]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/linux.git/commitdiff
x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack
authorJiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Tue, 11 Jun 2024 23:44:27 +0000 (08:44 +0900)
committerMasami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Tue, 11 Jun 2024 23:44:27 +0000 (08:44 +0900)
Currently the application with enabled shadow stack will crash
if it sets up return uprobe. The reason is the uretprobe kernel
code changes the user space task's stack, but does not update
shadow stack accordingly.

Adding new functions to update values on shadow stack and using
them in uprobe code to keep shadow stack in sync with uretprobe
changes to user stack.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240611112158.40795-2-jolsa@kernel.org/
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Fixes: 488af8ea7131 ("x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c

index 42fee8959df7bee17e27eaa7990db2401478d1d5..896909f306e306a8db596da2df96cf8318cbc54b 100644 (file)
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clon
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
 int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
 int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
+int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val);
 #else
 static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
                               unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
 static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
 static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
index 6f1e9883f07425e87d2ee7c4366ed284a8051ee7..9797d4cdb78a2cb65f5683723785a99e2cfbe6a0 100644 (file)
@@ -577,3 +577,14 @@ long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
                return wrss_control(true);
        return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val)
+{
+       unsigned long ssp;
+
+       if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+               return 0;
+
+       ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+       return write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)val);
+}
index 6c07f6daaa227a91da0864ecf35de79e23c10243..6402fb3089d262197ee7b709f3bf2f770c96c508 100644 (file)
@@ -1076,8 +1076,13 @@ arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(unsigned long trampoline_vaddr, struct pt_regs
                return orig_ret_vaddr;
 
        nleft = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, &trampoline_vaddr, rasize);
-       if (likely(!nleft))
+       if (likely(!nleft)) {
+               if (shstk_update_last_frame(trampoline_vaddr)) {
+                       force_sig(SIGSEGV);
+                       return -1;
+               }
                return orig_ret_vaddr;
+       }
 
        if (nleft != rasize) {
                pr_err("return address clobbered: pid=%d, %%sp=%#lx, %%ip=%#lx\n",