-/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/
-
/***
This file is part of systemd.
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "dns-domain.h"
+#include "gcrypt-util.h"
#include "hexdecoct.h"
#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h"
#include "resolved-dns-packet.h"
#ifdef HAVE_GCRYPT
-static void initialize_libgcrypt(void) {
- const char *p;
-
- if (gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P))
- return;
-
- p = gcry_check_version("1.4.5");
- assert(p);
-
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM);
- gcry_control(GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0);
-}
-
static int rr_compare(const void *a, const void *b) {
DnsResourceRecord **x = (DnsResourceRecord**) a, **y = (DnsResourceRecord**) b;
size_t m;
if (rrsig->rrsig.inception > rrsig->rrsig.expiration)
return -EINVAL;
- name = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key);
+ name = dns_resource_key_name(rrsig->key);
n_key_labels = dns_name_count_labels(name);
if (n_key_labels < 0)
assert(rrsig->key->type == DNS_TYPE_RRSIG);
assert(dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY);
- /* Verifies the the RRSet matching the specified "key" in "a",
+ /* Verifies that the RRSet matches the specified "key" in "a",
* using the signature "rrsig" and the key "dnskey". It's
- * assumed the RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */
+ * assumed that RRSIG and DNSKEY match. */
md_algorithm = algorithm_to_gcrypt_md(rrsig->rrsig.algorithm);
if (md_algorithm == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
return 0;
}
- name = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key);
+ name = dns_resource_key_name(key);
/* Some keys may only appear signed in the zone apex, and are invalid anywhere else. (SOA, NS...) */
if (dns_type_apex_only(rrsig->rrsig.type_covered)) {
qsort_safe(list, n, sizeof(DnsResourceRecord*), rr_compare);
/* OK, the RRs are now in canonical order. Let's calculate the digest */
- initialize_libgcrypt();
+ initialize_libgcrypt(false);
hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(md_algorithm);
assert(hash_size > 0);
if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, false) != rrsig->rrsig.key_tag)
return 0;
- return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer);
+ return dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), rrsig->rrsig.signer);
}
int dnssec_key_match_rrsig(const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsResourceRecord *rrsig) {
if (rrsig->rrsig.type_covered != key->type)
return 0;
- return dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rrsig->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key));
+ return dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rrsig->key), dns_resource_key_name(key));
}
int dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
if (dnssec_keytag(dnskey, mask_revoke) != ds->ds.key_tag)
return 0;
- initialize_libgcrypt();
+ initialize_libgcrypt(false);
md_algorithm = digest_to_gcrypt_md(ds->ds.digest_type);
if (md_algorithm < 0)
if (ds->ds.digest_size != hash_size)
return 0;
- r = dnssec_canonicalize(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), owner_name, sizeof(owner_name));
+ r = dnssec_canonicalize(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), owner_name, sizeof(owner_name));
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (ds->key->class != dnskey->key->class)
continue;
- r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(dnskey->key), DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(ds->key));
+ r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key), dns_resource_key_name(ds->key));
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
if (algorithm < 0)
return algorithm;
- initialize_libgcrypt();
+ initialize_libgcrypt(false);
hash_size = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algorithm);
assert(hash_size > 0);
if (memcmp(rr->nsec3.salt, nsec3->nsec3.salt, rr->nsec3.salt_size) != 0)
return 0;
- a = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key);
+ a = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key);
r = dns_name_parent(&a); /* strip off hash */
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return 0;
- b = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(nsec3->key);
+ b = dns_resource_key_name(nsec3->key);
r = dns_name_parent(&b); /* strip off hash */
if (r < 0)
return r;
* any NSEC3 RR in the response. Any NSEC3 record will do as all NSEC3
* records from a given zone in a response must use the same
* parameters. */
- zone = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key);
+ zone = dns_resource_key_name(key);
for (;;) {
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(zone_rr, flags, answer) {
r = nsec3_is_good(zone_rr, NULL);
if (r == 0)
continue;
- r = dns_name_equal_skip(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(zone_rr->key), 1, zone);
+ r = dns_name_equal_skip(dns_resource_key_name(zone_rr->key), 1, zone);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0)
found_zone:
/* Second step, find the closest encloser NSEC3 RR in 'answer' that matches 'key' */
- p = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key);
+ p = dns_resource_key_name(key);
for (;;) {
_cleanup_free_ char *hashed_domain = NULL;
if (enclosure_rr->nsec3.next_hashed_name_size != (size_t) hashed_size)
continue;
- r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain);
+ r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(enclosure_rr->key), hashed_domain);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), next_closer_domain, next_hashed_domain);
+ r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), next_closer_domain, next_hashed_domain);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
no_closer = true;
}
- r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain);
+ r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wildcard_domain);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
wildcard_rr = rr;
}
- r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain);
+ r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wildcard_domain, next_hashed_domain);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r > 0) {
if (rr->n_skip_labels_source != 1)
return 0;
- n = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key);
+ n = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key);
r = dns_label_unescape(&n, label, sizeof(label));
if (r <= 0)
return r;
if (r <= 0)
return r;
- /* If the name we we are interested in is not a prefix of the common suffix of the NSEC RR's owner and next domain names, then we can't say anything either. */
- r = dns_name_common_suffix(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix);
+ /* If the name we are interested in is not a prefix of the common suffix of the NSEC RR's owner and next domain names, then we can't say anything either. */
+ r = dns_name_common_suffix(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r <= 0)
return r;
- r = dns_name_equal(name, DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key));
+ r = dns_name_equal(name, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
if (r <= 0)
return r;
/* Checks whether the "Next Closer" is witin the space covered by the specified RR. */
- r = dns_name_common_suffix(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix);
+ r = dns_name_common_suffix(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* p is now the "Next Closer". */
- return dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), p, rr->nsec.next_domain_name);
+ return dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), p, rr->nsec.next_domain_name);
}
static int dnssec_nsec_covers_wildcard(DnsResourceRecord *rr, const char *name) {
* NSEC yyy.zzz.xoo.bar → bar: indicates that a number of wildcards don#t exist either...
*/
- r = dns_name_common_suffix(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix);
+ r = dns_name_common_suffix(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->nsec.next_domain_name, &common_suffix);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r <= 0)
return r;
- wc = strjoina("*.", common_suffix, NULL);
- return dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), wc, rr->nsec.next_domain_name);
+ wc = strjoina("*.", common_suffix);
+ return dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), wc, rr->nsec.next_domain_name);
}
int dnssec_nsec_test(DnsAnswer *answer, DnsResourceKey *key, DnssecNsecResult *result, bool *authenticated, uint32_t *ttl) {
/* Look for any NSEC/NSEC3 RRs that say something about the specified key. */
- name = DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(key);
+ name = dns_resource_key_name(key);
DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_FLAGS(rr, flags, answer) {
continue;
/* Check if this is a direct match. If so, we have encountered a NODATA case */
- r = dns_name_equal(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), name);
+ r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0) {
if (r == 0)
continue;
- r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name);
+ r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), name, rr->nsec.next_domain_name);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r < 0)
return r;
- r = dns_name_between(DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_NAME(rr->key), hashed_domain, next_hashed_domain);
+ r = dns_name_between(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), hashed_domain, next_hashed_domain);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Run a positive NSEC3 wildcard proof. Specifically:
*
- * A proof that the the "next closer" of the generating wildcard does not exist.
+ * A proof that the "next closer" of the generating wildcard does not exist.
*
* Note a key difference between the NSEC3 and NSEC versions of the proof. NSEC RRs don't have to exist for
* empty non-transients. NSEC3 RRs however have to. This means it's sufficient to check if the next closer name
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