--- /dev/null
+From 1598ecda7b239e9232dda032bfddeed9d89fab6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 20:47:07 +0100
+Subject: arm64: kaslr: ensure randomized quantities are clean to the PoC
+
+From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+
+commit 1598ecda7b239e9232dda032bfddeed9d89fab6c upstream.
+
+kaslr_early_init() is called with the kernel mapped at its
+link time offset, and if it returns with a non-zero offset,
+the kernel is unmapped and remapped again at the randomized
+offset.
+
+During its execution, kaslr_early_init() also randomizes the
+base of the module region and of the linear mapping of DRAM,
+and sets two variables accordingly. However, since these
+variables are assigned with the caches on, they may get lost
+during the cache maintenance that occurs when unmapping and
+remapping the kernel, so ensure that these values are cleaned
+to the PoC.
+
+Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
+Fixes: f80fb3a3d508 ("arm64: add support for kernel ASLR")
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+
+Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+
++#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+ #include <asm/fixmap.h>
+ #include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/memory.h>
+@@ -43,7 +44,7 @@ static __init u64 get_kaslr_seed(void *f
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+-static __init const u8 *get_cmdline(void *fdt)
++static __init const u8 *kaslr_get_cmdline(void *fdt)
+ {
+ static __initconst const u8 default_cmdline[] = CONFIG_CMDLINE;
+
+@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys,
+ * Check if 'nokaslr' appears on the command line, and
+ * return 0 if that is the case.
+ */
+- cmdline = get_cmdline(fdt);
++ cmdline = kaslr_get_cmdline(fdt);
+ str = strstr(cmdline, "nokaslr");
+ if (str == cmdline || (str > cmdline && *(str - 1) == ' '))
+ return 0;
+@@ -178,5 +179,8 @@ u64 __init kaslr_early_init(u64 dt_phys,
+ module_alloc_base += (module_range * (seed & ((1 << 21) - 1))) >> 21;
+ module_alloc_base &= PAGE_MASK;
+
++ __flush_dcache_area(&module_alloc_base, sizeof(module_alloc_base));
++ __flush_dcache_area(&memstart_offset_seed, sizeof(memstart_offset_seed));
++
+ return offset;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 310ca162d779efee8a2dc3731439680f3e9c1e86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 14:01:02 +0100
+Subject: block/loop: Use global lock for ioctl() operation.
+
+From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+
+commit 310ca162d779efee8a2dc3731439680f3e9c1e86 upstream.
+
+syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference [1] which is caused by
+race condition between ioctl(loop_fd, LOOP_CLR_FD, 0) versus
+ioctl(other_loop_fd, LOOP_SET_FD, loop_fd) due to traversing other
+loop devices at loop_validate_file() without holding corresponding
+lo->lo_ctl_mutex locks.
+
+Since ioctl() request on loop devices is not frequent operation, we don't
+need fine grained locking. Let's use global lock in order to allow safe
+traversal at loop_validate_file().
+
+Note that syzbot is also reporting circular locking dependency between
+bdev->bd_mutex and lo->lo_ctl_mutex [2] which is caused by calling
+blkdev_reread_part() with lock held. This patch does not address it.
+
+[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f3cfe26e785d85f9ee259f385515291d21bd80a3
+[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=bf154052f0eea4bc7712499e4569505907d15889
+
+Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+bf89c128e05dd6c62523@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/block/loop.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ drivers/block/loop.h | 1 -
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
++++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
+
+ static DEFINE_IDR(loop_index_idr);
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_index_mutex);
++static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_ctl_mutex);
+
+ static int max_part;
+ static int part_shift;
+@@ -1033,7 +1034,7 @@ static int loop_clr_fd(struct loop_devic
+ */
+ if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 1) {
+ lo->lo_flags |= LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR;
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -1082,12 +1083,12 @@ static int loop_clr_fd(struct loop_devic
+ if (!part_shift)
+ lo->lo_disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN;
+ loop_unprepare_queue(lo);
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ /*
+- * Need not hold lo_ctl_mutex to fput backing file.
+- * Calling fput holding lo_ctl_mutex triggers a circular
++ * Need not hold loop_ctl_mutex to fput backing file.
++ * Calling fput holding loop_ctl_mutex triggers a circular
+ * lock dependency possibility warning as fput can take
+- * bd_mutex which is usually taken before lo_ctl_mutex.
++ * bd_mutex which is usually taken before loop_ctl_mutex.
+ */
+ fput(filp);
+ return 0;
+@@ -1350,7 +1351,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
+ struct loop_device *lo = bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
+ int err;
+
+- mutex_lock_nested(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex, 1);
++ mutex_lock_nested(&loop_ctl_mutex, 1);
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case LOOP_SET_FD:
+ err = loop_set_fd(lo, mode, bdev, arg);
+@@ -1359,7 +1360,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
+ err = loop_change_fd(lo, bdev, arg);
+ break;
+ case LOOP_CLR_FD:
+- /* loop_clr_fd would have unlocked lo_ctl_mutex on success */
++ /* loop_clr_fd would have unlocked loop_ctl_mutex on success */
+ err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
+ if (!err)
+ goto out_unlocked;
+@@ -1395,7 +1396,7 @@ static int lo_ioctl(struct block_device
+ default:
+ err = lo->ioctl ? lo->ioctl(lo, cmd, arg) : -EINVAL;
+ }
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+
+ out_unlocked:
+ return err;
+@@ -1528,16 +1529,16 @@ static int lo_compat_ioctl(struct block_
+
+ switch(cmd) {
+ case LOOP_SET_STATUS:
+- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ err = loop_set_status_compat(
+ lo, (const struct compat_loop_info __user *) arg);
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ break;
+ case LOOP_GET_STATUS:
+- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ err = loop_get_status_compat(
+ lo, (struct compat_loop_info __user *) arg);
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ break;
+ case LOOP_SET_CAPACITY:
+ case LOOP_CLR_FD:
+@@ -1581,7 +1582,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
+ if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
+ return;
+
+- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
+ /*
+ * In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
+@@ -1598,7 +1599,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
+ loop_flush(lo);
+ }
+
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ }
+
+ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
+@@ -1644,10 +1645,10 @@ static int unregister_transfer_cb(int id
+ struct loop_device *lo = ptr;
+ struct loop_func_table *xfer = data;
+
+- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (lo->lo_encryption == xfer)
+ loop_release_xfer(lo);
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -1813,7 +1814,6 @@ static int loop_add(struct loop_device *
+ if (!part_shift)
+ disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN;
+ disk->flags |= GENHD_FL_EXT_DEVT;
+- mutex_init(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
+ atomic_set(&lo->lo_refcnt, 0);
+ lo->lo_number = i;
+ spin_lock_init(&lo->lo_lock);
+@@ -1926,19 +1926,19 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
+ ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ break;
+- mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 0) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ break;
+ }
+ lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
+- mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ idr_remove(&loop_index_idr, lo->lo_number);
+ loop_remove(lo);
+ break;
+--- a/drivers/block/loop.h
++++ b/drivers/block/loop.h
+@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ struct loop_device {
+
+ spinlock_t lo_lock;
+ int lo_state;
+- struct mutex lo_ctl_mutex;
+ struct kthread_worker worker;
+ struct task_struct *worker_task;
+ bool use_dio;
--- /dev/null
+From 04906b2f542c23626b0ef6219b808406f8dddbe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 09:48:10 +0100
+Subject: blockdev: Fix livelocks on loop device
+
+From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+
+commit 04906b2f542c23626b0ef6219b808406f8dddbe9 upstream.
+
+bd_set_size() updates also block device's block size. This is somewhat
+unexpected from its name and at this point, only blkdev_open() uses this
+functionality. Furthermore, this can result in changing block size under
+a filesystem mounted on a loop device which leads to livelocks inside
+__getblk_gfp() like:
+
+Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
+NMI backtrace for cpu 1
+CPU: 1 PID: 10863 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc5+ #151
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google
+01/01/2011
+RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x3f/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:106
+...
+Call Trace:
+ init_page_buffers+0x3e2/0x530 fs/buffer.c:904
+ grow_dev_page fs/buffer.c:947 [inline]
+ grow_buffers fs/buffer.c:1009 [inline]
+ __getblk_slow fs/buffer.c:1036 [inline]
+ __getblk_gfp+0x906/0xb10 fs/buffer.c:1313
+ __bread_gfp+0x2d/0x310 fs/buffer.c:1347
+ sb_bread include/linux/buffer_head.h:307 [inline]
+ fat12_ent_bread+0x14e/0x3d0 fs/fat/fatent.c:75
+ fat_ent_read_block fs/fat/fatent.c:441 [inline]
+ fat_alloc_clusters+0x8ce/0x16e0 fs/fat/fatent.c:489
+ fat_add_cluster+0x7a/0x150 fs/fat/inode.c:101
+ __fat_get_block fs/fat/inode.c:148 [inline]
+...
+
+Trivial reproducer for the problem looks like:
+
+truncate -s 1G /tmp/image
+losetup /dev/loop0 /tmp/image
+mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 /dev/loop0
+mount -t ext4 /dev/loop0 /mnt
+losetup -c /dev/loop0
+l /mnt
+
+Fix the problem by moving initialization of a block device block size
+into a separate function and call it when needed.
+
+Thanks to Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> for help with
+debugging the problem.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+9933e4476f365f5d5a1b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/block_dev.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/block_dev.c
++++ b/fs/block_dev.c
+@@ -114,6 +114,20 @@ void invalidate_bdev(struct block_device
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(invalidate_bdev);
+
++static void set_init_blocksize(struct block_device *bdev)
++{
++ unsigned bsize = bdev_logical_block_size(bdev);
++ loff_t size = i_size_read(bdev->bd_inode);
++
++ while (bsize < PAGE_SIZE) {
++ if (size & bsize)
++ break;
++ bsize <<= 1;
++ }
++ bdev->bd_block_size = bsize;
++ bdev->bd_inode->i_blkbits = blksize_bits(bsize);
++}
++
+ int set_blocksize(struct block_device *bdev, int size)
+ {
+ /* Size must be a power of two, and between 512 and PAGE_SIZE */
+@@ -1209,18 +1223,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_disk_change);
+
+ void bd_set_size(struct block_device *bdev, loff_t size)
+ {
+- unsigned bsize = bdev_logical_block_size(bdev);
+-
+ inode_lock(bdev->bd_inode);
+ i_size_write(bdev->bd_inode, size);
+ inode_unlock(bdev->bd_inode);
+- while (bsize < PAGE_SIZE) {
+- if (size & bsize)
+- break;
+- bsize <<= 1;
+- }
+- bdev->bd_block_size = bsize;
+- bdev->bd_inode->i_blkbits = blksize_bits(bsize);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(bd_set_size);
+
+@@ -1297,8 +1302,10 @@ static int __blkdev_get(struct block_dev
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (!ret)
++ if (!ret) {
+ bd_set_size(bdev,(loff_t)get_capacity(disk)<<9);
++ set_init_blocksize(bdev);
++ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the device is invalidated, rescan partition
+@@ -1333,6 +1340,7 @@ static int __blkdev_get(struct block_dev
+ goto out_clear;
+ }
+ bd_set_size(bdev, (loff_t)bdev->bd_part->nr_sects << 9);
++ set_init_blocksize(bdev);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (bdev->bd_contains == bdev) {
--- /dev/null
+From a214720cbf50cd8c3f76bbb9c3f5c283910e9d33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: YunQiang Su <ysu@wavecomp.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Jan 2019 13:45:10 +0800
+Subject: Disable MSI also when pcie-octeon.pcie_disable on
+
+From: YunQiang Su <ysu@wavecomp.com>
+
+commit a214720cbf50cd8c3f76bbb9c3f5c283910e9d33 upstream.
+
+Octeon has an boot-time option to disable pcie.
+
+Since MSI depends on PCI-E, we should also disable MSI also with
+this option is on in order to avoid inadvertently accessing PCIe
+registers.
+
+Signed-off-by: YunQiang Su <ysu@wavecomp.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
+Cc: pburton@wavecomp.com
+Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: aaro.koskinen@iki.fi
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.3+
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c
++++ b/arch/mips/pci/msi-octeon.c
+@@ -369,7 +369,9 @@ int __init octeon_msi_initialize(void)
+ int irq;
+ struct irq_chip *msi;
+
+- if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_PCIE) {
++ if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_INVALID) {
++ return 0;
++ } else if (octeon_dma_bar_type == OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_PCIE) {
+ msi_rcv_reg[0] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV0;
+ msi_rcv_reg[1] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV1;
+ msi_rcv_reg[2] = CVMX_PEXP_NPEI_MSI_RCV2;
--- /dev/null
+From 628bd85947091830a8c4872adfd5ed1d515a9cf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 08:42:14 -0700
+Subject: loop: Fix double mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex) in loop_control_ioctl()
+
+From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+
+commit 628bd85947091830a8c4872adfd5ed1d515a9cf2 upstream.
+
+Commit 0a42e99b58a20883 ("loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex") forgot to
+remove mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex) from loop_control_ioctl() when
+replacing loop_index_mutex with loop_ctl_mutex.
+
+Fixes: 0a42e99b58a20883 ("loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex")
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+c0138741c2290fc5e63f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/block/loop.c | 2 --
+ 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
++++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
+@@ -1929,12 +1929,10 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
+ break;
+ if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (atomic_read(&lo->lo_refcnt) > 0) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ break;
+ }
+ lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
--- /dev/null
+From 967d1dc144b50ad005e5eecdfadfbcfb399ffff6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 14:01:03 +0100
+Subject: loop: Fold __loop_release into loop_release
+
+From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+
+commit 967d1dc144b50ad005e5eecdfadfbcfb399ffff6 upstream.
+
+__loop_release() has a single call site. Fold it there. This is
+currently not a huge win but it will make following replacement of
+loop_index_mutex more obvious.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/block/loop.c | 16 +++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
++++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
+@@ -1575,12 +1575,15 @@ out:
+ return err;
+ }
+
+-static void __lo_release(struct loop_device *lo)
++static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
+ {
++ struct loop_device *lo;
+ int err;
+
++ mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ lo = disk->private_data;
+ if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
+- return;
++ goto unlock_index;
+
+ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
+@@ -1590,7 +1593,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
+ */
+ err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
+ if (!err)
+- return;
++ goto unlock_index;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
+@@ -1600,12 +1603,7 @@ static void __lo_release(struct loop_dev
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+-}
+-
+-static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
+-{
+- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
+- __lo_release(disk->private_data);
++unlock_index:
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 0a42e99b58a208839626465af194cfe640ef9493 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 14:01:04 +0100
+Subject: loop: Get rid of loop_index_mutex
+
+From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+
+commit 0a42e99b58a208839626465af194cfe640ef9493 upstream.
+
+Now that loop_ctl_mutex is global, just get rid of loop_index_mutex as
+there is no good reason to keep these two separate and it just
+complicates the locking.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/block/loop.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/block/loop.c
++++ b/drivers/block/loop.c
+@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+ static DEFINE_IDR(loop_index_idr);
+-static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_index_mutex);
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(loop_ctl_mutex);
+
+ static int max_part;
+@@ -1560,9 +1559,11 @@ static int lo_compat_ioctl(struct block_
+ static int lo_open(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode)
+ {
+ struct loop_device *lo;
+- int err = 0;
++ int err;
+
+- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ err = mutex_lock_killable(&loop_ctl_mutex);
++ if (err)
++ return err;
+ lo = bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
+ if (!lo) {
+ err = -ENXIO;
+@@ -1571,7 +1572,7 @@ static int lo_open(struct block_device *
+
+ atomic_inc(&lo->lo_refcnt);
+ out:
+- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+@@ -1580,12 +1581,11 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
+ struct loop_device *lo;
+ int err;
+
+- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ lo = disk->private_data;
+ if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
+- goto unlock_index;
++ goto out_unlock;
+
+- mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
+ /*
+ * In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
+@@ -1593,7 +1593,7 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
+ */
+ err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
+ if (!err)
+- goto unlock_index;
++ return;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
+@@ -1602,9 +1602,8 @@ static void lo_release(struct gendisk *d
+ loop_flush(lo);
+ }
+
++out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+-unlock_index:
+- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
+ }
+
+ static const struct block_device_operations lo_fops = {
+@@ -1890,7 +1889,7 @@ static struct kobject *loop_probe(dev_t
+ struct kobject *kobj;
+ int err;
+
+- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ err = loop_lookup(&lo, MINOR(dev) >> part_shift);
+ if (err < 0)
+ err = loop_add(&lo, MINOR(dev) >> part_shift);
+@@ -1898,7 +1897,7 @@ static struct kobject *loop_probe(dev_t
+ kobj = NULL;
+ else
+ kobj = get_disk(lo->lo_disk);
+- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+
+ *part = 0;
+ return kobj;
+@@ -1908,9 +1907,13 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
+ unsigned long parm)
+ {
+ struct loop_device *lo;
+- int ret = -ENOSYS;
++ int ret;
++
++ ret = mutex_lock_killable(&loop_ctl_mutex);
++ if (ret)
++ return ret;
+
+- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ ret = -ENOSYS;
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case LOOP_CTL_ADD:
+ ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
+@@ -1924,7 +1927,6 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
+ ret = loop_lookup(&lo, parm);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ break;
+- mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ if (lo->lo_state != Lo_unbound) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+@@ -1936,7 +1938,6 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
+ break;
+ }
+ lo->lo_disk->private_data = NULL;
+- mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ idr_remove(&loop_index_idr, lo->lo_number);
+ loop_remove(lo);
+ break;
+@@ -1946,7 +1947,7 @@ static long loop_control_ioctl(struct fi
+ break;
+ ret = loop_add(&lo, -1);
+ }
+- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+@@ -2029,10 +2030,10 @@ static int __init loop_init(void)
+ THIS_MODULE, loop_probe, NULL, NULL);
+
+ /* pre-create number of devices given by config or max_loop */
+- mutex_lock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+ for (i = 0; i < nr; i++)
+ loop_add(&lo, i);
+- mutex_unlock(&loop_index_mutex);
++ mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "loop: module loaded\n");
+ return 0;
--- /dev/null
+From a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2019 15:41:11 -0800
+Subject: LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on free
+
+From: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
+
+commit a5795fd38ee8194451ba3f281f075301a3696ce2 upstream.
+
+From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+
+Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying
+to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization
+that could result in this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/security.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/security/security.c
++++ b/security/security.c
+@@ -904,6 +904,13 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cre
+
+ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+ {
++ /*
++ * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
++ * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
++ */
++ if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
++ return;
++
+ call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From cd26d1c4d1bc947b56ae404998ae2276df7b39b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
+Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 09:06:46 -0500
+Subject: media: vb2: vb2_mmap: move lock up
+
+From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
+
+commit cd26d1c4d1bc947b56ae404998ae2276df7b39b7 upstream.
+
+If a filehandle is dup()ped, then it is possible to close it from one fd
+and call mmap from the other. This creates a race condition in vb2_mmap
+where it is using queue data that __vb2_queue_free (called from close())
+is in the process of releasing.
+
+By moving up the mutex_lock(mmap_lock) in vb2_mmap this race is avoided
+since __vb2_queue_free is called with the same mutex locked. So vb2_mmap
+now reads consistent buffer data.
+
+Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
+Reported-by: syzbot+be93025dd45dccd8923c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hansverk@cisco.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c | 11 ++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c
++++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/videobuf2-core.c
+@@ -1916,9 +1916,13 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
++
++ mutex_lock(&q->mmap_lock);
++
+ if (vb2_fileio_is_active(q)) {
+ dprintk(1, "mmap: file io in progress\n");
+- return -EBUSY;
++ ret = -EBUSY;
++ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -1926,7 +1930,7 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
+ */
+ ret = __find_plane_by_offset(q, off, &buffer, &plane);
+ if (ret)
+- return ret;
++ goto unlock;
+
+ vb = q->bufs[buffer];
+
+@@ -1942,8 +1946,9 @@ int vb2_mmap(struct vb2_queue *q, struct
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- mutex_lock(&q->mmap_lock);
+ ret = call_memop(vb, mmap, vb->planes[plane].mem_priv, vma);
++
++unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&q->mmap_lock);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
--- /dev/null
+From 701f49bc028edb19ffccd101997dd84f0d71e279 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2018 06:15:31 -0400
+Subject: media: vivid: fix error handling of kthread_run
+
+From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+
+commit 701f49bc028edb19ffccd101997dd84f0d71e279 upstream.
+
+kthread_run returns an error pointer, but elsewhere in the code
+dev->kthread_vid_cap/out is checked against NULL.
+
+If kthread_run returns an error, then set the pointer to NULL.
+
+I chose this method over changing all kthread_vid_cap/out tests
+elsewhere since this is more robust.
+
+Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+Reported-by: syzbot+53d5b2df0d9744411e2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c | 5 ++++-
+ drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c | 5 ++++-
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c
++++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-cap.c
+@@ -877,8 +877,11 @@ int vivid_start_generating_vid_cap(struc
+ "%s-vid-cap", dev->v4l2_dev.name);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap)) {
++ int err = PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
++
++ dev->kthread_vid_cap = NULL;
+ v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "kernel_thread() failed\n");
+- return PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_cap);
++ return err;
+ }
+ *pstreaming = true;
+ vivid_grab_controls(dev, true);
+--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c
++++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-kthread-out.c
+@@ -248,8 +248,11 @@ int vivid_start_generating_vid_out(struc
+ "%s-vid-out", dev->v4l2_dev.name);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out)) {
++ int err = PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out);
++
++ dev->kthread_vid_out = NULL;
+ v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "kernel_thread() failed\n");
+- return PTR_ERR(dev->kthread_vid_out);
++ return err;
+ }
+ *pstreaming = true;
+ vivid_grab_controls(dev, true);
--- /dev/null
+From 9729d6d282a6d7ce88e64c9119cecdf79edf4e88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+Date: Mon, 29 Oct 2018 13:32:38 -0400
+Subject: media: vivid: set min width/height to a value > 0
+
+From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+
+commit 9729d6d282a6d7ce88e64c9119cecdf79edf4e88 upstream.
+
+The capture DV timings capabilities allowed for a minimum width and
+height of 0. So passing a timings struct with 0 values is allowed
+and will later cause a division by zero.
+
+Ensure that the width and height must be >= 16 to avoid this.
+
+Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+Reported-by: syzbot+57c3d83d71187054d56f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c
++++ b/drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-common.c
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ const struct v4l2_dv_timings_cap vivid_d
+ .type = V4L2_DV_BT_656_1120,
+ /* keep this initialization for compatibility with GCC < 4.4.6 */
+ .reserved = { 0 },
+- V4L2_INIT_BT_TIMINGS(0, MAX_WIDTH, 0, MAX_HEIGHT, 14000000, 775000000,
++ V4L2_INIT_BT_TIMINGS(16, MAX_WIDTH, 16, MAX_HEIGHT, 14000000, 775000000,
+ V4L2_DV_BT_STD_CEA861 | V4L2_DV_BT_STD_DMT |
+ V4L2_DV_BT_STD_CVT | V4L2_DV_BT_STD_GTF,
+ V4L2_DV_BT_CAP_PROGRESSIVE | V4L2_DV_BT_CAP_INTERLACED)
--- /dev/null
+From ac4ca4b9f4623ba5e1ea7a582f286567c611e027 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jonathan Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 08:56:31 +0000
+Subject: mfd: tps6586x: Handle interrupts on suspend
+
+From: Jonathan Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
+
+commit ac4ca4b9f4623ba5e1ea7a582f286567c611e027 upstream.
+
+The tps6586x driver creates an irqchip that is used by its various child
+devices for managing interrupts. The tps6586x-rtc device is one of its
+children that uses the tps6586x irqchip. When using the tps6586x-rtc as
+a wake-up device from suspend, the following is seen:
+
+ PM: Syncing filesystems ... done.
+ Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
+ OOM killer disabled.
+ Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.000 seconds) done.
+ Disabling non-boot CPUs ...
+ Entering suspend state LP1
+ Enabling non-boot CPUs ...
+ CPU1 is up
+ tps6586x 3-0034: failed to read interrupt status
+ tps6586x 3-0034: failed to read interrupt status
+
+The reason why the tps6586x interrupt status cannot be read is because
+the tps6586x interrupt is not masked during suspend and when the
+tps6586x-rtc interrupt occurs, to wake-up the device, the interrupt is
+seen before the i2c controller has been resumed in order to read the
+tps6586x interrupt status.
+
+The tps6586x-rtc driver sets it's interrupt as a wake-up source during
+suspend, which gets propagated to the parent tps6586x interrupt.
+However, the tps6586x-rtc driver cannot disable it's interrupt during
+suspend otherwise we would never be woken up and so the tps6586x must
+disable it's interrupt instead.
+
+Prevent the tps6586x interrupt handler from executing on exiting suspend
+before the i2c controller has been resumed by disabling the tps6586x
+interrupt on entering suspend and re-enabling it on resuming from
+suspend.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
+Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c
++++ b/drivers/mfd/tps6586x.c
+@@ -594,6 +594,29 @@ static int tps6586x_i2c_remove(struct i2
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++static int __maybe_unused tps6586x_i2c_suspend(struct device *dev)
++{
++ struct tps6586x *tps6586x = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
++
++ if (tps6586x->client->irq)
++ disable_irq(tps6586x->client->irq);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int __maybe_unused tps6586x_i2c_resume(struct device *dev)
++{
++ struct tps6586x *tps6586x = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
++
++ if (tps6586x->client->irq)
++ enable_irq(tps6586x->client->irq);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(tps6586x_pm_ops, tps6586x_i2c_suspend,
++ tps6586x_i2c_resume);
++
+ static const struct i2c_device_id tps6586x_id_table[] = {
+ { "tps6586x", 0 },
+ { },
+@@ -604,6 +627,7 @@ static struct i2c_driver tps6586x_driver
+ .driver = {
+ .name = "tps6586x",
+ .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(tps6586x_of_match),
++ .pm = &tps6586x_pm_ops,
+ },
+ .probe = tps6586x_i2c_probe,
+ .remove = tps6586x_i2c_remove,
--- /dev/null
+From 5a9372f751b5350e0ce3d2ee91832f1feae2c2e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 17:24:31 +0100
+Subject: mips: fix n32 compat_ipc_parse_version
+
+From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+
+commit 5a9372f751b5350e0ce3d2ee91832f1feae2c2e5 upstream.
+
+While reading through the sysvipc implementation, I noticed that the n32
+semctl/shmctl/msgctl system calls behave differently based on whether
+o32 support is enabled or not: Without o32, the IPC_64 flag passed by
+user space is rejected but calls without that flag get IPC_64 behavior.
+
+As far as I can tell, this was inadvertently changed by a cleanup patch
+but never noticed by anyone, possibly nobody has tried using sysvipc
+on n32 after linux-3.19.
+
+Change it back to the old behavior now.
+
+Fixes: 78aaf956ba3a ("MIPS: Compat: Fix build error if CONFIG_MIPS32_COMPAT but no compat ABI.")
+Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
+Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.19+
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/mips/Kconfig | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
+@@ -3135,6 +3135,7 @@ config MIPS32_O32
+ config MIPS32_N32
+ bool "Kernel support for n32 binaries"
+ depends on 64BIT
++ select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
+ select COMPAT
+ select MIPS32_COMPAT
+ select SYSVIPC_COMPAT if SYSVIPC
--- /dev/null
+From e2c8d550a973bb34fc28bc8d0ec996f84562fb8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 19:14:31 -0800
+Subject: netfilter: ebtables: account ebt_table_info to kmemcg
+
+From: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
+
+commit e2c8d550a973bb34fc28bc8d0ec996f84562fb8a upstream.
+
+The [ip,ip6,arp]_tables use x_tables_info internally and the underlying
+memory is already accounted to kmemcg. Do the same for ebtables. The
+syzbot, by using setsockopt(EBT_SO_SET_ENTRIES), was able to OOM the
+whole system from a restricted memcg, a potential DoS.
+
+By accounting the ebt_table_info, the memory used for ebt_table_info can
+be contained within the memcg of the allocating process. However the
+lifetime of ebt_table_info is independent of the allocating process and
+is tied to the network namespace. So, the oom-killer will not be able to
+relieve the memory pressure due to ebt_table_info memory. The memory for
+ebt_table_info is allocated through vmalloc. Currently vmalloc does not
+handle the oom-killed allocating process correctly and one large
+allocation can bypass memcg limit enforcement. So, with this patch,
+at least the small allocations will be contained. For large allocations,
+we need to fix vmalloc.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+7713f3aa67be76b1552c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
++++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+@@ -1147,14 +1147,16 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, c
+ tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name) - 1] = 0;
+
+ countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
+- newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
++ newinfo = __vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
++ PAGE_KERNEL);
+ if (!newinfo)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (countersize)
+ memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
+
+- newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
++ newinfo->entries = __vmalloc(tmp.entries_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT,
++ PAGE_KERNEL);
+ if (!newinfo->entries) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_newinfo;
--- /dev/null
+From a01421e4484327fe44f8e126793ed5a48a221e24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
+Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 14:34:38 +0100
+Subject: omap2fb: Fix stack memory disclosure
+
+From: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
+
+commit a01421e4484327fe44f8e126793ed5a48a221e24 upstream.
+
+Using [1] for static analysis I found that the OMAPFB_QUERY_PLANE,
+OMAPFB_GET_COLOR_KEY, OMAPFB_GET_DISPLAY_INFO, and OMAPFB_GET_VRAM_INFO
+cases could all leak uninitialized stack memory--either due to
+uninitialized padding or 'reserved' fields.
+
+Fix them by clearing the shared union used to store copied out data.
+
+[1] https://github.com/vlad902/kernel-uninitialized-memory-checker
+
+Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
+Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+Fixes: b39a982ddecf ("OMAP: DSS2: omapfb driver")
+Cc: security@kernel.org
+[b.zolnierkie: prefix patch subject with "omap2fb: "]
+Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c
++++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/omap2/omapfb/omapfb-ioctl.c
+@@ -609,6 +609,8 @@ int omapfb_ioctl(struct fb_info *fbi, un
+
+ int r = 0;
+
++ memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p));
++
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case OMAPFB_SYNC_GFX:
+ DBG("ioctl SYNC_GFX\n");
--- /dev/null
+From 400b8b9a2a17918f8ce00786f596f530e7f30d50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 18:34:02 +0800
+Subject: sctp: allocate sctp_sockaddr_entry with kzalloc
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+commit 400b8b9a2a17918f8ce00786f596f530e7f30d50 upstream.
+
+The similar issue as fixed in Commit 4a2eb0c37b47 ("sctp: initialize
+sin6_flowinfo for ipv6 addrs in sctp_inet6addr_event") also exists
+in sctp_inetaddr_event, as Alexander noticed.
+
+To fix it, allocate sctp_sockaddr_entry with kzalloc for both sctp
+ipv4 and ipv6 addresses, as does in sctp_v4/6_copy_addrlist().
+
+Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot+ae0c70c0c2d40c51bb92@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/sctp/ipv6.c | 5 +----
+ net/sctp/protocol.c | 4 +---
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
++++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+@@ -97,11 +97,9 @@ static int sctp_inet6addr_event(struct n
+
+ switch (ev) {
+ case NETDEV_UP:
+- addr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_sockaddr_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
++ addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (addr) {
+ addr->a.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+- addr->a.v6.sin6_port = 0;
+- addr->a.v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
+ addr->a.v6.sin6_addr = ifa->addr;
+ addr->a.v6.sin6_scope_id = ifa->idev->dev->ifindex;
+ addr->valid = 1;
+@@ -413,7 +411,6 @@ static void sctp_v6_copy_addrlist(struct
+ addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (addr) {
+ addr->a.v6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+- addr->a.v6.sin6_port = 0;
+ addr->a.v6.sin6_addr = ifp->addr;
+ addr->a.v6.sin6_scope_id = dev->ifindex;
+ addr->valid = 1;
+--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
++++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
+@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static void sctp_v4_copy_addrlist(struct
+ addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (addr) {
+ addr->a.v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+- addr->a.v4.sin_port = 0;
+ addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_local;
+ addr->valid = 1;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&addr->list);
+@@ -777,10 +776,9 @@ static int sctp_inetaddr_event(struct no
+
+ switch (ev) {
+ case NETDEV_UP:
+- addr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_sockaddr_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
++ addr = kzalloc(sizeof(*addr), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (addr) {
+ addr->a.v4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+- addr->a.v4.sin_port = 0;
+ addr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_local;
+ addr->valid = 1;
+ spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.local_addr_lock);
--- /dev/null
+From 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 10:55:10 -0500
+Subject: selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy
+
+From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+
+commit 5b0e7310a2a33c06edc7eb81ffc521af9b2c5610 upstream.
+
+levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
+the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure
+sens_destroy handles that case correctly.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
++++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+@@ -726,7 +726,8 @@ static int sens_destroy(void *key, void
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ levdatum = datum;
+- ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
++ if (levdatum->level)
++ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ kfree(levdatum->level);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
scsi-sd-fix-cache_type_store.patch
crypto-talitos-reorder-code-in-talitos_edesc_alloc.patch
crypto-talitos-fix-ablkcipher-for-config_vmap_stack.patch
+mips-fix-n32-compat_ipc_parse_version.patch
+mfd-tps6586x-handle-interrupts-on-suspend.patch
+arm64-kaslr-ensure-randomized-quantities-are-clean-to-the-poc.patch
+disable-msi-also-when-pcie-octeon.pcie_disable-on.patch
+omap2fb-fix-stack-memory-disclosure.patch
+media-vivid-fix-error-handling-of-kthread_run.patch
+media-vivid-set-min-width-height-to-a-value-0.patch
+lsm-check-for-null-cred-security-on-free.patch
+media-vb2-vb2_mmap-move-lock-up.patch
+sunrpc-handle-enomem-in-rpcb_getport_async.patch
+netfilter-ebtables-account-ebt_table_info-to-kmemcg.patch
+selinux-fix-gpf-on-invalid-policy.patch
+blockdev-fix-livelocks-on-loop-device.patch
+sctp-allocate-sctp_sockaddr_entry-with-kzalloc.patch
+tipc-fix-uninit-value-in-tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats.patch
+tipc-fix-uninit-value-in-tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable.patch
+tipc-fix-uninit-value-in-tipc_nl_compat_link_set.patch
+tipc-fix-uninit-value-in-tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump.patch
+tipc-fix-uninit-value-in-tipc_nl_compat_doit.patch
+block-loop-use-global-lock-for-ioctl-operation.patch
+loop-fold-__loop_release-into-loop_release.patch
+loop-get-rid-of-loop_index_mutex.patch
+loop-fix-double-mutex_unlock-loop_ctl_mutex-in-loop_control_ioctl.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 81c88b18de1f11f70c97f28ced8d642c00bb3955 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2018 10:35:11 -0500
+Subject: sunrpc: handle ENOMEM in rpcb_getport_async
+
+From: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
+
+commit 81c88b18de1f11f70c97f28ced8d642c00bb3955 upstream.
+
+If we ignore the error we'll hit a null dereference a little later.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+4b98281f2401ab849f4b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c
++++ b/net/sunrpc/rpcb_clnt.c
+@@ -770,6 +770,12 @@ void rpcb_getport_async(struct rpc_task
+ case RPCBVERS_3:
+ map->r_netid = xprt->address_strings[RPC_DISPLAY_NETID];
+ map->r_addr = rpc_sockaddr2uaddr(sap, GFP_ATOMIC);
++ if (!map->r_addr) {
++ status = -ENOMEM;
++ dprintk("RPC: %5u %s: no memory available\n",
++ task->tk_pid, __func__);
++ goto bailout_free_args;
++ }
+ map->r_owner = "";
+ break;
+ case RPCBVERS_2:
+@@ -792,6 +798,8 @@ void rpcb_getport_async(struct rpc_task
+ rpc_put_task(child);
+ return;
+
++bailout_free_args:
++ kfree(map);
+ bailout_release_client:
+ rpc_release_client(rpcb_clnt);
+ bailout_nofree:
--- /dev/null
+From 0762216c0ad2a2fccd63890648eca491f2c83d9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 17:22:26 +0800
+Subject: tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable
+
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+
+commit 0762216c0ad2a2fccd63890648eca491f2c83d9a upstream.
+
+syzbot reported:
+
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484
+CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113
+ kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917
+ __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500
+ strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484
+ nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389
+ __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
+ tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107
+ genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
+ genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454
+ genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
+ netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
+ netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
+ __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
+ do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
+RIP: 0033:0x440179
+Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
+RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00
+R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
+
+Uninit was created at:
+ kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline]
+ kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180
+ kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104
+ kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113
+ slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
+ slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline]
+ __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360
+ __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
+ __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206
+ alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline]
+ netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline]
+ netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
+ __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
+ do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
+
+The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid
+string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable().
+
+Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions:
+tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable()
+tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump()
+tipc_nl_compat_media_set()
+tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set()
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+b33d5cae0efd35dbfe77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
++++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(
+ struct nlattr *prop;
+ struct nlattr *bearer;
+ struct tipc_bearer_config *b;
++ int len;
+
+ b = (struct tipc_bearer_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+
+@@ -387,6 +388,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(
+ if (!bearer)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
++ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
++ if (!string_is_valid(b->name, len))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, b->name))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+@@ -412,6 +417,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable
+ {
+ char *name;
+ struct nlattr *bearer;
++ int len;
+
+ name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+
+@@ -419,6 +425,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable
+ if (!bearer)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
++ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
++ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, name))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+@@ -479,6 +489,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump
+ struct nlattr *prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_MAX + 1];
+ struct nlattr *stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX + 1];
+ int err;
++ int len;
+
+ if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
+ return -EINVAL;
+@@ -505,6 +516,11 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump
+ return err;
+
+ name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
++
++ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
++ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (strcmp(name, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME])) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+@@ -645,6 +661,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_media_set(stru
+ struct nlattr *prop;
+ struct nlattr *media;
+ struct tipc_link_config *lc;
++ int len;
+
+ lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+
+@@ -652,6 +669,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_media_set(stru
+ if (!media)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
++ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME);
++ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME, lc->name))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+@@ -672,6 +693,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set(str
+ struct nlattr *prop;
+ struct nlattr *bearer;
+ struct tipc_link_config *lc;
++ int len;
+
+ lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+
+@@ -679,6 +701,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set(str
+ if (!bearer)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
++ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME);
++ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, lc->name))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
--- /dev/null
+From 2753ca5d9009c180dbfd4c802c80983b4b6108d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 17:22:29 +0800
+Subject: tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_doit
+
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+
+commit 2753ca5d9009c180dbfd4c802c80983b4b6108d1 upstream.
+
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x404/0xa10 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335
+CPU: 0 PID: 4514 Comm: syz-executor485 Not tainted 4.16.0+ #87
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:53
+ kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
+ __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
+ tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x404/0xa10 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335
+ tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x164b/0x2700 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1153
+ genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 [inline]
+ genl_rcv_msg+0x1686/0x1810 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2447
+ genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635
+ netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1311 [inline]
+ netlink_unicast+0x166b/0x1740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1337
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x1048/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
+ SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091
+ SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087
+ do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
+RIP: 0033:0x43fda9
+RSP: 002b:00007ffd0c184ba8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 000000000043fda9
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020023000 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
+R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 00000000004016d0
+R13: 0000000000401760 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
+
+Uninit was created at:
+ kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:278 [inline]
+ kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:188
+ kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:314
+ kmsan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:321
+ slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:445 [inline]
+ slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2737 [inline]
+ __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xaed/0x11c0 mm/slub.c:4369
+ __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
+ __alloc_skb+0x2cf/0x9f0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
+ alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:984 [inline]
+ netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1183 [inline]
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x9a6/0x1310 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1875
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:640 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2046
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
+ SYSC_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2091
+ SyS_sendmsg+0x54/0x80 net/socket.c:2087
+ do_syscall_64+0x309/0x430 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2
+
+In tipc_nl_compat_recv(), when the len variable returned by
+nlmsg_attrlen() is 0, the message is still treated as a valid one,
+which is obviously unresonable. When len is zero, it means the
+message not only doesn't contain any valid TLV payload, but also
+TLV header is not included. Under this stituation, tlv_type field
+in TLV header is still accessed in tipc_nl_compat_dumpit() or
+tipc_nl_compat_doit(), but the field space is obviously illegal.
+Of course, it is not initialized.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+bca0dc46634781f08b38@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Reported-by: syzbot+6bdb590321a7ae40c1a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
++++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+@@ -1240,7 +1240,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_recv(struct sk
+ }
+
+ len = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
+- if (len && !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
++ if (!len || !TLV_OK(msg.req, len)) {
+ msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto send;
--- /dev/null
+From 8b66fee7f8ee18f9c51260e7a43ab37db5177a05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 17:22:25 +0800
+Subject: tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats
+
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+
+commit 8b66fee7f8ee18f9c51260e7a43ab37db5177a05 upstream.
+
+syzbot reports following splat:
+
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
+CPU: 1 PID: 11057 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
+ kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
+ __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295
+ strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
+ nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats+0x1f0/0x360 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:760
+ __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
+ tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
+ genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
+ genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
+ genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
+ netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
+ netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
+ __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
+ do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
+RIP: 0033:0x457ec9
+Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
+RSP: 002b:00007f2557338c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f25573396d4
+R13: 00000000004cb478 R14: 00000000004d86c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
+
+Uninit was created at:
+ kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
+ kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
+ kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
+ kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185
+ slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
+ slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline]
+ __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383
+ __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline]
+ __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205
+ alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline]
+ netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
+ netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
+ __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
+ do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
+
+The uninitialised access happened in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats:
+ nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name)
+
+This is because name string is not validated before it's used.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+e01d94b5a4c266be6e4c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
++++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+@@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ static int tipc_skb_tailroom(struct sk_b
+ return limit;
+ }
+
++static inline int TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(struct tlv_desc *tlv)
++{
++ return TLV_GET_LEN(tlv) - TLV_SPACE(0);
++}
++
+ static int tipc_add_tlv(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 type, void *data, u16 len)
+ {
+ struct tlv_desc *tlv = (struct tlv_desc *)skb_tail_pointer(skb);
+@@ -166,6 +171,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *tipc_get_err_tlv(
+ return buf;
+ }
+
++static inline bool string_is_valid(char *s, int len)
++{
++ return memchr(s, '\0', len) ? true : false;
++}
++
+ static int __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump *cmd,
+ struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
+ struct sk_buff *arg)
+@@ -741,6 +751,7 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_sta
+ {
+ char *name;
+ struct nlattr *link;
++ int len;
+
+ name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+
+@@ -748,6 +759,10 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_sta
+ if (!link)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
++ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
++ if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
--- /dev/null
+From edf5ff04a45750ac8ce2435974f001dc9cfbf055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 17:22:27 +0800
+Subject: tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_set
+
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+
+commit edf5ff04a45750ac8ce2435974f001dc9cfbf055 upstream.
+
+syzbot reports following splat:
+
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
+CPU: 1 PID: 9306 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
+Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
+ kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
+ __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313
+ strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486
+ nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline]
+ __tipc_nl_compat_link_set net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:708 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x929/0x1220 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:744
+ __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344
+ tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
+ genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
+ genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
+ genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
+ netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
+ netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
+ __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
+ do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
+
+The uninitialised access happened in
+ nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, lc->name)
+
+This is because lc->name string is not validated before it's used.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+d78b8a29241a195aefb8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
++++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+@@ -753,9 +753,14 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_link_set(struc
+ struct tipc_link_config *lc;
+ struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
+ struct tipc_media *media;
++ int len;
+
+ lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
+
++ len = min_t(int, TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
++ if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ media = tipc_media_find(lc->name);
+ if (media) {
+ cmd->doit = &tipc_nl_media_set;
--- /dev/null
+From 974cb0e3e7c963ced06c4e32c5b2884173fa5e01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 17:22:28 +0800
+Subject: tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump
+
+From: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+
+commit 974cb0e3e7c963ced06c4e32c5b2884173fa5e01 upstream.
+
+syzbot reported:
+
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
+BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x4a8/0xba0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:826
+CPU: 0 PID: 6290 Comm: syz-executor848 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113
+ kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917
+ __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500
+ __arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline]
+ __fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x4a8/0xba0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:826
+ __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x59e/0xdb0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:205
+ tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x63a/0x820 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:270
+ tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1151 [inline]
+ tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1402/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210
+ genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline]
+ genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454
+ genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637
+ netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
+ netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
+ __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
+ do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
+RIP: 0033:0x440179
+Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
+RSP: 002b:00007ffecec49318 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00
+R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
+
+Uninit was created at:
+ kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline]
+ kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180
+ kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104
+ kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113
+ slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
+ slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline]
+ __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360
+ __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
+ __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206
+ alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline]
+ netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline]
+ netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116
+ __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
+ __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161
+ do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
+
+We cannot take for granted the thing that the length of data contained
+in TLV is longer than the size of struct tipc_name_table_query in
+tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump().
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+06e771a754829716a327@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/tipc/netlink_compat.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
++++ b/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c
+@@ -815,6 +815,8 @@ static int tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dum
+ };
+
+ ntq = (struct tipc_name_table_query *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
++ if (TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req) < sizeof(struct tipc_name_table_query))
++ return -EINVAL;
+
+ depth = ntohl(ntq->depth);
+
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
