Mitigate DoS attacks that use client-initiated SSL/TLS renegotiation.
There is a well-known DoS attack using client-initiated SSL/TLS
renegotiation. The severety or uniqueness of this attack method
is disputed, but many believe it is serious/real.
There is even a (disputed) CVE 2011-1473:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-1473
The old Squid code tried to disable client-initiated renegotiation, but
it did not work reliably (or at all), depending on Squid version, due
to OpenSSL API changes and conflicting SslBump callbacks. That
code is now removed and client-initiated renegotiations are allowed.
With this change, Squid aborts the TLS connection, with a level-1 ERROR
message if the rate of client-initiated renegotiate requests exceeds
5 requests in 10 seconds (approximately). This protection and the rate
limit are currently hard-coded but the rate is not expected to be
exceeded under normal circumstances.