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1 From 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
2 From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
3 Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 18:19:40 +0100
4 Subject: Documentation: refer to config RANDOMIZE_BASE for kernel address-space randomization
5
6 From: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
7
8 commit 82ca67321f55a8d1da6ac3ed611da3c32818bb37 upstream.
9
10 The config RANDOMIZE_SLAB does not exist, the authors probably intended to
11 refer to the config RANDOMIZE_BASE, which provides kernel address-space
12 randomization. They probably just confused SLAB with BASE (these two
13 four-letter words coincidentally share three common letters), as they also
14 point out the config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM as further randomization within
15 the same sentence.
16
17 Fix the reference of the config for kernel address-space randomization to
18 the config that provides that.
19
20 Fixes: 6e88559470f5 ("Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre")
21 Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>
22 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211230171940.27558-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com
23 Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
24 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
25 ---
26 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 2 +-
27 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
28
29 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
30 +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
31 @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ Spectre variant 2
32 before invoking any firmware code to prevent Spectre variant 2 exploits
33 using the firmware.
34
35 - Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_SLAB=y
36 + Using kernel address space randomization (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=y
37 and CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y in the kernel configuration) makes
38 attacks on the kernel generally more difficult.
39