-/***
- This file is part of systemd.
-
- Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
-
- systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
- (at your option) any later version.
-
- systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
- Lesser General Public License for more details.
-
- You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
- along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-***/
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
#include <errno.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <syslog.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
#include <selinux/context.h>
#include <selinux/label.h>
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "selinux-util.h"
+#include "stdio-util.h"
#include "time-util.h"
#include "util.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
-DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(security_context_t, freecon);
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(char*, freecon);
DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(context_t, context_free);
-#define _cleanup_security_context_free_ _cleanup_(freeconp)
+#define _cleanup_freecon_ _cleanup_(freeconp)
#define _cleanup_context_free_ _cleanup_(context_freep)
static int cached_use = -1;
static struct selabel_handle *label_hnd = NULL;
#define log_enforcing(...) log_full(security_getenforce() == 1 ? LOG_ERR : LOG_DEBUG, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define log_enforcing_errno(r, ...) log_full_errno(security_getenforce() == 1 ? LOG_ERR : LOG_DEBUG, r, __VA_ARGS__)
#endif
-bool mac_selinux_have(void) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+bool mac_selinux_use(void) {
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (cached_use < 0)
cached_use = is_selinux_enabled() > 0;
#endif
}
-bool mac_selinux_use(void) {
- if (!mac_selinux_have())
- return false;
-
- /* Never try to configure SELinux features if we aren't
- * root */
-
- return getuid() == 0;
-}
-
void mac_selinux_retest(void) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
cached_use = -1;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_init(void) {
int r = 0;
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
usec_t before_timestamp, after_timestamp;
struct mallinfo before_mallinfo, after_mallinfo;
label_hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0);
if (!label_hnd) {
- log_enforcing("Failed to initialize SELinux context: %m");
+ log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to initialize SELinux context: %m");
r = security_getenforce() == 1 ? -errno : 0;
} else {
char timespan[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX];
void mac_selinux_finish(void) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (!label_hnd)
return;
#endif
}
-int mac_selinux_fix(const char *path, bool ignore_enoent, bool ignore_erofs) {
+int mac_selinux_fix(const char *path, LabelFixFlags flags) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ char procfs_path[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
+ _cleanup_freecon_ char* fcon = NULL;
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
- r = lstat(path, &st);
- if (r >= 0) {
- _cleanup_security_context_free_ security_context_t fcon = NULL;
+ /* Open the file as O_PATH, to pin it while we determine and adjust the label */
+ fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ if ((flags & LABEL_IGNORE_ENOENT) && errno == ENOENT)
+ return 0;
- r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, path, st.st_mode);
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, path, st.st_mode) < 0) {
+ r = -errno;
/* If there's no label to set, then exit without warning */
- if (r < 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+ if (r == -ENOENT)
return 0;
- if (r >= 0) {
- r = lsetfilecon_raw(path, fcon);
-
- /* If the FS doesn't support labels, then exit without warning */
- if (r < 0 && errno == EOPNOTSUPP)
- return 0;
- }
+ goto fail;
}
- if (r < 0) {
- /* Ignore ENOENT in some cases */
- if (ignore_enoent && errno == ENOENT)
+ xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
+ if (setfilecon_raw(procfs_path, fcon) < 0) {
+ _cleanup_freecon_ char *oldcon = NULL;
+
+ r = -errno;
+
+ /* If the FS doesn't support labels, then exit without warning */
+ if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP)
return 0;
- if (ignore_erofs && errno == EROFS)
+ /* It the FS is read-only and we were told to ignore failures caused by that, suppress error */
+ if (r == -EROFS && (flags & LABEL_IGNORE_EROFS))
return 0;
- log_enforcing("Unable to fix SELinux security context of %s: %m", path);
- if (security_getenforce() == 1)
- return -errno;
+ /* If the old label is identical to the new one, suppress any kind of error */
+ if (getfilecon_raw(procfs_path, &oldcon) >= 0 && streq(fcon, oldcon))
+ return 0;
+
+ goto fail;
}
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ log_enforcing_errno(r, "Unable to fix SELinux security context of %s: %m", path);
+ if (security_getenforce() == 1)
+ return r;
#endif
return 0;
int mac_selinux_apply(const char *path, const char *label) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return 0;
assert(path);
assert(label);
- if (setfilecon(path, (security_context_t) label) < 0) {
- log_enforcing("Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, path);
+ if (setfilecon(path, label) < 0) {
+ log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, path);
if (security_getenforce() > 0)
return -errno;
}
int mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe(const char *exe, char **label) {
int r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
- _cleanup_security_context_free_ security_context_t mycon = NULL, fcon = NULL;
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ _cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
security_class_t sclass;
assert(exe);
assert(label);
- if (!mac_selinux_have())
+ if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
return -errno;
sclass = string_to_security_class("process");
- r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, (security_context_t *) label);
+ r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
#endif
assert(label);
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
- if (!mac_selinux_have())
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
r = getcon_raw(label);
int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *exec_label, char **label) {
int r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
- _cleanup_security_context_free_ security_context_t mycon = NULL, peercon = NULL, fcon = NULL;
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ _cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *peercon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
_cleanup_context_free_ context_t pcon = NULL, bcon = NULL;
security_class_t sclass;
const char *range = NULL;
assert(exe);
assert(label);
- if (!mac_selinux_have())
+ if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
return -ENOMEM;
sclass = string_to_security_class("process");
- r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, (security_context_t *) label);
+ r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
#endif
char* mac_selinux_free(char *label) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (!label)
return NULL;
- if (!mac_selinux_have())
+ if (!mac_selinux_use())
return NULL;
-
- freecon((security_context_t) label);
+ freecon(label);
#endif
return NULL;
}
-int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(const char *path, mode_t mode) {
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
- _cleanup_security_context_free_ security_context_t filecon = NULL;
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+static int selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(const char *abspath, mode_t mode) {
+ _cleanup_freecon_ char *filecon = NULL;
int r;
- assert(path);
-
- if (!label_hnd)
- return 0;
-
- if (path_is_absolute(path))
- r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &filecon, path, mode);
- else {
- _cleanup_free_ char *newpath = NULL;
-
- r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &newpath);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
- r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &filecon, newpath, mode);
- }
+ assert(abspath);
+ assert(path_is_absolute(abspath));
+ r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &filecon, abspath, mode);
if (r < 0) {
/* No context specified by the policy? Proceed without setting it. */
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
- log_enforcing("Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", path);
+ log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", abspath);
} else {
if (setfscreatecon_raw(filecon) >= 0)
return 0; /* Success! */
- log_enforcing("Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", filecon, path);
+ log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", filecon, abspath);
}
if (security_getenforce() > 0)
return -errno;
-#endif
return 0;
}
+#endif
+
+int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_at(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode) {
+ int r = 0;
+
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ _cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL;
+
+ assert(path);
+
+ if (!label_hnd)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!path_is_absolute(path)) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+
+ if (dirfd == AT_FDCWD)
+ r = safe_getcwd(&p);
+ else
+ r = fd_get_path(dirfd, &p);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ path = abspath = path_join(p, path);
+ if (!path)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ r = selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(path, mode);
+#endif
+ return r;
+}
+
+int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(const char *path, mode_t mode) {
+ int r = 0;
+
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ _cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL;
+
+ assert(path);
+
+ if (!label_hnd)
+ return 0;
+
+ r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &abspath);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(abspath, mode);
+#endif
+ return r;
+}
void mac_selinux_create_file_clear(void) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
PROTECT_ERRNO;
if (!mac_selinux_use())
int mac_selinux_create_socket_prepare(const char *label) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return 0;
assert(label);
- if (setsockcreatecon((security_context_t) label) < 0) {
- log_enforcing("Failed to set SELinux security context %s for sockets: %m", label);
+ if (setsockcreatecon(label) < 0) {
+ log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for sockets: %m", label);
if (security_getenforce() == 1)
return -errno;
void mac_selinux_create_socket_clear(void) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
PROTECT_ERRNO;
if (!mac_selinux_use())
/* Binds a socket and label its file system object according to the SELinux policy */
-#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
- _cleanup_security_context_free_ security_context_t fcon = NULL;
+#if HAVE_SELINUX
+ _cleanup_freecon_ char *fcon = NULL;
const struct sockaddr_un *un;
bool context_changed = false;
char *path;
if (errno == ENOENT)
goto skipped;
- log_enforcing("Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", path);
+ log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", path);
if (security_getenforce() > 0)
return -errno;
} else {
if (setfscreatecon_raw(fcon) < 0) {
- log_enforcing("Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", fcon, path);
+ log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", fcon, path);
if (security_getenforce() > 0)
return -errno;
} else
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / blobdiff