#include "selinux-util.h"
#include "signal-util.h"
#include "smack-util.h"
+#include "special.h"
#include "string-table.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
(void) vt_disallocate(path);
}
+static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) {
+ return IN_SET(i,
+ EXEC_INPUT_TTY,
+ EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE,
+ EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL);
+}
+
static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) {
- return
- o == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
- o == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
- o == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
- o == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE;
+ return IN_SET(o,
+ EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY,
+ EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE,
+ EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE,
+ EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE);
+}
+
+static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext *c) {
+ assert(c);
+
+ /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
+
+ if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input))
+ return true;
+
+ if (is_terminal_output(c->std_output))
+ return true;
+
+ if (is_terminal_output(c->std_error))
+ return true;
+
+ return !!c->tty_path;
}
static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) {
return r;
}
-static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) {
- return
- i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY ||
- i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ||
- i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL;
-}
-
static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty_stdin) {
if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin)
return STDIN_FILENO;
}
- i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
+ i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN);
switch (i) {
return STDERR_FILENO;
}
- i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
+ i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN);
o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd);
if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) {
k++;
}
- if (setgroups(k, gids) < 0) {
+ r = maybe_setgroups(k, gids);
+ if (r < 0) {
free(gids);
- return -errno;
+ return r;
}
free(gids);
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
}
+#endif
+
static int setup_pam(
const char *name,
const char *user,
uid_t uid,
+ gid_t gid,
const char *tty,
char ***env,
int fds[], unsigned n_fds) {
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM
+
static const struct pam_conv conv = {
.conv = null_conv,
.appdata_ptr = NULL
* and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
* If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
* to fail to exit normally */
+
+ r = maybe_setgroups(0, NULL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
+ if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
+ log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
- log_error_errno(r, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
+ log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
(void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1);
closelog();
return r;
-}
+#else
+ return 0;
#endif
+}
static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) {
char process_name[11];
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
-static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) {
+static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit* u, const char* msg) {
+ if (!is_seccomp_available()) {
+ log_open();
+ log_unit_debug(u, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg);
+ log_close();
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int apply_seccomp(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
uint32_t negative_action, action;
scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
Iterator i;
assert(c);
+ if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "syscall filtering"))
+ return 0;
+
negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno);
seccomp = seccomp_init(c->syscall_whitelist ? negative_action : SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
return r;
}
-static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_address_families(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
Iterator i;
int r;
assert(c);
+ if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
+ return 0;
+
seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (!seccomp)
return -ENOMEM;
return r;
}
-static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
int r;
assert(c);
+ if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
+ return 0;
+
seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (!seccomp)
return -ENOMEM;
+ r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
r = seccomp_rule_add(
seccomp,
SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
return r;
}
-static int apply_restrict_realtime(const ExecContext *c) {
+static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit* u, const ExecContext *c) {
static const int permitted_policies[] = {
SCHED_OTHER,
SCHED_BATCH,
assert(c);
+ if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "RestrictRealtime="))
+ return 0;
+
seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (!seccomp)
return -ENOMEM;
+ r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
/* Determine the highest policy constant we want to allow */
for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies); i++)
if (permitted_policies[i] > max_policy)
return r;
}
+static int apply_protect_sysctl(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
+ scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(c);
+
+ /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
+ * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
+
+ if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
+ return 0;
+
+ seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+ if (!seccomp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(_sysctl),
+ 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
+
+finish:
+ seccomp_release(seccomp);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
+ static const int module_syscalls[] = {
+ SCMP_SYS(delete_module),
+ SCMP_SYS(finit_module),
+ SCMP_SYS(init_module),
+ };
+
+ scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+ unsigned i;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(c);
+
+ /* Turn of module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
+
+ if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "ProtectKernelModules="))
+ return 0;
+
+ seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+ if (!seccomp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(module_syscalls); i++) {
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ module_syscalls[i], 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
+
+finish:
+ seccomp_release(seccomp);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int apply_private_devices(Unit *u, const ExecContext *c) {
+ const SystemCallFilterSet *set;
+ scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
+ const char *sys;
+ bool syscalls_found = false;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(c);
+
+ /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
+
+ if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u, "PrivateDevices="))
+ return 0;
+
+ seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
+ if (!seccomp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ for (set = syscall_filter_sets; set->set_name; set++)
+ if (streq(set->set_name, "@raw-io")) {
+ syscalls_found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* We should never fail here */
+ if (!syscalls_found) {
+ r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ NULSTR_FOREACH(sys, set->value) {
+ int id;
+ bool add = true;
+
+#ifndef __NR_s390_pci_mmio_read
+ if (streq(sys, "s390_pci_mmio_read"))
+ add = false;
+#endif
+#ifndef __NR_s390_pci_mmio_write
+ if (streq(sys, "s390_pci_mmio_write"))
+ add = false;
+#endif
+
+ if (!add)
+ continue;
+
+ id = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(sys);
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ id, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+ }
+
+ r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto finish;
+
+ r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
+
+finish:
+ seccomp_release(seccomp);
+ return r;
+}
+
#endif
static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) {
assert(idle_pipe);
-
idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]);
idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]);
}
static int build_environment(
+ Unit *u,
const ExecContext *c,
const ExecParameters *p,
unsigned n_fds,
unsigned n_env = 0;
char *x;
+ assert(u);
assert(c);
assert(ret);
- our_env = new0(char*, 12);
+ our_env = new0(char*, 14);
if (!our_env)
return -ENOMEM;
our_env[n_env++] = x;
}
- if (p->watchdog_usec > 0) {
+ if ((p->flags & EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG) && p->watchdog_usec > 0) {
if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0)
return -ENOMEM;
our_env[n_env++] = x;
our_env[n_env++] = x;
}
+ /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
+ * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
+ * check the database directly. */
+ if (unit_has_name(u, SPECIAL_DBUS_SERVICE)) {
+ x = strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
+ if (!x)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+ }
+
if (home) {
x = strappend("HOME=", home);
if (!x)
our_env[n_env++] = x;
}
- if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input) ||
- c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
- c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
- c->tty_path) {
+ if (!sd_id128_is_null(u->invocation_id)) {
+ if (asprintf(&x, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u->invocation_id)) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ our_env[n_env++] = x;
+ }
+
+ if (exec_context_needs_term(c)) {
+ const char *tty_path, *term = NULL;
+
+ tty_path = exec_context_tty_path(c);
+
+ /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try to inherit
+ * the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the container manager
+ * passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
+
+ if (path_equal(tty_path, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
+ term = getenv("TERM");
+ if (!term)
+ term = default_term_for_tty(tty_path);
- x = strdup(default_term_for_tty(exec_context_tty_path(c)));
+ x = strappend("TERM=", term);
if (!x)
return -ENOMEM;
our_env[n_env++] = x;
if (context->private_devices ||
context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO ||
- context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
+ context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO ||
+ context->protect_kernel_tunables ||
+ context->protect_kernel_modules ||
+ context->protect_control_groups)
return true;
return false;
return 0;
}
+static int setup_runtime_directory(
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ uid_t uid,
+ gid_t gid) {
+
+ char **rt;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(context);
+ assert(params);
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->runtime_directory) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p;
+
+ p = strjoin(params->runtime_prefix, "/", *rt, NULL);
+ if (!p)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r = mkdir_p_label(p, context->runtime_directory_mode);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = chmod_and_chown(p, context->runtime_directory_mode, uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int setup_smack(
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecCommand *command) {
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
+ int r;
+
+ assert(context);
+ assert(command);
+
+ if (!mac_smack_use())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (context->smack_process_label) {
+ r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+#ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
+ else {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL;
+
+ r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
+ if (r < 0 && r != -ENODATA && r != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return r;
+
+ r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int compile_read_write_paths(
+ const ExecContext *context,
+ const ExecParameters *params,
+ char ***ret) {
+
+ _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
+ char **rt;
+
+ /* Compile the list of writable paths. This is the combination of the explicitly configured paths, plus all
+ * runtime directories. */
+
+ if (strv_isempty(context->read_write_paths) &&
+ strv_isempty(context->runtime_directory)) {
+ *ret = NULL; /* NOP if neither is set */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ l = strv_copy(context->read_write_paths);
+ if (!l)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->runtime_directory) {
+ char *s;
+
+ s = strjoin(params->runtime_prefix, "/", *rt, NULL);
+ if (!s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (strv_consume(&l, s) < 0)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ *ret = l;
+ l = NULL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void append_socket_pair(int *array, unsigned *n, int pair[2]) {
assert(array);
assert(n);
const ExecParameters *params,
ExecRuntime *runtime,
DynamicCreds *dcreds,
+ int user_lookup_fd,
int socket_fd,
int *fds, unsigned n_fds) {
unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
- int dont_close[n_fds + 11];
+ int dont_close[n_fds + 12];
assert(params);
append_socket_pair(dont_close, &n_dont_close, dcreds->group->storage_socket);
}
+ if (user_lookup_fd >= 0)
+ dont_close[n_dont_close++] = user_lookup_fd;
+
return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close);
}
+static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext *c) {
+ assert(c);
+
+ return c->address_families_whitelist ||
+ !set_isempty(c->address_families);
+}
+
+static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext *c) {
+ assert(c);
+
+ return c->syscall_whitelist ||
+ !set_isempty(c->syscall_filter) ||
+ !set_isempty(c->syscall_archs);
+}
+
+static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext *c) {
+ assert(c);
+
+ if (c->no_new_privileges)
+ return true;
+
+ if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
+ return false;
+
+ return context_has_address_families(c) || /* we need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
+ c->memory_deny_write_execute ||
+ c->restrict_realtime ||
+ c->protect_kernel_tunables ||
+ c->protect_kernel_modules ||
+ c->private_devices ||
+ context_has_syscall_filters(c);
+}
+
+static int send_user_lookup(
+ Unit *unit,
+ int user_lookup_fd,
+ uid_t uid,
+ gid_t gid) {
+
+ assert(unit);
+
+ /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
+ * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
+ * specified. */
+
+ if (user_lookup_fd < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!uid_is_valid(uid) && !gid_is_valid(gid))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (writev(user_lookup_fd,
+ (struct iovec[]) {
+ { .iov_base = &uid, .iov_len = sizeof(uid) },
+ { .iov_base = &gid, .iov_len = sizeof(gid) },
+ { .iov_base = unit->id, .iov_len = strlen(unit->id) }}, 3) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int exec_child(
Unit *unit,
ExecCommand *command,
int socket_fd,
int *fds, unsigned n_fds,
char **files_env,
+ int user_lookup_fd,
int *exit_status) {
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
log_forget_fds();
- r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, dcreds, socket_fd, fds, n_fds);
+ r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, dcreds, user_lookup_fd, socket_fd, fds, n_fds);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
return r;
exec_context_tty_reset(context, params);
- if (params->confirm_spawn) {
+ if (params->flags & EXEC_CONFIRM_SPAWN) {
char response;
r = ask_for_confirmation(&response, argv);
return r;
}
- if (uid == UID_INVALID || gid == GID_INVALID) {
+ if (!uid_is_valid(uid) || !gid_is_valid(gid)) {
*exit_status = EXIT_USER;
return -ESRCH;
}
} else {
if (context->user) {
username = context->user;
- r = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell);
+ r = get_user_creds_clean(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_USER;
return r;
}
+
+ /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
+ * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
}
if (context->group) {
}
}
+ r = send_user_lookup(unit, user_lookup_fd, uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ user_lookup_fd = safe_close(user_lookup_fd);
+
/* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
* must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
if (socket_fd >= 0)
USER_PROCESS,
username ? "root" : context->user);
- if (context->user && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) {
+ if (context->user) {
r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
}
if (!strv_isempty(context->runtime_directory) && params->runtime_prefix) {
- char **rt;
-
- STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->runtime_directory) {
- _cleanup_free_ char *p;
-
- p = strjoin(params->runtime_prefix, "/", *rt, NULL);
- if (!p) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- r = mkdir_p_label(p, context->runtime_directory_mode);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
- return r;
- }
-
- r = chmod_and_chown(p, context->runtime_directory_mode, uid, gid);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
- return r;
- }
+ r = setup_runtime_directory(context, params, uid, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
+ return r;
}
}
r = build_environment(
+ unit,
context,
params,
n_fds,
}
accum_env = strv_env_clean(accum_env);
- umask(context->umask);
+ (void) umask(context->umask);
- if (params->apply_permissions && !command->privileged) {
- r = enforce_groups(context, username, gid);
+ if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) && !command->privileged) {
+ r = setup_smack(context, command);
if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
return r;
}
-#ifdef HAVE_SMACK
- if (context->smack_process_label) {
- r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
- return r;
- }
- }
-#ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
- else {
- _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL;
-
- r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
- if (r < 0 && r != -ENODATA && r != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
- return r;
- }
- r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL);
- if (r < 0) {
- *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
- return r;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM
if (context->pam_name && username) {
- r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds);
+ r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, gid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_PAM;
return r;
}
}
-#endif
}
if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
}
needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime);
-
if (needs_mount_namespace) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char **rw = NULL;
char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL;
+ NameSpaceInfo ns_info = {
+ .private_dev = context->private_devices,
+ .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
+ .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
+ .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
+ };
/* The runtime struct only contains the parent
* of the private /tmp, which is
var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
}
+ r = compile_read_write_paths(context, params, &rw);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
+ return r;
+ }
+
r = setup_namespace(
- params->apply_chroot ? context->root_directory : NULL,
- context->read_write_paths,
+ (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) ? context->root_directory : NULL,
+ &ns_info,
+ rw,
context->read_only_paths,
context->inaccessible_paths,
tmp,
var,
- context->private_devices,
context->protect_home,
context->protect_system,
context->mount_flags);
}
}
+ if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) && !command->privileged) {
+ r = enforce_groups(context, username, gid);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
if (context->working_directory_home)
wd = home;
else if (context->working_directory)
else
wd = "/";
- if (params->apply_chroot) {
+ if (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT) {
if (!needs_mount_namespace && context->root_directory)
if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
- if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0 && !command->privileged) {
+ if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) &&
+ mac_selinux_use() &&
+ params->selinux_context_net &&
+ socket_fd >= 0 &&
+ !command->privileged) {
+
r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
}
#endif
- if (params->apply_permissions && context->private_users) {
+ if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) && context->private_users) {
r = setup_private_users(uid, gid);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_USER;
return r;
}
- if (params->apply_permissions && !command->privileged) {
+ if ((params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS) && !command->privileged) {
- bool use_address_families = context->address_families_whitelist ||
- !set_isempty(context->address_families);
- bool use_syscall_filter = context->syscall_whitelist ||
- !set_isempty(context->syscall_filter) ||
- !set_isempty(context->syscall_archs);
int secure_bits = context->secure_bits;
for (i = 0; i < _RLIMIT_MAX; i++) {
return -errno;
}
- if (context->no_new_privileges ||
- (!have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && (use_address_families || context->memory_deny_write_execute || context->restrict_realtime || use_syscall_filter)))
+ if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context))
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES;
return -errno;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
- if (use_address_families) {
- r = apply_address_families(context);
+ if (context_has_address_families(context)) {
+ r = apply_address_families(unit, context);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES;
return r;
}
if (context->memory_deny_write_execute) {
- r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(context);
+ r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit, context);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
return r;
}
if (context->restrict_realtime) {
- r = apply_restrict_realtime(context);
+ r = apply_restrict_realtime(unit, context);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->protect_kernel_tunables) {
+ r = apply_protect_sysctl(unit, context);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context->protect_kernel_modules) {
+ r = apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit, context);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
return r;
}
}
- if (use_syscall_filter) {
- r = apply_seccomp(context);
+ if (context->private_devices) {
+ r = apply_private_devices(unit, context);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (context_has_syscall_filters(context)) {
+ r = apply_seccomp(unit, context);
if (r < 0) {
*exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
return r;
socket_fd,
fds, n_fds,
files_env,
+ unit->manager->user_lookup_fds[1],
&exit_status);
if (r < 0) {
log_open();
"%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
"%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
"%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
+ "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
+ "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
+ "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
"%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
"%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
"%sProtectHome: %s\n"
prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking),
prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp),
prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_tunables),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->protect_kernel_modules),
+ prefix, yes_no(c->protect_control_groups),
prefix, yes_no(c->private_network),
prefix, yes_no(c->private_users),
prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home),
"%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n",
prefix, s->pid);
- if (s->start_timestamp.realtime > 0)
+ if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->start_timestamp))
fprintf(f,
"%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->start_timestamp.realtime));
- if (s->exit_timestamp.realtime > 0)
+ if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s->exit_timestamp))
fprintf(f,
"%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
"%sExit Code: %s\n"
free(r->tmp_dir);
free(r->var_tmp_dir);
safe_close_pair(r->netns_storage_socket);
- free(r);
-
- return NULL;
+ return mfree(r);
}
int exec_runtime_serialize(Unit *u, ExecRuntime *rt, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / blobdiff