--- /dev/null
+From 56763f12b0f02706576a088e85ef856deacc98a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Sun, 27 Feb 2022 10:01:41 -0800
+Subject: netfilter: fix use-after-free in __nf_register_net_hook()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+commit 56763f12b0f02706576a088e85ef856deacc98a0 upstream.
+
+We must not dereference @new_hooks after nf_hook_mutex has been released,
+because other threads might have freed our allocated hooks already.
+
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_hook_entries_get_hook_ops include/linux/netfilter.h:130 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hooks_validate net/netfilter/core.c:171 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __nf_register_net_hook+0x77a/0x820 net/netfilter/core.c:438
+Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c1a8000 by task syz-executor237/4430
+
+CPU: 1 PID: 4430 Comm: syz-executor237 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-syzkaller-00306-g2293be58d6a1 #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
+ dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
+ print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
+ __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
+ kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
+ nf_hook_entries_get_hook_ops include/linux/netfilter.h:130 [inline]
+ hooks_validate net/netfilter/core.c:171 [inline]
+ __nf_register_net_hook+0x77a/0x820 net/netfilter/core.c:438
+ nf_register_net_hook+0x114/0x170 net/netfilter/core.c:571
+ nf_register_net_hooks+0x59/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:587
+ nf_synproxy_ipv6_init+0x85/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c:1218
+ synproxy_tg6_check+0x30d/0x560 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_SYNPROXY.c:81
+ xt_check_target+0x26c/0x9e0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1038
+ check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:530 [inline]
+ find_check_entry.constprop.0+0x7f1/0x9e0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:573
+ translate_table+0xc8b/0x1750 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:735
+ do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1153 [inline]
+ do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x56e/0xb90 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1639
+ nf_setsockopt+0x83/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
+ ipv6_setsockopt+0x122/0x180 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1024
+ rawv6_setsockopt+0xd3/0x6a0 net/ipv6/raw.c:1084
+ __sys_setsockopt+0x2db/0x610 net/socket.c:2180
+ __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline]
+ __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2188
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
+RIP: 0033:0x7f65a1ace7d9
+Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 71 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
+RSP: 002b:00007f65a1a7f308 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00007f65a1ace7d9
+RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000029 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 00007f65a1b574c8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
+R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f65a1b55130
+R13: 00007f65a1b574c0 R14: 00007f65a1b24090 R15: 0000000000022000
+ </TASK>
+
+The buggy address belongs to the page:
+page:ffffea0000706a00 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1c1a8
+flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
+raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0001c1b108 ffffea000046dd08 0000000000000000
+raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
+page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
+page_owner tracks the page as freed
+page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), pid 4430, ts 1061781545818, free_ts 1061791488993
+ prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline]
+ get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165
+ __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389
+ __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:572 [inline]
+ alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:595 [inline]
+ kmalloc_large_node+0x62/0x130 mm/slub.c:4438
+ __kmalloc_node+0x35a/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:4454
+ kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
+ kvmalloc_node+0x97/0x100 mm/util.c:580
+ kvmalloc include/linux/slab.h:731 [inline]
+ kvzalloc include/linux/slab.h:739 [inline]
+ allocate_hook_entries_size net/netfilter/core.c:61 [inline]
+ nf_hook_entries_grow+0x140/0x780 net/netfilter/core.c:128
+ __nf_register_net_hook+0x144/0x820 net/netfilter/core.c:429
+ nf_register_net_hook+0x114/0x170 net/netfilter/core.c:571
+ nf_register_net_hooks+0x59/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:587
+ nf_synproxy_ipv6_init+0x85/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c:1218
+ synproxy_tg6_check+0x30d/0x560 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_SYNPROXY.c:81
+ xt_check_target+0x26c/0x9e0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1038
+ check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:530 [inline]
+ find_check_entry.constprop.0+0x7f1/0x9e0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:573
+ translate_table+0xc8b/0x1750 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:735
+ do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1153 [inline]
+ do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x56e/0xb90 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1639
+ nf_setsockopt+0x83/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
+page last free stack trace:
+ reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
+ free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline]
+ free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404
+ free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline]
+ free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404
+ kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:613
+ rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2527 [inline]
+ rcu_core+0x7b1/0x1820 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2778
+ __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
+
+Memory state around the buggy address:
+ ffff88801c1a7f00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+ ffff88801c1a7f80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+>ffff88801c1a8000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+ ^
+ ffff88801c1a8080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+ ffff88801c1a8100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+
+Fixes: 2420b79f8c18 ("netfilter: debug: check for sorted array")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/core.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/netfilter/core.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/core.c
+@@ -336,14 +336,15 @@ static int __nf_register_net_hook(struct
+ p = nf_entry_dereference(*pp);
+ new_hooks = nf_hook_entries_grow(p, reg);
+
+- if (!IS_ERR(new_hooks))
++ if (!IS_ERR(new_hooks)) {
++ hooks_validate(new_hooks);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, new_hooks);
++ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&nf_hook_mutex);
+ if (IS_ERR(new_hooks))
+ return PTR_ERR(new_hooks);
+
+- hooks_validate(new_hooks);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER_INGRESS
+ if (pf == NFPROTO_NETDEV && reg->hooknum == NF_NETDEV_INGRESS)
+ net_inc_ingress_queue();
--- /dev/null
+From 747670fd9a2d1b7774030dba65ca022ba442ce71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2022 14:02:41 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: nf_queue: don't assume sk is full socket
+
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+
+commit 747670fd9a2d1b7774030dba65ca022ba442ce71 upstream.
+
+There is no guarantee that state->sk refers to a full socket.
+
+If refcount transitions to 0, sock_put calls sk_free which then ends up
+with garbage fields.
+
+I'd like to thank Oleksandr Natalenko and Jiri Benc for considerable
+debug work and pointing out state->sk oddities.
+
+Fixes: ca6fb0651883 ("tcp: attach SYNACK messages to request sockets instead of listener")
+Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nf_queue.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
+@@ -64,6 +64,15 @@ static void nf_queue_entry_release_br_nf
+ #endif
+ }
+
++static void nf_queue_sock_put(struct sock *sk)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_INET
++ sock_gen_put(sk);
++#else
++ sock_put(sk);
++#endif
++}
++
+ void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
+ {
+ struct nf_hook_state *state = &entry->state;
+@@ -74,7 +83,7 @@ void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct
+ if (state->out)
+ dev_put(state->out);
+ if (state->sk)
+- sock_put(state->sk);
++ nf_queue_sock_put(state->sk);
+
+ nf_queue_entry_release_br_nf_refs(entry->skb);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From c3873070247d9e3c7a6b0cf9bf9b45e8018427b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 06:22:22 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: nf_queue: fix possible use-after-free
+
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+
+commit c3873070247d9e3c7a6b0cf9bf9b45e8018427b1 upstream.
+
+Eric Dumazet says:
+ The sock_hold() side seems suspect, because there is no guarantee
+ that sk_refcnt is not already 0.
+
+On failure, we cannot queue the packet and need to indicate an
+error. The packet will be dropped by the caller.
+
+v2: split skb prefetch hunk into separate change
+
+Fixes: 271b72c7fa82c ("udp: RCU handling for Unicast packets.")
+Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h | 2 +-
+ net/netfilter/nf_queue.c | 13 +++++++++----
+ net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h
++++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_queue.h
+@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void nf_register_queue_handler(struct ne
+ void nf_unregister_queue_handler(struct net *net);
+ void nf_reinject(struct nf_queue_entry *entry, unsigned int verdict);
+
+-void nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry);
++bool nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry);
+ void nf_queue_entry_release_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry);
+
+ static inline void init_hashrandom(u32 *jhash_initval)
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_queue.c
+@@ -108,18 +108,20 @@ static void nf_queue_entry_get_br_nf_ref
+ }
+
+ /* Bump dev refs so they don't vanish while packet is out */
+-void nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
++bool nf_queue_entry_get_refs(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
+ {
+ struct nf_hook_state *state = &entry->state;
+
++ if (state->sk && !refcount_inc_not_zero(&state->sk->sk_refcnt))
++ return false;
++
+ if (state->in)
+ dev_hold(state->in);
+ if (state->out)
+ dev_hold(state->out);
+- if (state->sk)
+- sock_hold(state->sk);
+
+ nf_queue_entry_get_br_nf_refs(entry->skb);
++ return true;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_queue_entry_get_refs);
+
+@@ -210,7 +212,10 @@ static int __nf_queue(struct sk_buff *sk
+ .size = sizeof(*entry) + route_key_size,
+ };
+
+- nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry);
++ if (!nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry)) {
++ kfree(entry);
++ return -ENOTCONN;
++ }
+
+ switch (entry->state.pf) {
+ case AF_INET:
+--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c
+@@ -712,9 +712,15 @@ static struct nf_queue_entry *
+ nf_queue_entry_dup(struct nf_queue_entry *e)
+ {
+ struct nf_queue_entry *entry = kmemdup(e, e->size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+- if (entry)
+- nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry);
+- return entry;
++
++ if (!entry)
++ return NULL;
++
++ if (nf_queue_entry_get_refs(entry))
++ return entry;
++
++ kfree(entry);
++ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER)
ata-pata_hpt37x-fix-pci-clock-detection.patch
alsa-intel_hdmi-fix-reference-to-pcm-buffer-address.patch
asoc-ops-shift-tested-values-in-snd_soc_put_volsw-by-min.patch
+xfrm-fix-mtu-regression.patch
+netfilter-fix-use-after-free-in-__nf_register_net_hook.patch
+xfrm-fix-the-if_id-check-in-changelink.patch
+xfrm-enforce-validity-of-offload-input-flags.patch
+netfilter-nf_queue-don-t-assume-sk-is-full-socket.patch
+netfilter-nf_queue-fix-possible-use-after-free.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 7c76ecd9c99b6e9a771d813ab1aa7fa428b3ade1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 16:14:32 +0200
+Subject: xfrm: enforce validity of offload input flags
+
+From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
+
+commit 7c76ecd9c99b6e9a771d813ab1aa7fa428b3ade1 upstream.
+
+struct xfrm_user_offload has flags variable that received user input,
+but kernel didn't check if valid bits were provided. It caused a situation
+where not sanitized input was forwarded directly to the drivers.
+
+For example, XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6 define that was exposed, was used by
+strongswan, but not implemented in the kernel at all.
+
+As a solution, check and sanitize input flags to forward
+XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND to the drivers.
+
+Fixes: d77e38e612a0 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API")
+Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h | 6 ++++++
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 6 +++++-
+ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h
++++ b/include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h
+@@ -504,6 +504,12 @@ struct xfrm_user_offload {
+ int ifindex;
+ __u8 flags;
+ };
++/* This flag was exposed without any kernel code that supporting it.
++ * Unfortunately, strongswan has the code that uses sets this flag,
++ * which makes impossible to reuse this bit.
++ *
++ * So leave it here to make sure that it won't be reused by mistake.
++ */
+ #define XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6 1
+ #define XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND 2
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c
+@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ int xfrm_dev_state_add(struct net *net,
+ if (x->encap || x->tfcpad)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (xuo->flags & ~(XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6 | XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ dev = dev_get_by_index(net, xuo->ifindex);
+ if (!dev) {
+ if (!(xuo->flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND)) {
+@@ -243,7 +246,8 @@ int xfrm_dev_state_add(struct net *net,
+
+ xso->dev = dev;
+ xso->num_exthdrs = 1;
+- xso->flags = xuo->flags;
++ /* Don't forward bit that is not implemented */
++ xso->flags = xuo->flags & ~XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6;
+
+ err = dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_add(x);
+ if (err) {
--- /dev/null
+From 6596a0229541270fb8d38d989f91b78838e5e9da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
+Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2022 10:22:53 +0100
+Subject: xfrm: fix MTU regression
+
+From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
+
+commit 6596a0229541270fb8d38d989f91b78838e5e9da upstream.
+
+Commit 749439bfac6e1a2932c582e2699f91d329658196 ("ipv6: fix udpv6
+sendmsg crash caused by too small MTU") breaks PMTU for xfrm.
+
+A Packet Too Big ICMPv6 message received in response to an ESP
+packet will prevent all further communication through the tunnel
+if the reported MTU minus the ESP overhead is smaller than 1280.
+
+E.g. in a case of a tunnel-mode ESP with sha256/aes the overhead
+is 92 bytes. Receiving a PTB with MTU of 1371 or less will result
+in all further packets in the tunnel dropped. A ping through the
+tunnel fails with "ping: sendmsg: Invalid argument".
+
+Apparently the MTU on the xfrm route is smaller than 1280 and
+fails the check inside ip6_setup_cork() added by 749439bf.
+
+We found this by debugging USGv6/ipv6ready failures. Failing
+tests are: "Phase-2 Interoperability Test Scenario IPsec" /
+5.3.11 and 5.4.11 (Tunnel Mode: Fragmentation).
+
+Commit b515d2637276a3810d6595e10ab02c13bfd0b63a ("xfrm:
+xfrm_state_mtu should return at least 1280 for ipv6") attempted
+to fix this but caused another regression in TCP MSS calculations
+and had to be reverted.
+
+The patch below fixes the situation by dropping the MTU
+check and instead checking for the underflows described in the
+749439bf commit message.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
+Fixes: 749439bfac6e ("ipv6: fix udpv6 sendmsg crash caused by too small MTU")
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -1361,8 +1361,6 @@ static int ip6_setup_cork(struct sock *s
+ if (np->frag_size)
+ mtu = np->frag_size;
+ }
+- if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
+- return -EINVAL;
+ cork->base.fragsize = mtu;
+ cork->base.gso_size = ipc6->gso_size;
+ cork->base.tx_flags = 0;
+@@ -1424,8 +1422,6 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock
+
+ fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len +
+ (opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0);
+- maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen -
+- sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
+
+ headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) +
+ (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) +
+@@ -1433,6 +1429,13 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock
+ sizeof(struct frag_hdr) : 0) +
+ rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
+
++ if (mtu < fragheaderlen ||
++ ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen < sizeof(struct frag_hdr))
++ goto emsgsize;
++
++ maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen -
++ sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
++
+ /* as per RFC 7112 section 5, the entire IPv6 Header Chain must fit
+ * the first fragment
+ */
--- /dev/null
+From 6d0d95a1c2b07270870e7be16575c513c29af3f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 07:51:57 +0100
+Subject: xfrm: fix the if_id check in changelink
+
+From: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
+
+commit 6d0d95a1c2b07270870e7be16575c513c29af3f1 upstream.
+
+if_id will be always 0, because it was not yet initialized.
+
+Fixes: 8dce43919566 ("xfrm: interface with if_id 0 should return error")
+Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_interface.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_interface.c
+@@ -695,12 +695,12 @@ static int xfrmi_changelink(struct net_d
+ struct net *net = xi->net;
+ struct xfrm_if_parms p = {};
+
++ xfrmi_netlink_parms(data, &p);
+ if (!p.if_id) {
+ NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "if_id must be non zero");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+- xfrmi_netlink_parms(data, &p);
+ xi = xfrmi_locate(net, &p);
+ if (!xi) {
+ xi = netdev_priv(dev);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
