--- /dev/null
+From 9158c6bb245113d4966df9b2ba602197a379412e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhen Ni <zhen.ni@easystack.cn>
+Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 15:51:04 +0800
+Subject: afs: Fix potential null pointer dereference in afs_put_server
+
+From: Zhen Ni <zhen.ni@easystack.cn>
+
+commit 9158c6bb245113d4966df9b2ba602197a379412e upstream.
+
+afs_put_server() accessed server->debug_id before the NULL check, which
+could lead to a null pointer dereference. Move the debug_id assignment,
+ensuring we never dereference a NULL server pointer.
+
+Fixes: 2757a4dc1849 ("afs: Fix access after dec in put functions")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Zhen Ni <zhen.ni@easystack.cn>
+Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/afs/server.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/afs/server.c
++++ b/fs/afs/server.c
+@@ -401,13 +401,14 @@ struct afs_server *afs_use_server(struct
+ void afs_put_server(struct afs_net *net, struct afs_server *server,
+ enum afs_server_trace reason)
+ {
+- unsigned int a, debug_id = server->debug_id;
++ unsigned int a, debug_id;
+ bool zero;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!server)
+ return;
+
++ debug_id = server->debug_id;
+ a = atomic_read(&server->active);
+ zero = __refcount_dec_and_test(&server->ref, &r);
+ trace_afs_server(debug_id, r - 1, a, reason);
--- /dev/null
+From 1a194e6c8e1ee745e914b0b7f50fa86c89ed13fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2025 10:00:23 -0700
+Subject: fbcon: fix integer overflow in fbcon_do_set_font
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
+
+commit 1a194e6c8e1ee745e914b0b7f50fa86c89ed13fe upstream.
+
+Fix integer overflow vulnerabilities in fbcon_do_set_font() where font
+size calculations could overflow when handling user-controlled font
+parameters.
+
+The vulnerabilities occur when:
+1. CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount) performs h * pith * charcount
+ multiplication with user-controlled values that can overflow.
+2. FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size addition can also overflow
+3. This results in smaller allocations than expected, leading to buffer
+ overflows during font data copying.
+
+Add explicit overflow checking using check_mul_overflow() and
+check_add_overflow() kernel helpers to safety validate all size
+calculations before allocation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
+Fixes: 39b3cffb8cf3 ("fbcon: prevent user font height or width change from causing potential out-of-bounds access")
+Cc: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com>
+Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Cc: syzbot+38a3699c7eaf165b97a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch>
+Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
+Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
+Cc: "Ville Syrjälä" <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
+Cc: Qianqiang Liu <qianqiang.liu@163.com>
+Cc: Shixiong Ou <oushixiong@kylinos.cn>
+Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.9+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250912170023.3931881-1-samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 11 +++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
++++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
+@@ -2510,9 +2510,16 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data
+ if (fbcon_invalid_charcount(info, charcount))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+- size = CALC_FONTSZ(h, pitch, charcount);
++ /* Check for integer overflow in font size calculation */
++ if (check_mul_overflow(h, pitch, &size) ||
++ check_mul_overflow(size, charcount, &size))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ /* Check for overflow in allocation size calculation */
++ if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &size))
++ return -EINVAL;
+
+- new_data = kmalloc(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int) + size, GFP_USER);
++ new_data = kmalloc(size, GFP_USER);
+
+ if (!new_data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
--- /dev/null
+From 9b2f5ef00e852f8e8902a4d4f73aeedc60220c12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
+Date: Mon, 22 Sep 2025 15:45:54 +0200
+Subject: fbcon: Fix OOB access in font allocation
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
+
+commit 9b2f5ef00e852f8e8902a4d4f73aeedc60220c12 upstream.
+
+Commit 1a194e6c8e1e ("fbcon: fix integer overflow in fbcon_do_set_font")
+introduced an out-of-bounds access by storing data and allocation sizes
+in the same variable. Restore the old size calculation and use the new
+variable 'alloc_size' for the allocation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
+Fixes: 1a194e6c8e1e ("fbcon: fix integer overflow in fbcon_do_set_font")
+Reported-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
+Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/15020
+Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/6201
+Cc: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>
+Cc: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
+Cc: George Kennedy <george.kennedy@oracle.com>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch>
+Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
+Cc: "Ville Syrjälä" <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com>
+Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
+Cc: Qianqiang Liu <qianqiang.liu@163.com>
+Cc: Shixiong Ou <oushixiong@kylinos.cn>
+Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.9+
+Cc: Zsolt Kajtar <soci@c64.rulez.org>
+Reviewed-by: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Qianqiang Liu <qianqiang.liu@163.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250922134619.257684-1-tzimmermann@suse.de
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
++++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c
+@@ -2483,7 +2483,7 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data
+ unsigned charcount = font->charcount;
+ int w = font->width;
+ int h = font->height;
+- int size;
++ int size, alloc_size;
+ int i, csum;
+ u8 *new_data, *data = font->data;
+ int pitch = PITCH(font->width);
+@@ -2516,10 +2516,10 @@ static int fbcon_set_font(struct vc_data
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Check for overflow in allocation size calculation */
+- if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &size))
++ if (check_add_overflow(FONT_EXTRA_WORDS * sizeof(int), size, &alloc_size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+- new_data = kmalloc(size, GFP_USER);
++ new_data = kmalloc(alloc_size, GFP_USER);
+
+ if (!new_data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
--- /dev/null
+From 85e1ff61060a765d91ee62dc5606d4d547d9d105 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2025 12:58:58 -0700
+Subject: kmsan: fix out-of-bounds access to shadow memory
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
+
+commit 85e1ff61060a765d91ee62dc5606d4d547d9d105 upstream.
+
+Running sha224_kunit on a KMSAN-enabled kernel results in a crash in
+kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin():
+
+ BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffbc3840291000
+ #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
+ #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
+ PGD 1810067 P4D 1810067 PUD 192d067 PMD 3c17067 PTE 0
+ Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
+ CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 81 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G N 6.17.0-rc3 #10 PREEMPT(voluntary)
+ Tainted: [N]=TEST
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
+ RIP: 0010:kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin+0x91/0x100
+ [...]
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ __msan_memset+0xee/0x1a0
+ sha224_final+0x9e/0x350
+ test_hash_buffer_overruns+0x46f/0x5f0
+ ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x46/0xa0
+ ? __pfx_test_hash_buffer_overruns+0x10/0x10
+ kunit_try_run_case+0x198/0xa00
+
+This occurs when memset() is called on a buffer that is not 4-byte aligned
+and extends to the end of a guard page, i.e. the next page is unmapped.
+
+The bug is that the loop at the end of kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin()
+accesses the wrong shadow memory bytes when the address is not 4-byte
+aligned. Since each 4 bytes are associated with an origin, it rounds the
+address and size so that it can access all the origins that contain the
+buffer. However, when it checks the corresponding shadow bytes for a
+particular origin, it incorrectly uses the original unrounded shadow
+address. This results in reads from shadow memory beyond the end of the
+buffer's shadow memory, which crashes when that memory is not mapped.
+
+To fix this, correctly align the shadow address before accessing the 4
+shadow bytes corresponding to each origin.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250911195858.394235-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
+Fixes: 2ef3cec44c60 ("kmsan: do not wipe out origin when doing partial unpoisoning")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
+Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ mm/kmsan/core.c | 10 +++++++---
+ mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/mm/kmsan/core.c
++++ b/mm/kmsan/core.c
+@@ -262,7 +262,8 @@ void kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin(vo
+ u32 origin, bool checked)
+ {
+ u64 address = (u64)addr;
+- u32 *shadow_start, *origin_start;
++ void *shadow_start;
++ u32 *aligned_shadow, *origin_start;
+ size_t pad = 0;
+
+ KMSAN_WARN_ON(!kmsan_metadata_is_contiguous(addr, size));
+@@ -281,9 +282,12 @@ void kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin(vo
+ }
+ __memset(shadow_start, b, size);
+
+- if (!IS_ALIGNED(address, KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE)) {
++ if (IS_ALIGNED(address, KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE)) {
++ aligned_shadow = shadow_start;
++ } else {
+ pad = address % KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE;
+ address -= pad;
++ aligned_shadow = shadow_start - pad;
+ size += pad;
+ }
+ size = ALIGN(size, KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE);
+@@ -297,7 +301,7 @@ void kmsan_internal_set_shadow_origin(vo
+ * corresponding shadow slot is zero.
+ */
+ for (int i = 0; i < size / KMSAN_ORIGIN_SIZE; i++) {
+- if (origin || !shadow_start[i])
++ if (origin || !aligned_shadow[i])
+ origin_start[i] = origin;
+ }
+ }
+--- a/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c
++++ b/mm/kmsan/kmsan_test.c
+@@ -523,6 +523,21 @@ DEFINE_TEST_MEMSETXX(16)
+ DEFINE_TEST_MEMSETXX(32)
+ DEFINE_TEST_MEMSETXX(64)
+
++/* Test case: ensure that KMSAN does not access shadow memory out of bounds. */
++static void test_memset_on_guarded_buffer(struct kunit *test)
++{
++ void *buf = vmalloc(PAGE_SIZE);
++
++ kunit_info(test,
++ "memset() on ends of guarded buffer should not crash\n");
++
++ for (size_t size = 0; size <= 128; size++) {
++ memset(buf, 0xff, size);
++ memset(buf + PAGE_SIZE - size, 0xff, size);
++ }
++ vfree(buf);
++}
++
+ static noinline void fibonacci(int *array, int size, int start)
+ {
+ if (start < 2 || (start == size))
+@@ -602,6 +617,7 @@ static struct kunit_case kmsan_test_case
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_memset16),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_memset32),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_memset64),
++ KUNIT_CASE(test_memset_on_guarded_buffer),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_long_origin_chain),
+ KUNIT_CASE(test_stackdepot_roundtrip),
+ {},
--- /dev/null
+From 7b7387650dcf2881fd8bb55bcf3c8bd6c9542dd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2025 15:41:39 +0800
+Subject: mm/hugetlb: fix folio is still mapped when deleted
+
+From: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
+
+commit 7b7387650dcf2881fd8bb55bcf3c8bd6c9542dd7 upstream.
+
+Migration may be raced with fallocating hole. remove_inode_single_folio
+will unmap the folio if the folio is still mapped. However, it's called
+without folio lock. If the folio is migrated and the mapped pte has been
+converted to migration entry, folio_mapped() returns false, and won't
+unmap it. Due to extra refcount held by remove_inode_single_folio,
+migration fails, restores migration entry to normal pte, and the folio is
+mapped again. As a result, we triggered BUG in filemap_unaccount_folio.
+
+The log is as follows:
+ BUG: Bad page cache in process hugetlb pfn:156c00
+ page: refcount:515 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000099fef6e1 index:0x0 pfn:0x156c00
+ head: order:9 mapcount:1 entire_mapcount:1 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
+ aops:hugetlbfs_aops ino:dcc dentry name(?):"my_hugepage_file"
+ flags: 0x17ffffc00000c1(locked|waiters|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
+ page_type: f4(hugetlb)
+ page dumped because: still mapped when deleted
+ CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 395 Comm: hugetlb Not tainted 6.17.0-rc5-00044-g7aac71907bde-dirty #484 NONE
+ Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x70
+ filemap_unaccount_folio+0xc4/0x1c0
+ __filemap_remove_folio+0x38/0x1c0
+ filemap_remove_folio+0x41/0xd0
+ remove_inode_hugepages+0x142/0x250
+ hugetlbfs_fallocate+0x471/0x5a0
+ vfs_fallocate+0x149/0x380
+
+Hold folio lock before checking if the folio is mapped to avold race with
+migration.
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250912074139.3575005-1-tujinjiang@huawei.com
+Fixes: 4aae8d1c051e ("mm/hugetlbfs: unmap pages if page fault raced with hole punch")
+Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
+Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
+Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
+Cc: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
+Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
++++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
+@@ -619,14 +619,16 @@ static bool remove_inode_single_folio(st
+
+ /*
+ * If folio is mapped, it was faulted in after being
+- * unmapped in caller. Unmap (again) while holding
+- * the fault mutex. The mutex will prevent faults
+- * until we finish removing the folio.
++ * unmapped in caller or hugetlb_vmdelete_list() skips
++ * unmapping it due to fail to grab lock. Unmap (again)
++ * while holding the fault mutex. The mutex will prevent
++ * faults until we finish removing the folio. Hold folio
++ * lock to guarantee no concurrent migration.
+ */
++ folio_lock(folio);
+ if (unlikely(folio_mapped(folio)))
+ hugetlb_unmap_file_folio(h, mapping, folio, index);
+
+- folio_lock(folio);
+ /*
+ * We must remove the folio from page cache before removing
+ * the region/ reserve map (hugetlb_unreserve_pages). In
crypto-af_alg-fix-incorrect-boolean-values-in-af_alg_ctx.patch
tracing-dynevent-add-a-missing-lockdown-check-on-dynevent.patch
arm-dts-socfpga-sodia-fix-mdio-bus-probe-and-phy-address.patch
+afs-fix-potential-null-pointer-dereference-in-afs_put_server.patch
+kmsan-fix-out-of-bounds-access-to-shadow-memory.patch
+mm-hugetlb-fix-folio-is-still-mapped-when-deleted.patch
+fbcon-fix-integer-overflow-in-fbcon_do_set_font.patch
+fbcon-fix-oob-access-in-font-allocation.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
