--- /dev/null
+From 1720db928e5a58ca7d75ac1d514c3b73fd7061a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
+Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 16:00:52 +0800
+Subject: 6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path
+
+From: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
+
+commit 1720db928e5a58ca7d75ac1d514c3b73fd7061a7 upstream.
+
+lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding
+lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error
+path drops the lock before printing nhc->name.
+
+lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies
+on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only
+waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported
+and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net
+core RX critical section, for example the Bluetooth 6LoWPAN L2CAP receive
+path.
+
+This leaves a race where one task drops lowpan_nhc_lock in the error path,
+another task unregisters and frees the matching descriptor after
+synchronize_net() returns, and the first task then dereferences nhc->name
+for the warning.
+
+With the post-unlock window widened, KASAN reports:
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression+0x1f4/0x220
+ Read of size 8
+ lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression
+ lowpan_header_decompress
+
+Fix this by printing the warning before dropping lowpan_nhc_lock, so the
+descriptor name is read while unregister is still excluded. The malformed
+packet is still rejected with -ENOTSUPP.
+
+Fixes: 92aa7c65d295 ("6lowpan: add generic nhc layer interface")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
+Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
+Reported-by: Ao Wang <wangao@seu.edu.cn>
+Reported-by: Xuewei Feng <fengxw06@126.com>
+Reported-by: Qi Li <qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn>
+Reported-by: Ke Xu <xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
+Acked-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260609080054.4541-1-zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/6lowpan/nhc.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/6lowpan/nhc.c
++++ b/net/6lowpan/nhc.c
+@@ -168,9 +168,9 @@ int lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression(struct s
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else {
+- spin_unlock_bh(&lowpan_nhc_lock);
+ netdev_warn(dev, "received nhc id for %s which is not implemented.\n",
+ nhc->name);
++ spin_unlock_bh(&lowpan_nhc_lock);
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+ }
+ } else {
--- /dev/null
+From c9a71daaecb2fb1d8c704545cc0b1c920b9bf5d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chi Wang <wangchi@kylinos.cn>
+Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2026 15:42:44 +0800
+Subject: audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Chi Wang <wangchi@kylinos.cn>
+
+commit c9a71daaecb2fb1d8c704545cc0b1c920b9bf5d7 upstream.
+
+Multiple readers access audit_queue.qlen via skb_queue_len() without
+holding the queue lock or using READ_ONCE(), while kauditd writes to
+this field via the skb_dequeue() → __skb_unlink() path with WRITE_ONCE()
+protected by a spinlock. This constitutes data races.
+
+All affected skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) call sites:
+ - kauditd_thread() wait_event_freezable() condition
+ - audit_receive_msg() AUDIT_GET handler (s.backlog assignment)
+ - audit_receive() backlog check
+ - audit_log_start() backlog check and pr_warn()
+
+KCSAN reports the following conflicting access pattern (one example):
+==================================================================
+BUG: KCSAN: data-race in audit_log_start / skb_dequeue
+
+write (marked) to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 661 on cpu 57:
+ skb_dequeue+0x70/0xf0
+ kauditd_send_queue+0x71/0x220
+ kauditd_thread+0x1cb/0x430
+ kthread+0x1c2/0x210
+ ret_from_fork+0x162/0x1a0
+ ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
+
+read to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 36586 on cpu 1:
+ audit_log_start+0x2a0/0x6b0
+ audit_core_dumps+0x64/0xa0
+ do_coredump+0x14b/0x1260
+ get_signal+0xeb2/0xf70
+ arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x41/0x170
+ exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xa2/0x1c0
+ do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x1c0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0xe0
+
+value changed: 0x00000001 -> 0x00000000
+==================================================================
+
+Resolve the race by switching to lockless helper skb_queue_len_lockless(),
+which internally uses READ_ONCE() and properly pairs with the WRITE_ONCE()
+write accesses already present on the writer side.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 3197542482df ("audit: rework audit_log_start()")
+Signed-off-by: Chi Wang <wangchi@kylinos.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com>
+[PM: line length tweak]
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/audit.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/audit.c
++++ b/kernel/audit.c
+@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ main_queue:
+ * do the multicast send and rotate records from the
+ * main queue to the retry/hold queues */
+ wait_event_freezable(kauditd_wait,
+- (skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) ? 1 : 0));
++ (skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue) ? 1 : 0));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -1247,7 +1247,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
+ s.rate_limit = audit_rate_limit;
+ s.backlog_limit = audit_backlog_limit;
+ s.lost = atomic_read(&audit_lost);
+- s.backlog = skb_queue_len(&audit_queue);
++ s.backlog = skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue);
+ s.feature_bitmap = AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_ALL;
+ s.backlog_wait_time = audit_backlog_wait_time;
+ s.backlog_wait_time_actual = atomic_read(&audit_backlog_wait_time_actual);
+@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sk_buff
+
+ /* can't block with the ctrl lock, so penalize the sender now */
+ if (audit_backlog_limit &&
+- (skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)) {
++ (skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)) {
+ DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
+
+ /* wake kauditd to try and flush the queue */
+@@ -1890,7 +1890,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(str
+ long stime = audit_backlog_wait_time;
+
+ while (audit_backlog_limit &&
+- (skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)) {
++ (skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue) > audit_backlog_limit)) {
+ /* wake kauditd to try and flush the queue */
+ wake_up_interruptible(&kauditd_wait);
+
+@@ -1910,7 +1910,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(str
+ } else {
+ if (audit_rate_check() && printk_ratelimit())
+ pr_warn("audit_backlog=%d > audit_backlog_limit=%d\n",
+- skb_queue_len(&audit_queue),
++ skb_queue_len_lockless(&audit_queue),
+ audit_backlog_limit);
+ audit_log_lost("backlog limit exceeded");
+ return NULL;
--- /dev/null
+From 6d827ade51a24e18d81afb9f32756d339520a14c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
+Date: Fri, 8 May 2026 12:24:16 +0800
+Subject: crypto: amlogic - avoid double cleanup in meson_crypto_probe()
+
+From: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
+
+commit 6d827ade51a24e18d81afb9f32756d339520a14c upstream.
+
+When meson_allocate_chanlist() fails after a partial allocation, it already
+unwinds the allocated chanlist state through its local error path.
+meson_crypto_probe() then jump to error_flow and calls
+meson_free_chanlist() again, causing the same per-flow resources to be torn
+down twice. In the reproduced failure path, the second teardown
+re-entered crypto_engine_exit() on an already destroyed worker and KASAN
+reported a slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker().
+
+Prevent double-free by handling partial allocation failures locally within
+meson_allocate_chanlist() and skipping the outer cleanup path.
+
+The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
+developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
+v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
+available.
+
+The bug was reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN on v7.1,
+using the reproducer under tools/testing/meson_crypto_probe. The reproducer
+forces the second dma_alloc_attrs() call in the gxl-crypto probe path to
+return NULL, making meson_allocate_chanlist() fail after partial
+initialization. On the unpatched kernel this reliably triggered a
+slab-use-after-free. With this fix applied, the same reproducer no longer
+emits any KASAN report and the probe fails cleanly with -ENOMEM.
+
+ ==================================================================
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
+ Read of size 8 at addr ff1100010c057a68 by task insmod/265
+
+ CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 265 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.1.0-rc2-00376-g810af9adc907-dirty #10 PREEMPT(lazy)
+ Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
+ print_report+0xcb/0x5e0
+ ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0
+ ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
+ ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
+ kasan_report+0xca/0x100
+ ? kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
+ kthread_destroy_worker+0xb2/0xd0
+ meson_crypto_probe+0x4d0/0xc10 [amlogic_gxl_crypto]
+ platform_probe+0x99/0x140
+ really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0
+ ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
+ __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
+ ? acpi_driver_match_device+0xb0/0x100
+ driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210
+ ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10
+ __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320
+ bus_for_each_drv+0x104/0x190
+ ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10
+ ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50
+ __device_attach+0x19d/0x3b0
+ ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10
+ ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220
+ device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0
+ bus_probe_device+0x5b/0x130
+ device_add+0xcfd/0x1430
+ ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10
+ ? insert_resource+0x34/0x50
+ ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290
+ platform_device_add+0x24e/0x590
+ ? __pfx_meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x10/0x10 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]
+ meson_crypto_probe_repro_init+0x330/0xff0 [meson_crypto_probe_repro]
+ do_one_initcall+0xc0/0x450
+ ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
+ ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2c/0x50
+ ? __create_object+0x59/0x80
+ ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60
+ do_init_module+0x27b/0x7d0
+ ? __pfx_do_init_module+0x10/0x10
+ ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x84/0x1d0
+ ? kfree+0x32c/0x510
+ ? load_module+0x561e/0x5ff0
+ load_module+0x54fe/0x5ff0
+ ? __pfx_load_module+0x10/0x10
+ ? security_file_permission+0x20/0x40
+ ? kernel_read_file+0x23d/0x6e0
+ ? mmap_region+0x235/0x4a0
+ ? __pfx_kernel_read_file+0x10/0x10
+ ? __file_has_perm+0x2c0/0x3e0
+ init_module_from_file+0x158/0x180
+ ? __pfx_init_module_from_file+0x10/0x10
+ ? __lock_acquire+0x45a/0x1ba0
+ ? idempotent_init_module+0x315/0x610
+ ? lock_release+0xc9/0x290
+ ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x4b/0x220
+ ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x220
+ idempotent_init_module+0x330/0x610
+ ? __pfx_idempotent_init_module+0x10/0x10
+ ? __pfx_cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x10/0x10
+ ? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x385/0x520
+ __x64_sys_finit_module+0xbe/0x120
+ do_syscall_64+0x115/0x690
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
+ RIP: 0033:0x7f7d6d31690d
+ Code: 5b 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f3 b4 0f 00 f7 d8 >
+ RSP: 002b:00007fffc027ac68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
+ RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055f7b81967c0 RCX: 00007f7d6d31690d
+ RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055f79a0d6cd2 RDI: 0000000000000003
+ RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+ R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055f79a0d6cd2
+ R13: 000055f7b8196790 R14: 000055f79a0d5888 R15: 000055f7b81968e0
+ </TASK>
+
+Fixes: 48fe583fe541 ("crypto: amlogic - Add crypto accelerator for amlogic GXL")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-core.c
+@@ -275,8 +275,8 @@ static int meson_crypto_probe(struct pla
+ return 0;
+ error_alg:
+ meson_unregister_algs(mc);
+-error_flow:
+ meson_free_chanlist(mc, MAXFLOW - 1);
++error_flow:
+ clk_disable_unprepare(mc->busclk);
+ return err;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From b81dde13cc163450dcb402dcc915ef13ba241e01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
+Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2026 16:47:44 +0200
+Subject: debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable
+
+From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
+
+commit b81dde13cc163450dcb402dcc915ef13ba241e01 upstream.
+
+syzbot reported a puzzling splat:
+
+ WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20
+
+stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in
+hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when
+debug_object_assert_init() can't find a shadow object. In that case debug
+objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup.
+
+Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the
+following a few seconds before the splat:
+
+ ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled
+
+So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup
+failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug
+objects and freed the shadow objects:
+
+debug_object_assert_init()
+ if (!debug_objects_enabled)
+ return; obj = alloc();
+ if (!obj) {
+ // Out of memory
+ debug_objects_enabled = false;
+ free_objects();
+ obj = lookup_or_alloc();
+
+ // The lookup failed because the other side
+ // removed the objects, so this returns
+ // an error code as the object in question
+ // is not statically initialized
+
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj))
+ return;
+ if (!obj) {
+ debug_oom();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ print(...)
+ if (!debug_objects_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ fixup(...)
+
+The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false,
+but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer
+disfunctional.
+
+This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and
+debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized
+objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case
+gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the
+NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow
+object.
+
+Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before
+invoking the print and fixup function in those two places.
+
+Fixes: b84d435cc228 ("debugobjects: Extend to assert that an object is initialized")
+Reported-by: syzbot+5e8dda76ca21dae314b6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/874iiwlzlb.ffs@fw13
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ lib/debugobjects.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/lib/debugobjects.c
++++ b/lib/debugobjects.c
+@@ -722,6 +722,14 @@ int debug_object_activate(void *addr, co
+ }
+
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&db->lock, flags);
++
++ /*
++ * lookup_object_or_alloc() might have raced with a concurrent
++ * allocation failure which disabled debug objects.
++ */
++ if (!debug_objects_enabled)
++ return 0;
++
+ debug_print_object(&o, "activate");
+
+ switch (o.state) {
+@@ -899,6 +907,15 @@ void debug_object_assert_init(void *addr
+ return;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * lookup_object_or_alloc() might have raced with a concurrent
++ * allocation failure which disabled debug objects. Don't run the fixup
++ * as it might turn a valid object useless. See for example
++ * hrtimer_fixup_assert_init().
++ */
++ if (!debug_objects_enabled)
++ return;
++
+ /* Object is neither tracked nor static. It's not initialized. */
+ debug_print_object(&o, "assert_init");
+ debug_object_fixup(descr->fixup_assert_init, addr, ODEBUG_STATE_NOTAVAILABLE);
--- /dev/null
+From 90f0109019e6817eb40a486671b7722d1544ae29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Runyu Xiao <runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn>
+Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 23:40:35 +0800
+Subject: gpio: eic-sprd: use raw_spinlock_t in the irq startup path
+
+From: Runyu Xiao <runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn>
+
+commit 90f0109019e6817eb40a486671b7722d1544ae29 upstream.
+
+sprd_eic_irq_unmask() enables the GPIO IRQ and then updates controller
+state through sprd_eic_update(), which takes sprd_eic->lock with
+spin_lock_irqsave(). The callback can be reached from irq_startup()
+while setting up a requested IRQ. That path is not sleepable, but on
+PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t becomes a sleeping lock.
+
+This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
+reviewed against the current tree.
+
+The grounded PoC kept the request_threaded_irq() -> __setup_irq() ->
+irq_startup() -> sprd_eic_irq_unmask() -> sprd_eic_update() carrier and
+used the original spin_lock_irqsave(&sprd_eic->lock) edge. Lockdep
+reported:
+
+ BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context
+ hardirqs last disabled at ... __setup_irq.constprop.0 ... [vuln_msv]
+ sprd_rt_spin_lock_irqsave+0x1c/0x30 [vuln_msv]
+ sprd_eic_update.constprop.0+0x48/0x90 [vuln_msv]
+ sprd_eic_irq_unmask.constprop.0+0x35/0x50 [vuln_msv]
+ __setup_irq.constprop.0+0xd/0x30 [vuln_msv]
+
+Convert the Spreadtrum EIC controller lock to raw_spinlock_t. The
+locked section only serializes MMIO register updates and does not contain
+sleepable operations, so keeping it non-sleeping is appropriate for the
+irqchip callbacks.
+
+Fixes: 25518e024e3a ("gpio: Add Spreadtrum EIC driver support")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao <runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617154035.1199948-3-runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn
+Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/gpio/gpio-eic-sprd.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-eic-sprd.c
++++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-eic-sprd.c
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ struct sprd_eic {
+ struct irq_chip intc;
+ void __iomem *base[SPRD_EIC_MAX_BANK];
+ enum sprd_eic_type type;
+- spinlock_t lock;
++ raw_spinlock_t lock;
+ int irq;
+ };
+
+@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static void sprd_eic_update(struct gpio_
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 tmp;
+
+- spin_lock_irqsave(&sprd_eic->lock, flags);
++ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sprd_eic->lock, flags);
+ tmp = readl_relaxed(base + reg);
+
+ if (val)
+@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static void sprd_eic_update(struct gpio_
+ tmp &= ~BIT(SPRD_EIC_BIT(offset));
+
+ writel_relaxed(tmp, base + reg);
+- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sprd_eic->lock, flags);
++ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sprd_eic->lock, flags);
+ }
+
+ static int sprd_eic_read(struct gpio_chip *chip, unsigned int offset, u16 reg)
+@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static int sprd_eic_probe(struct platfor
+ if (!sprd_eic)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+- spin_lock_init(&sprd_eic->lock);
++ raw_spin_lock_init(&sprd_eic->lock);
+ sprd_eic->type = pdata->type;
+
+ sprd_eic->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
--- /dev/null
+From e3046eeada299f917a8ad883af4434bfb86556b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 31 May 2026 10:22:51 -0400
+Subject: hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data()
+
+From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+
+commit e3046eeada299f917a8ad883af4434bfb86556b1 upstream.
+
+random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into
+vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using
+vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a
+memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted
+buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32
+or 64).
+
+A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond
+sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline
+array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes
+those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe
+them directly via /dev/hwrng.
+
+Concrete impact is inside the guest:
+
+ - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that
+ over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data
+ into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread
+ that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace
+ interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB.
+
+ - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a
+ malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised
+ guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for
+ guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest
+ root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest
+ kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In
+ practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually
+ disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the
+ fix is still worth carrying because the underlying
+ memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host.
+
+KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend
+has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000:
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0
+ Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52
+ Call Trace:
+ __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
+ virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0
+ hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470
+ kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0
+ Allocated by task 1:
+ probe_common+0xa5/0x660
+ virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0
+ The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800
+ which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
+ The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
+ allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20)
+
+Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer
+overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened
+usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in
+the USB 9p transport.
+
+With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place,
+the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the
+bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are
+discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request.
+
+Fixes: f7f510ec1957 ("virtio: An entropy device, as suggested by hpa.")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Suggested-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Message-ID: <20260531142251.2792061-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
++++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/virtio-rng.c
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
+ #include <asm/barrier.h>
+ #include <linux/err.h>
+ #include <linux/hw_random.h>
++#include <linux/nospec.h>
+ #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+ #include <linux/spinlock.h>
+ #include <linux/virtio.h>
+@@ -66,8 +67,26 @@ static void request_entropy(struct virtr
+ static unsigned int copy_data(struct virtrng_info *vi, void *buf,
+ unsigned int size)
+ {
+- size = min_t(unsigned int, size, vi->data_avail);
+- memcpy(buf, vi->data + vi->data_idx, size);
++ unsigned int idx, avail;
++
++ /*
++ * vi->data_avail was set from the device-reported used.len and
++ * vi->data_idx was advanced by previous copy_data() calls. A
++ * malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can drive either past
++ * sizeof(vi->data). Clamp at point of use and harden the index
++ * with array_index_nospec() so the memcpy() below cannot be
++ * steered into adjacent slab memory, including under
++ * speculation.
++ */
++ avail = min_t(unsigned int, vi->data_avail, sizeof(vi->data));
++ if (vi->data_idx >= avail) {
++ vi->data_avail = 0;
++ request_entropy(vi);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ size = min_t(unsigned int, size, avail - vi->data_idx);
++ idx = array_index_nospec(vi->data_idx, sizeof(vi->data));
++ memcpy(buf, vi->data + idx, size);
+ vi->data_idx += size;
+ vi->data_avail -= size;
+ if (vi->data_avail == 0)
--- /dev/null
+From 29bef9934b2521f787bb15dd1985d4c0d12ae02a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Runyu Xiao <runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn>
+Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 01:22:03 +0800
+Subject: io_uring/io-wq: re-check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item
+
+From: Runyu Xiao <runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn>
+
+commit 29bef9934b2521f787bb15dd1985d4c0d12ae02a upstream.
+
+commit 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work
+run loop") fixed the obvious case where io_worker_handle_work() took one
+exit-bit snapshot before draining pending work, but the fix stops one
+level too early.
+
+io_worker_handle_work() now re-checks IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT in its outer work
+run loop, yet it still snapshots that bit once before processing a whole
+dependent linked-work chain. If io_wq_exit_start() sets IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
+after the first linked item has started, the remaining linked items can
+still reuse stale do_kill = false, skip IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL, and continue
+running after exit has begun.
+
+Move the check further inside, so it covers linked items too. Note: this
+is a syzbot special as it loves setting up tons of slow linked work on
+weird devices like msr that take forever to read, and immediately close
+the ring. Exit then takes a long time.
+
+Fixes: 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work run loop")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Runyu Xiao <runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527172203.2043962-1-runyu.xiao@seu.edu.cn
+Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ io_uring/io-wq.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/io_uring/io-wq.c
++++ b/io_uring/io-wq.c
+@@ -556,7 +556,6 @@ static void io_worker_handle_work(struct
+ struct io_wq *wq = wqe->wq;
+
+ do {
+- bool do_kill = test_bit(IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT, &wq->state);
+ struct io_wq_work *work;
+ get_next:
+ /*
+@@ -578,6 +577,7 @@ get_next:
+
+ /* handle a whole dependent link */
+ do {
++ bool do_kill = test_bit(IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT, &wq->state);
+ struct io_wq_work *next_hashed, *linked;
+ unsigned int hash = io_get_work_hash(work);
+
--- /dev/null
+From 7993211bde166471dffac074dc965489f86531f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yuyang Huang <yuyanghuang@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 08:50:14 +0900
+Subject: ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction
+
+From: Yuyang Huang <yuyanghuang@google.com>
+
+commit 7993211bde166471dffac074dc965489f86531f8 upstream.
+
+When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through
+the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling
+them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's
+multicast hash table (mc_hash).
+
+Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after
+ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash
+can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is
+decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is
+accessing it, a use-after-free occurs.
+
+Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using
+ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation.
+
+BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
+Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276
+
+Call Trace:
+ <IRQ>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90
+ print_report+0x175/0x7c0
+ kasan_report+0x147/0x180
+ ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
+ udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0
+ ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390
+ ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120
+ NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0
+ __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340
+ process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00
+ __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0
+ net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60
+ handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0
+ do_softirq+0x57/0x80
+ </IRQ>
+
+Allocated by task 2239:
+ kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
+ __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
+ ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40
+ __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0
+ do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010
+ ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90
+ do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300
+
+Freed by task 0:
+ kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
+ kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50
+ __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60
+ __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220
+ rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190
+ rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0
+ handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0
+
+Fixes: e9897071350b ("igmp: hash a hash table to speedup ip_check_mc_rcu()")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Yuyang Huang <yuyanghuang@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260701235014.73505-1-yuyanghuang@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/igmp.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+@@ -1816,6 +1816,7 @@ void ip_mc_destroy_dev(struct in_device
+ #endif
+
+ while ((i = rtnl_dereference(in_dev->mc_list)) != NULL) {
++ ip_mc_hash_remove(in_dev, i);
+ in_dev->mc_list = i->next_rcu;
+ in_dev->mc_count--;
+ ip_mc_clear_src(i);
--- /dev/null
+From c32fe4c4918c9aa49f61359e3b42619c4d8686de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
+Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 20:58:10 +0000
+Subject: media: staging: ipu3-imgu: Add range check for imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe
+
+From: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
+
+commit c32fe4c4918c9aa49f61359e3b42619c4d8686de upstream.
+
+If the driver's stripe information is invalid it can result in an integer
+underflow. Add a range check to avoid this kind of error.
+
+This patch fixes the following smatch error:
+drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c:1792 imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe() warn: 'acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0]->width - 2 * f' 4294967168 can't fit into 65535 'acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1]->offset'
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: e11110a5b744 ("media: staging/intel-ipu3: css: Compute and program ccs")
+Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>
+Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/media/ipu3/ipu3-css-params.c
+@@ -1773,6 +1773,8 @@ static int imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe(struc
+ acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0].width =
+ ALIGN(css_pipe->rect[IPU3_CSS_RECT_BDS].width, f);
+ } else {
++ u32 offset;
++
+ /* Image processing is divided into two stripes */
+ acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0].width =
+ acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1].width =
+@@ -1791,8 +1793,10 @@ static int imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe(struc
+ acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1].width += f;
+ }
+ /* Overlap between stripes is IPU3_UAPI_ISP_VEC_ELEMS * 4 */
+- acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1].offset =
+- acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0].width - 2 * f;
++ offset = acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[0].width - 2 * f;
++ if (offset > 65535)
++ return -EINVAL;
++ acc->stripe.bds_out_stripes[1].offset = offset;
+ }
+
+ acc->stripe.effective_stripes[0].height =
--- /dev/null
+From 8b2c1d41bc36c100b38ce5ee6def246c527eaf8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrei Kuchynski <akuchynski@chromium.org>
+Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 13:17:21 +0000
+Subject: mfd: cros_ec: Delay dev_set_drvdata() until probe success
+
+From: Andrei Kuchynski <akuchynski@chromium.org>
+
+commit 8b2c1d41bc36c100b38ce5ee6def246c527eaf8a upstream.
+
+If ec_device_probe() fails, cros_ec_class_release releases memory for the
+cros_ec_dev structure. However, because the drvdata was already set,
+sub-drivers like cros_ec_typec can still retrieve the stale pointer via the
+platform device. This leads to a use-after-free when cros_ec_typec attempts
+to access &typec->ec->ec->dev on a device that has already been released.
+Move dev_set_drvdata() to ensure that the pointer is only made available
+once all initialization steps have succeeded.
+
+ sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/class/chromeos/cros_ec'
+ Call trace:
+ sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x94/0xdc
+ sysfs_create_link+0x30/0x44
+ device_add_class_symlinks+0x90/0x13c
+ device_add+0xf0/0x50c
+ ec_device_probe+0x150/0x4f0
+ platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0
+ ...
+ BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in __memcpy+0x44/0x230
+ Write at addr f5ffff809e2d33ac by task kworker/u32:5/125
+ Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [fe]
+ Tainted : [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
+ Hardware name: Google Navi unprovisioned 0x7FFFFFFF/sku0 board/sku3
+ Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
+ Call trace:
+ __memcpy+0x44/0x230
+ cros_ec_check_features+0x60/0xcc [cros_ec_proto]
+ cros_typec_probe+0xe8/0x6e0 [cros_ec_typec]
+ platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 1c1d152cc5ac ("platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - utilize new cdev_device_add helper function")
+Co-developed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrei Kuchynski <akuchynski@chromium.org>
+Reviewed-by: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260427131721.1165078-1-akuchynski@chromium.org
+Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c
++++ b/drivers/mfd/cros_ec_dev.c
+@@ -137,7 +137,6 @@ static int ec_device_probe(struct platfo
+ if (!ec)
+ return retval;
+
+- dev_set_drvdata(dev, ec);
+ ec->ec_dev = dev_get_drvdata(dev->parent);
+ ec->dev = dev;
+ ec->cmd_offset = ec_platform->cmd_offset;
+@@ -179,6 +178,8 @@ static int ec_device_probe(struct platfo
+ if (retval)
+ goto failed;
+
++ dev_set_drvdata(dev, ec);
++
+ /* check whether this EC is a sensor hub. */
+ if (cros_ec_get_sensor_count(ec) > 0) {
+ retval = mfd_add_hotplug_devices(ec->dev,
--- /dev/null
+From d129c3177d7b1138fd5066fcc63a698b3ba415b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zijing Yin <yzjaurora@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2026 07:44:41 -0700
+Subject: net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states
+
+From: Zijing Yin <yzjaurora@gmail.com>
+
+commit d129c3177d7b1138fd5066fcc63a698b3ba415b0 upstream.
+
+pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by
+allocating x->calg and copying only the algorithm name:
+
+ x->calg = kmalloc_obj(*x->calg);
+ if (!x->calg) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name);
+ x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt;
+
+Unlike the authentication (x->aalg) and encryption (x->ealg) branches of
+the same function, the compression branch never initializes
+calg->alg_key_len. IPComp carries no key and the allocation only
+reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field
+is left containing uninitialized slab data.
+
+calg->alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an
+IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE:
+
+ xfrm_state_migrate()
+ xfrm_state_clone_and_setup()
+ x->calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig->calg);
+ kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig));
+
+where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8. With
+a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the
+68-byte calg object. Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating
+it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0):
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60
+ Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287
+ CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0
+ print_report+0xf7/0x600
+ kasan_report+0xe4/0x120
+ kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0
+ __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60
+ kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60
+ xfrm_state_migrate+0x70a/0x1da0
+ xfrm_migrate+0x753/0x18a0
+ xfrm_do_migrate+0xb47/0xf10
+ xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x411/0xb50
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x158/0x420
+ xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x71/0x90
+ netlink_unicast+0x584/0x850
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x8b0/0xdc0
+ ____sys_sendmsg+0x9f7/0xb90
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0
+ __sys_sendmsg+0x16d/0x220
+ do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
+ </TASK>
+
+ Allocated by task 9287:
+ kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
+ kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
+ __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
+ pfkey_add+0x2652/0x2ea0
+ pfkey_process+0x6d0/0x830
+ pfkey_sendmsg+0x42c/0x850
+ __sys_sendto+0x461/0x4b0
+ __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0
+ do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
+
+ The buggy address belongs to the object at ff11000025a74980
+ which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
+ The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
+ allocated 68-byte region [ff11000025a74980, ff11000025a749c4)
+
+Depending on the uninitialized value the same field can instead request
+an oversized kmemdup() allocation and make the migration clone fail.
+
+The XFRM netlink path is not affected: verify_one_alg() rejects an
+XFRMA_ALG_COMP attribute shorter than xfrm_alg_len(), so a calg added via
+XFRM_MSG_NEWSA is always self-consistent.
+
+Initialize calg->alg_key_len to 0, matching the aalg/ealg branches.
+
+Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Zijing Yin <yzjaurora@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/key/af_key.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/net/key/af_key.c
++++ b/net/key/af_key.c
+@@ -1206,6 +1206,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state * pfkey_msg2xfr
+ goto out;
+ }
+ strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name);
++ x->calg->alg_key_len = 0;
+ x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt;
+ } else {
+ int keysize = 0;
--- /dev/null
+From efb8763d7bbb40cff4cc55a6b62c3095a038149c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
+Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 18:31:18 +0800
+Subject: net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes
+
+From: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
+
+commit efb8763d7bbb40cff4cc55a6b62c3095a038149c upstream.
+
+Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP
+socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the
+`u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap
+to large values.
+
+With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the
+`tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into
+an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through
+`proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require
+`tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot
+become negative either.
+
+When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate
+`extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the
+`tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's
+`tcp_max_reordering`.
+
+Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`.
+This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through
+signed integer overflow.
+
+Fixes: 91cc17c0e5e5 ("[TCP]: MTUprobe: receiver window & data available checks fixed")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
+Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1a5b7e1ef4d70fbad8c8ee0b82d8405f3c964a3d.1781395200.git.bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+@@ -892,7 +892,9 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[]
+ .data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
++ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
++ .extra2 = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "tcp_retries1",
+@@ -1109,7 +1111,8 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[]
+ .data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec
++ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
++ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "tcp_dsack",
+@@ -1336,6 +1339,9 @@ static __net_init int ipv4_sysctl_init_n
+ */
+ table[i].mode &= ~0222;
+ }
++ if (table[i].extra2 >= (void *)&init_net.ipv4 &&
++ table[i].extra2 < (void *)(&init_net.ipv4 + 1))
++ table[i].extra2 += (void *)net - (void *)&init_net;
+ }
+ }
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+@@ -2343,7 +2343,7 @@ static int tcp_mtu_probe(struct sock *sk
+ struct sk_buff *skb, *nskb, *next;
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+ int probe_size;
+- int size_needed;
++ u64 size_needed;
+ int copy, len;
+ int mss_now;
+ int interval;
+@@ -2367,7 +2367,7 @@ static int tcp_mtu_probe(struct sock *sk
+ mss_now = tcp_current_mss(sk);
+ probe_size = tcp_mtu_to_mss(sk, (icsk->icsk_mtup.search_high +
+ icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low) >> 1);
+- size_needed = probe_size + (tp->reordering + 1) * tp->mss_cache;
++ size_needed = probe_size + (tp->reordering + 1) * (u64)tp->mss_cache;
+ interval = icsk->icsk_mtup.search_high - icsk->icsk_mtup.search_low;
+ /* When misfortune happens, we are reprobing actively,
+ * and then reprobe timer has expired. We stick with current
--- /dev/null
+From 7cd9103283b26b917360ec99d7d2f2d761bcf1ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
+Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 18:00:06 -0700
+Subject: netfilter: ipset: fix race between dump and ip_set_list resize
+
+From: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
+
+commit 7cd9103283b26b917360ec99d7d2f2d761bcf1ab upstream.
+
+The release path of ip_set_dump_do() and ip_set_dump_done() read
+inst->ip_set_list via ip_set_ref_netlink(), a plain rcu_dereference_raw()
+of the array pointer. These run from netlink_recvmsg() without the nfnl
+mutex and without an RCU read-side critical section.
+
+A concurrent ip_set_create() can grow the array: it publishes the new
+array, calls synchronize_net() and then kvfree()s the old one. Since the
+dump paths read the array outside any RCU reader, synchronize_net() does
+not wait for them and the old array can be freed while they still index
+into it, causing a use-after-free.
+
+The dumped set itself stays pinned via set->ref_netlink, so only the
+array load needs protecting. Take rcu_read_lock() around it, matching
+ip_set_get_byname() and __ip_set_put_byindex().
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
+ Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b5c4018 by task exploit/150
+ Call Trace:
+ ...
+ kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
+ ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1697)
+ netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325)
+ netlink_recvmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1976)
+ sock_recvmsg (net/socket.c:1159)
+ __sys_recvfrom (net/socket.c:2315)
+ ...
+ Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN NOPTI
+ KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x02d6...d0-0x02d6...d7]
+ RIP: 0010:ip_set_dump_do (net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1698)
+ Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
+
+Fixes: 8a02bdd50b2e ("netfilter: ipset: Fix calling ip_set() macro at dumping")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
+Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
+Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
+Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
+@@ -1490,7 +1490,11 @@ ip_set_dump_done(struct netlink_callback
+ struct ip_set_net *inst =
+ (struct ip_set_net *)cb->args[IPSET_CB_NET];
+ ip_set_id_t index = (ip_set_id_t)cb->args[IPSET_CB_INDEX];
+- struct ip_set *set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index);
++ struct ip_set *set;
++
++ rcu_read_lock();
++ set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index);
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (set->variant->uref)
+ set->variant->uref(set, cb, false);
+@@ -1695,7 +1699,9 @@ next_set:
+ release_refcount:
+ /* If there was an error or set is done, release set */
+ if (ret || !cb->args[IPSET_CB_ARG0]) {
++ rcu_read_lock();
+ set = ip_set_ref_netlink(inst, index);
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (set->variant->uref)
+ set->variant->uref(set, cb, false);
+ pr_debug("release set %s\n", set->name);
usb-xhci-fix-sleep-in-atomic-context-in-xhci_free_streams.patch
pci-altera-do-not-dispose-parent-irq-mapping.patch
pci-host-common-request-bus-reassignment-when-not-probe-only.patch
+netfilter-ipset-fix-race-between-dump-and-ip_set_list-resize.patch
+virtio-mmio-fix-device-release-warning-on-module-unload.patch
+hwrng-virtio-clamp-device-reported-used.len-at-copy_data.patch
+usb-chaoskey-fix-slab-use-after-free-in-chaoskey_release.patch
+6lowpan-fix-nhc-entry-use-after-free-on-error-path.patch
+tipc-fix-out-of-bounds-read-in-broadcast-gap-ack-blocks.patch
+media-staging-ipu3-imgu-add-range-check-for-imgu_css_cfg_acc_stripe.patch
+crypto-amlogic-avoid-double-cleanup-in-meson_crypto_probe.patch
+net-af_key-initialize-alg_key_len-for-ipcomp-states.patch
+audit-fix-data-races-of-skb_queue_len-readers-on-audit_queue.patch
+debugobjects-plug-race-against-a-concurrent-oom-disable.patch
+gpio-eic-sprd-use-raw_spinlock_t-in-the-irq-startup-path.patch
+io_uring-io-wq-re-check-io_wq_bit_exit-for-each-linked-work-item.patch
+ipv4-igmp-remove-multicast-group-from-hash-table-on-device-destruction.patch
+net-ipv4-bound-tcp-reordering-sysctl-writes-and-mtu-probe-sizes.patch
+mfd-cros_ec-delay-dev_set_drvdata-until-probe-success.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 2b66974a1b6134a4bbc3bfed181f7418f688eb54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
+Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 15:38:15 +0100
+Subject: tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks
+
+From: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
+
+commit 2b66974a1b6134a4bbc3bfed181f7418f688eb54 upstream.
+
+A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its
+data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len
+field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts
+(sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check
+that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz().
+
+The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen)
+break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the
+returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the
+receive skb with an attacker-controlled count:
+
+ this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one
+ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its
+data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400,
+bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals
+struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is
+non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out
+of the much smaller skb:
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60
+ Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69
+ Call trace:
+ kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60
+ tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80
+ tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0
+ tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4
+ tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340
+ tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104
+ The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00
+ which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704
+ The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
+ allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0)
+
+The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but
+the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how
+they are used.
+
+The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;"
+skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the
+broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record
+against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through
+tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than
+processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means
+"legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state.
+
+Fixes: d7626b5acff9 ("tipc: introduce Gap ACK blocks for broadcast link")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
+Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625143815.1525412-1-sam@bynar.io
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/tipc/bcast.c | 22 ++++++++++++++--------
+ net/tipc/bcast.h | 2 +-
+ net/tipc/node.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/tipc/bcast.c
++++ b/net/tipc/bcast.c
+@@ -497,12 +497,13 @@ void tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(struct net *net,
+ */
+ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l,
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr,
+- struct sk_buff_head *retrq)
++ struct sk_buff_head *retrq, bool *valid)
+ {
+ struct sk_buff_head *inputq = &tipc_bc_base(net)->inputq;
+ struct tipc_gap_ack_blks *ga;
+ struct sk_buff_head xmitq;
+ int rc = 0;
++ u16 glen;
+
+ __skb_queue_head_init(&xmitq);
+
+@@ -510,13 +511,18 @@ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net,
+ if (msg_type(hdr) != STATE_MSG) {
+ tipc_link_bc_init_rcv(l, hdr);
+ } else if (!msg_bc_ack_invalid(hdr)) {
+- tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, false);
+- if (!sysctl_tipc_bc_retruni)
+- retrq = &xmitq;
+- rc = tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv(l, msg_bcast_ack(hdr),
+- msg_bc_gap(hdr), ga, &xmitq,
+- retrq);
+- rc |= tipc_link_bc_sync_rcv(l, hdr, &xmitq);
++ glen = tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, false);
++ if (glen > msg_data_sz(hdr)) {
++ /* Malformed Gap ACK blocks; caller drops the msg */
++ *valid = false;
++ } else {
++ if (!sysctl_tipc_bc_retruni)
++ retrq = &xmitq;
++ rc = tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv(l, msg_bcast_ack(hdr),
++ msg_bc_gap(hdr), ga, &xmitq,
++ retrq);
++ rc |= tipc_link_bc_sync_rcv(l, hdr, &xmitq);
++ }
+ }
+ tipc_bcast_unlock(net);
+
+--- a/net/tipc/bcast.h
++++ b/net/tipc/bcast.h
+@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ void tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(struct net *net,
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr);
+ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l,
+ struct tipc_msg *hdr,
+- struct sk_buff_head *retrq);
++ struct sk_buff_head *retrq, bool *valid);
+ int tipc_nl_add_bc_link(struct net *net, struct tipc_nl_msg *msg,
+ struct tipc_link *bcl);
+ int tipc_nl_bc_link_set(struct net *net, struct nlattr *attrs[]);
+--- a/net/tipc/node.c
++++ b/net/tipc/node.c
+@@ -1804,12 +1804,15 @@ static void tipc_node_mcast_rcv(struct t
+ }
+
+ static void tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(struct tipc_node *n, struct tipc_msg *hdr,
+- int bearer_id, struct sk_buff_head *xmitq)
++ int bearer_id, struct sk_buff_head *xmitq,
++ bool *valid)
+ {
+ struct tipc_link *ucl;
+ int rc;
+
+- rc = tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(n->net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr, xmitq);
++ rc = tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(n->net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr, xmitq, valid);
++ if (!*valid)
++ return;
+
+ if (rc & TIPC_LINK_DOWN_EVT) {
+ tipc_node_reset_links(n);
+@@ -2111,12 +2114,18 @@ rcv:
+
+ /* Ensure broadcast reception is in synch with peer's send state */
+ if (unlikely(usr == LINK_PROTOCOL)) {
++ bool valid = true;
++
+ if (unlikely(skb_linearize(skb))) {
+ tipc_node_put(n);
+ goto discard;
+ }
+ hdr = buf_msg(skb);
+- tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(n, hdr, bearer_id, &xmitq);
++ tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(n, hdr, bearer_id, &xmitq, &valid);
++ if (!valid) {
++ tipc_node_put(n);
++ goto discard;
++ }
+ } else if (unlikely(tipc_link_acked(n->bc_entry.link) != bc_ack)) {
+ tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From abf76d3239dee97b66e7241ad04811f1ce562e28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
+Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 13:37:36 -0400
+Subject: USB: chaoskey: Fix slab-use-after-free in chaoskey_release()
+
+From: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
+
+commit abf76d3239dee97b66e7241ad04811f1ce562e28 upstream.
+
+The chaoskey driver has a use-after-free bug in its release routine.
+If the user closes the device file after the USB device has been
+unplugged, a debugging log statement will try to access the
+usb_interface structure after it has been deallocated:
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406)
+ Read of size 8 at addr ffff888168e8a0b8 by task chaoskey_raw_re/10106
+
+ Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
+ print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
+ kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
+ dev_driver_string (drivers/base/core.c:2406)
+ __dynamic_dev_dbg (lib/dynamic_debug.c:906)
+ chaoskey_release (drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c:323)
+ __fput (fs/file_table.c:510)
+ fput_close_sync (fs/file_table.c:615)
+ __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1507 fs/open.c:1492 fs/open.c:1492)
+ do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
+
+The driver's last reference to the interface structure is dropped in
+the chaoskey_free() routine, so the code must not use the interface --
+even in a debugging statement -- after that routine returns.
+(Exception: If we know that another reference is held by someone else,
+such as the device core while the disconnect routine runs, there's no
+problem. Thanks to Johan Hovold for pointing this out.)
+
+Since the bad access is part of an unimportant debugging statement,
+we can fix the problem simply by removing the whole statement.
+
+Reported-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/20EC9664-054E-438B-B411-2145D347F97B@gmail.com/
+Tested-by: Shuangpeng Bai <shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
+Fixes: 66e3e591891d ("usb: Add driver for Altus Metrum ChaosKey device (v2)")
+Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/bb5b1dc6-eb59-43e1-8d26-51e658e88bbe@rowland.harvard.edu
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c
++++ b/drivers/usb/misc/chaoskey.c
+@@ -321,7 +321,6 @@ bail:
+ mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
+ destruction:
+ mutex_unlock(&chaoskey_list_lock);
+- usb_dbg(interface, "release success");
+ return rv;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From c687bc35694698ec4c7f92bf929c3d659f0cecb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 16:37:10 +0200
+Subject: virtio-mmio: fix device release warning on module unload
+
+From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+
+commit c687bc35694698ec4c7f92bf929c3d659f0cecb8 upstream.
+
+Driver core expects devices to be allocated dynamically and complains
+loudly when a device that lacks a release function is freed.
+
+Use __root_device_register() to allocate and register the root device
+instead of open coding using a static device.
+
+Note that root_device_register(), which also creates a link to the
+module, cannot be used as the device is registered when parsing the
+module parameters which happens before the module kobject has been set
+up.
+
+Fixes: 81a054ce0b46 ("virtio-mmio: Devices parameter parsing")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5
+Cc: Pawel Moll <pawel.moll@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Message-ID: <20260427143710.14702-1-johan@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
++++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c
+@@ -675,9 +675,7 @@ static int virtio_mmio_remove(struct pla
+
+ #if defined(CONFIG_VIRTIO_MMIO_CMDLINE_DEVICES)
+
+-static struct device vm_cmdline_parent = {
+- .init_name = "virtio-mmio-cmdline",
+-};
++static struct device *vm_cmdline_parent;
+
+ static int vm_cmdline_parent_registered;
+ static int vm_cmdline_id;
+@@ -685,7 +683,6 @@ static int vm_cmdline_id;
+ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *device,
+ const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+- int err;
+ struct resource resources[2] = {};
+ char *str;
+ long long int base, size;
+@@ -717,11 +714,10 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *de
+ resources[1].start = resources[1].end = irq;
+
+ if (!vm_cmdline_parent_registered) {
+- err = device_register(&vm_cmdline_parent);
+- if (err) {
+- put_device(&vm_cmdline_parent);
++ vm_cmdline_parent = __root_device_register("virtio-mmio-cmdline", NULL);
++ if (IS_ERR(vm_cmdline_parent)) {
+ pr_err("Failed to register parent device!\n");
+- return err;
++ return PTR_ERR(vm_cmdline_parent);
+ }
+ vm_cmdline_parent_registered = 1;
+ }
+@@ -732,7 +728,7 @@ static int vm_cmdline_set(const char *de
+ (unsigned long long)resources[0].end,
+ (int)resources[1].start);
+
+- pdev = platform_device_register_resndata(&vm_cmdline_parent,
++ pdev = platform_device_register_resndata(vm_cmdline_parent,
+ "virtio-mmio", vm_cmdline_id++,
+ resources, ARRAY_SIZE(resources), NULL, 0);
+
+@@ -756,8 +752,12 @@ static int vm_cmdline_get_device(struct
+ static int vm_cmdline_get(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+ {
+ buffer[0] = '\0';
+- device_for_each_child(&vm_cmdline_parent, buffer,
+- vm_cmdline_get_device);
++
++ if (vm_cmdline_parent_registered) {
++ device_for_each_child(vm_cmdline_parent, buffer,
++ vm_cmdline_get_device);
++ }
++
+ return strlen(buffer) + 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -779,9 +779,9 @@ static int vm_unregister_cmdline_device(
+ static void vm_unregister_cmdline_devices(void)
+ {
+ if (vm_cmdline_parent_registered) {
+- device_for_each_child(&vm_cmdline_parent, NULL,
++ device_for_each_child(vm_cmdline_parent, NULL,
+ vm_unregister_cmdline_device);
+- device_unregister(&vm_cmdline_parent);
++ root_device_unregister(vm_cmdline_parent);
+ vm_cmdline_parent_registered = 0;
+ }
+ }
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
