#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include "qemu/units.h"
#include "target/arm/idau.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "cpu.h"
#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
#include "qemu/bitops.h"
#include "qemu/crc32c.h"
+#include "qemu/qemu-print.h"
#include "exec/exec-all.h"
#include "exec/cpu_ldst.h"
#include "arm_ldst.h"
#include <zlib.h> /* For crc32 */
-#include "exec/semihost.h"
+#include "hw/semihosting/semihost.h"
#include "sysemu/cpus.h"
#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
#include "fpu/softfloat.h"
#include "qemu/range.h"
#include "qapi/qapi-commands-target.h"
+#include "qapi/error.h"
+#include "qemu/guest-random.h"
#define ARM_CPU_FREQ 1000000000 /* FIXME: 1 GHz, should be configurable */
return true;
}
-bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu)
+bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu, bool kvm_sync)
{
/* Write the coprocessor state from cpu->env to the (index,value) list. */
int i;
for (i = 0; i < cpu->cpreg_array_len; i++) {
uint32_t regidx = kvm_to_cpreg_id(cpu->cpreg_indexes[i]);
const ARMCPRegInfo *ri;
+ uint64_t newval;
ri = get_arm_cp_reginfo(cpu->cp_regs, regidx);
if (!ri) {
if (ri->type & ARM_CP_NO_RAW) {
continue;
}
- cpu->cpreg_values[i] = read_raw_cp_reg(&cpu->env, ri);
+
+ newval = read_raw_cp_reg(&cpu->env, ri);
+ if (kvm_sync) {
+ /*
+ * Only sync if the previous list->cpustate sync succeeded.
+ * Rather than tracking the success/failure state for every
+ * item in the list, we just recheck "does the raw write we must
+ * have made in write_list_to_cpustate() read back OK" here.
+ */
+ uint64_t oldval = cpu->cpreg_values[i];
+
+ if (oldval == newval) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ write_raw_cp_reg(&cpu->env, ri, oldval);
+ if (read_raw_cp_reg(&cpu->env, ri) != oldval) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ write_raw_cp_reg(&cpu->env, ri, newval);
+ }
+ cpu->cpreg_values[i] = newval;
}
return ok;
}
{ .name = "APDAKEYLO_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 2, .opc2 = 0,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apda_key.lo) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apda.lo) },
{ .name = "APDAKEYHI_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 2, .opc2 = 1,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apda_key.hi) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apda.hi) },
{ .name = "APDBKEYLO_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 2, .opc2 = 2,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apdb_key.lo) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apdb.lo) },
{ .name = "APDBKEYHI_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 2, .opc2 = 3,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apdb_key.hi) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apdb.hi) },
{ .name = "APGAKEYLO_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 3, .opc2 = 0,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apga_key.lo) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apga.lo) },
{ .name = "APGAKEYHI_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 3, .opc2 = 1,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apga_key.hi) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apga.hi) },
{ .name = "APIAKEYLO_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 1, .opc2 = 0,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apia_key.lo) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apia.lo) },
{ .name = "APIAKEYHI_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 1, .opc2 = 1,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apia_key.hi) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apia.hi) },
{ .name = "APIBKEYLO_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 1, .opc2 = 2,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apib_key.lo) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apib.lo) },
{ .name = "APIBKEYHI_EL1", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
.opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 0, .crn = 2, .crm = 1, .opc2 = 3,
.access = PL1_RW, .accessfn = access_pauth,
- .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, apib_key.hi) },
+ .fieldoffset = offsetof(CPUARMState, keys.apib.hi) },
+ REGINFO_SENTINEL
+};
+
+static uint64_t rndr_readfn(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
+{
+ Error *err = NULL;
+ uint64_t ret;
+
+ /* Success sets NZCV = 0000. */
+ env->NF = env->CF = env->VF = 0, env->ZF = 1;
+
+ if (qemu_guest_getrandom(&ret, sizeof(ret), &err) < 0) {
+ /*
+ * ??? Failed, for unknown reasons in the crypto subsystem.
+ * The best we can do is log the reason and return the
+ * timed-out indication to the guest. There is no reason
+ * we know to expect this failure to be transitory, so the
+ * guest may well hang retrying the operation.
+ */
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "%s: Crypto failure: %s",
+ ri->name, error_get_pretty(err));
+ error_free(err);
+
+ env->ZF = 0; /* NZCF = 0100 */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* We do not support re-seeding, so the two registers operate the same. */
+static const ARMCPRegInfo rndr_reginfo[] = {
+ { .name = "RNDR", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
+ .type = ARM_CP_NO_RAW | ARM_CP_SUPPRESS_TB_END | ARM_CP_IO,
+ .opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 3, .crn = 2, .crm = 4, .opc2 = 0,
+ .access = PL0_R, .readfn = rndr_readfn },
+ { .name = "RNDRRS", .state = ARM_CP_STATE_AA64,
+ .type = ARM_CP_NO_RAW | ARM_CP_SUPPRESS_TB_END | ARM_CP_IO,
+ .opc0 = 3, .opc1 = 3, .crn = 2, .crm = 4, .opc2 = 1,
+ .access = PL0_R, .readfn = rndr_readfn },
REGINFO_SENTINEL
};
#endif
if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_pauth, cpu)) {
define_arm_cp_regs(cpu, pauth_reginfo);
}
+ if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_rndr, cpu)) {
+ define_arm_cp_regs(cpu, rndr_reginfo);
+ }
#endif
/*
static void arm_cpu_list_entry(gpointer data, gpointer user_data)
{
ObjectClass *oc = data;
- CPUListState *s = user_data;
const char *typename;
char *name;
typename = object_class_get_name(oc);
name = g_strndup(typename, strlen(typename) - strlen("-" TYPE_ARM_CPU));
- (*s->cpu_fprintf)(s->file, " %s\n",
- name);
+ qemu_printf(" %s\n", name);
g_free(name);
}
-void arm_cpu_list(FILE *f, fprintf_function cpu_fprintf)
+void arm_cpu_list(void)
{
- CPUListState s = {
- .file = f,
- .cpu_fprintf = cpu_fprintf,
- };
GSList *list;
list = object_class_get_list(TYPE_ARM_CPU, false);
list = g_slist_sort(list, arm_cpu_list_compare);
- (*cpu_fprintf)(f, "Available CPUs:\n");
- g_slist_foreach(list, arm_cpu_list_entry, &s);
+ qemu_printf("Available CPUs:\n");
+ g_slist_foreach(list, arm_cpu_list_entry, NULL);
g_slist_free(list);
}
g_assert_not_reached();
}
+void HELPER(v7m_preserve_fp_state)(CPUARMState *env)
+{
+ /* translate.c should never generate calls here in user-only mode */
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+}
+
+void HELPER(v7m_vlstm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr)
+{
+ /* translate.c should never generate calls here in user-only mode */
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+}
+
+void HELPER(v7m_vlldm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr)
+{
+ /* translate.c should never generate calls here in user-only mode */
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+}
+
uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op)
{
/* The TT instructions can be used by unprivileged code, but in
return target_el;
}
+/*
+ * Return true if the v7M CPACR permits access to the FPU for the specified
+ * security state and privilege level.
+ */
+static bool v7m_cpacr_pass(CPUARMState *env, bool is_secure, bool is_priv)
+{
+ switch (extract32(env->v7m.cpacr[is_secure], 20, 2)) {
+ case 0:
+ case 2: /* UNPREDICTABLE: we treat like 0 */
+ return false;
+ case 1:
+ return is_priv;
+ case 3:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * What kind of stack write are we doing? This affects how exceptions
+ * generated during the stacking are treated.
+ */
+typedef enum StackingMode {
+ STACK_NORMAL,
+ STACK_IGNFAULTS,
+ STACK_LAZYFP,
+} StackingMode;
+
static bool v7m_stack_write(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t addr, uint32_t value,
- ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool ignfault)
+ ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, StackingMode mode)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
&attrs, &prot, &page_size, &fi, NULL)) {
/* MPU/SAU lookup failed */
if (fi.type == ARMFault_QEMU_SFault) {
- qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
- "...SecureFault with SFSR.AUVIOL during stacking\n");
- env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_AUVIOL_MASK | R_V7M_SFSR_SFARVALID_MASK;
+ if (mode == STACK_LAZYFP) {
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...SecureFault with SFSR.LSPERR "
+ "during lazy stacking\n");
+ env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_LSPERR_MASK;
+ } else {
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...SecureFault with SFSR.AUVIOL "
+ "during stacking\n");
+ env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_AUVIOL_MASK;
+ }
+ env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_SFARVALID_MASK;
env->v7m.sfar = addr;
exc = ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE;
exc_secure = false;
} else {
- qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...MemManageFault with CFSR.MSTKERR\n");
- env->v7m.cfsr[secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_MSTKERR_MASK;
+ if (mode == STACK_LAZYFP) {
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...MemManageFault with CFSR.MLSPERR\n");
+ env->v7m.cfsr[secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_MLSPERR_MASK;
+ } else {
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...MemManageFault with CFSR.MSTKERR\n");
+ env->v7m.cfsr[secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_MSTKERR_MASK;
+ }
exc = ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM;
exc_secure = secure;
}
attrs, &txres);
if (txres != MEMTX_OK) {
/* BusFault trying to write the data */
- qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...BusFault with BFSR.STKERR\n");
- env->v7m.cfsr[M_REG_NS] |= R_V7M_CFSR_STKERR_MASK;
+ if (mode == STACK_LAZYFP) {
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...BusFault with BFSR.LSPERR\n");
+ env->v7m.cfsr[M_REG_NS] |= R_V7M_CFSR_LSPERR_MASK;
+ } else {
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...BusFault with BFSR.STKERR\n");
+ env->v7m.cfsr[M_REG_NS] |= R_V7M_CFSR_STKERR_MASK;
+ }
exc = ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS;
exc_secure = false;
goto pend_fault;
* later if we have two derived exceptions.
* The only case when we must not pend the exception but instead
* throw it away is if we are doing the push of the callee registers
- * and we've already generated a derived exception. Even in this
- * case we will still update the fault status registers.
+ * and we've already generated a derived exception (this is indicated
+ * by the caller passing STACK_IGNFAULTS). Even in this case we will
+ * still update the fault status registers.
*/
- if (!ignfault) {
+ switch (mode) {
+ case STACK_NORMAL:
armv7m_nvic_set_pending_derived(env->nvic, exc, exc_secure);
+ break;
+ case STACK_LAZYFP:
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending_lazyfp(env->nvic, exc, exc_secure);
+ break;
+ case STACK_IGNFAULTS:
+ break;
}
return false;
}
return false;
}
+void HELPER(v7m_preserve_fp_state)(CPUARMState *env)
+{
+ /*
+ * Preserve FP state (because LSPACT was set and we are about
+ * to execute an FP instruction). This corresponds to the
+ * PreserveFPState() pseudocode.
+ * We may throw an exception if the stacking fails.
+ */
+ ARMCPU *cpu = arm_env_get_cpu(env);
+ bool is_secure = env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_S_MASK;
+ bool negpri = !(env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_HFRDY_MASK);
+ bool is_priv = !(env->v7m.fpccr[is_secure] & R_V7M_FPCCR_USER_MASK);
+ bool splimviol = env->v7m.fpccr[is_secure] & R_V7M_FPCCR_SPLIMVIOL_MASK;
+ uint32_t fpcar = env->v7m.fpcar[is_secure];
+ bool stacked_ok = true;
+ bool ts = is_secure && (env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_TS_MASK);
+ bool take_exception;
+
+ /* Take the iothread lock as we are going to touch the NVIC */
+ qemu_mutex_lock_iothread();
+
+ /* Check the background context had access to the FPU */
+ if (!v7m_cpacr_pass(env, is_secure, is_priv)) {
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending_lazyfp(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, is_secure);
+ env->v7m.cfsr[is_secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_NOCP_MASK;
+ stacked_ok = false;
+ } else if (!is_secure && !extract32(env->v7m.nsacr, 10, 1)) {
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending_lazyfp(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, M_REG_S);
+ env->v7m.cfsr[M_REG_S] |= R_V7M_CFSR_NOCP_MASK;
+ stacked_ok = false;
+ }
+
+ if (!splimviol && stacked_ok) {
+ /* We only stack if the stack limit wasn't violated */
+ int i;
+ ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx;
+
+ mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_all(env, is_secure, is_priv, negpri);
+ for (i = 0; i < (ts ? 32 : 16); i += 2) {
+ uint64_t dn = *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2);
+ uint32_t faddr = fpcar + 4 * i;
+ uint32_t slo = extract64(dn, 0, 32);
+ uint32_t shi = extract64(dn, 32, 32);
+
+ if (i >= 16) {
+ faddr += 8; /* skip the slot for the FPSCR */
+ }
+ stacked_ok = stacked_ok &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, faddr, slo, mmu_idx, STACK_LAZYFP) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, faddr + 4, shi, mmu_idx, STACK_LAZYFP);
+ }
+
+ stacked_ok = stacked_ok &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, fpcar + 0x40,
+ vfp_get_fpscr(env), mmu_idx, STACK_LAZYFP);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We definitely pended an exception, but it's possible that it
+ * might not be able to be taken now. If its priority permits us
+ * to take it now, then we must not update the LSPACT or FP regs,
+ * but instead jump out to take the exception immediately.
+ * If it's just pending and won't be taken until the current
+ * handler exits, then we do update LSPACT and the FP regs.
+ */
+ take_exception = !stacked_ok &&
+ armv7m_nvic_can_take_pending_exception(env->nvic);
+
+ qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
+
+ if (take_exception) {
+ raise_exception_ra(env, EXCP_LAZYFP, 0, 1, GETPC());
+ }
+
+ env->v7m.fpccr[is_secure] &= ~R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK;
+
+ if (ts) {
+ /* Clear s0 to s31 and the FPSCR */
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 2) {
+ *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2) = 0;
+ }
+ vfp_set_fpscr(env, 0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Otherwise s0 to s15 and FPSCR are UNKNOWN; we choose to leave them
+ * unchanged.
+ */
+}
+
/* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit for the specified security bank.
* This may change the current stack pointer between Main and Process
* stack pointers if it is done for the CONTROL register for the current
/* translate.c should have made BXNS UNDEF unless we're secure */
assert(env->v7m.secure);
+ if (!(dest & 1)) {
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK;
+ }
switch_v7m_security_state(env, dest & 1);
env->thumb = 1;
env->regs[15] = dest & ~1;
*/
write_v7m_exception(env, 1);
}
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK;
switch_v7m_security_state(env, 0);
env->thumb = 1;
env->regs[15] = dest;
return false;
}
+static uint32_t v7m_integrity_sig(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t lr)
+{
+ /*
+ * Return the integrity signature value for the callee-saves
+ * stack frame section. @lr is the exception return payload/LR value
+ * whose FType bit forms bit 0 of the signature if FP is present.
+ */
+ uint32_t sig = 0xfefa125a;
+
+ if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP) || (lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_FTYPE_MASK)) {
+ sig |= 1;
+ }
+ return sig;
+}
+
static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
bool ignore_faults)
{
bool stacked_ok;
uint32_t limit;
bool want_psp;
+ uint32_t sig;
+ StackingMode smode = ignore_faults ? STACK_IGNFAULTS : STACK_NORMAL;
if (dotailchain) {
bool mode = lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_MODE_MASK;
/* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. A write failure may
* cause us to pend a derived exception.
*/
+ sig = v7m_integrity_sig(env, lr);
stacked_ok =
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr, 0xfefa125b, mmu_idx, ignore_faults) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x8, env->regs[4], mmu_idx,
- ignore_faults) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0xc, env->regs[5], mmu_idx,
- ignore_faults) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x10, env->regs[6], mmu_idx,
- ignore_faults) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x14, env->regs[7], mmu_idx,
- ignore_faults) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x18, env->regs[8], mmu_idx,
- ignore_faults) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x1c, env->regs[9], mmu_idx,
- ignore_faults) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x20, env->regs[10], mmu_idx,
- ignore_faults) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x24, env->regs[11], mmu_idx,
- ignore_faults);
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr, sig, mmu_idx, smode) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x8, env->regs[4], mmu_idx, smode) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0xc, env->regs[5], mmu_idx, smode) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x10, env->regs[6], mmu_idx, smode) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x14, env->regs[7], mmu_idx, smode) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x18, env->regs[8], mmu_idx, smode) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x1c, env->regs[9], mmu_idx, smode) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x20, env->regs[10], mmu_idx, smode) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x24, env->regs[11], mmu_idx, smode);
/* Update SP regardless of whether any of the stack accesses failed. */
*frame_sp_p = frameptr;
qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...taking pending %s exception %d\n",
targets_secure ? "secure" : "nonsecure", exc);
+ if (dotailchain) {
+ /* Sanitize LR FType and PREFIX bits */
+ if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
+ lr |= R_V7M_EXCRET_FTYPE_MASK;
+ }
+ lr = deposit32(lr, 24, 8, 0xff);
+ }
+
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) &&
(lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK)) {
switch_v7m_security_state(env, targets_secure);
write_v7m_control_spsel(env, 0);
arm_clear_exclusive(env);
+ /* Clear SFPA and FPCA (has no effect if no FPU) */
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] &=
+ ~(R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK | R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK);
/* Clear IT bits */
env->condexec_bits = 0;
env->regs[14] = lr;
env->thumb = addr & 1;
}
+static void v7m_update_fpccr(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t frameptr,
+ bool apply_splim)
+{
+ /*
+ * Like the pseudocode UpdateFPCCR: save state in FPCAR and FPCCR
+ * that we will need later in order to do lazy FP reg stacking.
+ */
+ bool is_secure = env->v7m.secure;
+ void *nvic = env->nvic;
+ /*
+ * Some bits are unbanked and live always in fpccr[M_REG_S]; some bits
+ * are banked and we want to update the bit in the bank for the
+ * current security state; and in one case we want to specifically
+ * update the NS banked version of a bit even if we are secure.
+ */
+ uint32_t *fpccr_s = &env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S];
+ uint32_t *fpccr_ns = &env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_NS];
+ uint32_t *fpccr = &env->v7m.fpccr[is_secure];
+ bool hfrdy, bfrdy, mmrdy, ns_ufrdy, s_ufrdy, sfrdy, monrdy;
+
+ env->v7m.fpcar[is_secure] = frameptr & ~0x7;
+
+ if (apply_splim && arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
+ bool splimviol;
+ uint32_t splim = v7m_sp_limit(env);
+ bool ign = armv7m_nvic_neg_prio_requested(nvic, is_secure) &&
+ (env->v7m.ccr[is_secure] & R_V7M_CCR_STKOFHFNMIGN_MASK);
+
+ splimviol = !ign && frameptr < splim;
+ *fpccr = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr, V7M_FPCCR, SPLIMVIOL, splimviol);
+ }
+
+ *fpccr = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr, V7M_FPCCR, LSPACT, 1);
+
+ *fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, S, is_secure);
+
+ *fpccr = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr, V7M_FPCCR, USER, arm_current_el(env) == 0);
+
+ *fpccr = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr, V7M_FPCCR, THREAD,
+ !arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env));
+
+ hfrdy = armv7m_nvic_get_ready_status(nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD, false);
+ *fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, HFRDY, hfrdy);
+
+ bfrdy = armv7m_nvic_get_ready_status(nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS, false);
+ *fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, BFRDY, bfrdy);
+
+ mmrdy = armv7m_nvic_get_ready_status(nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_MEM, is_secure);
+ *fpccr = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr, V7M_FPCCR, MMRDY, mmrdy);
+
+ ns_ufrdy = armv7m_nvic_get_ready_status(nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, false);
+ *fpccr_ns = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr_ns, V7M_FPCCR, UFRDY, ns_ufrdy);
+
+ monrdy = armv7m_nvic_get_ready_status(nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_DEBUG, false);
+ *fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, MONRDY, monrdy);
+
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
+ s_ufrdy = armv7m_nvic_get_ready_status(nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, true);
+ *fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, UFRDY, s_ufrdy);
+
+ sfrdy = armv7m_nvic_get_ready_status(nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE, false);
+ *fpccr_s = FIELD_DP32(*fpccr_s, V7M_FPCCR, SFRDY, sfrdy);
+ }
+}
+
+void HELPER(v7m_vlstm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr)
+{
+ /* fptr is the value of Rn, the frame pointer we store the FP regs to */
+ bool s = env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_S_MASK;
+ bool lspact = env->v7m.fpccr[s] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK;
+
+ assert(env->v7m.secure);
+
+ if (!(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Check access to the coprocessor is permitted */
+ if (!v7m_cpacr_pass(env, true, arm_current_el(env) != 0)) {
+ raise_exception_ra(env, EXCP_NOCP, 0, 1, GETPC());
+ }
+
+ if (lspact) {
+ /* LSPACT should not be active when there is active FP state */
+ raise_exception_ra(env, EXCP_LSERR, 0, 1, GETPC());
+ }
+
+ if (fptr & 7) {
+ raise_exception_ra(env, EXCP_UNALIGNED, 0, 1, GETPC());
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note that we do not use v7m_stack_write() here, because the
+ * accesses should not set the FSR bits for stacking errors if they
+ * fail. (In pseudocode terms, they are AccType_NORMAL, not AccType_STACK
+ * or AccType_LAZYFP). Faults in cpu_stl_data() will throw exceptions
+ * and longjmp out.
+ */
+ if (!(env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPEN_MASK)) {
+ bool ts = env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_TS_MASK;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (ts ? 32 : 16); i += 2) {
+ uint64_t dn = *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2);
+ uint32_t faddr = fptr + 4 * i;
+ uint32_t slo = extract64(dn, 0, 32);
+ uint32_t shi = extract64(dn, 32, 32);
+
+ if (i >= 16) {
+ faddr += 8; /* skip the slot for the FPSCR */
+ }
+ cpu_stl_data(env, faddr, slo);
+ cpu_stl_data(env, faddr + 4, shi);
+ }
+ cpu_stl_data(env, fptr + 0x40, vfp_get_fpscr(env));
+
+ /*
+ * If TS is 0 then s0 to s15 and FPSCR are UNKNOWN; we choose to
+ * leave them unchanged, matching our choice in v7m_preserve_fp_state.
+ */
+ if (ts) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 2) {
+ *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2) = 0;
+ }
+ vfp_set_fpscr(env, 0);
+ }
+ } else {
+ v7m_update_fpccr(env, fptr, false);
+ }
+
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK;
+}
+
+void HELPER(v7m_vlldm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr)
+{
+ /* fptr is the value of Rn, the frame pointer we load the FP regs from */
+ assert(env->v7m.secure);
+
+ if (!(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Check access to the coprocessor is permitted */
+ if (!v7m_cpacr_pass(env, true, arm_current_el(env) != 0)) {
+ raise_exception_ra(env, EXCP_NOCP, 0, 1, GETPC());
+ }
+
+ if (env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK) {
+ /* State in FP is still valid */
+ env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] &= ~R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK;
+ } else {
+ bool ts = env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_TS_MASK;
+ int i;
+ uint32_t fpscr;
+
+ if (fptr & 7) {
+ raise_exception_ra(env, EXCP_UNALIGNED, 0, 1, GETPC());
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (ts ? 32 : 16); i += 2) {
+ uint32_t slo, shi;
+ uint64_t dn;
+ uint32_t faddr = fptr + 4 * i;
+
+ if (i >= 16) {
+ faddr += 8; /* skip the slot for the FPSCR */
+ }
+
+ slo = cpu_ldl_data(env, faddr);
+ shi = cpu_ldl_data(env, faddr + 4);
+
+ dn = (uint64_t) shi << 32 | slo;
+ *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2) = dn;
+ }
+ fpscr = cpu_ldl_data(env, fptr + 0x40);
+ vfp_set_fpscr(env, fpscr);
+ }
+
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] |= R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK;
+}
+
static bool v7m_push_stack(ARMCPU *cpu)
{
/* Do the "set up stack frame" part of exception entry,
* should ignore further stack faults trying to process
* that derived exception.)
*/
- bool stacked_ok;
+ bool stacked_ok = true, limitviol = false;
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
uint32_t xpsr = xpsr_read(env);
uint32_t frameptr = env->regs[13];
ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = arm_mmu_idx(env);
+ uint32_t framesize;
+ bool nsacr_cp10 = extract32(env->v7m.nsacr, 10, 1);
+
+ if ((env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK) &&
+ (env->v7m.secure || nsacr_cp10)) {
+ if (env->v7m.secure &&
+ env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_TS_MASK) {
+ framesize = 0xa8;
+ } else {
+ framesize = 0x68;
+ }
+ } else {
+ framesize = 0x20;
+ }
/* Align stack pointer if the guest wants that */
if ((frameptr & 4) &&
xpsr |= XPSR_SPREALIGN;
}
- frameptr -= 0x20;
+ xpsr &= ~XPSR_SFPA;
+ if (env->v7m.secure &&
+ (env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK)) {
+ xpsr |= XPSR_SFPA;
+ }
+
+ frameptr -= framesize;
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
uint32_t limit = v7m_sp_limit(env);
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE,
env->v7m.secure);
env->regs[13] = limit;
- return true;
+ /*
+ * We won't try to perform any further memory accesses but
+ * we must continue through the following code to check for
+ * permission faults during FPU state preservation, and we
+ * must update FPCCR if lazy stacking is enabled.
+ */
+ limitviol = true;
+ stacked_ok = false;
}
}
* (which may be taken in preference to the one we started with
* if it has higher priority).
*/
- stacked_ok =
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr, env->regs[0], mmu_idx, false) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 4, env->regs[1], mmu_idx, false) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 8, env->regs[2], mmu_idx, false) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 12, env->regs[3], mmu_idx, false) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 16, env->regs[12], mmu_idx, false) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 20, env->regs[14], mmu_idx, false) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 24, env->regs[15], mmu_idx, false) &&
- v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 28, xpsr, mmu_idx, false);
+ stacked_ok = stacked_ok &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr, env->regs[0], mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 4, env->regs[1],
+ mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 8, env->regs[2],
+ mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 12, env->regs[3],
+ mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 16, env->regs[12],
+ mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 20, env->regs[14],
+ mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 24, env->regs[15],
+ mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 28, xpsr, mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL);
+
+ if (env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK) {
+ /* FPU is active, try to save its registers */
+ bool fpccr_s = env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_S_MASK;
+ bool lspact = env->v7m.fpccr[fpccr_s] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK;
+
+ if (lspact && arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...SecureFault because LSPACT and FPCA both set\n");
+ env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_LSERR_MASK;
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE, false);
+ } else if (!env->v7m.secure && !nsacr_cp10) {
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...Secure UsageFault with CFSR.NOCP because "
+ "NSACR.CP10 prevents stacking FP regs\n");
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, M_REG_S);
+ env->v7m.cfsr[M_REG_S] |= R_V7M_CFSR_NOCP_MASK;
+ } else {
+ if (!(env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPEN_MASK)) {
+ /* Lazy stacking disabled, save registers now */
+ int i;
+ bool cpacr_pass = v7m_cpacr_pass(env, env->v7m.secure,
+ arm_current_el(env) != 0);
- /* Update SP regardless of whether any of the stack accesses failed. */
- env->regs[13] = frameptr;
+ if (stacked_ok && !cpacr_pass) {
+ /*
+ * Take UsageFault if CPACR forbids access. The pseudocode
+ * here does a full CheckCPEnabled() but we know the NSACR
+ * check can never fail as we have already handled that.
+ */
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...UsageFault with CFSR.NOCP because "
+ "CPACR.CP10 prevents stacking FP regs\n");
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE,
+ env->v7m.secure);
+ env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_NOCP_MASK;
+ stacked_ok = false;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ((framesize == 0xa8) ? 32 : 16); i += 2) {
+ uint64_t dn = *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2);
+ uint32_t faddr = frameptr + 0x20 + 4 * i;
+ uint32_t slo = extract64(dn, 0, 32);
+ uint32_t shi = extract64(dn, 32, 32);
+
+ if (i >= 16) {
+ faddr += 8; /* skip the slot for the FPSCR */
+ }
+ stacked_ok = stacked_ok &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, faddr, slo,
+ mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL) &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, faddr + 4, shi,
+ mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL);
+ }
+ stacked_ok = stacked_ok &&
+ v7m_stack_write(cpu, frameptr + 0x60,
+ vfp_get_fpscr(env), mmu_idx, STACK_NORMAL);
+ if (cpacr_pass) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ((framesize == 0xa8) ? 32 : 16); i += 2) {
+ *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2) = 0;
+ }
+ vfp_set_fpscr(env, 0);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Lazy stacking enabled, save necessary info to stack later */
+ v7m_update_fpccr(env, frameptr + 0x20, true);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we broke a stack limit then SP was already updated earlier;
+ * otherwise we update SP regardless of whether any of the stack
+ * accesses failed or we took some other kind of fault.
+ */
+ if (!limitviol) {
+ env->regs[13] = frameptr;
+ }
return !stacked_ok;
}
{
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
uint32_t excret;
- uint32_t xpsr;
+ uint32_t xpsr, xpsr_mask;
bool ufault = false;
bool sfault = false;
bool return_to_sp_process;
bool rettobase = false;
bool exc_secure = false;
bool return_to_secure;
+ bool ftype;
+ bool restore_s16_s31;
/* If we're not in Handler mode then jumps to magic exception-exit
* addresses don't have magic behaviour. However for the v8M
excret);
}
+ ftype = excret & R_V7M_EXCRET_FTYPE_MASK;
+
+ if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP) && !ftype) {
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "M profile: zero FTYPE in exception "
+ "exit PC value 0x%" PRIx32 " is UNPREDICTABLE "
+ "if FPU not present\n",
+ excret);
+ ftype = true;
+ }
+
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
/* EXC_RETURN.ES validation check (R_SMFL). We must do this before
* we pick which FAULTMASK to clear.
*/
write_v7m_control_spsel_for_secstate(env, return_to_sp_process, exc_secure);
+ /*
+ * Clear scratch FP values left in caller saved registers; this
+ * must happen before any kind of tail chaining.
+ */
+ if ((env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_CLRONRET_MASK) &&
+ (env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK)) {
+ if (env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK) {
+ env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_LSERR_MASK;
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE, false);
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...taking SecureFault on existing "
+ "stackframe: error during lazy state deactivation\n");
+ v7m_exception_taken(cpu, excret, true, false);
+ return;
+ } else {
+ /* Clear s0..s15 and FPSCR */
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) {
+ *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2) = 0;
+ }
+ vfp_set_fpscr(env, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
if (sfault) {
env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_INVER_MASK;
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE, false);
if (return_to_secure &&
((excret & R_V7M_EXCRET_ES_MASK) == 0 ||
(excret & R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK) == 0)) {
- uint32_t expected_sig = 0xfefa125b;
uint32_t actual_sig;
pop_ok = v7m_stack_read(cpu, &actual_sig, frameptr, mmu_idx);
- if (pop_ok && expected_sig != actual_sig) {
+ if (pop_ok && v7m_integrity_sig(env, excret) != actual_sig) {
/* Take a SecureFault on the current stack */
env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_INVIS_MASK;
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE, false);
}
}
+ if (!ftype) {
+ /* FP present and we need to handle it */
+ if (!return_to_secure &&
+ (env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK)) {
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE, false);
+ env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_LSERR_MASK;
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...taking SecureFault on existing stackframe: "
+ "Secure LSPACT set but exception return is "
+ "not to secure state\n");
+ v7m_exception_taken(cpu, excret, true, false);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ restore_s16_s31 = return_to_secure &&
+ (env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_TS_MASK);
+
+ if (env->v7m.fpccr[return_to_secure] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK) {
+ /* State in FPU is still valid, just clear LSPACT */
+ env->v7m.fpccr[return_to_secure] &= ~R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK;
+ } else {
+ int i;
+ uint32_t fpscr;
+ bool cpacr_pass, nsacr_pass;
+
+ cpacr_pass = v7m_cpacr_pass(env, return_to_secure,
+ return_to_priv);
+ nsacr_pass = return_to_secure ||
+ extract32(env->v7m.nsacr, 10, 1);
+
+ if (!cpacr_pass) {
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE,
+ return_to_secure);
+ env->v7m.cfsr[return_to_secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_NOCP_MASK;
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...taking UsageFault on existing "
+ "stackframe: CPACR.CP10 prevents unstacking "
+ "FP regs\n");
+ v7m_exception_taken(cpu, excret, true, false);
+ return;
+ } else if (!nsacr_pass) {
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, true);
+ env->v7m.cfsr[M_REG_S] |= R_V7M_CFSR_INVPC_MASK;
+ qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
+ "...taking Secure UsageFault on existing "
+ "stackframe: NSACR.CP10 prevents unstacking "
+ "FP regs\n");
+ v7m_exception_taken(cpu, excret, true, false);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (restore_s16_s31 ? 32 : 16); i += 2) {
+ uint32_t slo, shi;
+ uint64_t dn;
+ uint32_t faddr = frameptr + 0x20 + 4 * i;
+
+ if (i >= 16) {
+ faddr += 8; /* Skip the slot for the FPSCR */
+ }
+
+ pop_ok = pop_ok &&
+ v7m_stack_read(cpu, &slo, faddr, mmu_idx) &&
+ v7m_stack_read(cpu, &shi, faddr + 4, mmu_idx);
+
+ if (!pop_ok) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ dn = (uint64_t)shi << 32 | slo;
+ *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2) = dn;
+ }
+ pop_ok = pop_ok &&
+ v7m_stack_read(cpu, &fpscr, frameptr + 0x60, mmu_idx);
+ if (pop_ok) {
+ vfp_set_fpscr(env, fpscr);
+ }
+ if (!pop_ok) {
+ /*
+ * These regs are 0 if security extension present;
+ * otherwise merely UNKNOWN. We zero always.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < (restore_s16_s31 ? 32 : 16); i += 2) {
+ *aa32_vfp_dreg(env, i / 2) = 0;
+ }
+ vfp_set_fpscr(env, 0);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] = FIELD_DP32(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S],
+ V7M_CONTROL, FPCA, !ftype);
+
/* Commit to consuming the stack frame */
frameptr += 0x20;
+ if (!ftype) {
+ frameptr += 0x48;
+ if (restore_s16_s31) {
+ frameptr += 0x40;
+ }
+ }
/* Undo stack alignment (the SPREALIGN bit indicates that the original
* pre-exception SP was not 8-aligned and we added a padding word to
* align it, so we undo this by ORing in the bit that increases it
}
*frame_sp_p = frameptr;
}
+
+ xpsr_mask = ~(XPSR_SPREALIGN | XPSR_SFPA);
+ if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_THUMB_DSP)) {
+ xpsr_mask &= ~XPSR_GE;
+ }
/* This xpsr_write() will invalidate frame_sp_p as it may switch stack */
- xpsr_write(env, xpsr, ~XPSR_SPREALIGN);
+ xpsr_write(env, xpsr, xpsr_mask);
+
+ if (env->v7m.secure) {
+ bool sfpa = xpsr & XPSR_SFPA;
+
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] = FIELD_DP32(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S],
+ V7M_CONTROL, SFPA, sfpa);
+ }
/* The restored xPSR exception field will be zero if we're
* resuming in Thread mode. If that doesn't match what the
[EXCP_NOCP] = "v7M NOCP UsageFault",
[EXCP_INVSTATE] = "v7M INVSTATE UsageFault",
[EXCP_STKOF] = "v8M STKOF UsageFault",
+ [EXCP_LAZYFP] = "v7M exception during lazy FP stacking",
+ [EXCP_LSERR] = "v8M LSERR UsageFault",
+ [EXCP_UNALIGNED] = "v7M UNALIGNED UsageFault",
};
if (idx >= 0 && idx < ARRAY_SIZE(excnames)) {
qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...really an SG instruction at 0x%08" PRIx32
", executing it\n", env->regs[15]);
env->regs[14] &= ~1;
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK;
switch_v7m_security_state(env, true);
xpsr_write(env, 0, XPSR_IT);
env->regs[15] += 4;
env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_UNDEFINSTR_MASK;
break;
case EXCP_NOCP:
- armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, env->v7m.secure);
- env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_NOCP_MASK;
+ {
+ /*
+ * NOCP might be directed to something other than the current
+ * security state if this fault is because of NSACR; we indicate
+ * the target security state using exception.target_el.
+ */
+ int target_secstate;
+
+ if (env->exception.target_el == 3) {
+ target_secstate = M_REG_S;
+ } else {
+ target_secstate = env->v7m.secure;
+ }
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, target_secstate);
+ env->v7m.cfsr[target_secstate] |= R_V7M_CFSR_NOCP_MASK;
break;
+ }
case EXCP_INVSTATE:
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, env->v7m.secure);
env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_INVSTATE_MASK;
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, env->v7m.secure);
env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_STKOF_MASK;
break;
+ case EXCP_LSERR:
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_SECURE, false);
+ env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_LSERR_MASK;
+ break;
+ case EXCP_UNALIGNED:
+ armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE, env->v7m.secure);
+ env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_UNALIGNED_MASK;
+ break;
case EXCP_SWI:
/* The PC already points to the next instruction. */
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_SVC, env->v7m.secure);
return;
}
break;
+ case EXCP_LAZYFP:
+ /*
+ * We already pended the specific exception in the NVIC in the
+ * v7m_preserve_fp_state() helper function.
+ */
+ break;
default:
cpu_abort(cs, "Unhandled exception 0x%x\n", cs->exception_index);
return; /* Never happens. Keep compiler happy. */
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
lr = R_V7M_EXCRET_RES1_MASK |
- R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK |
- R_V7M_EXCRET_FTYPE_MASK;
+ R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK;
/* The S bit indicates whether we should return to Secure
* or NonSecure (ie our current state).
* The ES bit indicates whether we're taking this exception
if (env->v7m.secure) {
lr |= R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK;
}
+ if (!(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK)) {
+ lr |= R_V7M_EXCRET_FTYPE_MASK;
+ }
} else {
lr = R_V7M_EXCRET_RES1_MASK |
R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK |
}
}
-/* Walk the page table and (if the mapping exists) add the page
- * to the TLB. Return false on success, or true on failure. Populate
- * fsr with ARM DFSR/IFSR fault register format value on failure.
- */
-bool arm_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address,
- MMUAccessType access_type, int mmu_idx,
- ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
-{
- ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
- CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
- hwaddr phys_addr;
- target_ulong page_size;
- int prot;
- int ret;
- MemTxAttrs attrs = {};
-
- ret = get_phys_addr(env, address, access_type,
- core_to_arm_mmu_idx(env, mmu_idx), &phys_addr,
- &attrs, &prot, &page_size, fi, NULL);
- if (!ret) {
- /*
- * Map a single [sub]page. Regions smaller than our declared
- * target page size are handled specially, so for those we
- * pass in the exact addresses.
- */
- if (page_size >= TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) {
- phys_addr &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
- address &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
- }
- tlb_set_page_with_attrs(cs, address, phys_addr, attrs,
- prot, mmu_idx, page_size);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
hwaddr arm_cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr,
MemTxAttrs *attrs)
{
}
if (!(reg & 4)) {
mask |= XPSR_NZCV | XPSR_Q; /* APSR */
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_THUMB_DSP)) {
+ mask |= XPSR_GE;
+ }
}
/* EPSR reads as zero */
return xpsr_read(env) & mask;
break;
case 20: /* CONTROL */
- return env->v7m.control[env->v7m.secure];
+ {
+ uint32_t value = env->v7m.control[env->v7m.secure];
+ if (!env->v7m.secure) {
+ /* SFPA is RAZ/WI from NS; FPCA is stored in the M_REG_S bank */
+ value |= env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK;
+ }
+ return value;
+ }
case 0x94: /* CONTROL_NS */
/* We have to handle this here because unprivileged Secure code
* can read the NS CONTROL register.
if (!env->v7m.secure) {
return 0;
}
- return env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS];
+ return env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] |
+ (env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK);
}
if (el == 0) {
*/
uint32_t mask = extract32(maskreg, 8, 4);
uint32_t reg = extract32(maskreg, 0, 8);
+ int cur_el = arm_current_el(env);
- if (arm_current_el(env) == 0 && reg > 7) {
- /* only xPSR sub-fields may be written by unprivileged */
+ if (cur_el == 0 && reg > 7 && reg != 20) {
+ /*
+ * only xPSR sub-fields and CONTROL.SFPA may be written by
+ * unprivileged code
+ */
return;
}
env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_NPRIV_MASK;
env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] |= val & R_V7M_CONTROL_NPRIV_MASK;
}
+ /*
+ * SFPA is RAZ/WI from NS. FPCA is RO if NSACR.CP10 == 0,
+ * RES0 if the FPU is not present, and is stored in the S bank
+ */
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP) &&
+ extract32(env->v7m.nsacr, 10, 1)) {
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK;
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] |= val & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK;
+ }
return;
case 0x98: /* SP_NS */
{
env->v7m.faultmask[env->v7m.secure] = val & 1;
break;
case 20: /* CONTROL */
- /* Writing to the SPSEL bit only has an effect if we are in
+ /*
+ * Writing to the SPSEL bit only has an effect if we are in
* thread mode; other bits can be updated by any privileged code.
* write_v7m_control_spsel() deals with updating the SPSEL bit in
* env->v7m.control, so we only need update the others.
* For v7M, we must just ignore explicit writes to SPSEL in handler
* mode; for v8M the write is permitted but will have no effect.
+ * All these bits are writes-ignored from non-privileged code,
+ * except for SFPA.
*/
- if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8) ||
- !arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env)) {
+ if (cur_el > 0 && (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8) ||
+ !arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env))) {
write_v7m_control_spsel(env, (val & R_V7M_CONTROL_SPSEL_MASK) != 0);
}
- if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
+ if (cur_el > 0 && arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_MAIN)) {
env->v7m.control[env->v7m.secure] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_NPRIV_MASK;
env->v7m.control[env->v7m.secure] |= val & R_V7M_CONTROL_NPRIV_MASK;
}
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_VFP)) {
+ /*
+ * SFPA is RAZ/WI from NS or if no FPU.
+ * FPCA is RO if NSACR.CP10 == 0, RES0 if the FPU is not present.
+ * Both are stored in the S bank.
+ */
+ if (env->v7m.secure) {
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK;
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] |= val & R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK;
+ }
+ if (cur_el > 0 &&
+ (env->v7m.secure || !arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) ||
+ extract32(env->v7m.nsacr, 10, 1))) {
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] &= ~R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK;
+ env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] |= val & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK;
+ }
+ }
break;
default:
bad_reg:
#endif
+bool arm_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int size,
+ MMUAccessType access_type, int mmu_idx,
+ bool probe, uintptr_t retaddr)
+{
+ ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
+ cpu->env.exception.vaddress = address;
+ if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
+ cs->exception_index = EXCP_PREFETCH_ABORT;
+ } else {
+ cs->exception_index = EXCP_DATA_ABORT;
+ }
+ cpu_loop_exit_restore(cs, retaddr);
+#else
+ hwaddr phys_addr;
+ target_ulong page_size;
+ int prot, ret;
+ MemTxAttrs attrs = {};
+ ARMMMUFaultInfo fi = {};
+
+ /*
+ * Walk the page table and (if the mapping exists) add the page
+ * to the TLB. On success, return true. Otherwise, if probing,
+ * return false. Otherwise populate fsr with ARM DFSR/IFSR fault
+ * register format, and signal the fault.
+ */
+ ret = get_phys_addr(&cpu->env, address, access_type,
+ core_to_arm_mmu_idx(&cpu->env, mmu_idx),
+ &phys_addr, &attrs, &prot, &page_size, &fi, NULL);
+ if (likely(!ret)) {
+ /*
+ * Map a single [sub]page. Regions smaller than our declared
+ * target page size are handled specially, so for those we
+ * pass in the exact addresses.
+ */
+ if (page_size >= TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) {
+ phys_addr &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
+ address &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
+ }
+ tlb_set_page_with_attrs(cs, address, phys_addr, attrs,
+ prot, mmu_idx, page_size);
+ return true;
+ } else if (probe) {
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ /* now we have a real cpu fault */
+ cpu_restore_state(cs, retaddr, true);
+ arm_deliver_fault(cpu, address, access_type, mmu_idx, &fi);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in)
{
/* Implement DC ZVA, which zeroes a fixed-length block of memory.
* We know that in fact for any v8 CPU the page size is at least 4K
* and the block size must be 2K or less, but TARGET_PAGE_SIZE is only
* 1K as an artefact of legacy v5 subpage support being present in the
- * same QEMU executable.
+ * same QEMU executable. So in practice the hostaddr[] array has
+ * two entries, given the current setting of TARGET_PAGE_BITS_MIN.
*/
int maxidx = DIV_ROUND_UP(blocklen, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE);
- void *hostaddr[maxidx];
+ void *hostaddr[DIV_ROUND_UP(2 * KiB, 1 << TARGET_PAGE_BITS_MIN)];
int try, i;
unsigned mmu_idx = cpu_mmu_index(env, false);
TCGMemOpIdx oi = make_memop_idx(MO_UB, mmu_idx);
+ assert(maxidx <= ARRAY_SIZE(hostaddr));
+
for (try = 0; try < 2; try++) {
for (i = 0; i < maxidx; i++) {
return 0;
}
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
+ /* CPACR can cause a NOCP UsageFault taken to current security state */
+ if (!v7m_cpacr_pass(env, env->v7m.secure, cur_el != 0)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) && !env->v7m.secure) {
+ if (!extract32(env->v7m.nsacr, 10, 1)) {
+ /* FP insns cause a NOCP UsageFault taken to Secure */
+ return 3;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* The CPACR controls traps to EL1, or PL1 if we're 32 bit:
* 0, 2 : trap EL0 and EL1/PL1 accesses
* 1 : trap only EL0 accesses
return 0;
}
-ARMMMUIdx arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate_and_priv(CPUARMState *env,
- bool secstate, bool priv)
+ARMMMUIdx arm_v7m_mmu_idx_all(CPUARMState *env,
+ bool secstate, bool priv, bool negpri)
{
ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = ARM_MMU_IDX_M;
mmu_idx |= ARM_MMU_IDX_M_PRIV;
}
- if (armv7m_nvic_neg_prio_requested(env->nvic, secstate)) {
+ if (negpri) {
mmu_idx |= ARM_MMU_IDX_M_NEGPRI;
}
return mmu_idx;
}
+ARMMMUIdx arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate_and_priv(CPUARMState *env,
+ bool secstate, bool priv)
+{
+ bool negpri = armv7m_nvic_neg_prio_requested(env->nvic, secstate);
+
+ return arm_v7m_mmu_idx_all(env, secstate, priv, negpri);
+}
+
/* Return the MMU index for a v7M CPU in the specified security state */
ARMMMUIdx arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secstate)
{
flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32, SCTLR_B, arm_sctlr_b(env));
flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32, NS, !access_secure_reg(env));
if (env->vfp.xregs[ARM_VFP_FPEXC] & (1 << 30)
- || arm_el_is_aa64(env, 1)) {
+ || arm_el_is_aa64(env, 1) || arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32, VFPEN, 1);
}
- flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32, XSCALE_CPAR, env->cp15.c15_cpar);
+ /* Note that XSCALE_CPAR shares bits with VECSTRIDE */
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_XSCALE)) {
+ flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32,
+ XSCALE_CPAR, env->cp15.c15_cpar);
+ }
}
flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_ANY, MMUIDX, arm_to_core_mmu_idx(mmu_idx));
flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32, STACKCHECK, 1);
}
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) &&
+ FIELD_EX32(env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S], V7M_FPCCR, S) != env->v7m.secure) {
+ flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32, FPCCR_S_WRONG, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M) &&
+ (env->v7m.fpccr[env->v7m.secure] & R_V7M_FPCCR_ASPEN_MASK) &&
+ (!(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_FPCA_MASK) ||
+ (env->v7m.secure &&
+ !(env->v7m.control[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_CONTROL_SFPA_MASK)))) {
+ /*
+ * ASPEN is set, but FPCA/SFPA indicate that there is no active
+ * FP context; we must create a new FP context before executing
+ * any FP insn.
+ */
+ flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32, NEW_FP_CTXT_NEEDED, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
+ bool is_secure = env->v7m.fpccr[M_REG_S] & R_V7M_FPCCR_S_MASK;
+
+ if (env->v7m.fpccr[is_secure] & R_V7M_FPCCR_LSPACT_MASK) {
+ flags = FIELD_DP32(flags, TBFLAG_A32, LSPACT, 1);
+ }
+ }
+
*pflags = flags;
*cs_base = 0;
}
projects / thirdparty / qemu.git / blobdiff