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1 /*
2 * Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 #include <stdlib.h>
11 #include "ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/ktls.h"
13 #include "record/record_local.h"
14 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
18
19 #define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
20
21 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
22 static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = { 0x74, 0x6C, 0x73, 0x31, 0x33, 0x20, 0x00 };
23 #else
24 static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
25 #endif
26
27 /*
28 * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
29 * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
30 * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
31 * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
32 * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
33 */
34 int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
35 const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
36 const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
37 unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
38 {
39 EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF,
40 s->ctx->propq);
41 EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
42 OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
43 int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
44 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
45 int ret;
46 size_t hashlen;
47
48 kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
49 EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
50 if (kctx == NULL)
51 return 0;
52
53 if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
54 if (fatal) {
55 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
56 } else {
57 /*
58 * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
59 * or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
60 */
61 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
62 }
63 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
64 return 0;
65 }
66
67 if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
68 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
69 if (fatal)
70 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
71 else
72 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
73 return 0;
74 }
75 hashlen = (size_t)ret;
76
77 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
78 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
79 (char *)mdname, 0);
80 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
81 (unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
82 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
83 (unsigned char *)label_prefix,
84 sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
85 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
86 (unsigned char *)label, labellen);
87 if (data != NULL)
88 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA,
89 (unsigned char *)data,
90 datalen);
91 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
92
93 ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) <= 0;
94 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
95
96 if (ret != 0) {
97 if (fatal)
98 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
99 else
100 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
101 }
102
103 return ret == 0;
104 }
105
106 /*
107 * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
108 * success 0 on failure.
109 */
110 int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
111 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
112 {
113 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
114 static const unsigned char keylabel[] ={ 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x00 };
115 #else
116 static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
117 #endif
118
119 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
120 NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
121 }
122
123 /*
124 * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
125 * success 0 on failure.
126 */
127 int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret,
128 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
129 {
130 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
131 static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = { 0x69, 0x76, 0x00 };
132 #else
133 static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
134 #endif
135
136 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
137 NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
138 }
139
140 int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
141 const unsigned char *secret,
142 unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
143 {
144 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
145 static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = { 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
146 #else
147 static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
148 #endif
149
150 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
151 sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
152 }
153
154 /*
155 * Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
156 * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
157 * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
158 */
159 int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md,
160 const unsigned char *prevsecret,
161 const unsigned char *insecret,
162 size_t insecretlen,
163 unsigned char *outsecret)
164 {
165 size_t mdlen;
166 int mdleni;
167 int ret;
168 EVP_KDF *kdf;
169 EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
170 OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
171 int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
172 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
173 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
174 static const char derived_secret_label[] = { 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
175 #else
176 static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
177 #endif
178
179 kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, s->ctx->propq);
180 kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
181 EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
182 if (kctx == NULL) {
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
184 return 0;
185 }
186
187 mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
188 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
189 if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
191 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
192 return 0;
193 }
194 mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
195
196 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
197 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
198 (char *)mdname, 0);
199 if (insecret != NULL)
200 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
201 (unsigned char *)insecret,
202 insecretlen);
203 if (prevsecret != NULL)
204 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
205 (unsigned char *)prevsecret, mdlen);
206 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
207 (unsigned char *)label_prefix,
208 sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
209 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
210 (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
211 sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1);
212 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
213
214 ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen, params) <= 0;
215
216 if (ret != 0)
217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
218
219 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
220 return ret == 0;
221 }
222
223 /*
224 * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the
225 * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
226 * generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
227 */
228 int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret,
229 size_t insecretlen)
230 {
231 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
232 return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
233 insecret, insecretlen,
234 (unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
235 }
236
237 /*
238 * Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master
239 * secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
240 * failure.
241 */
242 int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
243 unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
244 size_t *secret_size)
245 {
246 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
247
248 *secret_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
249 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
250 return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
251 }
252
253 /*
254 * Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
255 * 0 on error.
256 */
257 size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
258 unsigned char *out)
259 {
260 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(ssl_handshake_md(s));
261 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
262 unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
263 unsigned char *key = NULL;
264 size_t len = 0, hashlen;
265 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
266
267 /* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
268 if (s->ctx->propq != NULL)
269 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
270 (char *)s->ctx->propq,
271 0);
272 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
273
274 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
275 /* SSLfatal() already called */
276 goto err;
277 }
278
279 if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
280 key = s->server_finished_secret;
281 } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
282 key = s->client_finished_secret;
283 } else {
284 if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s),
285 s->client_app_traffic_secret,
286 finsecret, hashlen))
287 goto err;
288 key = finsecret;
289 }
290
291 if (!EVP_Q_mac(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC", s->ctx->propq, mdname,
292 params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen,
293 /* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
294 out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) {
295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
296 goto err;
297 }
298
299 err:
300 OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
301 return len;
302 }
303
304 /*
305 * There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
306 * for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
307 */
308 int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
309 {
310 const EVP_CIPHER *c;
311 const EVP_MD *hash;
312
313 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
314 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, NULL,
315 0)) {
316 /* Error is already recorded */
317 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
318 return 0;
319 }
320
321 ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
322 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
323 ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
324 s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
325
326 return 1;
327 }
328
329 static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md,
330 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
331 const unsigned char *insecret,
332 const unsigned char *hash,
333 const unsigned char *label,
334 size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
335 unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv,
336 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx)
337 {
338 size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen;
339 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
340 size_t hashlen;
341
342 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
343 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
345 return 0;
346 }
347 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
348
349 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
350 secret, hashlen, 1)) {
351 /* SSLfatal() already called */
352 return 0;
353 }
354
355 keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
356 if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
357 uint32_t algenc;
358
359 ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
360 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
361 algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
362 } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
363 /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
364 algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
365 } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
366 /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
367 algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
368 } else {
369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
370 return 0;
371 }
372 if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
373 taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
374 else
375 taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
376 } else {
377 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
378 taglen = 0;
379 }
380
381 if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen)
382 || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) {
383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
384 return 0;
385 }
386
387 if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
388 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL)
389 || (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
390 taglen, NULL))
391 || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
393 return 0;
394 }
395
396 return 1;
397 }
398
399 int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
400 {
401 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
402 static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x65, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
403 static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
404 static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
405 static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
406 static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
407 static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
408 static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = {0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
409 static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
410 #else
411 static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
412 static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
413 static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
414 static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
415 static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
416 static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master";
417 static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
418 static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "e exp master";
419 #endif
420 unsigned char *iv;
421 unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
422 unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
423 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
424 unsigned char *hash = hashval;
425 unsigned char *insecret;
426 unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
427 const char *log_label = NULL;
428 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
429 size_t finsecretlen = 0;
430 const unsigned char *label;
431 size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
432 int ret = 0;
433 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
434 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
435 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
436 ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
437 void *rl_sequence;
438 BIO *bio;
439 #endif
440
441 if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
442 if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
443 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx);
444 } else {
445 s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
446 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) {
447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
448 goto err;
449 }
450 }
451 ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
452 iv = s->read_iv;
453
454 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
455 } else {
456 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
457 if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
459 } else {
460 s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
461 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
463 goto err;
464 }
465 }
466 ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
467 iv = s->write_iv;
468
469 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
470 }
471
472 if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
473 || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
474 if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
475 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
476 long handlen;
477 void *hdata;
478 unsigned int hashlenui;
479 const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
480
481 insecret = s->early_secret;
482 label = client_early_traffic;
483 labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
484 log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
485
486 handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
487 if (handlen <= 0) {
488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
489 goto err;
490 }
491
492 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
493 && s->max_early_data > 0
494 && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
495 /*
496 * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
497 * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
498 * must be using an external PSK.
499 */
500 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
501 && s->max_early_data ==
502 s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
504 goto err;
505 }
506 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
507 }
508 if (sslcipher == NULL) {
509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
510 goto err;
511 }
512
513 /*
514 * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
515 * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
516 * use ssl_handshake_md().
517 */
518 mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
519 if (mdctx == NULL) {
520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
521 goto err;
522 }
523
524 /*
525 * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
526 * it again
527 */
528 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(s->ctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
529 /* Error is already recorded */
530 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
531 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
532 goto err;
533 }
534
535 md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
536 if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
537 || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
538 || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
540 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
541 goto err;
542 }
543 hashlen = hashlenui;
544 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
545
546 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
547 early_exporter_master_secret,
548 sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
549 hashval, hashlen,
550 s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
551 1)) {
552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
553 goto err;
554 }
555
556 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
557 s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
558 /* SSLfatal() already called */
559 goto err;
560 }
561 } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
562 insecret = s->handshake_secret;
563 finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
564 finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
565 label = client_handshake_traffic;
566 labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
567 log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
568 /*
569 * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
570 * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
571 * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
572 * processed early data then we delay changing the server
573 * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
574 * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
575 * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
576 */
577 hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
578 } else {
579 insecret = s->master_secret;
580 label = client_application_traffic;
581 labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
582 log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
583 /*
584 * For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
585 * Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
586 * what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
587 * previously saved value.
588 */
589 hash = s->server_finished_hash;
590 }
591 } else {
592 /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
593 if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
594 insecret = s->handshake_secret;
595 finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
596 finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
597 label = server_handshake_traffic;
598 labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
599 log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
600 } else {
601 insecret = s->master_secret;
602 label = server_application_traffic;
603 labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
604 log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
605 }
606 }
607
608 if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
609 md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
610 cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
611 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
612 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
613 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
614 goto err;
615 }
616 }
617
618 /*
619 * Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
620 * client application traffic secret
621 */
622 if (label == server_application_traffic)
623 memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
624
625 if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
626 memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
627
628 if (label == client_application_traffic) {
629 /*
630 * We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
631 * hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
632 */
633 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
634 resumption_master_secret,
635 sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
636 hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
637 hashlen, 1)) {
638 /* SSLfatal() already called */
639 goto err;
640 }
641 }
642
643 /* check whether cipher is known */
644 if (!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
645 goto err;
646
647 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
648 insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
649 iv, ciph_ctx)) {
650 /* SSLfatal() already called */
651 goto err;
652 }
653
654 if (label == server_application_traffic) {
655 memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
656 /* Now we create the exporter master secret */
657 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
658 exporter_master_secret,
659 sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
660 hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
661 hashlen, 1)) {
662 /* SSLfatal() already called */
663 goto err;
664 }
665
666 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
667 hashlen)) {
668 /* SSLfatal() already called */
669 goto err;
670 }
671 } else if (label == client_application_traffic)
672 memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
673
674 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
675 /* SSLfatal() already called */
676 goto err;
677 }
678
679 if (finsecret != NULL
680 && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
681 finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
683 goto err;
684 }
685
686 if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
687 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS;
688 else
689 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
691 # if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
692 if (!(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
693 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)
694 goto skip_ktls;
695
696 /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
697 if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
698 goto skip_ktls;
699
700 /* ktls does not support record padding */
701 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL)
702 goto skip_ktls;
703
704 /* check that cipher is supported */
705 if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, cipher, ciph_ctx))
706 goto skip_ktls;
707
708 if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
709 bio = s->wbio;
710 else
711 bio = s->rbio;
712
713 if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
715 goto err;
716 }
717
718 /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
719 if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {
720 if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
721 goto skip_ktls;
722 }
723
724 /* configure kernel crypto structure */
725 if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
726 rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
727 else
728 rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
729
730 if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx, rl_sequence, &crypto_info,
731 which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, iv, key, NULL, 0))
732 goto skip_ktls;
733
734 /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
735 if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
736 if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
737 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
738 }
739 skip_ktls:
740 # endif
741 #endif
742 ret = 1;
743 err:
744 if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
745 /* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
746 ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
747 }
748 OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
749 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
750 return ret;
751 }
752
753 int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending)
754 {
755 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
756 static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = { 0x74, 0x72 ,0x61 ,0x66 ,0x66 ,0x69 ,0x63 ,0x20 ,0x75 ,0x70 ,0x64, 0x00};
757 #else
758 static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
759 #endif
760 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
761 size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
762 unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
763 unsigned char *insecret, *iv;
764 unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
765 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
766 int ret = 0;
767
768 if (s->server == sending)
769 insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
770 else
771 insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
772
773 if (sending) {
774 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
775 iv = s->write_iv;
776 ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
777 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
778 } else {
779 iv = s->read_iv;
780 ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
781 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
782 }
783
784 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s),
785 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
786 application_traffic,
787 sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
788 iv, ciph_ctx)) {
789 /* SSLfatal() already called */
790 goto err;
791 }
792
793 memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
794
795 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
796 ret = 1;
797 err:
798 OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
799 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
800 return ret;
801 }
802
803 int tls13_alert_code(int code)
804 {
805 /* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
806 if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
807 return code;
808
809 return tls1_alert_code(code);
810 }
811
812 int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
813 const char *label, size_t llen,
814 const unsigned char *context,
815 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
816 {
817 unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
818 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
819 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
820 #else
821 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
822 #endif
823 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
824 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
825 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
826 unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
827 int ret = 0;
828
829 if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
830 goto err;
831
832 if (!use_context)
833 contextlen = 0;
834
835 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
836 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
837 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
838 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
839 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
840 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
841 (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
842 data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
843 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
844 sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
845 out, olen, 0))
846 goto err;
847
848 ret = 1;
849 err:
850 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
851 return ret;
852 }
853
854 int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
855 const char *label, size_t llen,
856 const unsigned char *context,
857 size_t contextlen)
858 {
859 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
860 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
861 #else
862 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
863 #endif
864 unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
865 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
866 const EVP_MD *md;
867 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
868 unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
869 int ret = 0;
870 const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
871
872 if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
873 goto err;
874
875 if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
876 && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
877 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
878 else
879 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
880
881 md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
882
883 /*
884 * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
885 * the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
886 * is like so:
887 *
888 * TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
889 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
890 * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
891 *
892 * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
893 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
894 * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
895 *
896 * Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
897 */
898 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
899 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
900 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
901 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
902 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
903 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
904 (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
905 data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
906 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
907 sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
908 out, olen, 0))
909 goto err;
910
911 ret = 1;
912 err:
913 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
914 return ret;
915 }