X-Git-Url: http://git.ipfire.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=df613740a91a5bfd098924c0bd5b34970216840f;hb=0159a1bb41b385a00836e9e7baeadad2f014b788;hp=8cfdec686028a4b53c1d172508fdc0b6db96e47b;hpb=cf9143f945a67f3d540e2704fdbdf1bdc985233d;p=thirdparty%2Fopenssl.git

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 8cfdec6860..df613740a9 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -7,6 +7,52 @@
  https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
  release branch.
 
+ Changes between 1.0.2t and 1.0.2u [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+  *)
+
+ Changes between 1.0.2s and 1.0.2t [10 Sep 2019]
+
+   *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+      used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+      or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+      `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+      This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+      especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+      By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+      serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+      internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
+      [Nicola Tuveri]
+
+  *) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+     this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+     NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+     does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+     (CVE-2019-1547)
+     [Billy Bob Brumley]
+
+  *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+     An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+     second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+     recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+     encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+     decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+     used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+     As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+     key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+     certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+     The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+     CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+     (CVE-2019-1563)
+     [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+  *) Document issue with installation paths in diverse Windows builds
+
+     '/usr/local/ssl' is an unsafe prefix for location to install OpenSSL
+     binaries and run-time config file.
+     (CVE-2019-1552)
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
  Changes between 1.0.2r and 1.0.2s [28 May 2019]
 
   *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.