]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable.git/commit
bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size
authorAndrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
Wed, 27 Mar 2024 02:42:45 +0000 (22:42 -0400)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 10 Apr 2024 14:19:36 +0000 (16:19 +0200)
commit37dc1718dc0c4392dbfcb9adec22a776e745dd69
tree47c353e6d7162afa3c37a8ead180d1d218113505
parenta583117668ddb86e98f2e11c7caa3db0e6df52a3
bpf: Protect against int overflow for stack access size

[ Upstream commit ecc6a2101840177e57c925c102d2d29f260d37c8 ]

This patch re-introduces protection against the size of access to stack
memory being negative; the access size can appear negative as a result
of overflowing its signed int representation. This should not actually
happen, as there are other protections along the way, but we should
protect against it anyway. One code path was missing such protections
(fixed in the previous patch in the series), causing out-of-bounds array
accesses in check_stack_range_initialized(). This patch causes the
verification of a program with such a non-sensical access size to fail.

This check used to exist in a more indirect way, but was inadvertendly
removed in a833a17aeac7.

Fixes: a833a17aeac7 ("bpf: Fix verification of indirect var-off stack access")
Reported-by: syzbot+33f4297b5f927648741a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+aafd0513053a1cbf52ef@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQLORV5PT0iTAhRER+iLBTkByCYNBYyvBSgjN1T31K+gOw@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240327024245.318299-3-andreimatei1@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
kernel/bpf/verifier.c