Merge pull request #11827 from keszybz/pkgconfig-variables

[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / load-fragment.c

diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c
index 4ebe92fd45cc6ca3a04037b18176ab4d74f2f754..a4efd309003f5bd70ce567a5b298a2ea6cca4108 100644 (file)
--- a/src/core/load-fragment.c
+++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
 #include "unit-name.h"
 #include "unit-printf.h"
 #include "user-util.h"
+#include "time-util.h"
 #include "web-util.h"
 
 static int parse_socket_protocol(const char *s) {
@@ -560,7 +561,8 @@ int config_parse_exec(
                 for (;;) {
                         /* We accept an absolute path as first argument.  If it's prefixed with - and the path doesn't
                          * exist, we ignore it instead of erroring out; if it's prefixed with @, we allow overriding of
-                         * argv[0]; if it's prefixed with +, it will be run with full privileges and no sandboxing; if
+                         * argv[0]; if it's prefixed with :, we will not do environment variable substitution;
+                         * if it's prefixed with +, it will be run with full privileges and no sandboxing; if
                          * it's prefixed with '!' we apply sandboxing, but do not change user/group credentials; if
                          * it's prefixed with '!!', then we apply user/group credentials if the kernel supports ambient
                          * capabilities -- if it doesn't we don't apply the credentials themselves, but do apply most
@@ -575,6 +577,8 @@ int config_parse_exec(
                                 ignore = true;
                         } else if (*f == '@' && !separate_argv0)
                                 separate_argv0 = true;
+                        else if (*f == ':' && !(flags & EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND))
+                                flags |= EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND;
                         else if (*f == '+' && !(flags & (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID|EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC)))
                                 flags |= EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED;
                         else if (*f == '!' && !(flags & (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID|EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC)))
@@ -3749,7 +3753,7 @@ int config_parse_exec_directories(
 
                 if (path_startswith(k, "private")) {
                         log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, 0,
-                                   "%s= path can't be 'private', ingoring assignment: %s", lvalue, word);
+                                   "%s= path can't be 'private', ignoring assignment: %s", lvalue, word);
                         continue;
                 }
 
@@ -4254,6 +4258,12 @@ int config_parse_pid_file(
         assert(rvalue);
         assert(u);
 
+        if (isempty(rvalue)) {
+                /* An empty assignment removes already set value. */
+                *s = mfree(*s);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
         r = unit_full_printf(u, rvalue, &k);
         if (r < 0) {
                 log_syntax(unit, LOG_ERR, filename, line, r, "Failed to resolve unit specifiers in '%s', ignoring: %m", rvalue);