Merge branch 'tb/t7700-fixup'

[thirdparty/git.git] / fsck.c

diff --git a/fsck.c b/fsck.c
index 1ad02fcdfabea74dc7f3d1c214400516d327a421..78af29d26459e1d392d8a64ff72dd5fed575daff 100644 (file)
--- a/fsck.c
+++ b/fsck.c
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
 #include "packfile.h"
 #include "submodule-config.h"
 #include "config.h"
-#include "credential.h"
 #include "help.h"
 
 static ssize_t max_tree_entry_len = 4096;
@@ -328,7 +327,8 @@ static int fsck_walk_tree(struct tree *tree, void *data, struct fsck_options *op
                return -1;
 
        name = fsck_get_object_name(options, &tree->object.oid);
-       if (init_tree_desc_gently(&desc, tree->buffer, tree->size, 0))
+       if (init_tree_desc_gently(&desc, &tree->object.oid,
+                                 tree->buffer, tree->size, 0))
                return -1;
        while (tree_entry_gently(&desc, &entry)) {
                struct object *obj;
@@ -599,7 +599,8 @@ static int fsck_tree(const struct object_id *tree_oid,
        const char *o_name;
        struct name_stack df_dup_candidates = { NULL };
 
-       if (init_tree_desc_gently(&desc, buffer, size, TREE_DESC_RAW_MODES)) {
+       if (init_tree_desc_gently(&desc, tree_oid, buffer, size,
+                                 TREE_DESC_RAW_MODES)) {
                retval += report(options, tree_oid, OBJ_TREE,
                                 FSCK_MSG_BAD_TREE,
                                 "cannot be parsed as a tree");
@@ -1047,138 +1048,6 @@ done:
        return ret;
 }
 
-static int starts_with_dot_slash(const char *const path)
-{
-       return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_SLASH |
-                               PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM);
-}
-
-static int starts_with_dot_dot_slash(const char *const path)
-{
-       return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_DOT_SLASH |
-                               PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM);
-}
-
-static int submodule_url_is_relative(const char *url)
-{
-       return starts_with_dot_slash(url) || starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url);
-}
-
-/*
- * Count directory components that a relative submodule URL should chop
- * from the remote_url it is to be resolved against.
- *
- * In other words, this counts "../" components at the start of a
- * submodule URL.
- *
- * Returns the number of directory components to chop and writes a
- * pointer to the next character of url after all leading "./" and
- * "../" components to out.
- */
-static int count_leading_dotdots(const char *url, const char **out)
-{
-       int result = 0;
-       while (1) {
-               if (starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url)) {
-                       result++;
-                       url += strlen("../");
-                       continue;
-               }
-               if (starts_with_dot_slash(url)) {
-                       url += strlen("./");
-                       continue;
-               }
-               *out = url;
-               return result;
-       }
-}
-/*
- * Check whether a transport is implemented by git-remote-curl.
- *
- * If it is, returns 1 and writes the URL that would be passed to
- * git-remote-curl to the "out" parameter.
- *
- * Otherwise, returns 0 and leaves "out" untouched.
- *
- * Examples:
- *   http::https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git
- *   https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git
- *   git://example.com/repo.git -> 0
- *
- * This is for use in checking for previously exploitable bugs that
- * required a submodule URL to be passed to git-remote-curl.
- */
-static int url_to_curl_url(const char *url, const char **out)
-{
-       /*
-        * We don't need to check for case-aliases, "http.exe", and so
-        * on because in the default configuration, is_transport_allowed
-        * prevents URLs with those schemes from being cloned
-        * automatically.
-        */
-       if (skip_prefix(url, "http::", out) ||
-           skip_prefix(url, "https::", out) ||
-           skip_prefix(url, "ftp::", out) ||
-           skip_prefix(url, "ftps::", out))
-               return 1;
-       if (starts_with(url, "http://") ||
-           starts_with(url, "https://") ||
-           starts_with(url, "ftp://") ||
-           starts_with(url, "ftps://")) {
-               *out = url;
-               return 1;
-       }
-       return 0;
-}
-
-static int check_submodule_url(const char *url)
-{
-       const char *curl_url;
-
-       if (looks_like_command_line_option(url))
-               return -1;
-
-       if (submodule_url_is_relative(url) || starts_with(url, "git://")) {
-               char *decoded;
-               const char *next;
-               int has_nl;
-
-               /*
-                * This could be appended to an http URL and url-decoded;
-                * check for malicious characters.
-                */
-               decoded = url_decode(url);
-               has_nl = !!strchr(decoded, '\n');
-
-               free(decoded);
-               if (has_nl)
-                       return -1;
-
-               /*
-                * URLs which escape their root via "../" can overwrite
-                * the host field and previous components, resolving to
-                * URLs like https::example.com/submodule.git and
-                * https:///example.com/submodule.git that were
-                * susceptible to CVE-2020-11008.
-                */
-               if (count_leading_dotdots(url, &next) > 0 &&
-                   (*next == ':' || *next == '/'))
-                       return -1;
-       }
-
-       else if (url_to_curl_url(url, &curl_url)) {
-               struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
-               int ret = 0;
-               if (credential_from_url_gently(&c, curl_url, 1) ||
-                   !*c.host)
-                       ret = -1;
-               credential_clear(&c);
-               return ret;
-       }
-
-       return 0;
-}
-
 struct fsck_gitmodules_data {
        const struct object_id *oid;
        struct fsck_options *options;