--- /dev/null
+From 85b8350ae99d1300eb6dc072459246c2649a8e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
+Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 10:19:49 +0100
+Subject: ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2: fix CAN message ram offset and size
+
+From: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
+
+commit 85b8350ae99d1300eb6dc072459246c2649a8e50 upstream.
+
+CAN0 and CAN1 instances share the same message ram configured
+at 0x210000 on sama5d2 Linux systems.
+According to current configuration of CAN0, we need 0x1c00 bytes
+so that the CAN1 don't overlap its message ram:
+64 x RX FIFO0 elements => 64 x 72 bytes
+32 x TXE (TX Event FIFO) elements => 32 x 8 bytes
+32 x TXB (TX Buffer) elements => 32 x 72 bytes
+So a total of 7168 bytes (0x1C00).
+
+Fix offset to match this needed size.
+Make the CAN0 message ram ioremap match exactly this size so that is
+easily understandable. Adapt CAN1 size accordingly.
+
+Fixes: bc6d5d7666b7 ("ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2: add m_can nodes")
+Reported-by: Dan Sneddon <dan.sneddon@microchip.com>
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
+Tested-by: Cristian Birsan <cristian.birsan@microchip.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201203091949.9015-1-nicolas.ferre@microchip.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi
++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sama5d2.dtsi
+@@ -1298,7 +1298,7 @@
+
+ can0: can@f8054000 {
+ compatible = "bosch,m_can";
+- reg = <0xf8054000 0x4000>, <0x210000 0x4000>;
++ reg = <0xf8054000 0x4000>, <0x210000 0x1c00>;
+ reg-names = "m_can", "message_ram";
+ interrupts = <56 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 7>,
+ <64 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 7>;
+@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@
+
+ can1: can@fc050000 {
+ compatible = "bosch,m_can";
+- reg = <0xfc050000 0x4000>, <0x210000 0x4000>;
++ reg = <0xfc050000 0x4000>, <0x210000 0x3800>;
+ reg-names = "m_can", "message_ram";
+ interrupts = <57 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 7>,
+ <65 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 7>;
+@@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@
+ assigned-clocks = <&can1_gclk>;
+ assigned-clock-parents = <&utmi>;
+ assigned-clock-rates = <40000000>;
+- bosch,mram-cfg = <0x1100 0 0 64 0 0 32 32>;
++ bosch,mram-cfg = <0x1c00 0 0 64 0 0 32 32>;
+ status = "disabled";
+ };
+
--- /dev/null
+From df9dbaf2c415cd94ad520067a1eccfee62f00a33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "H. Nikolaus Schaller" <hns@goldelico.com>
+Date: Sat, 3 Oct 2020 16:10:00 +0200
+Subject: ARM: dts: pandaboard: fix pinmux for gpio user button of Pandaboard ES
+
+From: H. Nikolaus Schaller <hns@goldelico.com>
+
+commit df9dbaf2c415cd94ad520067a1eccfee62f00a33 upstream.
+
+The pinmux control register offset passed to OMAP4_IOPAD is odd.
+
+Fixes: ab9a13665e7c ("ARM: dts: pandaboard: add gpio user button")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: H. Nikolaus Schaller <hns@goldelico.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/arm/boot/dts/omap4-panda-es.dts | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/omap4-panda-es.dts
++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/omap4-panda-es.dts
+@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
+
+ button_pins: pinmux_button_pins {
+ pinctrl-single,pins = <
+- OMAP4_IOPAD(0x11b, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE3) /* gpio_113 */
++ OMAP4_IOPAD(0x0fc, PIN_INPUT_PULLUP | MUX_MODE3) /* gpio_113 */
+ >;
+ };
+ };
--- /dev/null
+From e5cafce3ad0f8652d6849314d951459c2bff7233 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
+Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 10:45:12 +0000
+Subject: ceph: fix race in concurrent __ceph_remove_cap invocations
+
+From: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
+
+commit e5cafce3ad0f8652d6849314d951459c2bff7233 upstream.
+
+A NULL pointer dereference may occur in __ceph_remove_cap with some of the
+callbacks used in ceph_iterate_session_caps, namely trim_caps_cb and
+remove_session_caps_cb. Those callers hold the session->s_mutex, so they
+are prevented from concurrent execution, but ceph_evict_inode does not.
+
+Since the callers of this function hold the i_ceph_lock, the fix is simply
+a matter of returning immediately if caps->ci is NULL.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/43272
+Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
+Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/ceph/caps.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ceph/caps.c
++++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c
+@@ -1047,12 +1047,19 @@ void __ceph_remove_cap(struct ceph_cap *
+ {
+ struct ceph_mds_session *session = cap->session;
+ struct ceph_inode_info *ci = cap->ci;
+- struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc =
+- ceph_sb_to_client(ci->vfs_inode.i_sb)->mdsc;
++ struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc;
+ int removed = 0;
+
++ /* 'ci' being NULL means the remove have already occurred */
++ if (!ci) {
++ dout("%s: cap inode is NULL\n", __func__);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ dout("__ceph_remove_cap %p from %p\n", cap, &ci->vfs_inode);
+
++ mdsc = ceph_inode_to_client(&ci->vfs_inode)->mdsc;
++
+ /* remove from inode's cap rbtree, and clear auth cap */
+ rb_erase(&cap->ci_node, &ci->i_caps);
+ if (ci->i_auth_cap == cap)
--- /dev/null
+From cca415537244f6102cbb09b5b90db6ae2c953bdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chunguang Xu <brookxu@tencent.com>
+Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2020 23:58:18 +0800
+Subject: ext4: fix a memory leak of ext4_free_data
+
+From: Chunguang Xu <brookxu@tencent.com>
+
+commit cca415537244f6102cbb09b5b90db6ae2c953bdd upstream.
+
+When freeing metadata, we will create an ext4_free_data and
+insert it into the pending free list. After the current
+transaction is committed, the object will be freed.
+
+ext4_mb_free_metadata() will check whether the area to be freed
+overlaps with the pending free list. If true, return directly. At this
+time, ext4_free_data is leaked. Fortunately, the probability of this
+problem is small, since it only occurs if the file system is corrupted
+such that a block is claimed by more one inode and those inodes are
+deleted within a single jbd2 transaction.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu <brookxu@tencent.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604764698-4269-8-git-send-email-brookxu@tencent.com
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Cc: stable@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+@@ -4690,6 +4690,7 @@ ext4_mb_free_metadata(handle_t *handle,
+ ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, group) +
+ EXT4_C2B(sbi, cluster),
+ "Block already on to-be-freed list");
++ kmem_cache_free(ext4_free_data_cachep, new_entry);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 46e294efc355c48d1dd4d58501aa56dac461792a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2020 12:06:49 +0100
+Subject: ext4: fix deadlock with fs freezing and EA inodes
+
+From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+
+commit 46e294efc355c48d1dd4d58501aa56dac461792a upstream.
+
+Xattr code using inodes with large xattr data can end up dropping last
+inode reference (and thus deleting the inode) from places like
+ext4_xattr_set_entry(). That function is called with transaction started
+and so ext4_evict_inode() can deadlock against fs freezing like:
+
+CPU1 CPU2
+
+removexattr() freeze_super()
+ vfs_removexattr()
+ ext4_xattr_set()
+ handle = ext4_journal_start()
+ ...
+ ext4_xattr_set_entry()
+ iput(old_ea_inode)
+ ext4_evict_inode(old_ea_inode)
+ sb->s_writers.frozen = SB_FREEZE_FS;
+ sb_wait_write(sb, SB_FREEZE_FS);
+ ext4_freeze()
+ jbd2_journal_lock_updates()
+ -> blocks waiting for all
+ handles to stop
+ sb_start_intwrite()
+ -> blocks as sb is already in SB_FREEZE_FS state
+
+Generally it is advisable to delete inodes from a separate transaction
+as it can consume quite some credits however in this case it would be
+quite clumsy and furthermore the credits for inode deletion are quite
+limited and already accounted for. So just tweak ext4_evict_inode() to
+avoid freeze protection if we have transaction already started and thus
+it is not really needed anyway.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: dec214d00e0d ("ext4: xattr inode deduplication")
+Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127110649.24730-1-jack@suse.cz
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/ext4/inode.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
+@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ void ext4_evict_inode(struct inode *inod
+ */
+ int extra_credits = 6;
+ struct ext4_xattr_inode_array *ea_inode_array = NULL;
++ bool freeze_protected = false;
+
+ trace_ext4_evict_inode(inode);
+
+@@ -250,9 +251,14 @@ void ext4_evict_inode(struct inode *inod
+
+ /*
+ * Protect us against freezing - iput() caller didn't have to have any
+- * protection against it
+- */
+- sb_start_intwrite(inode->i_sb);
++ * protection against it. When we are in a running transaction though,
++ * we are already protected against freezing and we cannot grab further
++ * protection due to lock ordering constraints.
++ */
++ if (!ext4_journal_current_handle()) {
++ sb_start_intwrite(inode->i_sb);
++ freeze_protected = true;
++ }
+
+ if (!IS_NOQUOTA(inode))
+ extra_credits += EXT4_MAXQUOTAS_DEL_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb);
+@@ -271,7 +277,8 @@ void ext4_evict_inode(struct inode *inod
+ * cleaned up.
+ */
+ ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
+- sb_end_intwrite(inode->i_sb);
++ if (freeze_protected)
++ sb_end_intwrite(inode->i_sb);
+ goto no_delete;
+ }
+
+@@ -312,7 +319,8 @@ void ext4_evict_inode(struct inode *inod
+ stop_handle:
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+ ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
+- sb_end_intwrite(inode->i_sb);
++ if (freeze_protected)
++ sb_end_intwrite(inode->i_sb);
+ ext4_xattr_inode_array_free(ea_inode_array);
+ goto no_delete;
+ }
+@@ -341,7 +349,8 @@ stop_handle:
+ else
+ ext4_free_inode(handle, inode);
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+- sb_end_intwrite(inode->i_sb);
++ if (freeze_protected)
++ sb_end_intwrite(inode->i_sb);
+ ext4_xattr_inode_array_free(ea_inode_array);
+ return;
+ no_delete:
--- /dev/null
+From 207cdd565dfc95a0a5185263a567817b7ebf5467 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 11:34:56 +0100
+Subject: ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
+
+From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+
+commit 207cdd565dfc95a0a5185263a567817b7ebf5467 upstream.
+
+Commit a408e4a86b36b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
+permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the
+original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the
+existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which
+is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges
+to open a new one.
+
+Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to
+do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes
+the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file
+when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor.
+
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8ec0 ima: Set file->f_mode
+Fixes: 2fe5d6def1672 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension")
+Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
+Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 20 +++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
++++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file
+ loff_t i_size;
+ int rc;
+ struct file *f = file;
+- bool new_file_instance = false, modified_mode = false;
++ bool new_file_instance = false;
+
+ /*
+ * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on
+@@ -433,18 +433,10 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file
+ O_TRUNC | O_CREAT | O_NOCTTY | O_EXCL);
+ flags |= O_RDONLY;
+ f = dentry_open(&file->f_path, flags, file->f_cred);
+- if (IS_ERR(f)) {
+- /*
+- * Cannot open the file again, lets modify f_mode
+- * of original and continue
+- */
+- pr_info_ratelimited("Unable to reopen file for reading.\n");
+- f = file;
+- f->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
+- modified_mode = true;
+- } else {
+- new_file_instance = true;
+- }
++ if (IS_ERR(f))
++ return PTR_ERR(f);
++
++ new_file_instance = true;
+ }
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(f));
+@@ -459,8 +451,6 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file
+ out:
+ if (new_file_instance)
+ fput(f);
+- else if (modified_mode)
+- f->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 9afc9a8a4909fece0e911e72b1060614ba2f7969 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhe Li <lizhe67@huawei.com>
+Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:37:11 +0800
+Subject: jffs2: Fix GC exit abnormally
+
+From: Zhe Li <lizhe67@huawei.com>
+
+commit 9afc9a8a4909fece0e911e72b1060614ba2f7969 upstream.
+
+The log of this problem is:
+jffs2: Error garbage collecting node at 0x***!
+jffs2: No space for garbage collection. Aborting GC thread
+
+This is because GC believe that it do nothing, so it abort.
+
+After going over the image of jffs2, I find a scene that
+can trigger this problem stably.
+The scene is: there is a normal dirent node at summary-area,
+but abnormal at corresponding not-summary-area with error
+name_crc.
+
+The reason that GC exit abnormally is because it find that
+abnormal dirent node to GC, but when it goes to function
+jffs2_add_fd_to_list, it cannot meet the condition listed
+below:
+
+if ((*prev)->nhash == new->nhash && !strcmp((*prev)->name, new->name))
+
+So no node is marked obsolete, statistical information of
+erase_block do not change, which cause GC exit abnormally.
+
+The root cause of this problem is: we do not check the
+name_crc of the abnormal dirent node with summary is enabled.
+
+Noticed that in function jffs2_scan_dirent_node, we use
+function jffs2_scan_dirty_space to deal with the dirent
+node with error name_crc. So this patch add a checking
+code in function read_direntry to ensure the correctness
+of dirent node. If checked failed, the dirent node will
+be marked obsolete so GC will pass this node and this
+problem will be fixed.
+
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Zhe Li <lizhe67@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/jffs2/readinode.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/jffs2/readinode.c
++++ b/fs/jffs2/readinode.c
+@@ -672,6 +672,22 @@ static inline int read_direntry(struct j
+ jffs2_free_full_dirent(fd);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_JFFS2_SUMMARY
++ /*
++ * we use CONFIG_JFFS2_SUMMARY because without it, we
++ * have checked it while mounting
++ */
++ crc = crc32(0, fd->name, rd->nsize);
++ if (unlikely(crc != je32_to_cpu(rd->name_crc))) {
++ JFFS2_NOTICE("name CRC failed on dirent node at"
++ "%#08x: read %#08x,calculated %#08x\n",
++ ref_offset(ref), je32_to_cpu(rd->node_crc), crc);
++ jffs2_mark_node_obsolete(c, ref);
++ jffs2_free_full_dirent(fd);
++ return 0;
++ }
++#endif
+ }
+
+ fd->nhash = full_name_hash(NULL, fd->name, rd->nsize);
--- /dev/null
+From ca4e514774930f30b66375a974b5edcbebaf0e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2020 11:10:15 +0000
+Subject: KVM: arm64: Introduce handling of AArch32 TTBCR2 traps
+
+From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
+
+commit ca4e514774930f30b66375a974b5edcbebaf0e7e upstream.
+
+ARMv8.2 introduced TTBCR2, which shares TCR_EL1 with TTBCR.
+Gracefully handle traps to this register when HCR_EL2.TVM is set.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
+ arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
++++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ enum vcpu_sysreg {
+ #define c2_TTBR1 (TTBR1_EL1 * 2) /* Translation Table Base Register 1 */
+ #define c2_TTBR1_high (c2_TTBR1 + 1) /* TTBR1 top 32 bits */
+ #define c2_TTBCR (TCR_EL1 * 2) /* Translation Table Base Control R. */
++#define c2_TTBCR2 (c2_TTBCR + 1) /* Translation Table Base Control R. 2 */
+ #define c3_DACR (DACR32_EL2 * 2)/* Domain Access Control Register */
+ #define c5_DFSR (ESR_EL1 * 2) /* Data Fault Status Register */
+ #define c5_IFSR (IFSR32_EL2 * 2)/* Instruction Fault Status Register */
+--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+@@ -1661,6 +1661,7 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc cp15_re
+ { Op1( 0), CRn( 2), CRm( 0), Op2( 0), access_vm_reg, NULL, c2_TTBR0 },
+ { Op1( 0), CRn( 2), CRm( 0), Op2( 1), access_vm_reg, NULL, c2_TTBR1 },
+ { Op1( 0), CRn( 2), CRm( 0), Op2( 2), access_vm_reg, NULL, c2_TTBCR },
++ { Op1( 0), CRn( 2), CRm( 0), Op2( 3), access_vm_reg, NULL, c2_TTBCR2 },
+ { Op1( 0), CRn( 3), CRm( 0), Op2( 0), access_vm_reg, NULL, c3_DACR },
+ { Op1( 0), CRn( 5), CRm( 0), Op2( 0), access_vm_reg, NULL, c5_DFSR },
+ { Op1( 0), CRn( 5), CRm( 0), Op2( 1), access_vm_reg, NULL, c5_IFSR },
--- /dev/null
+From d85be8a49e733dcd23674aa6202870d54bf5600d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 09:29:20 +0000
+Subject: powerpc: Fix incorrect stw{, ux, u, x} instructions in __set_pte_at
+
+From: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+
+commit d85be8a49e733dcd23674aa6202870d54bf5600d upstream.
+
+The placeholder for instruction selection should use the second
+argument's operand, which is %1, not %0. This could generate incorrect
+assembly code if the memory addressing of operand %0 is a different
+form from that of operand %1.
+
+Also remove the %Un placeholder because having %Un placeholders
+for two operands which are based on the same local var (ptep) doesn't
+make much sense. By the way, it doesn't change the current behaviour
+because "<>" constraint is missing for the associated "=m".
+
+[chleroy: revised commit log iaw segher's comments and removed %U0]
+
+Fixes: 9bf2b5cdc5fe ("powerpc: Fixes for CONFIG_PTE_64BIT for SMP support")
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.28+
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
+Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/96354bd77977a6a933fe9020da57629007fdb920.1603358942.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h | 4 ++--
+ arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h | 4 ++--
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h
++++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h
+@@ -434,9 +434,9 @@ static inline void __set_pte_at(struct m
+ if (pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_HASHPTE)
+ flush_hash_entry(mm, ptep, addr);
+ __asm__ __volatile__("\
+- stw%U0%X0 %2,%0\n\
++ stw%X0 %2,%0\n\
+ eieio\n\
+- stw%U0%X0 %L2,%1"
++ stw%X1 %L2,%1"
+ : "=m" (*ptep), "=m" (*((unsigned char *)ptep+4))
+ : "r" (pte) : "memory");
+
+--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h
++++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h
+@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ static inline void __set_pte_at(struct m
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC32) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PTE_64BIT) && !percpu) {
+ __asm__ __volatile__("\
+- stw%U0%X0 %2,%0\n\
++ stw%X0 %2,%0\n\
+ eieio\n\
+- stw%U0%X0 %L2,%1"
++ stw%X1 %L2,%1"
+ : "=m" (*ptep), "=m" (*((unsigned char *)ptep+4))
+ : "r" (pte) : "memory");
+ return;
--- /dev/null
+From c74cf7a3d59a21b290fe0468f5b470d0b8ee37df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 15:53:15 +0100
+Subject: powerpc/powernv/memtrace: Don't leak kernel memory to user space
+
+From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+
+commit c74cf7a3d59a21b290fe0468f5b470d0b8ee37df upstream.
+
+We currently leak kernel memory to user space, because memory
+offlining doesn't do any implicit clearing of memory and we are
+missing explicit clearing of memory.
+
+Let's keep it simple and clear pages before removing the linear
+mapping.
+
+Reproduced in QEMU/TCG with 10 GiB of main memory:
+ [root@localhost ~]# dd obs=9G if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/null
+ [... wait until "free -m" used counter no longer changes and cancel]
+ 19665802+0 records in
+ 1+0 records out
+ 9663676416 bytes (9.7 GB, 9.0 GiB) copied, 135.548 s, 71.3 MB/s
+ [root@localhost ~]# cat /sys/devices/system/memory/block_size_bytes
+ 40000000
+ [root@localhost ~]# echo 0x40000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/memtrace/enable
+ [ 402.978663][ T1086] page:000000001bc4bc74 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x24900
+ [ 402.980063][ T1086] flags: 0x7ffff000001000(reserved)
+ [ 402.980415][ T1086] raw: 007ffff000001000 c00c000000924008 c00c000000924008 0000000000000000
+ [ 402.980627][ T1086] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
+ [ 402.980845][ T1086] page dumped because: unmovable page
+ [ 402.989608][ T1086] Offlined Pages 16384
+ [ 403.324155][ T1086] memtrace: Allocated trace memory on node 0 at 0x0000000200000000
+
+Before this patch:
+ [root@localhost ~]# hexdump -C /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/memtrace/00000000/trace | head
+ 00000000 c8 25 72 51 4d 26 36 c5 5c c2 56 15 d5 1a cd 10 |.%rQM&6.\.V.....|
+ 00000010 19 b9 50 b2 cb e3 60 b8 ec 0a f3 ec 4b 3c 39 f0 |..P...`.....K<9.|$
+ 00000020 4e 5a 4c cf bd 26 19 ff 37 79 13 67 24 b7 b8 57 |NZL..&..7y.g$..W|$
+ 00000030 98 3e f5 be 6f 14 6a bd a4 52 bc 6e e9 e0 c1 5d |.>..o.j..R.n...]|$
+ 00000040 76 b3 ae b5 88 d7 da e3 64 23 85 2c 10 88 07 b6 |v.......d#.,....|$
+ 00000050 9a d8 91 de f7 50 27 69 2e 64 9c 6f d3 19 45 79 |.....P'i.d.o..Ey|$
+ 00000060 6a 6f 8a 61 71 19 1f c7 f1 df 28 26 ca 0f 84 55 |jo.aq.....(&...U|$
+ 00000070 01 3f be e4 e2 e1 da ff 7b 8c 8e 32 37 b4 24 53 |.?......{..27.$S|$
+ 00000080 1b 70 30 45 56 e6 8c c4 0e b5 4c fb 9f dd 88 06 |.p0EV.....L.....|$
+ 00000090 ef c4 18 79 f1 60 b1 5c 79 59 4d f4 36 d7 4a 5c |...y.`.\yYM.6.J\|$
+
+After this patch:
+ [root@localhost ~]# hexdump -C /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/memtrace/00000000/trace | head
+ 00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
+ *
+ 40000000
+
+Fixes: 9d5171a8f248 ("powerpc/powernv: Enable removal of memory for in memory tracing")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
+Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111145322.15793-2-david@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/memtrace.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/memtrace.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/memtrace.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,23 @@ static int change_memblock_state(struct
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++static void memtrace_clear_range(unsigned long start_pfn,
++ unsigned long nr_pages)
++{
++ unsigned long pfn;
++
++ /*
++ * As pages are offline, we cannot trust the memmap anymore. As HIGHMEM
++ * does not apply, avoid passing around "struct page" and use
++ * clear_page() instead directly.
++ */
++ for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn < start_pfn + nr_pages; pfn++) {
++ if (IS_ALIGNED(pfn, PAGES_PER_SECTION))
++ cond_resched();
++ clear_page(__va(PFN_PHYS(pfn)));
++ }
++}
++
+ /* called with device_hotplug_lock held */
+ static bool memtrace_offline_pages(u32 nid, u64 start_pfn, u64 nr_pages)
+ {
+@@ -115,6 +132,11 @@ static u64 memtrace_alloc_node(u32 nid,
+ for (base_pfn = end_pfn; base_pfn > start_pfn; base_pfn -= nr_pages) {
+ if (memtrace_offline_pages(nid, base_pfn, nr_pages) == true) {
+ /*
++ * Clear the range while we still have a linear
++ * mapping.
++ */
++ memtrace_clear_range(base_pfn, nr_pages);
++ /*
+ * Remove memory in memory block size chunks so that
+ * iomem resources are always split to the same size and
+ * we never try to remove memory that spans two iomem
--- /dev/null
+From d6718941a2767fb383e105d257d2105fe4f15f0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 15:53:16 +0100
+Subject: powerpc/powernv/memtrace: Fix crashing the kernel when enabling concurrently
+
+From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+
+commit d6718941a2767fb383e105d257d2105fe4f15f0e upstream.
+
+It's very easy to crash the kernel right now by simply trying to
+enable memtrace concurrently, hammering on the "enable" interface
+
+loop.sh:
+ #!/bin/bash
+
+ dmesg --console-off
+
+ while true; do
+ echo 0x40000000 > /sys/kernel/debug/powerpc/memtrace/enable
+ done
+
+[root@localhost ~]# loop.sh &
+[root@localhost ~]# loop.sh &
+
+Resulting quickly in a kernel crash. Let's properly protect using a
+mutex.
+
+Fixes: 9d5171a8f248 ("powerpc/powernv: Enable removal of memory for in memory tracing")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org# v4.14+
+Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111145322.15793-3-david@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/memtrace.c | 22 +++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/memtrace.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/memtrace.c
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ struct memtrace_entry {
+ char name[16];
+ };
+
++static DEFINE_MUTEX(memtrace_mutex);
+ static u64 memtrace_size;
+
+ static struct memtrace_entry *memtrace_array;
+@@ -294,6 +295,7 @@ static int memtrace_online(void)
+
+ static int memtrace_enable_set(void *data, u64 val)
+ {
++ int rc = -EAGAIN;
+ u64 bytes;
+
+ /*
+@@ -306,25 +308,31 @@ static int memtrace_enable_set(void *dat
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
++ mutex_lock(&memtrace_mutex);
++
+ /* Re-add/online previously removed/offlined memory */
+ if (memtrace_size) {
+ if (memtrace_online())
+- return -EAGAIN;
++ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+- if (!val)
+- return 0;
++ if (!val) {
++ rc = 0;
++ goto out_unlock;
++ }
+
+ /* Offline and remove memory */
+ if (memtrace_init_regions_runtime(val))
+- return -EINVAL;
++ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if (memtrace_init_debugfs())
+- return -EINVAL;
++ goto out_unlock;
+
+ memtrace_size = val;
+-
+- return 0;
++ rc = 0;
++out_unlock:
++ mutex_unlock(&memtrace_mutex);
++ return rc;
+ }
+
+ static int memtrace_enable_get(void *data, u64 *val)
--- /dev/null
+From f10881a46f8914428110d110140a455c66bdf27b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 13:54:34 -0600
+Subject: powerpc/rtas: Fix typo of ibm,open-errinjct in RTAS filter
+
+From: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
+
+commit f10881a46f8914428110d110140a455c66bdf27b upstream.
+
+Commit bd59380c5ba4 ("powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace")
+introduced the following error when invoking the errinjct userspace
+tool:
+
+ [root@ltcalpine2-lp5 librtas]# errinjct open
+ [327884.071171] sys_rtas: RTAS call blocked - exploit attempt?
+ [327884.071186] sys_rtas: token=0x26, nargs=0 (called by errinjct)
+ errinjct: Could not open RTAS error injection facility
+ errinjct: librtas: open: Unexpected I/O error
+
+The entry for ibm,open-errinjct in rtas_filter array has a typo where
+the "j" is omitted in the rtas call name. After fixing this typo the
+errinjct tool functions again as expected.
+
+ [root@ltcalpine2-lp5 linux]# errinjct open
+ RTAS error injection facility open, token = 1
+
+Fixes: bd59380c5ba4 ("powerpc/rtas: Restrict RTAS requests from userspace")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201208195434.8289-1-tyreld@linux.ibm.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c
+@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ static struct rtas_filter rtas_filters[]
+ { "ibm,display-message", -1, 0, -1, -1, -1 },
+ { "ibm,errinjct", -1, 2, -1, -1, -1, 1024 },
+ { "ibm,close-errinjct", -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 },
+- { "ibm,open-errinct", -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 },
++ { "ibm,open-errinjct", -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 },
+ { "ibm,get-config-addr-info2", -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 },
+ { "ibm,get-dynamic-sensor-state", -1, 1, -1, -1, -1 },
+ { "ibm,get-indices", -1, 2, 3, -1, -1 },
--- /dev/null
+From 7c6c86b36a36dd4a13d30bba07718e767aa2e7a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
+Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 10:35:38 +0000
+Subject: powerpc/xmon: Change printk() to pr_cont()
+
+From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
+
+commit 7c6c86b36a36dd4a13d30bba07718e767aa2e7a1 upstream.
+
+Since some time now, printk() adds carriage return, leading to
+unusable xmon output if there is no udbg backend available:
+
+ [ 54.288722] sysrq: Entering xmon
+ [ 54.292209] Vector: 0 at [cace3d2c]
+ [ 54.292274] pc:
+ [ 54.292331] c0023650
+ [ 54.292468] : xmon+0x28/0x58
+ [ 54.292519]
+ [ 54.292574] lr:
+ [ 54.292630] c0023724
+ [ 54.292749] : sysrq_handle_xmon+0xa4/0xfc
+ [ 54.292801]
+ [ 54.292867] sp: cace3de8
+ [ 54.292931] msr: 9032
+ [ 54.292999] current = 0xc28d0000
+ [ 54.293072] pid = 377, comm = sh
+ [ 54.293157] Linux version 5.10.0-rc6-s3k-dev-01364-gedf13f0ccd76-dirty (root@po17688vm.idsi0.si.c-s.fr) (powerpc64-linux-gcc (GCC) 10.1.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.34) #4211 PREEMPT Fri Dec 4 09:32:11 UTC 2020
+ [ 54.293287] enter ? for help
+ [ 54.293470] [cace3de8]
+ [ 54.293532] c0023724
+ [ 54.293654] sysrq_handle_xmon+0xa4/0xfc
+ [ 54.293711] (unreliable)
+ ...
+ [ 54.296002]
+ [ 54.296159] --- Exception: c01 (System Call) at
+ [ 54.296217] 0fd4e784
+ [ 54.296303]
+ [ 54.296375] SP (7fca6ff0) is in userspace
+ [ 54.296431] mon>
+ [ 54.296484] <no input ...>
+
+Use pr_cont() instead.
+
+Fixes: 4bcc595ccd80 ("printk: reinstate KERN_CONT for printing continuation lines")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
+Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
+[mpe: Mention that it only happens when udbg is not available]
+Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c8a6ec704416ecd5ff2bd26213c9bc026bdd19de.1607077340.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/powerpc/xmon/nonstdio.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/powerpc/xmon/nonstdio.c
++++ b/arch/powerpc/xmon/nonstdio.c
+@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ void xmon_printf(const char *format, ...
+
+ if (n && rc == 0) {
+ /* No udbg hooks, fallback to printk() - dangerous */
+- printk("%s", xmon_outbuf);
++ pr_cont("%s", xmon_outbuf);
+ }
+ }
+
usb-serial-keyspan_pda-fix-write-wakeup-use-after-free.patch
usb-serial-keyspan_pda-fix-tx-unthrottle-use-after-free.patch
usb-serial-keyspan_pda-fix-write-unthrottling.patch
+ext4-fix-a-memory-leak-of-ext4_free_data.patch
+ext4-fix-deadlock-with-fs-freezing-and-ea-inodes.patch
+kvm-arm64-introduce-handling-of-aarch32-ttbcr2-traps.patch
+arm-dts-pandaboard-fix-pinmux-for-gpio-user-button-of-pandaboard-es.patch
+arm-dts-at91-sama5d2-fix-can-message-ram-offset-and-size.patch
+powerpc-fix-incorrect-stw-ux-u-x-instructions-in-__set_pte_at.patch
+powerpc-rtas-fix-typo-of-ibm-open-errinjct-in-rtas-filter.patch
+powerpc-xmon-change-printk-to-pr_cont.patch
+powerpc-powernv-memtrace-don-t-leak-kernel-memory-to-user-space.patch
+powerpc-powernv-memtrace-fix-crashing-the-kernel-when-enabling-concurrently.patch
+ima-don-t-modify-file-descriptor-mode-on-the-fly.patch
+ceph-fix-race-in-concurrent-__ceph_remove_cap-invocations.patch
+smb3-avoid-confusing-warning-message-on-mount-to-azure.patch
+smb3.1.1-do-not-log-warning-message-if-server-doesn-t-populate-salt.patch
+ubifs-wbuf-don-t-leak-kernel-memory-to-flash.patch
+jffs2-fix-gc-exit-abnormally.patch
--- /dev/null
+From ebcd6de98754d9b6a5f89d7835864b1c365d432f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:13:31 -0600
+Subject: SMB3: avoid confusing warning message on mount to Azure
+
+From: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+
+commit ebcd6de98754d9b6a5f89d7835864b1c365d432f upstream.
+
+Mounts to Azure cause an unneeded warning message in dmesg
+ "CIFS: VFS: parse_server_interfaces: incomplete interface info"
+
+Azure rounds up the size (by 8 additional bytes, to a
+16 byte boundary) of the structure returned on the query
+of the server interfaces at mount time. This is permissible
+even though different than other servers so do not log a warning
+if query network interfaces response is only rounded up by 8
+bytes or fewer.
+
+CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
++++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+@@ -366,7 +366,8 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_i
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- if (bytes_left || p->Next)
++ /* Azure rounds the buffer size up 8, to a 16 byte boundary */
++ if ((bytes_left > 8) || p->Next)
+ cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: incomplete interface info\n", __func__);
+
+
--- /dev/null
+From 7955f105afb6034af344038d663bc98809483cdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2020 22:19:00 -0600
+Subject: SMB3.1.1: do not log warning message if server doesn't populate salt
+
+From: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+
+commit 7955f105afb6034af344038d663bc98809483cdd upstream.
+
+In the negotiate protocol preauth context, the server is not required
+to populate the salt (although it is done by most servers) so do
+not warn on mount.
+
+We retain the checks (warn) that the preauth context is the minimum
+size and that the salt does not exceed DataLength of the SMB response.
+Although we use the defaults in the case that the preauth context
+response is invalid, these checks may be useful in the future
+as servers add support for additional mechanisms.
+
+CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c | 7 +++++--
+ fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h | 14 +++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
++++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+@@ -406,8 +406,8 @@ build_preauth_ctxt(struct smb2_preauth_n
+ pneg_ctxt->ContextType = SMB2_PREAUTH_INTEGRITY_CAPABILITIES;
+ pneg_ctxt->DataLength = cpu_to_le16(38);
+ pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithmCount = cpu_to_le16(1);
+- pneg_ctxt->SaltLength = cpu_to_le16(SMB311_SALT_SIZE);
+- get_random_bytes(pneg_ctxt->Salt, SMB311_SALT_SIZE);
++ pneg_ctxt->SaltLength = cpu_to_le16(SMB311_LINUX_CLIENT_SALT_SIZE);
++ get_random_bytes(pneg_ctxt->Salt, SMB311_LINUX_CLIENT_SALT_SIZE);
+ pneg_ctxt->HashAlgorithms = SMB2_PREAUTH_INTEGRITY_SHA512;
+ }
+
+@@ -461,6 +461,9 @@ static void decode_preauth_context(struc
+ if (len < MIN_PREAUTH_CTXT_DATA_LEN) {
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING "server sent bad preauth context\n");
+ return;
++ } else if (len < MIN_PREAUTH_CTXT_DATA_LEN + le16_to_cpu(ctxt->SaltLength)) {
++ pr_warn_once("server sent invalid SaltLength\n");
++ return;
+ }
+ if (le16_to_cpu(ctxt->HashAlgorithmCount) != 1)
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING "illegal SMB3 hash algorithm count\n");
+--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h
++++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.h
+@@ -257,12 +257,20 @@ struct smb2_neg_context {
+ /* Followed by array of data */
+ } __packed;
+
+-#define SMB311_SALT_SIZE 32
++#define SMB311_LINUX_CLIENT_SALT_SIZE 32
+ /* Hash Algorithm Types */
+ #define SMB2_PREAUTH_INTEGRITY_SHA512 cpu_to_le16(0x0001)
+ #define SMB2_PREAUTH_HASH_SIZE 64
+
+-#define MIN_PREAUTH_CTXT_DATA_LEN (SMB311_SALT_SIZE + 6)
++/*
++ * SaltLength that the server send can be zero, so the only three required
++ * fields (all __le16) end up six bytes total, so the minimum context data len
++ * in the response is six bytes which accounts for
++ *
++ * HashAlgorithmCount, SaltLength, and 1 HashAlgorithm.
++ */
++#define MIN_PREAUTH_CTXT_DATA_LEN 6
++
+ struct smb2_preauth_neg_context {
+ __le16 ContextType; /* 1 */
+ __le16 DataLength;
+@@ -270,7 +278,7 @@ struct smb2_preauth_neg_context {
+ __le16 HashAlgorithmCount; /* 1 */
+ __le16 SaltLength;
+ __le16 HashAlgorithms; /* HashAlgorithms[0] since only one defined */
+- __u8 Salt[SMB311_SALT_SIZE];
++ __u8 Salt[SMB311_LINUX_CLIENT_SALT_SIZE];
+ } __packed;
+
+ /* Encryption Algorithms Ciphers */
--- /dev/null
+From 20f1431160c6b590cdc269a846fc5a448abf5b98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 22:05:30 +0100
+Subject: ubifs: wbuf: Don't leak kernel memory to flash
+
+From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+
+commit 20f1431160c6b590cdc269a846fc5a448abf5b98 upstream.
+
+Write buffers use a kmalloc()'ed buffer, they can leak
+up to seven bytes of kernel memory to flash if writes are not
+aligned.
+So use ubifs_pad() to fill these gaps with padding bytes.
+This was never a problem while scanning because the scanner logic
+manually aligns node lengths and skips over these gaps.
+
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Fixes: 1e51764a3c2ac05a2 ("UBIFS: add new flash file system")
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/ubifs/io.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ubifs/io.c
++++ b/fs/ubifs/io.c
+@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void ubifs_pad(const struct ubifs_info *
+ {
+ uint32_t crc;
+
+- ubifs_assert(c, pad >= 0 && !(pad & 7));
++ ubifs_assert(c, pad >= 0);
+
+ if (pad >= UBIFS_PAD_NODE_SZ) {
+ struct ubifs_ch *ch = buf;
+@@ -728,6 +728,10 @@ int ubifs_wbuf_write_nolock(struct ubifs
+ * write-buffer.
+ */
+ memcpy(wbuf->buf + wbuf->used, buf, len);
++ if (aligned_len > len) {
++ ubifs_assert(c, aligned_len - len < 8);
++ ubifs_pad(c, wbuf->buf + wbuf->used + len, aligned_len - len);
++ }
+
+ if (aligned_len == wbuf->avail) {
+ dbg_io("flush jhead %s wbuf to LEB %d:%d",
+@@ -820,13 +824,18 @@ int ubifs_wbuf_write_nolock(struct ubifs
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&wbuf->lock);
+- if (aligned_len)
++ if (aligned_len) {
+ /*
+ * And now we have what's left and what does not take whole
+ * max. write unit, so write it to the write-buffer and we are
+ * done.
+ */
+ memcpy(wbuf->buf, buf + written, len);
++ if (aligned_len > len) {
++ ubifs_assert(c, aligned_len - len < 8);
++ ubifs_pad(c, wbuf->buf + len, aligned_len - len);
++ }
++ }
+
+ if (c->leb_size - wbuf->offs >= c->max_write_size)
+ wbuf->size = c->max_write_size;
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
