#include "includes.h"
#include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
+#include "kdc/db-glue.h"
#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
+#include "sdb.h"
+#include "sdb_hdb.h"
/*
* Given the right private pointer from hdb_samba4,
return samba_wdc_get_pac(priv, context, client, NULL, pac);
}
-/* Resign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
-
-static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_reget_pac(void *priv, krb5_context context,
- const krb5_principal client_principal,
- const krb5_principal delegated_proxy_principal,
- struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
- struct hdb_entry_ex *server,
- struct hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
- krb5_pac *pac)
+static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_reget_pac2(krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_principal delegated_proxy_principal,
+ struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
+ struct hdb_entry_ex *server,
+ struct hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
+ krb5_pac *pac,
+ krb5_cksumtype ctype)
{
struct samba_kdc_entry *p =
talloc_get_type_abort(server->ctx,
struct samba_kdc_entry *krbtgt_skdc_entry =
talloc_get_type_abort(krbtgt->ctx,
struct samba_kdc_entry);
- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(p, 0, "samba_kdc_reget_pac context");
+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(p, 0, "samba_kdc_reget_pac2 context");
krb5_pac new_pac = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *pac_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *upn_blob = NULL;
DATA_BLOB *deleg_blob = NULL;
krb5_error_code ret;
NTSTATUS nt_status;
- struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig;
- struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig;
bool is_in_db, is_untrusted;
size_t num_types = 0;
uint32_t *types = NULL;
ssize_t upn_dns_info_idx = -1;
ssize_t srv_checksum_idx = -1;
ssize_t kdc_checksum_idx = -1;
+ ssize_t tkt_checksum_idx = -1;
if (!mem_ctx) {
return ENOMEM;
return ret;
}
+ if (delegated_proxy_principal != NULL) {
+ krb5_enctype etype;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+
+ if (!is_in_db) {
+ /*
+ * The RODC-issued PAC was signed by a KDC entry that we
+ * don't have a key for. The server signature is not
+ * trustworthy, since it could have been created by the
+ * server we got the ticket from. We must not proceed as
+ * otherwise the ticket signature is unchecked.
+ */
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
+ }
+
+ /* Fetch the correct key depending on the checksum type. */
+ if (ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5) {
+ etype = ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC;
+ } else {
+ ret = krb5_cksumtype_to_enctype(context,
+ ctype,
+ &etype);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &krbtgt->entry, etype, &key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the KDC and ticket signatures. */
+ ret = krb5_pac_verify(context,
+ *pac,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ &key->key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("PAC KDC signature failed to verify\n"));
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ deleg_blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
+ if (!deleg_blob) {
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ nt_status = samba_kdc_update_delegation_info_blob(mem_ctx,
+ context, *pac,
+ server->entry.principal,
+ delegated_proxy_principal,
+ deleg_blob);
+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+ DEBUG(0, ("Building PAC failed: %s\n",
+ nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
if (is_untrusted) {
struct samba_kdc_entry *client_skdc_entry = NULL;
return ENOMEM;
}
- pac_srv_sig = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
- if (!pac_srv_sig) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- pac_kdc_sig = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA);
- if (!pac_kdc_sig) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
nt_status = samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(mem_ctx, context,
krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
*pac, pac_blob,
- pac_srv_sig, pac_kdc_sig);
- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
- DEBUG(0, ("Building PAC failed: %s\n",
- nt_errstr(nt_status)));
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (is_in_db) {
- /* Now check the KDC signature, fetching the correct key based on the enc type */
- ret = kdc_check_pac(context, pac_srv_sig->signature, pac_kdc_sig, krbtgt);
- if (ret != 0) {
- DEBUG(1, ("PAC KDC signature failed to verify\n"));
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ret;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (delegated_proxy_principal) {
- deleg_blob = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB);
- if (!deleg_blob) {
- talloc_free(mem_ctx);
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- nt_status = samba_kdc_update_delegation_info_blob(mem_ctx,
- context, *pac,
- server->entry.principal,
- delegated_proxy_principal,
- deleg_blob);
+ NULL, NULL);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("Building PAC failed: %s\n",
nt_errstr(nt_status)));
}
kdc_checksum_idx = i;
break;
+ case PAC_TYPE_TICKET_CHECKSUM:
+ if (tkt_checksum_idx != -1) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("ticket checksum type[%"PRIu32"] twice [%zd] and [%zu]: \n",
+ types[i],
+ tkt_checksum_idx,
+ i));
+ SAFE_FREE(types);
+ talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+ tkt_checksum_idx = i;
+ break;
default:
continue;
}
return ret;
}
+/* Resign (and reform, including possibly new groups) a PAC */
+
+static krb5_error_code samba_wdc_reget_pac(void *priv, krb5_context context,
+ const krb5_principal client_principal,
+ const krb5_principal delegated_proxy_principal,
+ struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
+ struct hdb_entry_ex *server,
+ struct hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
+ krb5_pac *pac)
+{
+ struct samba_kdc_entry *krbtgt_skdc_entry =
+ talloc_get_type_abort(krbtgt->ctx,
+ struct samba_kdc_entry);
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ krb5_cksumtype ctype = CKSUMTYPE_NONE;
+ struct hdb_entry_ex signing_krbtgt_hdb;
+
+ if (delegated_proxy_principal) {
+ uint16_t rodc_id;
+ unsigned int my_krbtgt_number;
+
+ /*
+ * We're using delegated_proxy_principal for the moment to
+ * indicate cases where the ticket was encrypted with the server
+ * key, and not a krbtgt key. This cannot be trusted, so we need
+ * to find a krbtgt key that signs the PAC in order to trust the
+ * ticket.
+ *
+ * The krbtgt passed in to this function refers to the krbtgt
+ * used to decrypt the ticket of the server requesting
+ * S4U2Proxy.
+ *
+ * When we implement service ticket renewal, we need to check
+ * the PAC, and this will need to be updated.
+ */
+ ret = krb5_pac_get_kdc_checksum_info(context,
+ *pac,
+ &ctype,
+ &rodc_id);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to get PAC checksum info\n"));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to check the KDC and ticket signatures, fetching the
+ * correct key based on the enctype.
+ */
+
+ my_krbtgt_number = krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
+
+ if (my_krbtgt_number != 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we are an RODC, and we are not the KDC that signed
+ * the evidence ticket, then we need to proxy the
+ * request.
+ */
+ if (rodc_id != my_krbtgt_number) {
+ return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we are a DC, the ticket may have been signed by a
+ * different KDC than the one that issued the header
+ * ticket.
+ */
+ if (rodc_id != krbtgt->entry.kvno >> 16) {
+ struct sdb_entry_ex signing_krbtgt_sdb;
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't sign the ticket, then return an
+ * error.
+ */
+ if (rodc_id != 0) {
+ return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fetch our key from the database. To support
+ * key rollover, we're going to need to try
+ * multiple keys by trial and error. For now,
+ * krbtgt keys aren't assumed to change.
+ */
+ ret = samba_kdc_fetch(context,
+ krbtgt_skdc_entry->kdc_db_ctx,
+ krbtgt->entry.principal,
+ SDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | SDB_F_CANON,
+ 0,
+ &signing_krbtgt_sdb);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = sdb_entry_ex_to_hdb_entry_ex(context,
+ &signing_krbtgt_sdb,
+ &signing_krbtgt_hdb);
+ sdb_free_entry(&signing_krbtgt_sdb);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Replace the krbtgt entry with our own entry
+ * for further processing.
+ */
+ krbtgt = &signing_krbtgt_hdb;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = samba_wdc_reget_pac2(context,
+ delegated_proxy_principal,
+ client,
+ server,
+ krbtgt,
+ pac,
+ ctype);
+
+ if (krbtgt == &signing_krbtgt_hdb) {
+ hdb_free_entry(context, &signing_krbtgt_hdb);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static char *get_netbios_name(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, HostAddresses *addrs)
{
char *nb_name = NULL;
projects / thirdparty / samba.git / commitdiff
