return ok;
}
+int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (ctx->cert == NULL && sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted) >= 1)
+ ctx->cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, 0);
+ return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+}
+
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
- SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
int ret;
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert),
ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx);
+ ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx);
/*
* Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
=head1 DESCRIPTION
-These functions are typically called after X509_verify_cert() has indicated
+These functions are typically called after certificate or chain verification
+using L<X509_verify_cert(3)> or L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify(3)> has indicated
an error or in a verification callback to determine the nature of an error.
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error() returns the error code of B<ctx>, see
certificate being verified by the B<ctx>.
X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain() returns a complete validate chain if a previous
-call to X509_verify_cert() is successful. If the call to X509_verify_cert()
-is B<not> successful the returned chain may be incomplete or invalid. The
-returned chain persists after the B<ctx> structure is freed, when it is
-no longer needed it should be free up using:
+verification is successful. Otherwise the returned chain may be incomplete or
+invalid. The returned chain persists after the B<ctx> structure is freed,
+when it is no longer needed it should be free up using:
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<X509_verify_cert(3)>,
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>, L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify(3)>,
L<X509_up_ref(3)>,
L<X509_free(3)>.
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
- int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
- X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
+ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trust_store,
+ X509 *target, STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted);
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
These functions initialise an B<X509_STORE_CTX> structure for subsequent use
-by X509_verify_cert().
+by L<X509_verify_cert(3)> or L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify(3)>.
X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex() returns a newly initialised B<X509_STORE_CTX>
structure associated with the specified library context I<libctx> and property
If I<ctx> is NULL nothing is done.
X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up I<ctx> for a subsequent verification operation.
-It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a I<ctx> is only
-good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second
-certificate with the same I<ctx> then you must call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup()
+It must be called before each call to L<X509_verify_cert(3)>, i.e., a I<ctx> is
+only good for one verification; if you want to verify a second certificate
+or chain with the same I<ctx> then you must call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup()
and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to
-X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to I<store>, the end
-entity certificate to be verified is set to I<x509> and a set of additional
-certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in
-I<chain>. Any or all of the I<store>, I<x509> and I<chain> parameters can be
-B<NULL>.
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)> or L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify(3)>.
+The trusted certificate store is set to I<trust_store> of type B<X509_STORE>.
+This may be NULL because there are no trusted certificates or because
+they are provided simply as a list using X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack().
+The end entity certificate to be verified is set to I<target>,
+and a list of additional certificates may be provided in I<untrusted>,
+which will not be trusted but may be used to build the chain.
+Each of the I<trust_store>, I<target> and I<untrusted> parameters can be
+B<NULL>. Yet note that L<X509_verify_cert(3)> and L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify(3)>
+will need a verification target.
+This can also be set using X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert().
+For L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify(3)>, which takes by default the first element of the
+list of untrusted certificates as its verification target,
+this can be also set indirectly using X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted().
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of
I<ctx> to I<sk>. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates
instead of using an B<X509_STORE>.
-X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert() sets the certificate to be verified in I<ctx> to
-I<x>.
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert() sets the target certificate to be verified in I<ctx>
+to I<x>.
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain() sets the validated chain used
by I<ctx> to be I<chain>.
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted() retrieves an internal pointer to the
stack of untrusted certificates associated with I<ctx>.
-X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted() sets the internal point to the stack
+X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted() sets the internal pointer to the stack
of untrusted certificates associated with I<ctx> to I<sk>.
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify() will take the first element, if any,
+as its default target if the target certificate is not set explicitly.
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() sets the internal verification parameter pointer
to I<param>. After this call B<param> should not be used.
find an appropriate set of parameters from I<name>.
X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates
-that were used in building the chain following a call to X509_verify_cert().
+that were used in building the chain following a call to L<X509_verify_cert(3)>.
+With L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify(3)>, this does not count the first chain element.
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify() provides the capability for overriding the default
verify function. This function is responsible for verifying chain signatures and
=head1 SEE ALSO
-L<X509_verify_cert(3)>
+L<X509_verify_cert(3)>, L<X509_STORE_CTX_verify(3)>,
L<X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
=head1 NAME
-X509_verify_cert - discover and verify X509 certificate chain
+X509_verify_cert,
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify - discover and verify X509 certificate chain
=head1 SYNOPSIS
- #include <openssl/x509.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+ int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
The X509_verify_cert() function attempts to discover and validate a
-certificate chain based on parameters in B<ctx>.
+certificate chain based on parameters in I<ctx>.
The verification context, of type B<X509_STORE_CTX>, can be constructed
using L<X509_STORE_CTX_new(3)> and L<X509_STORE_CTX_init(3)>.
-It usually includes a set of certificates serving as trust anchors,
-a set of non-trusted certificates that may be needed for chain construction,
+It usually includes a target certificate to be verified,
+a set of certificates serving as trust anchors,
+a list of non-trusted certificates that may be helpful for chain construction,
flags such as X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT, and various other optional components
such as a callback function that allows customizing the verification outcome.
A complete description of the certificate verification process is contained in
SSL/TLS code.
A negative return value from X509_verify_cert() can occur if it is invoked
-incorrectly, such as with no certificate set in B<ctx>, or when it is called
-twice in succession without reinitialising B<ctx> for the second call.
+incorrectly, such as with no certificate set in I<ctx>, or when it is called
+twice in succession without reinitialising I<ctx> for the second call.
A negative return value can also happen due to internal resource problems or if
a retry operation is requested during internal lookups (which never happens
with standard lookup methods).
Applications must check for <= 0 return value on error.
-=head1 RETURN VALUES
-
-If a complete chain can be built and validated this function returns 1,
-otherwise it return zero, in exceptional circumstances it can also
-return a negative code.
+The X509_STORE_CTX_verify() behaves like X509_verify_cert() except that its
+target certificate is the first element of the list of untrusted certificates
+in I<ctx> unless a target certificate is set explicitly.
-If the function fails additional error information can be obtained by
-examining B<ctx> using, for example L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)>.
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
-=head1 BUGS
+Both functions return 1 if a complete chain can be built and validated,
+otherwise they return 0, and in exceptional circumstances (such as malloc
+failure and internal errors) they can also return a negative code.
-This function uses the header F<< <openssl/x509.h> >>
-as opposed to most chain verification
-functions which use F<< <openssl/x509_vfy.h> >>.
+On error or failure additional error information can be obtained by
+examining I<ctx> using, for example, L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)>.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<X509_STORE_CTX_new(3)>, L<X509_STORE_CTX_init(3)>,
L<X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(3)>
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify() was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2009-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
const char *attrname, int type,
const unsigned char *bytes, int len);
-int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
-
/* lookup a cert from a X509 STACK */
X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, const X509_NAME *name,
const ASN1_INTEGER *serial);
.generate_stack_macros("X509_VERIFY_PARAM");
-}
+int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+int X509_STORE_CTX_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+
int X509_STORE_set_depth(X509_STORE *store, int depth);
typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
X509_STORE_CTX *store_ctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
- X509 *cert = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int store_ctx_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx();
if (!TEST_ptr(store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new())
|| !TEST_ptr(ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl))
|| !TEST_ptr(store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx))
- || !TEST_ptr(cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0))
- || !TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, store, cert, chain))
+ || !TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, store, NULL, chain))
|| !TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(store_ctx, store_ctx_idx,
ssl)))
goto end;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(store_ctx, SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl));
/* Mask "internal failures" (-1) from our return value. */
- if (!TEST_int_ge(ret = X509_verify_cert(store_ctx), 0))
+ if (!TEST_int_ge(ret = X509_STORE_CTX_verify(store_ctx), 0))
ret = 0;
SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx));
EVP_PKEY_is_a ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_can_sign ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+X509_STORE_CTX_verify ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new_ex ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
CTLOG_new_ex ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
CTLOG_new_from_base64_ex ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:CT
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / commitdiff
