upstream commit

switch auth2-pubkey.c to modern APIs; with & ok djm@

Upstream-ID: 8f08d4316eb1b0c4ffe4a206c05cdd45ed1daf07

diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
index 92ac20d908afa267e15a68fcafc66fecac2c99a7..eddf797fe9e6dc4d477af979312be1581fd5b8d8 100644 (file)
--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.27 2017/05/30 08:52:19 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.28 2017/05/30 14:10:53 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
        /* test for allowed key and correct signature */
        authenticated = 0;
        if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
-           PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-                       buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
+           PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+                       buffer_len(&b), 0)) == 0)
                authenticated = 1;
 
        buffer_free(&b);

diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 38940a6d958f0f4bc124ca3695b9bbb28c204bfa..a4a0911130978a8ccf3e8f84aa7881170f4661c4 100644 (file)
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.63 2017/05/30 08:52:19 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.64 2017/05/30 14:10:53 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "compat.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
@@ -77,40 +77,50 @@ extern u_int session_id2_len;
 static int
 userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
-       Buffer b;
+       struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+       struct sshbuf *b;
        struct sshkey *key = NULL;
-       char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL;
-       u_char *pkblob, *sig;
-       u_int alen, blen, slen;
-       int have_sig, pktype;
+       char *pkalg, *userstyle = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+       u_char *pkblob, *sig, have_sig;
+       size_t blen, slen;
+       int r, pktype;
        int authenticated = 0;
 
        if (!authctxt->valid) {
                debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
                return 0;
        }
-       have_sig = packet_get_char();
-       if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+       if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_u8 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+       if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
                debug2("%s: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH", __func__);
+               if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                       fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
                /* no explicit pkalg given */
-               pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
-               buffer_init(&b);
-               buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen);
                /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */
-               pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen);
-               buffer_free(&b);
+               /* XXX use sshbuf_from() */
+               if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+                   (r = sshbuf_put(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
+                   (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0)
+                       fatal("%s: failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+               sshbuf_free(b);
        } else {
-               pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen);
-               pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen);
+               if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+                   (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
+                       fatal("%s: sshpkt_get_cstring failed: %s",
+                           __func__, ssh_err(r));
        }
-       pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg);
+       pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
        if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
                /* this is perfectly legal */
                logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
                    __func__, pkalg);
                goto done;
        }
-       key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen);
+       if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+               error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+               goto done;
+       }
        if (key == NULL) {
                error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
                goto done;
@@ -120,15 +130,15 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
                    "(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
                goto done;
        }
-       if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
-           (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+       if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+           (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
                logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
                    "signature scheme");
                goto done;
        }
        fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
        if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
-               logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key));
+               logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
                goto done;
        }
        if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
@@ -141,54 +151,68 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
        if (have_sig) {
                debug3("%s: have signature for %s %s",
                    __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
-               sig = packet_get_string(&slen);
-               packet_check_eom();
-               buffer_init(&b);
-               if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
-                       buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+               if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
+                   (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+                       fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+               if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+                       fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+               if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+                       if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
+                           session_id2_len)) != 0)
+                               fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s",
+                                   __func__, ssh_err(r));
                } else {
-                       buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+                       if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
+                           session_id2_len)) != 0)
+                               fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
+                                   __func__, ssh_err(r));
                }
                /* reconstruct packet */
-               buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
                xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
                    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
                    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-               buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
-               free(userstyle);
-               buffer_put_cstring(&b,
-                   datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
-                   "ssh-userauth" :
-                   authctxt->service);
-               if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
-                       buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
+               if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+                   (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
+                   (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ?
+                   "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service)) != 0)
+                       fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
+                           __func__, ssh_err(r));
+               if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+                       if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0)
+                               fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
+                                   __func__, ssh_err(r));
                } else {
-                       buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
-                       buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig);
-                       buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+                       if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg) != 0))
+                               fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
+                                   __func__, ssh_err(r));
                }
-               buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+               if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+                       fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
+                           __func__, ssh_err(r));
 #ifdef DEBUG_PK
-               buffer_dump(&b);
+               sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
 #endif
                pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
 
                /* test for correct signature */
                authenticated = 0;
                if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
-                   PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-                   buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+                   PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b),
+                   sshbuf_len(b), ssh->compat)) == 0) {
                        authenticated = 1;
                        /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
                        auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
                        key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
                }
-               buffer_free(&b);
+               sshbuf_free(b);
                free(sig);
        } else {
                debug("%s: test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable for %s %s",
                    __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp);
-               packet_check_eom();
+               if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+                       fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 
                /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
                /*
@@ -199,11 +223,13 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
                 * issue? -markus
                 */
                if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) {
-                       packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
-                       packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
-                       packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
-                       packet_send();
-                       packet_write_wait();
+                       if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
+                           != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
+                           (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+                               fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+                       ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh);
                        authctxt->postponed = 1;
                }
        }
@@ -212,7 +238,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
 done:
        debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
        if (key != NULL)
-               key_free(key);
+               sshkey_free(key);
+       free(userstyle);
        free(pkalg);
        free(pkblob);
        free(fp);
@@ -233,23 +260,23 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key,
                i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
                va_end(ap);
                if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
-                       fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);        
+                       fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
        }
 
-       if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+       if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
                fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
                    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
                auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", 
-                   key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
+                   sshkey_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
                    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-                   key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+                   sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
                    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
                    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
                free(fp);
        } else {
                fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
                    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
-               auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
+               auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key),
                    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
                    extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
                free(fp);
@@ -762,16 +789,13 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key)
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 static int
-check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw)
+check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct passwd *pw)
 {
        char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
        int found_key = 0;
        u_long linenum = 0;
-       struct sshkey *found;
-
-       found_key = 0;
+       struct sshkey *found = NULL;
 
-       found = NULL;
        while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
                char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
                const char *reason = NULL;
@@ -780,8 +804,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw)
                if (found_key)
                        continue;
                if (found != NULL)
-                       key_free(found);
-               found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
+                       sshkey_free(found);
+               found = sshkey_new(sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
+               if (found == NULL)
+                       goto done;
                auth_clear_options();
 
                /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
@@ -790,7 +816,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw)
                if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
                        continue;
 
-               if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+               if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
                        /* no key?  check if there are options for this key */
                        int quoted = 0;
                        debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
@@ -804,14 +830,14 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw)
                        /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
                        for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
                                ;
-                       if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+                       if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
                                debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
                                /* still no key?  advance to next line*/
                                continue;
                        }
                }
-               if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-                       if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
+               if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+                       if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
                                continue;
                        if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
                            linenum) != 1)
@@ -822,7 +848,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw)
                            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                                continue;
                        debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
-                           file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+                           file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp);
                        /*
                         * If the user has specified a list of principals as
                         * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
@@ -839,7 +865,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw)
                                auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
                                continue;
                        }
-                       if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
+                       if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
                            authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
                            &reason) != 0)
                                goto fail_reason;
@@ -848,11 +874,11 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw)
                        verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
                            "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
                            (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-                           key_type(found), fp, file);
+                           sshkey_type(found), fp, file);
                        free(fp);
                        found_key = 1;
                        break;
-               } else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
+               } else if (sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
                        if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
                            linenum) != 1)
                                continue;
@@ -862,14 +888,15 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, struct sshkey* key, struct passwd *pw)
                            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                                continue;
                        debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
-                           file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
+                           file, linenum, sshkey_type(found), fp);
                        free(fp);
                        found_key = 1;
                        continue;
                }
        }
+ done:
        if (found != NULL)
-               key_free(found);
+               sshkey_free(found);
        if (!found_key)
                debug2("key not found");
        return found_key;
@@ -881,20 +908,20 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
 {
        char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
        const char *reason;
-       int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
+       int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
 
-       if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
+       if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
                return 0;
 
        if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
            options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
                return 0;
 
-       if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
-           options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) {
-               debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
-                   key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
-                   options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+       if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
+           options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) {
+               debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__,
+                   sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+                   options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r));
                goto out;
        }
        /*
@@ -919,7 +946,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
                auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
                goto out;
        }
-       if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
+       if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
            use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
                goto fail_reason;
        if (auth_cert_options(key, pw, &reason) != 0)
@@ -928,7 +955,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key)
        verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
            "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
            (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-           key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+           sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
            options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
        ret = 1;
 
@@ -1096,7 +1123,8 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, int auth_attempt)
 
        if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
                return 0;
-       if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
+       if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+           auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
                return 0;
 
        success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key);

diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index cd4089398a410f48251e226f8db7e706630f8f1d..2dee9721de380a42dd5cc574b07989e6878d85ac 100644 (file)
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.168 2017/05/30 08:52:19 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.169 2017/05/30 14:10:53 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -1330,25 +1330,25 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
 }
 
 int
-mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 {
        struct sshkey *key;
        u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
-       u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
-       int verified = 0;
-       int valid_data = 0;
+       size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+       int r, ret, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;
 
-       blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
-       signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
-       data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+       if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
+           (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 
        if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
          !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
                fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
 
-       key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-       if (key == NULL)
-               fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
+       /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
+       if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 
        switch (key_blobtype) {
        case MM_USERKEY:
@@ -1365,15 +1365,16 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
        if (!valid_data)
                fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
 
-       verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+       ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
+           active_state->compat);
        debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
-           __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+           __func__, key, (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified");
 
        /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
-       if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
+       if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
                auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
        else
-               key_free(key);
+               sshkey_free(key);
 
        free(blob);
        free(signature);
@@ -1383,11 +1384,15 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
 
        monitor_reset_key_state();
 
-       buffer_clear(m);
-       buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+       sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+       /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
+       encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
+       if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0)
+               fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
        mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
 
-       return (verified == 1);
+       return ret == 0;
 }
 
 static void

diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 0710a10b0e3ed28c9b4c17c5239bd70bf6d24a4a..25f3e9678b78d4cecb9ad2a6958ebf1282b523cc 100644 (file)
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.91 2017/05/30 08:52:19 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.92 2017/05/30 14:10:53 markus Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -436,13 +436,13 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
  */
 
 int
-mm_key_verify(struct sshkey *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data,
-    u_int datalen)
+mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
        Buffer m;
        u_char *blob;
        u_int len;
-       int verified = 0;
+       u_int encoded_ret = 0;
 
        debug3("%s entering", __func__);
 
@@ -461,11 +461,13 @@ mm_key_verify(struct sshkey *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data,
        debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
        mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m);
 
-       verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
+       encoded_ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
 
        buffer_free(&m);
 
-       return (verified);
+       if (encoded_ret != 0)
+               return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+       return 0;
 }
 
 void

diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index a1552d0c9be227b971f2c7a3ce9469662ecbda54..958cdbc9235425fef9a335a73f62fce433b09271 100644 (file)
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.33 2017/05/30 08:52:19 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.34 2017/05/30 14:10:53 markus Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *,
 int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int);
 int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
     const char *, struct sshkey *);
-int mm_key_verify(struct sshkey *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+    const u_char *, size_t, u_int);
 
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);