connection from. As responder, the local destination address must match at
least to one of the specified addresses, subnets or ranges.
+ If FQDNs are assigned they are resolved every time a configuration lookup
+ is done. If DNS resolution times out, the lookup is delayed for that time.
+
connections.<conn>.remote_addrs = %any
Remote address(es) to use for IKE communication, comma separated.
connection to. As responder, the initiator source address must match at
least to one of the specified addresses, subnets or ranges.
+ If FQDNs are assigned they are resolved every time a configuration lookup
+ is done. If DNS resolution times out, the lookup is delayed for that time.
+
To initiate a connection, at least one specific address or DNS name must
be specified.
connections.<conn>.local_port = 500
- Local UPD port for IKE communication.
+ Local UDP port for IKE communication.
- Local UPD port for IKE communication. By default the port of the socket
+ Local UDP port for IKE communication. By default the port of the socket
backend is used, which is usually _500_. If port _500_ is used, automatic
IKE port floating to port 4500 is used to work around NAT issues.
connections.<conn>.remote_port = 500
Remote UDP port for IKE communication.
- Remote UPD port for IKE communication. If the default of port _500_ is used,
+ Remote UDP port for IKE communication. If the default of port _500_ is used,
automatic IKE port floating to port 4500 is used to work around NAT issues.
connections.<conn>.proposals = default
Push mode is currently supported for IKEv1, but not in IKEv2. It is used
by a few implementations only, pull mode is recommended.
+connections.<conn>.dscp = 000000
+ Differentiated Services Field Codepoint to set on outgoing IKE packets (six
+ binary digits).
+
+ Differentiated Services Field Codepoint to set on outgoing IKE packets for
+ this connection. The value is a six digit binary encoded string specifying
+ the Codepoint to set, as defined in RFC 2474.
+
connections.<conn>.encap = no
Enforce UDP encapsulation by faking NAT-D payloads.
checking. For compatibility reasons, with IKEv1 a custom interval may be
specified; this option has no effect on connections using IKE2.
-connections.<conn>.fragmentation = no
- Use IKEv1 UDP packet fragmentation (_yes_, _no_ or _force_).
+connections.<conn>.fragmentation = yes
+ Use IKE UDP datagram fragmentation. (_yes_, _accept_, _no_ or _force_).
- The default of _no_ disables IKEv1 fragmentation mechanism, _yes_ enables
- it if support has been indicated by the peer. _force_ enforces
- fragmentation if required even before the peer had a chance to indicate
- support for it.
+ Use IKE fragmentation (proprietary IKEv1 extension or RFC 7383 IKEv2
+ fragmentation). Acceptable values are _yes_ (the default), _accept_,
+ _force_ and _no_. If set to _yes_, and the peer supports it, oversized IKE
+ messages will be sent in fragments. If set to _accept_, support for
+ fragmentation is announced to the peer but the daemon does not send its own
+ messages in fragments. If set to _force_ (only supported for IKEv1) the
+ initial IKE message will already be fragmented if required. Finally, setting
+ the option to _no_ will disable announcing support for this feature.
- IKE fragmentation is currently not supported with IKEv2.
+ Note that fragmented IKE messages sent by a peer are always accepted
+ irrespective of the value of this option (even when set to _no_).
connections.<conn>.send_certreq = yes
Send certificate requests payloads (_yes_ or _no_).
certificate payloads altogether, _always_ causes certificate payloads to be
sent unconditionally whenever certificate authentication is used.
+connections.<conn>.ppk_id =
+ String identifying the Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) to be used.
+
+connections.<conn>.ppk_required = no
+ Whether a Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) is required for this connection.
+
connections.<conn>.keyingtries = 1
Number of retransmission sequences to perform during initial connect.
On initiators this setting specifies whether an INITIAL_CONTACT notify is
sent during IKE_AUTH if no existing connection is found with the remote
peer (determined by the identities of the first authentication round).
- Only if set to _keep_ or _replace_ will the client send a notify.
+ Unless set to _never_ the client will send a notify.
connections.<conn>.reauth_time = 0s
Time to schedule IKE reauthentication.
other configuration attributes from. Each name references a pool by name
from either the **pools** section or an external pool.
+connections.<conn>.mediation = no
+ Whether this connection is a mediation connection.
+
+ Whether this connection is a mediation connection, that is, whether this
+ connection is used to mediate other connections using the IKEv2 Mediation
+ Extension. Mediation connections create no CHILD_SA.
+
+connections.<conn>.mediated_by =
+ The name of the connection to mediate this connection through.
+
+ The name of the connection to mediate this connection through. If given, the
+ connection will be mediated through the named mediation connection.
+ The mediation connection must have **mediation** enabled.
+
+connections.<conn>.mediation_peer =
+ Identity under which the peer is registered at the mediation server.
+
+ Identity under which the peer is registered at the mediation server, that
+ is, the IKE identity the other end of this connection uses as its local
+ identity on its connection to the mediation server. This is the identity we
+ request the mediation server to mediate us with. Only relevant on
+ connections that set **mediated_by**. If it is not given, the remote IKE
+ identity of the first authentication round of this connection will be used.
+
connections.<conn>.local<suffix> {}
Section for a local authentication round.
unique suffix. To define a single authentication round, the suffix may be
omitted.
+connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.round = 0
+ Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds are sorted. If
+ not specified rounds are ordered by their position in the config file/VICI
+ message.
+
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.certs =
Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for authentication.
Comma separated list of certificate candidates to use for authentication.
The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509_
- directory, or an absolute path.
+ directory or an absolute path.
The certificate used for authentication is selected based on the received
certificate request payloads. If no appropriate CA can be located, the
first certificate is used.
+connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix> =
+ Section for a certificate candidate to use for authentication.
+
+ Section for a certificate candidate to use for authentication. Certificates
+ in _certs_ are transmitted as binary blobs, these sections offer more
+ flexibility.
+
+connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix>.file =
+ Absolute path to the certificate to load.
+
+ Absolute path to the certificate to load. Passed as-is to the daemon, so it
+ must be readable by it.
+
+ Configure either this or _handle_, but not both, in one section.
+
+connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix>.handle =
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the certificate on a token.
+
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the certificate on a token.
+
+ Configure either this or _file_, but not both, in one section.
+
+connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix>.slot =
+ Optional slot number of the token that stores the certificate.
+
+connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.cert<suffix>.module =
+ Optional PKCS#11 module name.
+
+connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.pubkeys =
+ Comma separated list of raw public key candidates to use for authentication.
+
+ Comma separated list of raw public key candidates to use for authentication.
+ The public keys may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _pubkey_
+ directory or an absolute path.
+
+ Even though multiple local public keys could be defined in principle, only
+ the first public key in the list is used for authentication.
+
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.auth = pubkey
Authentication to perform locally (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
_eap[-method]_).
An EAP module implementing the appropriate method is selected to perform
the EAP conversation.
+ If both peers support RFC 7427 ("Signature Authentication in IKEv2")
+ specific hash algorithms to be used during IKEv2 authentication may be
+ configured. To do so use _ike:_ followed by a trust chain signature scheme
+ constraint (see description of the **remote** section's **auth** keyword).
+ For example, with _ike:pubkey-sha384-sha256_ a public key signature scheme
+ with either SHA-384 or SHA-256 would get used for authentication, in that
+ order and depending on the hash algorithms supported by the peer. If no
+ specific hash algorithms are configured, the default is to prefer an
+ algorithm that matches or exceeds the strength of the signature key.
+ If no constraints with _ike:_ prefix are configured any signature scheme
+ constraint (without _ike:_ prefix) will also apply to IKEv2 authentication,
+ unless this is disabled in **strongswan.conf**(5). To use RSASSA-PSS
+ signatures use _rsa/pss_ instead of _pubkey_ or _rsa_ as in e.g.
+ _ike:rsa/pss-sha256_. If _pubkey_ or _rsa_ constraints are configured
+ RSASSA-PSS signatures will only be used if enabled in
+ **strongswan.conf**(5).
+
connections.<conn>.local<suffix>.id =
IKE identity to use for authentication round.
optional unique suffix. To define a single authentication round, the suffix
may be omitted.
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.round = 0
+ Optional numeric identifier by which authentication rounds are sorted. If
+ not specified rounds are ordered by their position in the config file/VICI
+ message.
+
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.id = %any
IKE identity to expect for authentication round.
IKE identity to expect for authentication round. Refer to the _local_ _id_
section for details.
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.eap_id = id
+ Identity to use as peer identity during EAP authentication.
+
+ Identity to use as peer identity during EAP authentication. If set to _%any_
+ the EAP-Identity method will be used to ask the client for an identity.
+
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.groups =
Authorization group memberships to require.
can be certified by different means, for example by appropriate Attribute
Certificates or by an AAA backend involved in the authentication.
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert_policy =
+ Certificate policy OIDs the peer's certificate must have.
+
+ Comma separated list of certificate policy OIDs the peer's certificate must
+ have. OIDs are specified using the numerical dotted representation.
+
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.certs =
Comma separated list of certificate to accept for authentication.
Comma separated list of certificates to accept for authentication.
The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509_
- directory, or an absolute path.
+ directory or an absolute path.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix> =
+ Section for a certificate to accept for authentication.
+
+ Section for a certificate to accept for authentication. Certificates
+ in _certs_ are transmitted as binary blobs, these sections offer more
+ flexibility.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix>.file =
+ Absolute path to the certificate to load.
+
+ Absolute path to the certificate to load. Passed as-is to the daemon, so it
+ must be readable by it.
+
+ Configure either this or _handle_, but not both, in one section.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix>.handle =
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the certificate on a token.
+
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the certificate on a token.
+
+ Configure either this or _file_, but not both, in one section.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix>.slot =
+ Optional slot number of the token that stores the certificate.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cert<suffix>.module =
+ Optional PKCS#11 module name.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacerts =
Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for authentication.
Comma separated list of CA certificates to accept for authentication.
The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509ca_
- directory, or an absolute path.
+ directory or an absolute path.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix> =
+ Section for a CA certificate to accept for authentication.
+
+ Section for a CA certificate to accept for authentication. Certificates
+ in _cacerts_ are transmitted as binary blobs, these sections offer more
+ flexibility.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix>.file =
+ Absolute path to the certificate to load.
+
+ Absolute path to the certificate to load. Passed as-is to the daemon, so it
+ must be readable by it.
+
+ Configure either this or _handle_, but not both, in one section.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix>.handle =
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the CA certificate on a token.
+
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the CA certificate on a token.
+
+ Configure either this or _file_, but not both, in one section.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix>.slot =
+ Optional slot number of the token that stores the CA certificate.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.cacert<suffix>.module =
+ Optional PKCS#11 module name.
+
+connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.pubkeys =
+ Comma separated list of raw public keys to accept for authentication.
+
+ Comma separated list of raw public keys to accept for authentication.
+ The public keys may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _pubkey_
+ directory or an absolute path.
connections.<conn>.remote<suffix>.revocation = relaxed
Certificate revocation policy, (_strict_, _ifuri_ or _relaxed_).
Authentication to expect from remote (_pubkey_, _psk_, _xauth[-backend]_ or
_eap[-method]_).
- Authentication to expect from remote. See the **local** sections **auth**
+ Authentication to expect from remote. See the **local** section's **auth**
keyword description about the details of supported mechanisms.
+ To require a trustchain public key strength for the remote side, specify the
+ key type followed by the minimum strength in bits (for example _ecdsa-384_
+ or _rsa-2048-ecdsa-256_). To limit the acceptable set of hashing algorithms
+ for trustchain validation, append hash algorithms to _pubkey_ or a key
+ strength definition (for example _pubkey-sha256-sha512_,
+ _rsa-2048-sha256-sha384-sha512_ or
+ _rsa-2048-sha256-ecdsa-256-sha256-sha384_).
+ Unless disabled in **strongswan.conf**(5), or explicit IKEv2 signature
+ constraints are configured (refer to the description of the **local**
+ section's **auth** keyword for details), such key types and hash algorithms
+ are also applied as constraints against IKEv2 signature authentication
+ schemes used by the remote side. To require RSASSA-PSS signatures use
+ _rsa/pss_ instead of _pubkey_ or _rsa_ as in e.g. _rsa/pss-sha256_. If
+ _pubkey_ or _rsa_ constraints are configured RSASSA-PSS signatures will only
+ be accepted if enabled in **strongswan.conf**(5).
+
+ To specify trust chain constraints for EAP-(T)TLS, append a colon to the
+ EAP method, followed by the key type/size and hash algorithm as discussed
+ above (e.g. _eap-tls:ecdsa-384-sha384_).
+
connections.<conn>.children.<child> {}
CHILD_SA configuration sub-section.
For AH, this includes an integrity algorithm and an optional Diffie-Hellman
group. If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial
negotiation uses a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange using the specified
- group.
+ group (refer to _esp_proposals_ for details).
In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
mode algorithm is used instead of the separate encryption/integrity
algorithms.
- If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial (non
- IKE_AUTH piggybacked) negotiation uses a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange
- using the specified group. Extended Sequence Number support may be indicated
- with the _esn_ and _noesn_ values, both may be included to indicate support
- for both modes. If omitted, _noesn_ is assumed.
+ If a DH group is specified, CHILD_SA/Quick Mode rekeying and initial
+ negotiation use a separate Diffie-Hellman exchange using the specified
+ group. However, for IKEv2, the keys of the CHILD_SA created implicitly with
+ the IKE_SA will always be derived from the IKE_SA's key material. So any DH
+ group specified here will only apply when the CHILD_SA is later rekeyed or
+ is created with a separate CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange. A proposal mismatch
+ might, therefore, not immediately be noticed when the SA is established, but
+ may later cause rekeying to fail.
+
+ Extended Sequence Number support may be indicated with the _esn_ and _noesn_
+ values, both may be included to indicate support for both modes. If omitted,
+ _noesn_ is assumed.
In IKEv2, multiple algorithms of the same kind can be specified in a single
proposal, from which one gets selected. In IKEv1, only one algorithm per
for interoperability. If no algorithms are specified for AH nor ESP,
the _default_ set of algorithms for ESP is included.
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.sha256_96 = no
+ Use incorrect 96-bit truncation for HMAC-SHA-256.
+
+ HMAC-SHA-256 is used with 128-bit truncation with IPsec. For compatibility
+ with implementations that incorrectly use 96-bit truncation this option may
+ be enabled to configure the shorter truncation length in the kernel. This
+ is not negotiated, so this only works with peers that use the incorrect
+ truncation length (or have this option enabled).
+
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.local_ts = dynamic
Local traffic selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
value _opaque_ for RFC 4301 OPAQUE selectors. Port ranges may be specified
as well, none of the kernel backends currently support port ranges, though.
- Unless the Unity extension is used, IKEv1 supports the first specified
- selector only. IKEv1 uses very similar traffic selector narrowing as it is
- supported in the IKEv2 protocol.
+ When IKEv1 is used only the first selector is interpreted, except if
+ the Cisco Unity extension plugin is used. This is due to a limitation of the
+ IKEv1 protocol, which only allows a single pair of selectors per CHILD_SA.
+ So to tunnel traffic matched by several pairs of selectors when using IKEv1
+ several children (CHILD_SAs) have to be defined that cover the selectors.
+
+ The IKE daemon uses traffic selector narrowing for IKEv1, the same way it is
+ standardized and implemented for IKEv2. However, this may lead to problems
+ with other implementations. To avoid that, configure identical selectors in
+ such scenarios.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.remote_ts = dynamic
Remote selectors to include in CHILD_SA.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.updown =
Updown script to invoke on CHILD_SA up and down events.
-connections.<conn>.children.<child>.hostaccess = yes
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.hostaccess = no
Hostaccess variable to pass to **updown** script.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mode = tunnel
- IPsec Mode to establish (_tunnel_, _transport_, _beet_, _pass_ or _drop_).
+ IPsec Mode to establish (_tunnel_, _transport_, _transport_proxy_, _beet_,
+ _pass_ or _drop_).
IPsec Mode to establish CHILD_SA with. _tunnel_ negotiates the CHILD_SA
- in IPsec Tunnel Mode, whereas _transport_ uses IPsec Transport Mode. _beet_
- is the Bound End to End Tunnel mixture mode, working with fixed inner
+ in IPsec Tunnel Mode, whereas _transport_ uses IPsec Transport Mode.
+ _transport_proxy_ signifying the special Mobile IPv6 Transport Proxy Mode.
+ _beet_ is the Bound End to End Tunnel mixture mode, working with fixed inner
addresses without the need to include them in each packet.
Both _transport_ and _beet_ modes are subject to mode negotiation; _tunnel_
mode is negotiated if the preferred mode is not available.
- _pass_ and _drop_ are used to install shunt policies, which explicitly
- bypass the defined traffic from IPsec processing, or drop it, respectively.
+ _pass_ and _drop_ are used to install shunt policies which explicitly
+ bypass the defined traffic from IPsec processing or drop it, respectively.
+
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.policies = yes
+ Whether to install IPsec policies or not.
+
+ Whether to install IPsec policies or not. Disabling this can be useful in
+ some scenarios e.g. MIPv6, where policies are not managed by the IKE daemon.
+
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.policies_fwd_out = no
+ Whether to install outbound FWD IPsec policies or not.
+
+ Whether to install outbound FWD IPsec policies or not. Enabling this is
+ required in case there is a drop policy that would match and block forwarded
+ traffic for this CHILD_SA.
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.dpd_action = clear
Action to perform on DPD timeout (_clear_, _trap_ or _restart_).
not more than once. The default of _0_ uses dynamic reqids, allocated
incrementally.
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.priority = 0
+ Optional fixed priority for IPsec policies.
+
+ Optional fixed priority for IPsec policies. This could be useful to install
+ high-priority drop policies. The default of _0_ uses dynamically calculated
+ priorities based on the size of the traffic selectors.
+
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.interface =
+ Optional interface name to restrict IPsec policies.
+
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_in = 0/0x00000000
Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic.
- Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic. On Linux Netfilter may require
- marks on each packet to match an SA having that option set. This allows
- Netfilter rules to select specific tunnels for incoming traffic. The
- special value _%unique_ sets a unique mark on each CHILD_SA instance.
+ Netfilter mark and mask for input traffic. On Linux, Netfilter may require
+ marks on each packet to match an SA/policy having that option set. This
+ allows installing duplicate policies and enables Netfilter rules to select
+ specific SAs/policies for incoming traffic. Note that inbound marks are
+ only set on policies, by default, unless *mark_in_sa* is enabled. The
+ special value _%unique_ sets a unique mark on each CHILD_SA instance, beyond
+ that the value _%unique-dir_ assigns a different unique mark for each
+ CHILD_SA direction (in/out).
An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff.
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_in_sa = no
+ Whether to set *mark_in* on the inbound SA.
+
+ Whether to set *mark_in* on the inbound SA. By default, the inbound mark is
+ only set on the inbound policy. The tuple destination address, protocol and
+ SPI is unique and the mark is not required to find the correct SA, allowing
+ to mark traffic after decryption instead (where more specific selectors may
+ be used) to match different policies. Marking packets before decryption is
+ still possible, even if no mark is set on the SA.
+
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.mark_out = 0/0x00000000
Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic.
- Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic. On Linux Netfilter may require
- marks on each packet to match a policy having that option set. This allows
- Netfilter rules to select specific tunnels for outgoing traffic. The
- special value _%unique_ sets a unique mark on each CHILD_SA instance.
+ Netfilter mark and mask for output traffic. On Linux, Netfilter may require
+ marks on each packet to match a policy/SA having that option set. This
+ allows installing duplicate policies and enables Netfilter rules to select
+ specific policies/SAs for outgoing traffic. The special value _%unique_ sets
+ a unique mark on each CHILD_SA instance, beyond that the value _%unique-dir_
+ assigns a different unique mark for each CHILD_SA direction (in/out).
An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff.
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.set_mark_in = 0/0x00000000
+ Netfilter mark applied to packets after the inbound IPsec SA processed them.
+
+ Netfilter mark applied to packets after the inbound IPsec SA processed them.
+ This way it's not necessary to mark packets via Netfilter before decryption
+ or right afterwards to match policies or process them differently (e.g. via
+ policy routing).
+
+ An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
+ default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff. The special value _%same_ uses
+ the value (but not the mask) from **mark_in** as mark value, which can be
+ fixed, _%unique_ or _%unique-dir_.
+
+ Setting marks in XFRM input requires Linux 4.19 or higher.
+
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.set_mark_out = 0/0x00000000
+ Netfilter mark applied to packets after the outbound IPsec SA processed
+ them.
+
+ Netfilter mark applied to packets after the outbound IPsec SA processed
+ them. This allows processing ESP packets differently than the original
+ traffic (e.g. via policy routing).
+
+ An additional mask may be appended to the mark, separated by _/_. The
+ default mask if omitted is 0xffffffff. The special value _%same_ uses
+ the value (but not the mask) from **mark_out** as mark value, which can be
+ fixed, _%unique_ or _%unique-dir_.
+
+ Setting marks in XFRM output is supported since Linux 4.14. Setting a mask
+ requires at least Linux 4.19.
+
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.tfc_padding = 0
Traffic Flow Confidentiality padding.
default of 32 are supported using the Netlink backend only, a value of 0
disables IPsec replay protection.
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.hw_offload = no
+ Enable hardware offload for this CHILD_SA, if supported by the IPsec
+ implementation.
+
+ Enable hardware offload for this CHILD_SA, if supported by the IPsec
+ implementation. The value _yes_ enforces offloading and the installation
+ will fail if it's not supported by either kernel or device. The value _auto_
+ enables offloading, if it's supported, but the installation does not fail
+ otherwise.
+
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.copy_df = yes
+ Whether to copy the DF bit to the outer IPv4 header in tunnel mode.
+
+ Whether to copy the DF bit to the outer IPv4 header in tunnel mode. This
+ effectively disables Path MTU discovery (PMTUD). Controlling this behavior
+ is not supported by all kernel interfaces.
+
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.copy_ecn = yes
+ Whether to copy the ECN header field to/from the outer IP header in tunnel
+ mode.
+
+ Whether to copy the ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) header field
+ to/from the outer IP header in tunnel mode. Controlling this behavior is not
+ supported by all kernel interfaces.
+
+connections.<conn>.children.<child>.copy_dscp = out
+ Whether to copy the DSCP header field to/from the outer IP header in tunnel
+ mode.
+
+ Whether to copy the DSCP (Differentiated Services Field Codepoint) header
+ field to/from the outer IP header in tunnel mode. The value _out_ only
+ copies the field from the inner to the outer header, the value _in_ does the
+ opposite and only copies the field from the outer to the inner header when
+ decapsulating, the value _yes_ copies the field in both directions, and the
+ value _no_ disables copying the field altogether. Setting this to _yes_ or
+ _in_ could allow an attacker to adversely affect other traffic at the
+ receiver, which is why the default is _out_. Controlling this behavior is
+ not supported by all kernel interfaces.
+
connections.<conn>.children.<child>.start_action = none
Action to perform after loading the configuration (_none_, _trap_, _start_).
It is not recommended to define any private key decryption passphrases,
as then there is no real security benefit in having encrypted keys. Either
- store the key unencrypted, or enter the keys manually when loading
+ store the key unencrypted or enter the keys manually when loading
credentials.
secrets.eap<suffix> { # }
Value of the EAP/XAuth secret.
Value of the EAP/XAuth secret. It may either be an ASCII string, a hex
- encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix, or a Base64 encoded string if it
+ encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix or a Base64 encoded string if it
has a _0s_ prefix in its value.
secrets.eap<suffix>.id<suffix> =
be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
multiple users.
+secrets.ntlm<suffix> { # }
+ NTLM secret section for a specific secret.
+
+ NTLM secret section for a specific secret. Each NTLM secret is defined in
+ a unique section having the _ntlm_ prefix. NTLM secrets may only be used for
+ EAP-MSCHAPv2 authentication.
+
+secrets.ntlm<suffix>.secret =
+ Value of the NTLM secret.
+
+ Value of the NTLM secret, which is the NT Hash of the actual secret, that
+ is, MD4(UTF-16LE(secret)). The resulting 16-byte value may either be given
+ as a hex encoded string with a _0x_ prefix or as a Base64 encoded string
+ with a _0s_ prefix.
+
+secrets.ntlm<suffix>.id<suffix> =
+ Identity the NTLM secret belongs to.
+
+ Identity the NTLM secret belongs to. Multiple unique identities may
+ be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
+ multiple users.
+
secrets.ike<suffix> { # }
IKE preshared secret section for a specific secret.
Value of the IKE preshared secret.
Value of the IKE preshared secret. It may either be an ASCII string,
- a hex encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix, or a Base64 encoded string if
+ a hex encoded string if it has a _0x_ prefix or a Base64 encoded string if
it has a _0s_ prefix in its value.
secrets.ike<suffix>.id<suffix> =
may be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
multiple peers.
+secrets.ppk<suffix> { # }
+ Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) section for a specific secret.
+
+ Postquantum Preshared Key (PPK) section for a specific secret. Each PPK is
+ defined in a unique section having the _ppk_ prefix.
+
+secrets.ppk<suffix>.secret =
+ Value of the PPK.
+
+ Value of the PPK. It may either be an ASCII string, a hex encoded string if
+ it has a _0x_ prefix or a Base64 encoded string if it has a _0s_ prefix in
+ its value. Should have at least 256 bits of entropy for 128-bit security.
+
+secrets.ppk<suffix>.id<suffix> =
+ PPK identity the PPK belongs to.
+
+ PPK identity the PPK belongs to. Multiple unique identities
+ may be specified, each having an _id_ prefix, if a secret is shared between
+ multiple peers.
+
+secrets.private<suffix> { # }
+ Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _private_ folder.
+
+secrets.private<suffix>.file =
+ File name in the _private_ folder for which this passphrase should be used.
+
+secrets.private<suffix>.secret
+ Value of decryption passphrase for private key.
+
secrets.rsa<suffix> { # }
Private key decryption passphrase for a key in the _rsa_ folder.
secrets.pkcs12<suffix>.secret
Value of decryption passphrase for PKCS#12 container.
+secrets.token<suffix> { # }
+ Definition for a private key that's stored on a token/smartcard.
+
+secrets.token<suffix>.handle =
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the private key on the token.
+
+secrets.token<suffix>.slot =
+ Optional slot number to access the token.
+
+secrets.token<suffix>.module =
+ Optional PKCS#11 module name to access the token.
+
+secrets.token<suffix>.pin =
+ Optional PIN required to access the key on the token. If none is provided
+ the user is prompted during an interactive --load-creds call.
+
pools { # }
Section defining named pools.
Addresses allocated in pool.
Subnet or range defining addresses allocated in pool. Accepts a single CIDR
- subnet defining the pool to allocate addresses from, or an address range
+ subnet defining the pool to allocate addresses from or an address range
(<from>-<to>). Pools must be unique and non-overlapping.
pools.<name>.<attr> =
authorities.<name>.cacert =
CA certificate belonging to the certification authority.
- The certificates may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509ca_
- directory, or an absolute path.
+ CA certificate belonging to the certification authority. The certificates
+ may use a relative path from the **swanctl** _x509ca_ directory or an
+ absolute path.
+
+ Configure one of _cacert_, _file_, or _handle_ per section.
+
+authorities.<name>.file =
+ Absolute path to the certificate to load.
+
+ Absolute path to the certificate to load. Passed as-is to the daemon, so it
+ must be readable by it.
+
+ Configure one of _cacert_, _file_, or _handle_ per section.
+
+authorities.<name>.handle =
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the CA certificate on a token.
+
+ Hex-encoded CKA_ID of the CA certificate on a token.
+
+ Configure one of _cacert_, _file_, or _handle_ per section.
+
+authorities.<name>.slot =
+ Optional slot number of the token that stores the CA certificate.
+
+authorities.<name>.module =
+ Optional PKCS#11 module name.
authorities.<name>.crl_uris =
- Comma-separated list of CRL distribution points
+ Comma-separated list of CRL distribution points.
- Comma-separated list of CRL distribution points (ldap, http, or file URI)
+ Comma-separated list of CRL distribution points (ldap, http, or file URI).
authorities.<name>.ocsp_uris =
- Comma-separated list of OCSP URIs
-
- Comma-separated list of OCSP URIs
+ Comma-separated list of OCSP URIs.
authorities.<name>.cert_uri_base =
Defines the base URI for the Hash and URL feature supported by IKEv2.
built by appending the SHA1 hash of the DER encoded certificates to this
base URI.
+include conf.d/*.conf
+ Include config snippets
projects / thirdparty / strongswan.git / blobdiff