along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
***/
-#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <libcryptsetup.h>
#include <mntent.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
-#include <libcryptsetup.h>
+#include "sd-device.h"
+#include "ask-password-api.h"
+#include "device-util.h"
+#include "escape.h"
#include "fileio.h"
#include "log.h"
-#include "util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
-#include "ask-password-api.h"
-#include "def.h"
-#include "libudev.h"
-#include "udev-util.h"
+#include "util.h"
static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_TCRYPT or CRYPT_PLAIN */
static char *arg_cipher = NULL;
static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false;
static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false;
static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL;
+static uint64_t arg_offset = 0;
+static uint64_t arg_skip = 0;
static usec_t arg_timeout = 0;
/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't:
- offset=
- skip=
precheck=
check=
checkargs=
return 0;
}
+ } else if (startswith(option, "offset=")) {
+
+ if (safe_atou64(option+7, &arg_offset) < 0) {
+ log_error("offset= parse failure, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ } else if (startswith(option, "skip=")) {
+
+ if (safe_atou64(option+5, &arg_skip) < 0) {
+ log_error("skip= parse failure, refusing.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
} else if (!streq(option, "none"))
log_error("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option);
return r;
}
+ /* sanity-check options */
+ if (arg_type != NULL && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
+ if (arg_offset)
+ log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
+ if (arg_skip)
+ log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
+ }
+
return 0;
}
log_debug("%s", msg);
}
+static int disk_major_minor(const char *path, char **ret) {
+ struct stat st;
+
+ assert(path);
+
+ if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (asprintf(ret, "/dev/block/%d:%d", major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static char* disk_description(const char *path) {
static const char name_fields[] =
"ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0"
"ID_MODEL\0";
- _cleanup_udev_unref_ struct udev *udev = NULL;
- _cleanup_udev_device_unref_ struct udev_device *device = NULL;
+ _cleanup_device_unref_ sd_device *device = NULL;
struct stat st;
const char *i;
+ int r;
assert(path);
if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
return NULL;
- udev = udev_new();
- if (!udev)
- return NULL;
-
- device = udev_device_new_from_devnum(udev, 'b', st.st_rdev);
- if (!device)
+ r = sd_device_new_from_devnum(&device, 'b', st.st_rdev);
+ if (r < 0)
return NULL;
NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields) {
const char *name;
- name = udev_device_get_property_value(device, i);
- if (!isempty(name))
+ r = sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name);
+ if (r >= 0 && !isempty(name))
return strdup(name);
}
return NULL;
}
-static int get_password(const char *name, usec_t until, bool accept_cached, char ***passwords) {
- int r;
- char **p;
- _cleanup_free_ char *text = NULL;
- _cleanup_free_ char *escaped_name = NULL;
- char *id;
+static int get_password(const char *vol, const char *src, usec_t until, bool accept_cached, char ***ret) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *name_buffer = NULL, *mount_point = NULL, *maj_min = NULL, *text = NULL, *escaped_name = NULL;
+ _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
+ const char *name = NULL;
+ char **p, *id;
+ int r = 0;
- assert(name);
- assert(passwords);
+ assert(vol);
+ assert(src);
+ assert(ret);
+
+ description = disk_description(src);
+ mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol);
+
+ if (description && streq(vol, description))
+ /* If the description string is simply the
+ * volume name, then let's not show this
+ * twice */
+ description = mfree(description);
+
+ if (mount_point && description)
+ r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point);
+ else if (mount_point)
+ r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point);
+ else if (description)
+ r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ name = name_buffer ? name_buffer : vol;
if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s!", name) < 0)
return log_oom();
- escaped_name = cescape(name);
+ if (src)
+ (void) disk_major_minor(src, &maj_min);
+
+ if (maj_min) {
+ escaped_name = maj_min;
+ maj_min = NULL;
+ } else
+ escaped_name = cescape(name);
+
if (!escaped_name)
return log_oom();
- id = strappenda("cryptsetup:", escaped_name);
+ id = strjoina("cryptsetup:", escaped_name);
- r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, until, accept_cached, passwords);
+ r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", until,
+ ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE | (accept_cached*ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED),
+ &passwords);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m");
if (arg_verify) {
- _cleanup_strv_free_ char **passwords2 = NULL;
+ _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL;
- assert(strv_length(*passwords) == 1);
+ assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1);
if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s! (verification)", name) < 0)
return log_oom();
- id = strappenda("cryptsetup-verification:", escaped_name);
+ id = strjoina("cryptsetup-verification:", escaped_name);
- r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, until, false, &passwords2);
+ r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", until, ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE, &passwords2);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m");
assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1);
- if (!streq(*passwords[0], passwords2[0])) {
+ if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0])) {
log_warning("Passwords did not match, retrying.");
return -EAGAIN;
}
}
- strv_uniq(*passwords);
+ strv_uniq(passwords);
- STRV_FOREACH(p, *passwords) {
+ STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
char *c;
if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size)
continue;
/* Pad password if necessary */
- if (!(c = new(char, arg_key_size)))
+ c = new(char, arg_key_size);
+ if (!c)
return log_oom();
strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size);
*p = c;
}
+ *ret = passwords;
+ passwords = NULL;
+
return 0;
}
-static int attach_tcrypt(struct crypt_device *cd,
- const char *name,
- const char *key_file,
- char **passwords,
- uint32_t flags) {
+static int attach_tcrypt(
+ struct crypt_device *cd,
+ const char *name,
+ const char *key_file,
+ char **passwords,
+ uint32_t flags) {
+
int r = 0;
_cleanup_free_ char *passphrase = NULL;
struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
}
if ((!arg_type && r < 0) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
- struct crypt_params_plain params = {};
+ struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+ .offset = arg_offset,
+ .skip = arg_skip,
+ };
const char *cipher, *cipher_mode;
_cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL;
* it just configures encryption
* parameters when used for plain
* mode. */
- r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode,
- NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, ¶ms);
+ r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, ¶ms);
/* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */
pass_volume_key = (params.hash == NULL);
crypt_get_device_name(cd));
if (key_file) {
- r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, name, arg_key_slot,
- key_file, arg_keyfile_size,
- arg_keyfile_offset, flags);
+ r = crypt_activate_by_keyfile_offset(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, flags);
if (r < 0) {
log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file);
return -EAGAIN;
unsigned tries;
usec_t until;
crypt_status_info status;
- const char *key_file = NULL, *name = NULL;
- _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *name_buffer = NULL, *mount_point = NULL;
+ const char *key_file = NULL;
/* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS] */
/* A delicious drop of snake oil */
mlockall(MCL_FUTURE);
- description = disk_description(argv[3]);
- mount_point = disk_mount_point(argv[2]);
-
- if (description && streq(argv[2], description)) {
- /* If the description string is simply the
- * volume name, then let's not show this
- * twice */
- free(description);
- description = NULL;
- }
-
- k = 0;
- if (mount_point && description)
- k = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, argv[2], mount_point);
- else if (mount_point)
- k = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", argv[2], mount_point);
- else if (description)
- k = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, argv[2]);
-
- if (k < 0) {
- log_oom();
- goto finish;
- }
- name = name_buffer ? name_buffer : argv[2];
-
if (arg_header) {
log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header);
k = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header);
} else
k = crypt_init(&cd, argv[3]);
-
if (k) {
log_error_errno(k, "crypt_init() failed: %m");
goto finish;
/* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a
* warning it's OK to do this in two steps. */
- if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && (st.st_mode & 0005)) {
- if(!STR_IN_SET(key_file, "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/hw_random"))
- log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file);
- }
+ if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005))
+ log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file);
}
for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) {
- _cleanup_strv_free_ char **passwords = NULL;
+ _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
if (!key_file) {
- k = get_password(name, until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, &passwords);
+ k = get_password(argv[2], argv[3], until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, &passwords);
if (k == -EAGAIN)
continue;
else if (k < 0)
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / blobdiff