* beh backend: Use execv() instead of system() - CVE-2023-24805
With execv() command line arguments are passed as separate strings and
not the full command line in a single string. This prevents arbitrary
command execution by escaping the quoting of the arguments in a job
with forged job title.
* beh backend: Extra checks against odd/forged input - CVE-2023-24805
- Do not allow '/' in the scheme of the URI (= backend executable
name), to assure that only backends inside /usr/lib/cups/backend/
are used.
- Pre-define scheme buffer to empty string, to be defined for case of
uri being NULL.
- URI must have ':', to split off scheme, otherwise error.
- Check return value of snprintf() to create call path for backend, to
error out on truncation of a too long scheme or on complete failure
due to a completely odd scheme.
* beh backend: Further improvements - CVE-2023-24805
- Use strncat() instead of strncpy() for getting scheme from URI, the latter
does not require setting terminating zero byte in case of truncation.
- Also exclude "." or ".." as scheme, as directories are not valid CUPS
backends.
- Do not use fprintf() in sigterm_handler(), to not interfere with a
fprintf() which could be running in the main process when
sigterm_handler() is triggered.
- Use "static volatile int" for global variable job_canceled.