]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable-queue.git/commitdiff
4.10-stable patches
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 11 May 2017 12:34:38 +0000 (14:34 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Thu, 11 May 2017 12:34:38 +0000 (14:34 +0200)
added patches:
f2fs-sanity-check-segment-count.patch
xen-revert-commits-da72ff5bfcb0-and-72a9b186292d.patch

queue-4.10/f2fs-sanity-check-segment-count.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-4.10/series
queue-4.10/staging-lustre-mdc-make-it_open-take-lookup-bits-lock.patch [deleted file]
queue-4.10/xen-revert-commits-da72ff5bfcb0-and-72a9b186292d.patch [new file with mode: 0644]

diff --git a/queue-4.10/f2fs-sanity-check-segment-count.patch b/queue-4.10/f2fs-sanity-check-segment-count.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..c99e895
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From b9dd46188edc2f0d1f37328637860bb65a771124 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 16:28:48 -0700
+Subject: f2fs: sanity check segment count
+
+From: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
+
+commit b9dd46188edc2f0d1f37328637860bb65a771124 upstream.
+
+F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported
+size of disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/f2fs/super.c         |    7 +++++++
+ include/linux/f2fs_fs.h |    6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
++++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
+@@ -1441,6 +1441,13 @@ static int sanity_check_raw_super(struct
+               return 1;
+       }
++      if (le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count) > F2FS_MAX_SEGMENT) {
++              f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
++                      "Invalid segment count (%u)",
++                      le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count));
++              return 1;
++      }
++
+       /* check CP/SIT/NAT/SSA/MAIN_AREA area boundary */
+       if (sanity_check_area_boundary(sbi, bh))
+               return 1;
+--- a/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
++++ b/include/linux/f2fs_fs.h
+@@ -294,6 +294,12 @@ struct f2fs_nat_block {
+ #define SIT_ENTRY_PER_BLOCK (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct f2fs_sit_entry))
+ /*
++ * F2FS uses 4 bytes to represent block address. As a result, supported size of
++ * disk is 16 TB and it equals to 16 * 1024 * 1024 / 2 segments.
++ */
++#define F2FS_MAX_SEGMENT       ((16 * 1024 * 1024) / 2)
++
++/*
+  * Note that f2fs_sit_entry->vblocks has the following bit-field information.
+  * [15:10] : allocation type such as CURSEG_XXXX_TYPE
+  * [9:0] : valid block count
index eea9deb27cbf9006e0dd7bf2baf65c9e72da0a8b..5dd46cf156d5975c80781038cc6cb30557248a8a 100644 (file)
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ staging-lustre-llite-move-root_squash-from-sysfs-to-debugfs.patch
 staging-wlan-ng-add-missing-byte-order-conversion.patch
 staging-emxx_udc-remove-incorrect-__init-annotations.patch
 staging-lustre-ptlrpc-avoid-warning-on-missing-return.patch
-staging-lustre-mdc-make-it_open-take-lookup-bits-lock.patch
 alsa-hda-fix-deadlock-of-controller-device-lock-at-unbinding.patch
 sparc64-fix-fault-handling-in-ngbzero.s-and-genbzero.s.patch
 macsec-dynamically-allocate-space-for-sglist.patch
@@ -122,3 +121,5 @@ bnxt_en-allocate-enough-space-for-ntp_fltr_bmap.patch
 bpf-don-t-let-ldimm64-leak-map-addresses-on-unprivileged.patch
 net-mdio-mux-bcm-iproc-call-mdiobus_free-in-error-path.patch
 openvswitch-set-internal-device-max-mtu-to-eth_max_mtu.patch
+f2fs-sanity-check-segment-count.patch
+xen-revert-commits-da72ff5bfcb0-and-72a9b186292d.patch
diff --git a/queue-4.10/staging-lustre-mdc-make-it_open-take-lookup-bits-lock.patch b/queue-4.10/staging-lustre-mdc-make-it_open-take-lookup-bits-lock.patch
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 670e85b..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 26d2bf1e71525f4c0f644820c30d1344633159e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Patrick Farrell <paf@cray.com>
-Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2017 19:05:14 -0500
-Subject: staging: lustre: mdc: Make IT_OPEN take lookup bits lock
-
-From: Patrick Farrell <paf@cray.com>
-
-commit 26d2bf1e71525f4c0f644820c30d1344633159e2 upstream.
-
-An earlier commit accidentally changed handling of IT_OPEN,
-making it take the MDS_INODELOCK_UPDATE bits lock instead of
-MDS_INODELOCK_LOOKUP. This does not cause any known bugs.
-
-Signed-off-by: Patrick Farrell <paf@cray.com>
-Intel-bug-id: https://jira.hpdd.intel.com/browse/LU-8842
-Reviewed-on: https://review.whamcloud.com/23797
-Fixes: 70a251f68dea ("staging: lustre: obd: decruft md_enqueue() and md_intent_lock()"
-Reviewed-by: John L. Hammond <john.hammond@intel.com>
-Reviewed-by: Lai Siyao <lai.siyao@intel.com>
-Reviewed-by: Oleg Drokin <oleg.drokin@intel.com>
-Signed-off-by: James Simmons <jsimmons@infradead.org>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
----
- drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/mdc/mdc_locks.c |    2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- a/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/mdc/mdc_locks.c
-+++ b/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/mdc/mdc_locks.c
-@@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ int mdc_enqueue(struct obd_export *exp,
-               LASSERT(!policy);
-               saved_flags |= LDLM_FL_HAS_INTENT;
--              if (it->it_op & (IT_OPEN | IT_UNLINK | IT_GETATTR | IT_READDIR))
-+              if (it->it_op & (IT_UNLINK | IT_GETATTR | IT_READDIR))
-                       policy = &update_policy;
-               else if (it->it_op & IT_LAYOUT)
-                       policy = &layout_policy;
diff --git a/queue-4.10/xen-revert-commits-da72ff5bfcb0-and-72a9b186292d.patch b/queue-4.10/xen-revert-commits-da72ff5bfcb0-and-72a9b186292d.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..0473634
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+From 84d582d236dc1f9085e741affc72e9ba061a67c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2017 15:04:53 -0400
+Subject: xen: Revert commits da72ff5bfcb0 and 72a9b186292d
+
+From: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
+
+commit 84d582d236dc1f9085e741affc72e9ba061a67c2 upstream.
+
+Recent discussion (http://marc.info/?l=xen-devel&m=149192184523741)
+established that commit 72a9b186292d ("xen: Remove event channel
+notification through Xen PCI platform device") (and thus commit
+da72ff5bfcb0 ("partially revert "xen: Remove event channel
+notification through Xen PCI platform device"")) are unnecessary and,
+in fact, prevent HVM guests from booting on Xen releases prior to 4.0
+
+Therefore we revert both of those commits.
+
+The summary of that discussion is below:
+
+  Here is the brief summary of the current situation:
+
+  Before the offending commit (72a9b186292):
+
+  1) INTx does not work because of the reset_watches path.
+  2) The reset_watches path is only taken if you have Xen > 4.0
+  3) The Linux Kernel by default will use vector inject if the hypervisor
+     support. So even INTx does not work no body running the kernel with
+     Xen > 4.0 would notice. Unless he explicitly disabled this feature
+     either in the kernel or in Xen (and this can only be disabled by
+     modifying the code, not user-supported way to do it).
+
+  After the offending commit (+ partial revert):
+
+  1) INTx is no longer support for HVM (only for PV guests).
+  2) Any HVM guest The kernel will not boot on Xen < 4.0 which does
+     not have vector injection support. Since the only other mode
+     supported is INTx which.
+
+  So based on this summary, I think before commit (72a9b186292) we were
+  in much better position from a user point of view.
+
+Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
+Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
+Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
+Cc: x86@kernel.org
+Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
+Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
+Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
+Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
+Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
+Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
+Cc: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
+Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
+Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@amazon.com>
+Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/xen/events.h |   11 +++++++++++
+ arch/x86/pci/xen.c                |    2 +-
+ arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c          |   21 +++++++++++++++------
+ arch/x86/xen/smp.c                |    2 ++
+ arch/x86/xen/time.c               |    5 +++++
+ drivers/xen/events/events_base.c  |   26 +++++++++++++++++---------
+ drivers/xen/platform-pci.c        |   13 +++----------
+ include/xen/xen.h                 |    3 ++-
+ 8 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/events.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/events.h
+@@ -20,4 +20,15 @@ static inline int xen_irqs_disabled(stru
+ /* No need for a barrier -- XCHG is a barrier on x86. */
+ #define xchg_xen_ulong(ptr, val) xchg((ptr), (val))
++extern int xen_have_vector_callback;
++
++/*
++ * Events delivered via platform PCI interrupts are always
++ * routed to vcpu 0 and hence cannot be rebound.
++ */
++static inline bool xen_support_evtchn_rebind(void)
++{
++      return (!xen_hvm_domain() || xen_have_vector_callback);
++}
++
+ #endif /* _ASM_X86_XEN_EVENTS_H */
+--- a/arch/x86/pci/xen.c
++++ b/arch/x86/pci/xen.c
+@@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ void __init xen_msi_init(void)
+ int __init pci_xen_hvm_init(void)
+ {
+-      if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs))
++      if (!xen_have_vector_callback || !xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs))
+               return 0;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
++++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c
+@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ struct shared_info xen_dummy_shared_info
+ void *xen_initial_gdt;
+ RESERVE_BRK(shared_info_page_brk, PAGE_SIZE);
++__read_mostly int xen_have_vector_callback;
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_have_vector_callback);
+ static int xen_cpu_up_prepare(unsigned int cpu);
+ static int xen_cpu_up_online(unsigned int cpu);
+@@ -1508,7 +1510,10 @@ static void __init xen_pvh_early_guest_i
+       if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
+               return;
+-      BUG_ON(!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector));
++      if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector))
++              return;
++
++      xen_have_vector_callback = 1;
+       xen_pvh_early_cpu_init(0, false);
+       xen_pvh_set_cr_flags(0);
+@@ -1847,7 +1852,9 @@ static int xen_cpu_up_prepare(unsigned i
+               xen_vcpu_setup(cpu);
+       }
+-      if (xen_pv_domain() || xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock))
++      if (xen_pv_domain() ||
++          (xen_have_vector_callback &&
++           xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock)))
+               xen_setup_timer(cpu);
+       rc = xen_smp_intr_init(cpu);
+@@ -1863,7 +1870,9 @@ static int xen_cpu_dead(unsigned int cpu
+ {
+       xen_smp_intr_free(cpu);
+-      if (xen_pv_domain() || xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock))
++      if (xen_pv_domain() ||
++          (xen_have_vector_callback &&
++           xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock)))
+               xen_teardown_timer(cpu);
+       return 0;
+@@ -1902,8 +1911,8 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_guest_init(vo
+       xen_panic_handler_init();
+-      BUG_ON(!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector));
+-
++      if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_callback_vector))
++              xen_have_vector_callback = 1;
+       xen_hvm_smp_init();
+       WARN_ON(xen_cpuhp_setup());
+       xen_unplug_emulated_devices();
+@@ -1941,7 +1950,7 @@ bool xen_hvm_need_lapic(void)
+               return false;
+       if (!xen_hvm_domain())
+               return false;
+-      if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs))
++      if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs) && xen_have_vector_callback)
+               return false;
+       return true;
+ }
+--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c
++++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c
+@@ -765,6 +765,8 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_smp_prepare_c
+ void __init xen_hvm_smp_init(void)
+ {
++      if (!xen_have_vector_callback)
++              return;
+       smp_ops.smp_prepare_cpus = xen_hvm_smp_prepare_cpus;
+       smp_ops.smp_send_reschedule = xen_smp_send_reschedule;
+       smp_ops.cpu_die = xen_cpu_die;
+--- a/arch/x86/xen/time.c
++++ b/arch/x86/xen/time.c
+@@ -432,6 +432,11 @@ static void xen_hvm_setup_cpu_clockevent
+ void __init xen_hvm_init_time_ops(void)
+ {
++      /* vector callback is needed otherwise we cannot receive interrupts
++       * on cpu > 0 and at this point we don't know how many cpus are
++       * available */
++      if (!xen_have_vector_callback)
++              return;
+       if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_hvm_safe_pvclock)) {
+               printk(KERN_INFO "Xen doesn't support pvclock on HVM,"
+                               "disable pv timer\n");
+--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
++++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+@@ -1312,6 +1312,9 @@ static int rebind_irq_to_cpu(unsigned ir
+       if (!VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn))
+               return -1;
++      if (!xen_support_evtchn_rebind())
++              return -1;
++
+       /* Send future instances of this interrupt to other vcpu. */
+       bind_vcpu.port = evtchn;
+       bind_vcpu.vcpu = xen_vcpu_nr(tcpu);
+@@ -1645,15 +1648,20 @@ void xen_callback_vector(void)
+ {
+       int rc;
+       uint64_t callback_via;
+-
+-      callback_via = HVM_CALLBACK_VECTOR(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR);
+-      rc = xen_set_callback_via(callback_via);
+-      BUG_ON(rc);
+-      pr_info("Xen HVM callback vector for event delivery is enabled\n");
+-      /* in the restore case the vector has already been allocated */
+-      if (!test_bit(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, used_vectors))
+-              alloc_intr_gate(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR,
+-                              xen_hvm_callback_vector);
++      if (xen_have_vector_callback) {
++              callback_via = HVM_CALLBACK_VECTOR(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR);
++              rc = xen_set_callback_via(callback_via);
++              if (rc) {
++                      pr_err("Request for Xen HVM callback vector failed\n");
++                      xen_have_vector_callback = 0;
++                      return;
++              }
++              pr_info("Xen HVM callback vector for event delivery is enabled\n");
++              /* in the restore case the vector has already been allocated */
++              if (!test_bit(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, used_vectors))
++                      alloc_intr_gate(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR,
++                                      xen_hvm_callback_vector);
++      }
+ }
+ #else
+ void xen_callback_vector(void) {}
+--- a/drivers/xen/platform-pci.c
++++ b/drivers/xen/platform-pci.c
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static uint64_t get_callback_via(struct
+       pin = pdev->pin;
+       /* We don't know the GSI. Specify the PCI INTx line instead. */
+-      return ((uint64_t)0x01 << HVM_CALLBACK_VIA_TYPE_SHIFT) | /* PCI INTx identifier */
++      return ((uint64_t)0x01 << 56) | /* PCI INTx identifier */
+               ((uint64_t)pci_domain_nr(pdev->bus) << 32) |
+               ((uint64_t)pdev->bus->number << 16) |
+               ((uint64_t)(pdev->devfn & 0xff) << 8) |
+@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ static int xen_allocate_irq(struct pci_d
+ static int platform_pci_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+ {
+       int err;
+-      if (!xen_pv_domain())
++      if (xen_have_vector_callback)
+               return 0;
+       err = xen_set_callback_via(callback_via);
+       if (err) {
+@@ -138,14 +138,7 @@ static int platform_pci_probe(struct pci
+       platform_mmio = mmio_addr;
+       platform_mmiolen = mmio_len;
+-      /* 
+-       * Xen HVM guests always use the vector callback mechanism.
+-       * L1 Dom0 in a nested Xen environment is a PV guest inside in an
+-       * HVM environment. It needs the platform-pci driver to get
+-       * notifications from L0 Xen, but it cannot use the vector callback
+-       * as it is not exported by L1 Xen.
+-       */
+-      if (xen_pv_domain()) {
++      if (!xen_have_vector_callback) {
+               ret = xen_allocate_irq(pdev);
+               if (ret) {
+                       dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "request_irq failed err=%d\n", ret);
+--- a/include/xen/xen.h
++++ b/include/xen/xen.h
+@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ extern enum xen_domain_type xen_domain_t
+  */
+ #include <xen/features.h>
+ #define xen_pvh_domain() (xen_pv_domain() && \
+-                        xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
++                        xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap) && \
++                        xen_have_vector_callback)
+ #else
+ #define xen_pvh_domain()      (0)
+ #endif