--- /dev/null
+From 64e759f58f128730b97a3c3a26d283c075ad7c86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
+Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 15:41:53 +0100
+Subject: Bluetooth: Fix missing encryption refresh on Security Request
+
+From: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
+
+commit 64e759f58f128730b97a3c3a26d283c075ad7c86 upstream.
+
+If Security Request is received on connection that is already encrypted
+with sufficient security master should perform encryption key refresh
+procedure instead of just ignoring Slave Security Request
+(Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3 Part H 2.4.6).
+
+> ACL Data RX: Handle 3585 flags 0x02 dlen 6
+ SMP: Security Request (0x0b) len 1
+ Authentication requirement: Bonding, No MITM, SC, No Keypresses (0x09)
+< HCI Command: LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) plen 28
+ Handle: 3585
+ Random number: 0x0000000000000000
+ Encrypted diversifier: 0x0000
+ Long term key: 44264272a5c426a9e868f034cf0e69f3
+> HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4
+ LE Start Encryption (0x08|0x0019) ncmd 1
+ Status: Success (0x00)
+> HCI Event: Encryption Key Refresh Complete (0x30) plen 3
+ Status: Success (0x00)
+ Handle: 3585
+
+Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@codecoup.pl>
+Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/bluetooth/smp.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
++++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+@@ -2251,8 +2251,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2
+ else
+ sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
+- if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
++ if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK)) {
++ /* If link is already encrypted with sufficient security we
++ * still need refresh encryption as per Core Spec 5.0 Vol 3,
++ * Part H 2.4.6
++ */
++ smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->sec_level);
+ return 0;
++ }
+
+ if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
+ hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
--- /dev/null
+From 0dcd7876029b58770f769cbb7b484e88e4a305e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 14:42:53 -0800
+Subject: net: xfrm: use preempt-safe this_cpu_read() in ipcomp_alloc_tfms()
+
+From: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
+
+commit 0dcd7876029b58770f769cbb7b484e88e4a305e5 upstream.
+
+f7c83bcbfaf5 ("net: xfrm: use __this_cpu_read per-cpu helper") added a
+__this_cpu_read() call inside ipcomp_alloc_tfms().
+
+At the time, __this_cpu_read() required the caller to either not care
+about races or to handle preemption/interrupt issues. 3.15 tightened
+the rules around some per-cpu operations, and now __this_cpu_read()
+should never be used in a preemptible context. On 3.15 and later, we
+need to use this_cpu_read() instead.
+
+syzkaller reported this leading to the following kernel BUG while
+fuzzing sendmsg:
+
+BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: repro/3101
+caller is ipcomp_init_state+0x185/0x990
+CPU: 3 PID: 3101 Comm: repro Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4-00123-g86f84779d8e9 #154
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
+Call Trace:
+ dump_stack+0xb9/0x115
+ check_preemption_disabled+0x1cb/0x1f0
+ ipcomp_init_state+0x185/0x990
+ ? __xfrm_init_state+0x876/0xc20
+ ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0
+ ipcomp4_init_state+0xaa/0x7c0
+ __xfrm_init_state+0x3eb/0xc20
+ xfrm_init_state+0x19/0x60
+ pfkey_add+0x20df/0x36f0
+ ? pfkey_broadcast+0x3dd/0x600
+ ? pfkey_sock_destruct+0x340/0x340
+ ? pfkey_seq_stop+0x80/0x80
+ ? __skb_clone+0x236/0x750
+ ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f6/0x260
+ ? pfkey_sock_destruct+0x340/0x340
+ ? pfkey_process+0x62a/0x6f0
+ pfkey_process+0x62a/0x6f0
+ ? pfkey_send_new_mapping+0x11c0/0x11c0
+ ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1390/0x1390
+ pfkey_sendmsg+0x383/0x750
+ ? dump_sp+0x430/0x430
+ sock_sendmsg+0xc0/0x100
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0x6c8/0x8b0
+ ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x3b0/0x3b0
+ ? pagevec_lru_move_fn+0x144/0x1f0
+ ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x1c0
+ ? do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0xc43/0x11e0
+ ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0
+ ? get_kernel_page+0xb0/0xb0
+ ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40
+ ? do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x400/0x11e0
+ ? __handle_mm_fault+0x553/0x2460
+ ? __fget_light+0x163/0x1f0
+ ? __sys_sendmsg+0xc7/0x170
+ __sys_sendmsg+0xc7/0x170
+ ? SyS_shutdown+0x1a0/0x1a0
+ ? __do_page_fault+0x5a0/0xca0
+ ? lock_downgrade+0x5e0/0x5e0
+ SyS_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
+ ? __sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x170
+ do_syscall_64+0x19f/0x640
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
+RIP: 0033:0x7f0ee73dfb79
+RSP: 002b:00007ffe14fc15a8 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0ee73dfb79
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000208befc8 RDI: 0000000000000004
+RBP: 00007ffe14fc15b0 R08: 00007ffe14fc15c0 R09: 00007ffe14fc15c0
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: 0000000000400440
+R13: 00007ffe14fc16b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
+
+Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c
+@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static struct crypto_comp * __percpu *ip
+ struct crypto_comp *tfm;
+
+ /* This can be any valid CPU ID so we don't need locking. */
+- tfm = __this_cpu_read(*pos->tfms);
++ tfm = this_cpu_read(*pos->tfms);
+
+ if (!strcmp(crypto_comp_name(tfm), alg_name)) {
+ pos->users++;
--- /dev/null
+From c8d70a700a5b486bfa8e5a7d33d805389f6e59f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 14:27:31 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: bridge: ebt_among: add more missing match size checks
+
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+
+commit c8d70a700a5b486bfa8e5a7d33d805389f6e59f9 upstream.
+
+ebt_among is special, it has a dynamic match size and is exempt
+from the central size checks.
+
+commit c4585a2823edf ("bridge: ebt_among: add missing match size checks")
+added validation for pool size, but missed fact that the macros
+ebt_among_wh_src/dst can already return out-of-bound result because
+they do not check value of wh_src/dst_ofs (an offset) vs. the size
+of the match that userspace gave to us.
+
+v2:
+check that offset has correct alignment.
+Paolo Abeni points out that we should also check that src/dst
+wormhash arrays do not overlap, and src + length lines up with
+start of dst (or vice versa).
+v3: compact wormhash_sizes_valid() part
+
+NB: Fixes tag is intentionally wrong, this bug exists from day
+one when match was added for 2.6 kernel. Tag is there so stable
+maintainers will notice this one too.
+
+Tested with same rules from the earlier patch.
+
+Fixes: c4585a2823edf ("bridge: ebt_among: add missing match size checks")
+Reported-by: <syzbot+bdabab6f1983a03fc009@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c
++++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebt_among.c
+@@ -177,6 +177,28 @@ static bool poolsize_invalid(const struc
+ return w && w->poolsize >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_mac_wormhash_tuple));
+ }
+
++static bool wormhash_offset_invalid(int off, unsigned int len)
++{
++ if (off == 0) /* not present */
++ return false;
++
++ if (off < (int)sizeof(struct ebt_among_info) ||
++ off % __alignof__(struct ebt_mac_wormhash))
++ return true;
++
++ off += sizeof(struct ebt_mac_wormhash);
++
++ return off > len;
++}
++
++static bool wormhash_sizes_valid(const struct ebt_mac_wormhash *wh, int a, int b)
++{
++ if (a == 0)
++ a = sizeof(struct ebt_among_info);
++
++ return ebt_mac_wormhash_size(wh) + a == b;
++}
++
+ static int ebt_among_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
+ {
+ const struct ebt_among_info *info = par->matchinfo;
+@@ -189,6 +211,10 @@ static int ebt_among_mt_check(const stru
+ if (expected_length > em->match_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (wormhash_offset_invalid(info->wh_dst_ofs, em->match_size) ||
++ wormhash_offset_invalid(info->wh_src_ofs, em->match_size))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ wh_dst = ebt_among_wh_dst(info);
+ if (poolsize_invalid(wh_dst))
+ return -EINVAL;
+@@ -201,6 +227,14 @@ static int ebt_among_mt_check(const stru
+ if (poolsize_invalid(wh_src))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (info->wh_src_ofs < info->wh_dst_ofs) {
++ if (!wormhash_sizes_valid(wh_src, info->wh_src_ofs, info->wh_dst_ofs))
++ return -EINVAL;
++ } else {
++ if (!wormhash_sizes_valid(wh_dst, info->wh_dst_ofs, info->wh_src_ofs))
++ return -EINVAL;
++ }
++
+ expected_length += ebt_mac_wormhash_size(wh_src);
+
+ if (em->match_size != EBT_ALIGN(expected_length)) {
--- /dev/null
+From aebfa52a925d701114afd6af0def35bab16d4f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 11:08:50 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: drop template ct when conntrack is skipped.
+
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+
+commit aebfa52a925d701114afd6af0def35bab16d4f47 upstream.
+
+The ipv4 nf_ct code currently skips the nf_conntrak_in() call
+for fragmented packets. As a results later matches/target can end
+up manipulating template ct entry instead of 'real' ones.
+
+Exploiting the above, syzbot found a way to trigger the following
+splat:
+
+WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4242 at net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:55
+xt_cluster_mt+0x6c1/0x840 net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:127
+Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
+
+CPU: 1 PID: 4242 Comm: syzkaller027971 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #243
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
+Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53
+ panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183
+ __warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547
+ report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:184
+ fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178
+ fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline]
+ do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296
+ do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315
+ invalid_op+0x58/0x80 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:957
+RIP: 0010:xt_cluster_hash net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:55 [inline]
+RIP: 0010:xt_cluster_mt+0x6c1/0x840 net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:127
+RSP: 0018:ffff8801d2f6f2d0 EFLAGS: 00010293
+RAX: ffff8801af700540 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff84a2d1e1
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801d2f6f478 RDI: ffff8801cafd336a
+RBP: ffff8801d2f6f2e8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801b03b3d18
+R13: ffff8801cafd3300 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801d2f6f478
+ ipt_do_table+0xa91/0x19b0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:296
+ iptable_filter_hook+0x65/0x80 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_filter.c:41
+ nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline]
+ nf_hook_slow+0xba/0x1a0 net/netfilter/core.c:483
+ nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:243 [inline]
+ NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline]
+ raw_send_hdrinc.isra.17+0xf39/0x1880 net/ipv4/raw.c:432
+ raw_sendmsg+0x14cd/0x26b0 net/ipv4/raw.c:669
+ inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:763
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:639
+ SYSC_sendto+0x361/0x5c0 net/socket.c:1748
+ SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1716
+ do_syscall_64+0x280/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
+RIP: 0033:0x441b49
+RSP: 002b:00007ffff5ca8b18 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000441b49
+RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: 0000000020ff7000 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 00000000006cc018 R08: 000000002066354c R09: 0000000000000010
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 0000000000403470
+R13: 0000000000403500 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
+Dumping ftrace buffer:
+ (ftrace buffer empty)
+Kernel Offset: disabled
+Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
+
+Instead of adding checks for template ct on every target/match
+manipulating skb->_nfct, simply drop the template ct when skipping
+nf_conntrack_in().
+
+Fixes: 7b4fdf77a450ec ("netfilter: don't track fragmented packets")
+Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+0346441ae0545cfcea3a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l3proto_ipv4.c
+@@ -159,8 +159,20 @@ static unsigned int ipv4_conntrack_local
+ ip_hdrlen(skb) < sizeof(struct iphdr))
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+- if (ip_is_fragment(ip_hdr(skb))) /* IP_NODEFRAG setsockopt set */
++ if (ip_is_fragment(ip_hdr(skb))) { /* IP_NODEFRAG setsockopt set */
++ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
++ struct nf_conn *tmpl;
++
++ tmpl = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo);
++ if (tmpl && nf_ct_is_template(tmpl)) {
++ /* when skipping ct, clear templates to avoid fooling
++ * later targets/matches
++ */
++ skb->_nfct = 0;
++ nf_ct_put(tmpl);
++ }
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
++ }
+
+ return nf_conntrack_in(state->net, PF_INET, state->hook, skb);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Sat, 10 Mar 2018 01:15:45 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_proc_name
+
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+
+commit b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e upstream.
+
+recent and hashlimit both create /proc files, but only check that
+name is 0 terminated.
+
+This can trigger WARN() from procfs when name is "" or "/".
+Add helper for this and then use it for both.
+
+Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: <syzbot+0502b00edac2a0680b61@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h | 2 ++
+ net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c | 5 +++--
+ net/netfilter/xt_recent.c | 6 +++---
+ 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
++++ b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
+@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@ unsigned int *xt_alloc_entry_offsets(uns
+ bool xt_find_jump_offset(const unsigned int *offsets,
+ unsigned int target, unsigned int size);
+
++int xt_check_proc_name(const char *name, unsigned int size);
++
+ int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
+ bool inv_proto);
+ int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
+--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+@@ -366,6 +366,36 @@ textify_hooks(char *buf, size_t size, un
+ return buf;
+ }
+
++/**
++ * xt_check_proc_name - check that name is suitable for /proc file creation
++ *
++ * @name: file name candidate
++ * @size: length of buffer
++ *
++ * some x_tables modules wish to create a file in /proc.
++ * This function makes sure that the name is suitable for this
++ * purpose, it checks that name is NUL terminated and isn't a 'special'
++ * name, like "..".
++ *
++ * returns negative number on error or 0 if name is useable.
++ */
++int xt_check_proc_name(const char *name, unsigned int size)
++{
++ if (name[0] == '\0')
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ if (strnlen(name, size) == size)
++ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
++
++ if (strcmp(name, ".") == 0 ||
++ strcmp(name, "..") == 0 ||
++ strchr(name, '/'))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_check_proc_name);
++
+ int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *par,
+ unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto)
+ {
+--- a/net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/xt_hashlimit.c
+@@ -668,8 +668,9 @@ static int hashlimit_mt_check(const stru
+
+ if (info->cfg.gc_interval == 0 || info->cfg.expire == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+- if (info->name[sizeof(info->name)-1] != '\0')
+- return -EINVAL;
++ ret = xt_check_proc_name(info->name, sizeof(info->name));
++ if (ret)
++ return ret;
+ if (par->family == NFPROTO_IPV4) {
+ if (info->cfg.srcmask > 32 || info->cfg.dstmask > 32)
+ return -EINVAL;
+--- a/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/xt_recent.c
+@@ -364,9 +364,9 @@ static int recent_mt_check(const struct
+ info->hit_count, XT_RECENT_MAX_NSTAMPS - 1);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+- if (info->name[0] == '\0' ||
+- strnlen(info->name, XT_RECENT_NAME_LEN) == XT_RECENT_NAME_LEN)
+- return -EINVAL;
++ ret = xt_check_proc_name(info->name, sizeof(info->name));
++ if (ret)
++ return ret;
+
+ if (ip_pkt_list_tot && info->hit_count < ip_pkt_list_tot)
+ nstamp_mask = roundup_pow_of_two(ip_pkt_list_tot) - 1;
rdma-ucma-check-that-device-exists-prior-to-accessing-it.patch
rdma-ucma-don-t-allow-join-attempts-for-unsupported-af-family.patch
rdma-ucma-introduce-safer-rdma_addr_size-variants.patch
+net-xfrm-use-preempt-safe-this_cpu_read-in-ipcomp_alloc_tfms.patch
+xfrm-refuse-to-insert-32-bit-userspace-socket-policies-on-64-bit-systems.patch
+netfilter-bridge-ebt_among-add-more-missing-match-size-checks.patch
+netfilter-drop-template-ct-when-conntrack-is-skipped.patch
+netfilter-x_tables-add-and-use-xt_check_proc_name.patch
+bluetooth-fix-missing-encryption-refresh-on-security-request.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 19d7df69fdb2636856dc8919de72fc1bf8f79598 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 08:49:23 +0100
+Subject: xfrm: Refuse to insert 32 bit userspace socket policies on 64 bit systems
+
+From: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+
+commit 19d7df69fdb2636856dc8919de72fc1bf8f79598 upstream.
+
+We don't have a compat layer for xfrm, so userspace and kernel
+structures have different sizes in this case. This results in
+a broken configuration, so refuse to configure socket policies
+when trying to insert from 32 bit userspace as we do it already
+with policies inserted via netlink.
+
+Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e1a1577ca8bcb47b769a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+[use is_compat_task() - gregkh]
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+@@ -1845,6 +1845,11 @@ int xfrm_user_policy(struct sock *sk, in
+ struct xfrm_mgr *km;
+ struct xfrm_policy *pol = NULL;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
++ if (is_compat_task())
++ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
++#endif
++
+ if (!optval && !optlen) {
+ xfrm_sk_policy_insert(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, NULL);
+ xfrm_sk_policy_insert(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, NULL);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
