this->fragments = NULL;
}
+/**
+ * Reduce the fragment length but ensure it stays > 0
+ */
+#define REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(fl, amount) ({ \
+ fl = max(1, (ssize_t)fl - (amount)); \
+})
+
METHOD(message_t, fragment, status_t,
private_message_t *this, keymat_t *keymat, size_t frag_len,
enumerator_t **fragments)
}
/* frag_len is the complete IP datagram length, account for overhead (we
* assume no IP options/extension headers are used) */
- frag_len -= (src->get_family(src) == AF_INET) ? 20 : 40;
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, (src->get_family(src) == AF_INET) ? 20 : 40);
/* 8 (UDP header) */
- frag_len -= 8;
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, 8);
if (dst->get_port(dst) != IKEV2_UDP_PORT &&
src->get_port(src) != IKEV2_UDP_PORT)
{ /* reduce length due to non-ESP marker */
- frag_len -= 4;
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, 4);
}
if (is_encoded(this))
/* frag_len denoted the maximum IKE message size so far, later on it will
* denote the maximum content size of a fragment payload, therefore,
* account for IKE header */
- frag_len -= 28;
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, 28);
if (this->major_version == IKEV1_MAJOR_VERSION)
{
generator = NULL;
}
/* overhead for the fragmentation payload header */
- frag_len -= 8;
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, 8);
}
else
{
}
aead = keymat->get_aead(keymat, FALSE);
/* overhead for the encrypted fragment payload */
- frag_len -= aead->get_iv_size(aead) + aead->get_icv_size(aead);
- frag_len -= 8 /* header */;
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, aead->get_iv_size(aead));
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, aead->get_icv_size(aead));
+ /* header */
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, 8);
/* padding and padding length */
- frag_len = round_down(frag_len, aead->get_block_size(aead)) - 1;
+ frag_len = round_down(frag_len, aead->get_block_size(aead));
+ REDUCE_FRAG_LEN(frag_len, 1);
/* TODO-FRAG: if there are unencrypted payloads, should we account for
* their length in the first fragment? we still would have to add
* an encrypted fragment payload (albeit empty), even so we couldn't