2330 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 1;
2332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2334 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2335 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2336 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2338 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
&&
2339 s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2340 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2341 if (s
->tlsext_scts
!= NULL
) {
2342 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_scts
);
2343 s
->tlsext_scts
= NULL
;
2345 s
->tlsext_scts_len
= size
;
2347 s
->tlsext_scts
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
);
2348 if (s
->tlsext_scts
== NULL
) {
2349 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2352 memcpy(s
->tlsext_scts
, data
, size
);
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2357 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
&&
2358 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0) {
2359 unsigned char *selected
;
2360 unsigned char selected_len
;
2361 /* We must have requested it. */
2362 if (s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb
== NULL
) {
2363 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2366 /* The data must be valid */
2367 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt
)) {
2368 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2371 if (s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
, data
,
2374 ctx
->next_proto_select_cb_arg
) !=
2375 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2376 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2380 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2381 * a single Serverhello
2383 OPENSSL_free(s
->next_proto_negotiated
);
2384 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
2385 if (s
->next_proto_negotiated
== NULL
) {
2386 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2389 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, selected
, selected_len
);
2390 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= selected_len
;
2391 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
2395 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
) {
2397 /* We must have requested it. */
2398 if (!s
->s3
->alpn_sent
) {
2399 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2403 * The extension data consists of:
2404 * uint16 list_length
2405 * uint8 proto_length;
2406 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2408 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt
, &len
)
2409 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) != len
|| !PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &len
)
2410 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) != len
) {
2411 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2414 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2415 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
);
2416 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2417 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2420 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, len
)) {
2421 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2424 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= len
;
2426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2427 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
) {
2428 unsigned int hbtype
;
2429 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &hbtype
)) {
2430 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2434 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2435 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2437 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2438 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2439 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
2442 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2448 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
) {
2449 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s
, &spkt
, al
))
2453 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
) {
2454 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2455 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
) &&
2456 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
!= SSL_AEAD
2457 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
!= SSL_RC4
)
2458 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2459 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
) {
2460 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
2462 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
2465 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2466 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2468 else if (custom_ext_parse(s
, 0, type
, data
, size
, al
) <= 0)
2472 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2473 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2477 if (!s
->hit
&& tlsext_servername
== 1) {
2478 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
) {
2479 if (s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
== NULL
) {
2480 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
=
2481 OPENSSL_strdup(s
->tlsext_hostname
);
2482 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) {
2483 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2487 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2496 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2497 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2498 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2499 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2500 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2502 if (!renegotiate_seen
&& !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
)
2503 && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
2504 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2506 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
2512 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2515 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
) !=
2516 !(s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
)) {
2517 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS
);
2526 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2528 s
->s3
->alpn_sent
= 0;
2532 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2537 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL
*s
)
2539 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
;
2540 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2544 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2545 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2548 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2549 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2553 if (s
->ctx
!= NULL
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2555 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2556 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2557 else if (s
->initial_ctx
!= NULL
2558 && s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2560 s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2562 initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2565 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2566 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2569 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
2570 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
2573 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2574 s
->servername_done
= 0;
2580 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2581 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL
*s
)
2583 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2585 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
2587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2588 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2589 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
2591 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
);
2592 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
];
2594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2595 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
);
2597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2598 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
);
2599 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
);
2600 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
);
2604 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2609 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2610 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
2611 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2612 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2613 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2614 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2615 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2616 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2619 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2620 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
) {
2621 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2623 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2626 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2627 if (!s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
) {
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
2629 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
2630 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2634 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
2638 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2643 * Upon success, returns 1.
2644 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2646 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2648 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2651 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2652 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2653 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2654 * influence which certificate is sent
2656 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1) && s
->ctx
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2658 CERT_PKEY
*certpkey
;
2659 certpkey
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2660 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2661 if (certpkey
!= NULL
) {
2663 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2664 * et al can pick it up.
2666 s
->cert
->key
= certpkey
;
2667 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2669 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2670 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2671 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2673 /* status request response should be sent */
2674 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2675 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
)
2676 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 1;
2678 /* something bad happened */
2679 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2681 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2687 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s
, al
)) {
2694 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2696 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
;
2697 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2701 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2702 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2703 * must contain uncompressed.
2705 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2706 unsigned long alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2707 if ((s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
)
2708 && (s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
> 0)
2709 && (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
)
2710 && (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
> 0)
2711 && ((alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
) || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
))) {
2712 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2714 unsigned char *list
;
2715 int found_uncompressed
= 0;
2716 list
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
2717 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
; i
++) {
2718 if (*(list
++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
) {
2719 found_uncompressed
= 1;
2723 if (!found_uncompressed
) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2725 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST
);
2729 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
;
2730 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2732 if (s
->ctx
!= NULL
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2734 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2735 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2736 else if (s
->initial_ctx
!= NULL
2737 && s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2739 s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2741 initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2744 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2745 * that we don't receive a status message
2747 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2748 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= NULL
;
2749 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= 0;
2752 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2753 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2756 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
2757 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
2760 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2761 s
->servername_done
= 0;
2767 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2770 if (s
->version
< SSL3_VERSION
)
2772 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
, &al
) <= 0) {
2773 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2777 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2784 static RAW_EXTENSION
*get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
, size_t numexts
,
2789 for (loop
= 0; loop
< numexts
; loop
++) {
2790 if (exts
[loop
].type
== type
)
2798 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
2800 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
2801 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2802 * point to the resulting session.
2804 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2805 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2806 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2809 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2810 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2811 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2812 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2813 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2814 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2815 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2818 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2819 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2820 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2821 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2822 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2823 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2825 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
2829 const unsigned char *etick
;
2831 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
2834 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
2837 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2840 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
2843 ticketext
= get_extension_by_type(hello
->pre_proc_exts
,
2844 hello
->num_extensions
,
2845 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
);
2846 if (ticketext
== NULL
)
2849 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
2852 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2855 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
2858 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
2860 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2861 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2862 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2863 * calculate the master secret later.
2867 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext
->data
, &etick
, size
)) {
2868 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2871 retv
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, etick
, size
, hello
->session_id
,
2872 hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
2874 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2875 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
2878 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2881 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2882 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
2885 default: /* fatal error */
2891 * Sets the extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present
2892 * in the ClientHello
2894 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
2896 RAW_EXTENSION
*emsext
;
2898 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
2900 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
)
2903 emsext
= get_extension_by_type(hello
->pre_proc_exts
, hello
->num_extensions
,
2904 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
);
2907 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
2908 * client doesn't support EMS.
2913 /* The extensions must always be empty */
2914 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext
->data
) != 0)
2917 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
2923 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2925 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2926 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2927 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2928 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2929 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2930 * point to the resulting session.
2933 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2934 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2935 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2936 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2937 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2939 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
2940 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
2941 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
2944 unsigned char *sdec
;
2945 const unsigned char *p
;
2946 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, ret
= -1, declen
;
2948 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2949 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
2950 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
2951 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
2953 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2954 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
2957 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2962 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
2963 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
2964 int rv
= tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
2975 /* Check key name matches */
2976 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
,
2977 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
)) != 0) {
2981 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
,
2982 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
),
2983 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
2984 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL
,
2985 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
,
2986 etick
+ sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
)) <=
2992 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
2995 mlen
= HMAC_size(hctx
);
2999 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3001 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
3006 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3007 if (HMAC_Update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
3008 || HMAC_Final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3011 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3012 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
3013 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3016 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3017 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3018 p
= etick
+ 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3019 eticklen
-= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3020 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
3021 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
3022 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
3023 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3027 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
3028 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3033 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3037 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
3041 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3042 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3043 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3047 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
3048 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
3057 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3061 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3062 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3066 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3073 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md
[] = {
3074 {NID_md5
, TLSEXT_hash_md5
},
3075 {NID_sha1
, TLSEXT_hash_sha1
},
3076 {NID_sha224
, TLSEXT_hash_sha224
},
3077 {NID_sha256
, TLSEXT_hash_sha256
},
3078 {NID_sha384
, TLSEXT_hash_sha384
},
3079 {NID_sha512
, TLSEXT_hash_sha512
},
3080 {NID_id_GostR3411_94
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
},
3081 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
},
3082 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
},
3085 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig
[] = {
3086 {EVP_PKEY_RSA
, TLSEXT_signature_rsa
},
3087 {EVP_PKEY_DSA
, TLSEXT_signature_dsa
},
3088 {EVP_PKEY_EC
, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
},
3089 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
},
3090 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
},
3091 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
}
3094 static int tls12_find_id(int nid
, const tls12_lookup
*table
, size_t tlen
)
3097 for (i
= 0; i
< tlen
; i
++) {
3098 if (table
[i
].nid
== nid
)
3104 static int tls12_find_nid(int id
, const tls12_lookup
*table
, size_t tlen
)
3107 for (i
= 0; i
< tlen
; i
++) {
3108 if ((table
[i
].id
) == id
)
3109 return table
[i
].nid
;
3114 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET
*pkt
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
, const EVP_MD
*md
)
3120 md_id
= tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md
), tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3123 sig_id
= tls12_get_sigid(pk
);
3126 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, md_id
) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, sig_id
))
3132 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
3134 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk
), tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3141 unsigned char tlsext_hash
;
3144 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info
[] = {
3145 {NID_md5
, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_md5
},
3146 {NID_sha1
, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha1
},
3147 {NID_sha224
, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha224
},
3148 {NID_sha256
, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha256
},
3149 {NID_sha384
, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha384
},
3150 {NID_sha512
, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_sha512
},
3151 {NID_id_GostR3411_94
, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411
},
3152 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
3153 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256
},
3154 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
3155 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512
},
3158 static const tls12_hash_info
*tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg
)
3164 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info
); i
++) {
3165 if (tls12_md_info
[i
].tlsext_hash
== hash_alg
)
3166 return tls12_md_info
+ i
;
3172 const EVP_MD
*tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg
)
3174 const tls12_hash_info
*inf
;
3175 if (hash_alg
== TLSEXT_hash_md5
&& FIPS_mode())
3177 inf
= tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg
);
3180 return ssl_md(inf
->md_idx
);
3183 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg
)
3186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3187 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa
:
3188 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
;
3190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3191 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa
:
3192 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
3194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3195 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
:
3196 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
3198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3199 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
:
3200 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
3202 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
:
3203 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
3205 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
:
3206 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
3212 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3213 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid
, int *psign_nid
,
3214 int *psignhash_nid
, const unsigned char *data
)
3216 int sign_nid
= NID_undef
, hash_nid
= NID_undef
;
3217 if (!phash_nid
&& !psign_nid
&& !psignhash_nid
)
3219 if (phash_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
3220 hash_nid
= tls12_find_nid(data
[0], tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3222 *phash_nid
= hash_nid
;
3224 if (psign_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
3225 sign_nid
= tls12_find_nid(data
[1], tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3227 *psign_nid
= sign_nid
;
3229 if (psignhash_nid
) {
3230 if (sign_nid
== NID_undef
|| hash_nid
== NID_undef
3231 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid
, hash_nid
, sign_nid
) <= 0)
3232 *psignhash_nid
= NID_undef
;
3236 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3237 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const unsigned char *ptmp
)
3239 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3240 const tls12_hash_info
*hinf
= tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp
[0]);
3241 if (hinf
== NULL
|| ssl_md(hinf
->md_idx
) == NULL
)
3243 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3244 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp
[1]) == -1)
3246 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3247 return ssl_security(s
, op
, hinf
->secbits
, hinf
->nid
, (void *)ptmp
);
3251 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3252 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3256 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
3258 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
3259 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
3260 int have_rsa
= 0, have_dsa
= 0, have_ecdsa
= 0;
3262 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3263 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3264 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3266 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
);
3267 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
+= 2, sigalgs
+= 2) {
3268 switch (sigalgs
[1]) {
3269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3270 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa
:
3271 if (!have_rsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3276 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa
:
3277 if (!have_dsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
:
3283 if (!have_ecdsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3290 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aRSA
;
3292 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aDSS
;
3294 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aECDSA
;
3297 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
3298 const unsigned char *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
3302 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
+= 2, psig
+= 2) {
3303 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, psig
)) {
3304 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, psig
[0])
3305 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, psig
[1]))
3312 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3313 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, TLS_SIGALGS
*shsig
,
3314 const unsigned char *pref
, size_t preflen
,
3315 const unsigned char *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
3317 const unsigned char *ptmp
, *atmp
;
3318 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
3319 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
+= 2, ptmp
+= 2) {
3320 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3321 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, ptmp
))
3323 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
+= 2, atmp
+= 2) {
3324 if (ptmp
[0] == atmp
[0] && ptmp
[1] == atmp
[1]) {
3327 shsig
->rhash
= ptmp
[0];
3328 shsig
->rsign
= ptmp
[1];
3329 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig
->hash_nid
,
3331 &shsig
->signandhash_nid
, ptmp
);
3341 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3342 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
3344 const unsigned char *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
3345 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
3347 TLS_SIGALGS
*salgs
= NULL
;
3349 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3351 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
3352 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
3353 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
3354 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3355 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
3356 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
3357 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
3358 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
3359 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3360 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
3362 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &conf
);
3363 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
3366 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3367 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
3371 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3372 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
3374 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
3376 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS
));
3379 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
3383 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
3384 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
3388 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3390 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t dsize
)
3393 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3394 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3396 /* Should never happen */
3400 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
3401 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(dsize
);
3402 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
)
3404 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
= dsize
;
3405 memcpy(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
, data
, dsize
);
3409 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
3414 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
3415 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
3417 TLS_SIGALGS
*sigptr
;
3418 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
3421 for (i
= 0, sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
;
3422 i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++, sigptr
++) {
3423 idx
= tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr
->rsign
);
3424 if (idx
> 0 && pmd
[idx
] == NULL
) {
3425 md
= tls12_get_hash(sigptr
->rhash
);
3427 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3428 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
) {
3429 pvalid
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3430 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = md
;
3436 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3437 * the certificate for signing.
3439 if (!(s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
3441 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3442 * supported it stays as NULL.
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3445 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] == NULL
)
3446 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3449 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] == NULL
) {
3450 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
3451 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = EVP_sha1();
3454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3455 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] == NULL
)
3456 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha1();
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3459 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] == NULL
)
3460 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
);
3461 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] == NULL
)
3462 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
] =
3463 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
);
3464 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] == NULL
)
3465 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
] =
3466 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
);
3472 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
3473 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
3474 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
3476 const unsigned char *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3477 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
/ 2;
3478 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
3482 if (idx
>= (int)s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
)
3489 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash
, psign
, psignhash
, psig
);
3491 return (int)numsigalgs
;
3494 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
3495 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
3496 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
3498 TLS_SIGALGS
*shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
;
3499 if (!shsigalgs
|| idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
3500 || s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
3504 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash_nid
;
3506 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sign_nid
;
3508 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->signandhash_nid
;
3510 *rsig
= shsigalgs
->rsign
;
3512 *rhash
= shsigalgs
->rhash
;
3513 return (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
3516 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3520 int sigalgs
[MAX_SIGALGLEN
];
3523 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
3525 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
3526 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
3527 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
3528 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
3529 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3530 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
3532 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
3533 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
3534 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
3538 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
3540 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
3543 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
3546 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== MAX_SIGALGLEN
)
3548 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
3550 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
3552 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
3560 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
3561 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
3563 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
3566 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
; i
+= 2) {
3567 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sig_alg
&& sarg
->sigalgs
[i
+ 1] == hash_alg
)
3570 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = hash_alg
;
3571 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = sig_alg
;
3576 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3577 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3579 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
3583 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
3587 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
3590 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
3592 unsigned char *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
3597 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
);
3598 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
3600 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
3601 rhash
= tls12_find_id(*psig_nids
++, tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3602 rsign
= tls12_find_id(*psig_nids
++, tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3604 if (rhash
== -1 || rsign
== -1)
3611 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
3612 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3613 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
3615 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
3616 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3617 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
3623 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
3627 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
3631 if (default_nid
== -1)
3633 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
3635 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
3636 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
3637 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
3642 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3643 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
3647 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
3648 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
3649 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
3656 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3657 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3658 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3659 * attempting to use them.
3662 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3664 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3665 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3666 /* Strict mode flags */
3667 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3668 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3669 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3671 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
3676 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
3677 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
3680 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3681 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3683 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3686 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
3688 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
3689 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3691 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
3693 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
3694 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3700 idx
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pk
);
3703 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3705 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
3706 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
3708 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
3715 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3716 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
3717 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
3718 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3719 else if (!check_flags
)
3724 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3725 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3727 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
3729 unsigned char rsign
= 0;
3730 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
)
3732 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3735 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
:
3736 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
:
3737 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_rsa
;
3738 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
3741 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
3742 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_dsa
;
3743 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
3747 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
;
3748 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
3751 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
3752 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001
;
3753 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
3756 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
3757 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256
;
3758 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
3761 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
3762 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
;
3763 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
3772 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3773 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3775 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
3777 const unsigned char *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3778 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
+= 2, p
+= 2) {
3779 if (p
[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1
&& p
[1] == rsign
)
3782 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
3789 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3790 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
3794 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
3795 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3796 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3797 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
3799 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3806 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3807 else if (check_flags
)
3808 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
3810 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3811 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, check_flags
? 1 : 2))
3812 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
3813 else if (!check_flags
)
3816 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3817 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3818 else if (strict_mode
) {
3819 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3820 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3821 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
3822 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
3824 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
3831 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
3832 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
3834 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
3836 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
3839 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
3842 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
3846 const unsigned char *ctypes
;
3850 ctypelen
= (int)c
->ctype_num
;
3852 ctypes
= (unsigned char *)s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
3853 ctypelen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
;
3855 for (i
= 0; i
< ctypelen
; i
++) {
3856 if (ctypes
[i
] == check_type
) {
3857 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3861 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
3864 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3866 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
;
3868 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
3869 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3871 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
3872 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
3873 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3875 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
3876 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
3877 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
3878 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
3879 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
3884 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
3887 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
3889 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
3890 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
3894 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
3895 if (*pvalid
& CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
)
3896 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
3897 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
] != NULL
)
3898 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
3900 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3903 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3907 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
)
3910 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3911 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3918 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3919 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
3921 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
);
3922 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
);
3923 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
3924 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
3925 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
3926 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
3927 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
3930 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3931 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
3933 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
3936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3937 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
3939 int dh_secbits
= 80;
3940 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
3941 return DH_get_1024_160();
3942 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
3943 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
3948 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3949 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk
->privatekey
);
3952 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
3960 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
3961 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
3963 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
3964 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_pqg(dhp
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
3972 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
3973 return DH_get_2048_224();
3974 return DH_get_1024_160();
3978 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
3981 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
3984 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
3985 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
3986 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
3987 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
3989 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
3992 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3994 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
3997 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
3999 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4000 int secbits
= -1, md_nid
= NID_undef
, sig_nid
;
4001 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4002 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
4004 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
4005 if (sig_nid
&& OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid
, &md_nid
, NULL
)) {
4007 if (md_nid
&& (md
= EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid
)))
4008 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
4011 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
4013 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
4016 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
4019 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
4021 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
4022 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
4024 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
4025 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
4027 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
4028 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
4033 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4034 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4035 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4038 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
4040 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
4042 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
4047 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
4051 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
4052 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
4053 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);