/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <getopt.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "ask-password-api.h"
+#include "blockdev-util.h"
#include "build.h"
#include "cryptenroll-fido2.h"
#include "cryptenroll-list.h"
#include "cryptenroll-wipe.h"
#include "cryptenroll.h"
#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
+#include "devnum-util.h"
#include "env-util.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "string-table.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "terminal-util.h"
-#include "tpm-pcr.h"
-#include "tpm2-util.h"
+#include "tpm2-pcr.h"
static EnrollType arg_enroll_type = _ENROLL_TYPE_INVALID;
static char *arg_unlock_keyfile = NULL;
static UnlockType arg_unlock_type = UNLOCK_PASSWORD;
static char *arg_unlock_fido2_device = NULL;
+static char *arg_unlock_tpm2_device = NULL;
static char *arg_pkcs11_token_uri = NULL;
static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL;
static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL;
-static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
+static uint32_t arg_tpm2_seal_key_handle = 0;
+static char *arg_tpm2_device_key = NULL;
+static Tpm2PCRValue *arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values = NULL;
+static size_t arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values = 0;
static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false;
static char *arg_tpm2_public_key = NULL;
-static uint32_t arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
+static uint32_t arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = 0;
static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL;
+static char *arg_tpm2_pcrlock = NULL;
static char *arg_node = NULL;
static int *arg_wipe_slots = NULL;
static size_t arg_n_wipe_slots = 0;
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_unlock_keyfile, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_unlock_fido2_device, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_unlock_tpm2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_token_uri, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device_key, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_public_key, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_pcrlock, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_node, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_wipe_slots, freep);
static const char* const enroll_type_table[_ENROLL_TYPE_MAX] = {
[ENROLL_PASSWORD] = "password",
[ENROLL_RECOVERY] = "recovery",
- [ENROLL_PKCS11] = "pkcs11",
- [ENROLL_FIDO2] = "fido2",
- [ENROLL_TPM2] = "tpm2",
+ [ENROLL_PKCS11] = "pkcs11",
+ [ENROLL_FIDO2] = "fido2",
+ [ENROLL_TPM2] = "tpm2",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(enroll_type, EnrollType);
static const char *const luks2_token_type_table[_ENROLL_TYPE_MAX] = {
/* ENROLL_PASSWORD has no entry here, as slots of this type do not have a token in the LUKS2 header */
[ENROLL_RECOVERY] = "systemd-recovery",
- [ENROLL_PKCS11] = "systemd-pkcs11",
- [ENROLL_FIDO2] = "systemd-fido2",
- [ENROLL_TPM2] = "systemd-tpm2",
+ [ENROLL_PKCS11] = "systemd-pkcs11",
+ [ENROLL_FIDO2] = "systemd-fido2",
+ [ENROLL_TPM2] = "systemd-tpm2",
};
DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(luks2_token_type, EnrollType);
+static int determine_default_node(void) {
+ int r;
+
+ /* If no device is specified we'll default to the backing device of /var/.
+ *
+ * Why /var/ and not just / you ask?
+ *
+ * On most systems /var/ is going to be on the root fs, hence the outcome is usually the same.
+ *
+ * However, on systems where / and /var/ are separate it makes more sense to default to /var/ because
+ * that's where the persistent and variable data is placed (i.e. where LUKS should be used) while /
+ * doesn't really have to be variable and could as well be immutable or ephemeral. Hence /var/ should
+ * be a better default.
+ *
+ * Or to say this differently: it makes sense to support well systems with /var/ being on /. It also
+ * makes sense to support well systems with them being separate, and /var/ being variable and
+ * persistent. But any other kind of system appears much less interesting to support, and in that
+ * case people should just specify the device name explicitly. */
+
+ dev_t devno;
+ r = get_block_device("/var", &devno);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine block device backing /var/: %m");
+ if (r == 0)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENXIO),
+ "File system /var/ is on not backed by a (single) whole block device.");
+
+ _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *dev = NULL;
+ r = sd_device_new_from_devnum(&dev, 'b', devno);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Unable to access backing block device for /var/: %m");
+
+ const char *dm_uuid;
+ r = sd_device_get_property_value(dev, "DM_UUID", &dm_uuid);
+ if (r == -ENOENT)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Backing block device of /var/ is not a DM device: %m");
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Unable to query DM_UUID udev property of backing block device for /var/): %m");
+
+ if (!startswith(dm_uuid, "CRYPT-LUKS2-"))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENXIO), "Block device backing /var/ is not a LUKS2 device: %m");
+
+ _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *origin = NULL;
+ r = block_device_get_originating(dev, &origin);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get originating device of LUKS2 device backing /var/: %m");
+
+ const char *dp;
+ r = sd_device_get_devname(origin, &dp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get device path for LUKS2 device backing /var/: %m");
+
+ r = free_and_strdup_warn(&arg_node, dp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ log_info("No device specified, defaulting to '%s'.", arg_node);
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int help(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
int r;
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
- printf("%s [OPTIONS...] BLOCK-DEVICE\n"
- "\n%sEnroll a security token or authentication credential to a LUKS volume.%s\n\n"
+ printf("%1$s [OPTIONS...] [BLOCK-DEVICE]\n\n"
+ "%5$sEnroll a security token or authentication credential to a LUKS volume.%6$s\n\n"
" -h --help Show this help\n"
" --version Show package version\n"
- " --password Enroll a user-supplied password\n"
- " --recovery-key Enroll a recovery key\n"
+ " --wipe-slot=SLOT1,SLOT2,…\n"
+ " Wipe specified slots\n"
+ "\n%3$sUnlocking:%4$s\n"
" --unlock-key-file=PATH\n"
" Use a file to unlock the volume\n"
" --unlock-fido2-device=PATH\n"
" Use a FIDO2 device to unlock the volume\n"
+ " --unlock-tpm2-device=PATH\n"
+ " Use a TPM2 device to unlock the volume\n"
+ "\n%3$sSimple Enrollment:%4$s\n"
+ " --password Enroll a user-supplied password\n"
+ " --recovery-key Enroll a recovery key\n"
+ "\n%3$sPKCS11 Enrollment:%4$s\n"
" --pkcs11-token-uri=URI\n"
" Specify PKCS#11 security token URI\n"
- " --fido2-credential-algorithm=STRING\n"
- " Specify COSE algorithm for FIDO2 credential\n"
+ "\n%3$sFIDO2 Enrollment:%4$s\n"
" --fido2-device=PATH\n"
" Enroll a FIDO2-HMAC security token\n"
+ " --fido2-credential-algorithm=STRING\n"
+ " Specify COSE algorithm for FIDO2 credential\n"
" --fido2-with-client-pin=BOOL\n"
" Whether to require entering a PIN to unlock the volume\n"
" --fido2-with-user-presence=BOOL\n"
" Whether to require user presence to unlock the volume\n"
" --fido2-with-user-verification=BOOL\n"
" Whether to require user verification to unlock the volume\n"
+ "\n%3$sTPM2 Enrollment:%4$s\n"
" --tpm2-device=PATH\n"
" Enroll a TPM2 device\n"
+ " --tpm2-device-key=PATH\n"
+ " Enroll a TPM2 device using its public key\n"
+ " --tpm2-seal-key-handle=HANDLE\n"
+ " Specify handle of key to use for sealing\n"
" --tpm2-pcrs=PCR1+PCR2+PCR3+…\n"
" Specify TPM2 PCRs to seal against\n"
" --tpm2-public-key=PATH\n"
" --tpm2-signature=PATH\n"
" Validate public key enrollment works with JSON signature\n"
" file\n"
+ " --tpm2-pcrlock=PATH\n"
+ " Specify pcrlock policy to lock against\n"
" --tpm2-with-pin=BOOL\n"
" Whether to require entering a PIN to unlock the volume\n"
- " --wipe-slot=SLOT1,SLOT2,…\n"
- " Wipe specified slots\n"
- "\nSee the %s for details.\n",
+ "\nSee the %2$s for details.\n",
program_invocation_short_name,
- ansi_highlight(),
+ link,
+ ansi_underline(),
ansi_normal(),
- link);
+ ansi_highlight(),
+ ansi_normal());
return 0;
}
static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
-
enum {
ARG_VERSION = 0x100,
ARG_PASSWORD,
ARG_RECOVERY_KEY,
ARG_UNLOCK_KEYFILE,
ARG_UNLOCK_FIDO2_DEVICE,
+ ARG_UNLOCK_TPM2_DEVICE,
ARG_PKCS11_TOKEN_URI,
ARG_FIDO2_DEVICE,
ARG_TPM2_DEVICE,
+ ARG_TPM2_DEVICE_KEY,
+ ARG_TPM2_SEAL_KEY_HANDLE,
ARG_TPM2_PCRS,
ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY,
ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY_PCRS,
ARG_TPM2_SIGNATURE,
- ARG_TPM2_PIN,
+ ARG_TPM2_PCRLOCK,
+ ARG_TPM2_WITH_PIN,
ARG_WIPE_SLOT,
ARG_FIDO2_WITH_PIN,
ARG_FIDO2_WITH_UP,
{ "recovery-key", no_argument, NULL, ARG_RECOVERY_KEY },
{ "unlock-key-file", required_argument, NULL, ARG_UNLOCK_KEYFILE },
{ "unlock-fido2-device", required_argument, NULL, ARG_UNLOCK_FIDO2_DEVICE },
+ { "unlock-tpm2-device", required_argument, NULL, ARG_UNLOCK_TPM2_DEVICE },
{ "pkcs11-token-uri", required_argument, NULL, ARG_PKCS11_TOKEN_URI },
{ "fido2-credential-algorithm", required_argument, NULL, ARG_FIDO2_CRED_ALG },
{ "fido2-device", required_argument, NULL, ARG_FIDO2_DEVICE },
{ "fido2-with-user-presence", required_argument, NULL, ARG_FIDO2_WITH_UP },
{ "fido2-with-user-verification", required_argument, NULL, ARG_FIDO2_WITH_UV },
{ "tpm2-device", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_DEVICE },
+ { "tpm2-device-key", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_DEVICE_KEY },
+ { "tpm2-seal-key-handle", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_SEAL_KEY_HANDLE },
{ "tpm2-pcrs", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_PCRS },
{ "tpm2-public-key", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY },
{ "tpm2-public-key-pcrs", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY_PCRS },
{ "tpm2-signature", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_SIGNATURE },
- { "tpm2-with-pin", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_PIN },
+ { "tpm2-pcrlock", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_PCRLOCK },
+ { "tpm2-with-pin", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_WITH_PIN },
{ "wipe-slot", required_argument, NULL, ARG_WIPE_SLOT },
{}
};
+ bool auto_hash_pcr_values = true, auto_public_key_pcr_mask = true, auto_pcrlock = true;
int c, r;
assert(argc >= 0);
break;
}
+ case ARG_UNLOCK_TPM2_DEVICE: {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL;
+
+ if (arg_unlock_type != UNLOCK_PASSWORD)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Multiple unlock methods specified at once, refusing.");
+
+ assert(!arg_unlock_tpm2_device);
+
+ if (!streq(optarg, "auto")) {
+ device = strdup(optarg);
+ if (!device)
+ return log_oom();
+ }
+
+ arg_unlock_type = UNLOCK_TPM2;
+ arg_unlock_tpm2_device = TAKE_PTR(device);
+ break;
+ }
+
case ARG_PKCS11_TOKEN_URI: {
_cleanup_free_ char *uri = NULL;
break;
}
- case ARG_TPM2_PCRS:
- r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(optarg, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask);
+ case ARG_TPM2_DEVICE_KEY:
+ if (arg_enroll_type >= 0 || arg_tpm2_device_key)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Multiple operations specified at once, refusing.");
+
+
+ r = parse_path_argument(optarg, /* suppress_root= */ false, &arg_tpm2_device_key);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+ arg_enroll_type = ENROLL_TPM2;
break;
- case ARG_TPM2_PIN:
- r = parse_boolean_argument("--tpm2-with-pin=", optarg, &arg_tpm2_pin);
+ case ARG_TPM2_SEAL_KEY_HANDLE:
+ r = safe_atou32_full(optarg, 16, &arg_tpm2_seal_key_handle);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not parse TPM2 seal key handle index '%s': %m", optarg);
+
+ break;
+
+ case ARG_TPM2_PCRS:
+ auto_hash_pcr_values = false;
+ r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_append(optarg, &arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, &arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
case ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY_PCRS:
+ auto_public_key_pcr_mask = false;
r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(optarg, &arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask);
if (r < 0)
return r;
break;
+ case ARG_TPM2_PCRLOCK:
+ r = parse_path_argument(optarg, /* suppress_root= */ false, &arg_tpm2_pcrlock);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ auto_pcrlock = false;
+ break;
+
+ case ARG_TPM2_WITH_PIN:
+ r = parse_boolean_argument("--tpm2-with-pin=", optarg, &arg_tpm2_pin);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ break;
+
case ARG_WIPE_SLOT: {
const char *p = optarg;
if (n > INT_MAX)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ERANGE), "Slot index out of range: %u", n);
- a = reallocarray(arg_wipe_slots, sizeof(int), arg_n_wipe_slots + 1);
+ a = reallocarray(arg_wipe_slots, arg_n_wipe_slots + 1, sizeof(int));
if (!a)
return log_oom();
}
}
- if ((arg_enroll_type == ENROLL_FIDO2 && arg_unlock_type == UNLOCK_FIDO2)
- && !(arg_fido2_device && arg_unlock_fido2_device))
+ if (argc > optind+1)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
- "When both enrolling and unlocking with FIDO2 tokens, automatic discovery is unsupported. "
- "Please specify device paths for enrolling and unlocking respectively.");
+ "Too many arguments, refusing.");
+
+ if (optind < argc) {
+ r = parse_path_argument(argv[optind], false, &arg_node);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ } else {
+ if (wipe_requested())
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Wiping requested and no block device node specified, refusing.");
- if (arg_enroll_type == ENROLL_FIDO2 && !arg_fido2_device) {
- r = fido2_find_device_auto(&arg_fido2_device);
+ r = determine_default_node();
if (r < 0)
return r;
}
- if (optind >= argc)
- return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
- "No block device node specified, refusing.");
+ if (arg_enroll_type == ENROLL_FIDO2) {
- if (argc > optind+1)
- return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
- "Too many arguments, refusing.");
+ if (arg_unlock_type == UNLOCK_FIDO2 && !(arg_fido2_device && arg_unlock_fido2_device))
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "When both enrolling and unlocking with FIDO2 tokens, automatic discovery is unsupported. "
+ "Please specify device paths for enrolling and unlocking respectively.");
- r = parse_path_argument(argv[optind], false, &arg_node);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+ if (!arg_fido2_device) {
+ r = fido2_find_device_auto(&arg_fido2_device);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (auto_pcrlock) {
+ assert(!arg_tpm2_pcrlock);
+
+ r = tpm2_pcrlock_search_file(NULL, NULL, &arg_tpm2_pcrlock);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r != -ENOENT)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Search for pcrlock.json failed, assuming it does not exist: %m");
+ } else
+ log_info("Automatically using pcrlock policy '%s'.", arg_tpm2_pcrlock);
+ }
+
+ if (auto_public_key_pcr_mask) {
+ assert(arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask == 0);
+ arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = INDEX_TO_MASK(uint32_t, TPM2_PCR_KERNEL_BOOT);
+ }
- if (arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
- arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT;
- if (arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
- arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_C(1) << TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_IMAGE;
+ if (auto_hash_pcr_values && !arg_tpm2_pcrlock) { /* Only lock to PCR 7 by default if no pcrlock policy is around (which is a better replacement) */
+ assert(arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values == 0);
+
+ if (!GREEDY_REALLOC_APPEND(
+ arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values,
+ arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values,
+ &TPM2_PCR_VALUE_MAKE(TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT, /* hash= */ 0, /* value= */ {}),
+ 1))
+ return log_oom();
+ }
return 1;
}
/* Politely refuse operating on homed volumes. The enrolled tokens for the user record and the LUKS2
* volume should not get out of sync. */
- for (int token = 0; token < crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token ++) {
+ for (int token = 0; token < crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) {
r = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, "systemd-homed", NULL);
if (IN_SET(r, -ENOENT, -EINVAL, -EMEDIUMTYPE))
continue;
r = read_full_file_full(
AT_FDCWD,
arg_unlock_keyfile,
- 0,
+ UINT64_MAX,
SIZE_MAX,
READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE|READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET,
NULL,
r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, NULL);
if (r < 0)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS2 superblock: %m");
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS2 superblock of %s: %m", arg_node);
r = check_for_homed(cd);
if (r < 0)
switch (arg_unlock_type) {
+ case UNLOCK_PASSWORD:
+ r = load_volume_key_password(cd, arg_node, vk, &vks);
+ break;
+
case UNLOCK_KEYFILE:
r = load_volume_key_keyfile(cd, vk, &vks);
break;
r = load_volume_key_fido2(cd, arg_node, arg_unlock_fido2_device, vk, &vks);
break;
- case UNLOCK_PASSWORD:
- r = load_volume_key_password(cd, arg_node, vk, &vks);
+ case UNLOCK_TPM2:
+ r = load_volume_key_tpm2(cd, arg_node, arg_unlock_tpm2_device, vk, &vks);
break;
default:
_cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *vk = NULL;
size_t vks;
- int slot, r;
+ int slot, slot_to_wipe, r;
log_show_color(true);
log_parse_environment();
if (r <= 0)
return r;
+ /* A delicious drop of snake oil */
+ (void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE);
+
cryptsetup_enable_logging(NULL);
if (arg_enroll_type < 0)
break;
case ENROLL_TPM2:
- slot = enroll_tpm2(cd, vk, vks, arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_public_key, arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_signature, arg_tpm2_pin);
+ slot = enroll_tpm2(cd, vk, vks, arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_seal_key_handle, arg_tpm2_device_key, arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_public_key, arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_signature, arg_tpm2_pin, arg_tpm2_pcrlock, &slot_to_wipe);
+
+ if (slot >= 0 && slot_to_wipe >= 0) {
+ /* Updating PIN on an existing enrollment */
+ r = wipe_slots(
+ cd,
+ &slot_to_wipe,
+ /* n_explicit_slots= */ 1,
+ WIPE_EXPLICIT,
+ /* by_mask= */ 0,
+ /* except_slot= */ -1);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
break;
-
case _ENROLL_TYPE_INVALID:
/* List enrolled slots if we are called without anything to enroll or wipe */
if (!wipe_requested())