--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2020 09:54:15 -0700
+Subject: hv_netvsc: do not use VF device if link is down
+
+From: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 7c9864bbccc23e1812ac82966555d68c13ea4006 ]
+
+If the accelerated networking SRIOV VF device has lost carrier
+use the synthetic network device which is available as backup
+path. This is a rare case since if VF link goes down, normally
+the VMBus device will also loose external connectivity as well.
+But if the communication is between two VM's on the same host
+the VMBus device will still work.
+
+Reported-by: "Shah, Ashish N" <ashish.n.shah@intel.com>
+Fixes: 0c195567a8f6 ("netvsc: transparent VF management")
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 7 ++++---
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
++++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
+@@ -532,12 +532,13 @@ static int netvsc_start_xmit(struct sk_b
+ u32 hash;
+ struct hv_page_buffer pb[MAX_PAGE_BUFFER_COUNT];
+
+- /* if VF is present and up then redirect packets
+- * already called with rcu_read_lock_bh
++ /* If VF is present and up then redirect packets to it.
++ * Skip the VF if it is marked down or has no carrier.
++ * If netpoll is in uses, then VF can not be used either.
+ */
+ vf_netdev = rcu_dereference_bh(net_device_ctx->vf_netdev);
+ if (vf_netdev && netif_running(vf_netdev) &&
+- !netpoll_tx_running(net))
++ netif_carrier_ok(vf_netdev) && !netpoll_tx_running(net))
+ return netvsc_vf_xmit(net, vf_netdev, skb);
+
+ /* We will atmost need two pages to describe the rndis
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 11:37:13 +0300
+Subject: ipv4: Silence suspicious RCU usage warning
+
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 83f3522860f702748143e022f1a546547314c715 ]
+
+fib_trie_unmerge() is called with RTNL held, but not from an RCU
+read-side critical section. This leads to the following warning [1] when
+the FIB alias list in a leaf is traversed with
+hlist_for_each_entry_rcu().
+
+Since the function is always called with RTNL held and since
+modification of the list is protected by RTNL, simply use
+hlist_for_each_entry() and silence the warning.
+
+[1]
+WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
+5.8.0-rc4-custom-01520-gc1f937f3f83b #30 Not tainted
+-----------------------------
+net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1867 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
+
+other info that might help us debug this:
+
+rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
+1 lock held by ip/164:
+ #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x49a/0xbd0
+
+stack backtrace:
+CPU: 0 PID: 164 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01520-gc1f937f3f83b #30
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
+Call Trace:
+ dump_stack+0x100/0x184
+ lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d
+ fib_trie_unmerge+0x608/0xdb0
+ fib_unmerge+0x44/0x360
+ fib4_rule_configure+0xc8/0xad0
+ fib_nl_newrule+0x37a/0x1dd0
+ rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4f7/0xbd0
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480
+ rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30
+ netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40
+ ____sys_sendmsg+0x879/0xa00
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x190
+ __sys_sendmsg+0x103/0x1d0
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x7d/0xb0
+ do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+RIP: 0033:0x7fc80a234e97
+Code: Bad RIP value.
+RSP: 002b:00007ffef8b66798 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc80a234e97
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffef8b66800 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 000000005f141b1c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
+R10: 00007fc80a2a8ac0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
+R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffef8b67008 R15: 0000556fccb10020
+
+Fixes: 0ddcf43d5d4a ("ipv4: FIB Local/MAIN table collapse")
+Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c
+@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ struct fib_table *fib_trie_unmerge(struc
+ while ((l = leaf_walk_rcu(&tp, key)) != NULL) {
+ struct key_vector *local_l = NULL, *local_tp;
+
+- hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(fa, &l->leaf, fa_list) {
++ hlist_for_each_entry(fa, &l->leaf, fa_list) {
+ struct fib_alias *new_fa;
+
+ if (local_tb->tb_id != fa->tb_id)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 15:40:53 -0700
+Subject: ipv6: fix memory leaks on IPV6_ADDRFORM path
+
+From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 8c0de6e96c9794cb523a516c465991a70245da1c ]
+
+IPV6_ADDRFORM causes resource leaks when converting an IPv6 socket
+to IPv4, particularly struct ipv6_ac_socklist. Similar to
+struct ipv6_mc_socklist, we should just close it on this path.
+
+This bug can be easily reproduced with the following C program:
+
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+ int main()
+ {
+ int s, value;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 addr;
+ struct ipv6_mreq m6;
+
+ s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ addr.sin6_port = htons(5000);
+ inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::ffff:192.168.122.194", &addr.sin6_addr);
+ connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
+
+ inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe80::AAAA", &m6.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
+ m6.ipv6mr_interface = 5;
+ setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST, &m6, sizeof(m6));
+
+ value = AF_INET;
+ setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &value, sizeof(value));
+
+ close(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+Reported-by: ch3332xr@gmail.com
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/addrconf.h | 1 +
+ net/ipv6/anycast.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
+ net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/addrconf.h
++++ b/include/net/addrconf.h
+@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ int ipv6_sock_ac_join(struct sock *sk, i
+ const struct in6_addr *addr);
+ int ipv6_sock_ac_drop(struct sock *sk, int ifindex,
+ const struct in6_addr *addr);
++void __ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk);
+ void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk);
+
+ int __ipv6_dev_ac_inc(struct inet6_dev *idev, const struct in6_addr *addr);
+--- a/net/ipv6/anycast.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/anycast.c
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ int ipv6_sock_ac_drop(struct sock *sk, i
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk)
++void __ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk)
+ {
+ struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
+ struct net_device *dev = NULL;
+@@ -178,10 +178,7 @@ void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk)
+ struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
+ int prev_index;
+
+- if (!np->ipv6_ac_list)
+- return;
+-
+- rtnl_lock();
++ ASSERT_RTNL();
+ pac = np->ipv6_ac_list;
+ np->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;
+
+@@ -198,6 +195,16 @@ void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk)
+ sock_kfree_s(sk, pac, sizeof(*pac));
+ pac = next;
+ }
++}
++
++void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk)
++{
++ struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
++
++ if (!np->ipv6_ac_list)
++ return;
++ rtnl_lock();
++ __ipv6_sock_ac_close(sk);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ }
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
+@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct soc
+
+ fl6_free_socklist(sk);
+ __ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
++ __ipv6_sock_ac_close(sk);
+
+ /*
+ * Sock is moving from IPv6 to IPv4 (sk_prot), so
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Landen Chao <landen.chao@mediatek.com>
+Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 10:15:17 +0200
+Subject: net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix MTU warnings
+
+From: Landen Chao <landen.chao@mediatek.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 555a893303872e044fb86f0a5834ce78d41ad2e2 ]
+
+in recent kernel versions there are warnings about incorrect MTU size
+like these:
+
+eth0: mtu greater than device maximum
+mtk_soc_eth 1b100000.ethernet eth0: error -22 setting MTU to include DSA overhead
+
+Fixes: bfcb813203e6 ("net: dsa: configure the MTU for switch ports")
+Fixes: 72579e14a1d3 ("net: dsa: don't fail to probe if we couldn't set the MTU")
+Fixes: 7a4c53bee332 ("net: report invalid mtu value via netlink extack")
+Signed-off-by: Landen Chao <landen.chao@mediatek.com>
+Signed-off-by: Frank Wunderlich <frank-w@public-files.de>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c
+@@ -2452,6 +2452,8 @@ static int mtk_add_mac(struct mtk_eth *e
+ eth->netdev[id]->irq = eth->irq[0];
+ eth->netdev[id]->dev.of_node = np;
+
++ eth->netdev[id]->max_mtu = MTK_MAX_RX_LENGTH - MTK_RX_ETH_HLEN;
++
+ return 0;
+
+ free_netdev:
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 20:12:05 +0200
+Subject: net: gre: recompute gre csum for sctp over gre tunnels
+
+From: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 622e32b7d4a6492cf5c1f759ef833f817418f7b3 ]
+
+The GRE tunnel can be used to transport traffic that does not rely on a
+Internet checksum (e.g. SCTP). The issue can be triggered creating a GRE
+or GRETAP tunnel and transmitting SCTP traffic ontop of it where CRC
+offload has been disabled. In order to fix the issue we need to
+recompute the GRE csum in gre_gso_segment() not relying on the inner
+checksum.
+The issue is still present when we have the CRC offload enabled.
+In this case we need to disable the CRC offload if we require GRE
+checksum since otherwise skb_checksum() will report a wrong value.
+
+Fixes: 90017accff61 ("sctp: Add GSO support")
+Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/gre_offload.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/gre_offload.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/gre_offload.c
+@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *gre_gso_segment(s
+ netdev_features_t features)
+ {
+ int tnl_hlen = skb_inner_mac_header(skb) - skb_transport_header(skb);
++ bool need_csum, need_recompute_csum, gso_partial;
+ struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header;
+ __be16 protocol = skb->protocol;
+ u16 mac_len = skb->mac_len;
+ int gre_offset, outer_hlen;
+- bool need_csum, gso_partial;
+
+ if (!skb->encapsulation)
+ goto out;
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *gre_gso_segment(s
+ skb->protocol = skb->inner_protocol;
+
+ need_csum = !!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_GRE_CSUM);
++ need_recompute_csum = skb->csum_not_inet;
+ skb->encap_hdr_csum = need_csum;
+
+ features &= skb->dev->hw_enc_features;
+@@ -102,7 +103,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *gre_gso_segment(s
+ }
+
+ *(pcsum + 1) = 0;
+- *pcsum = gso_make_checksum(skb, 0);
++ if (need_recompute_csum && !skb_is_gso(skb)) {
++ __wsum csum;
++
++ csum = skb_checksum(skb, gre_offset,
++ skb->len - gre_offset, 0);
++ *pcsum = csum_fold(csum);
++ } else {
++ *pcsum = gso_make_checksum(skb, 0);
++ }
+ } while ((skb = skb->next));
+ out:
+ return segs;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 14:10:31 +0200
+Subject: net: lan78xx: replace bogus endpoint lookup
+
+From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit ea060b352654a8de1e070140d25fe1b7e4d50310 ]
+
+Drop the bogus endpoint-lookup helper which could end up accepting
+interfaces based on endpoints belonging to unrelated altsettings.
+
+Note that the returned bulk pipes and interrupt endpoint descriptor
+were never actually used. Instead the bulk-endpoint numbers are
+hardcoded to 1 and 2 (matching the specification), while the interrupt-
+endpoint descriptor was assumed to be the third descriptor created by
+USB core.
+
+Try to bring some order to this by dropping the bogus lookup helper and
+adding the missing endpoint sanity checks while keeping the interrupt-
+descriptor assumption for now.
+
+Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 117 +++++++++++-----------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c
+@@ -363,10 +363,6 @@ struct lan78xx_net {
+ struct tasklet_struct bh;
+ struct delayed_work wq;
+
+- struct usb_host_endpoint *ep_blkin;
+- struct usb_host_endpoint *ep_blkout;
+- struct usb_host_endpoint *ep_intr;
+-
+ int msg_enable;
+
+ struct urb *urb_intr;
+@@ -2751,78 +2747,12 @@ lan78xx_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ return NETDEV_TX_OK;
+ }
+
+-static int
+-lan78xx_get_endpoints(struct lan78xx_net *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
+-{
+- int tmp;
+- struct usb_host_interface *alt = NULL;
+- struct usb_host_endpoint *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+- struct usb_host_endpoint *status = NULL;
+-
+- for (tmp = 0; tmp < intf->num_altsetting; tmp++) {
+- unsigned ep;
+-
+- in = NULL;
+- out = NULL;
+- status = NULL;
+- alt = intf->altsetting + tmp;
+-
+- for (ep = 0; ep < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ep++) {
+- struct usb_host_endpoint *e;
+- int intr = 0;
+-
+- e = alt->endpoint + ep;
+- switch (e->desc.bmAttributes) {
+- case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT:
+- if (!usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc))
+- continue;
+- intr = 1;
+- /* FALLTHROUGH */
+- case USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK:
+- break;
+- default:
+- continue;
+- }
+- if (usb_endpoint_dir_in(&e->desc)) {
+- if (!intr && !in)
+- in = e;
+- else if (intr && !status)
+- status = e;
+- } else {
+- if (!out)
+- out = e;
+- }
+- }
+- if (in && out)
+- break;
+- }
+- if (!alt || !in || !out)
+- return -EINVAL;
+-
+- dev->pipe_in = usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev->udev,
+- in->desc.bEndpointAddress &
+- USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
+- dev->pipe_out = usb_sndbulkpipe(dev->udev,
+- out->desc.bEndpointAddress &
+- USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
+- dev->ep_intr = status;
+-
+- return 0;
+-}
+-
+ static int lan78xx_bind(struct lan78xx_net *dev, struct usb_interface *intf)
+ {
+ struct lan78xx_priv *pdata = NULL;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+- ret = lan78xx_get_endpoints(dev, intf);
+- if (ret) {
+- netdev_warn(dev->net, "lan78xx_get_endpoints failed: %d\n",
+- ret);
+- return ret;
+- }
+-
+ dev->data[0] = (unsigned long)kzalloc(sizeof(*pdata), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ pdata = (struct lan78xx_priv *)(dev->data[0]);
+@@ -3567,6 +3497,7 @@ static void lan78xx_stat_monitor(unsigne
+ static int lan78xx_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
+ const struct usb_device_id *id)
+ {
++ struct usb_host_endpoint *ep_blkin, *ep_blkout, *ep_intr;
+ struct lan78xx_net *dev;
+ struct net_device *netdev;
+ struct usb_device *udev;
+@@ -3617,6 +3548,34 @@ static int lan78xx_probe(struct usb_inte
+
+ mutex_init(&dev->stats.access_lock);
+
++ if (intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints < 3) {
++ ret = -ENODEV;
++ goto out2;
++ }
++
++ dev->pipe_in = usb_rcvbulkpipe(udev, BULK_IN_PIPE);
++ ep_blkin = usb_pipe_endpoint(udev, dev->pipe_in);
++ if (!ep_blkin || !usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(&ep_blkin->desc)) {
++ ret = -ENODEV;
++ goto out2;
++ }
++
++ dev->pipe_out = usb_sndbulkpipe(udev, BULK_OUT_PIPE);
++ ep_blkout = usb_pipe_endpoint(udev, dev->pipe_out);
++ if (!ep_blkout || !usb_endpoint_is_bulk_out(&ep_blkout->desc)) {
++ ret = -ENODEV;
++ goto out2;
++ }
++
++ ep_intr = &intf->cur_altsetting->endpoint[2];
++ if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(&ep_intr->desc)) {
++ ret = -ENODEV;
++ goto out2;
++ }
++
++ dev->pipe_intr = usb_rcvintpipe(dev->udev,
++ usb_endpoint_num(&ep_intr->desc));
++
+ ret = lan78xx_bind(dev, intf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out2;
+@@ -3629,23 +3588,7 @@ static int lan78xx_probe(struct usb_inte
+ netdev->max_mtu = MAX_SINGLE_PACKET_SIZE;
+ netif_set_gso_max_size(netdev, MAX_SINGLE_PACKET_SIZE - MAX_HEADER);
+
+- if (intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints < 3) {
+- ret = -ENODEV;
+- goto out3;
+- }
+-
+- dev->ep_blkin = (intf->cur_altsetting)->endpoint + 0;
+- dev->ep_blkout = (intf->cur_altsetting)->endpoint + 1;
+- dev->ep_intr = (intf->cur_altsetting)->endpoint + 2;
+-
+- dev->pipe_in = usb_rcvbulkpipe(udev, BULK_IN_PIPE);
+- dev->pipe_out = usb_sndbulkpipe(udev, BULK_OUT_PIPE);
+-
+- dev->pipe_intr = usb_rcvintpipe(dev->udev,
+- dev->ep_intr->desc.bEndpointAddress &
+- USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK);
+- period = dev->ep_intr->desc.bInterval;
+-
++ period = ep_intr->desc.bInterval;
+ maxp = usb_maxpacket(dev->udev, dev->pipe_intr, 0);
+ buf = kmalloc(maxp, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (buf) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 00:48:38 -0400
+Subject: openvswitch: Prevent kernel-infoleak in ovs_ct_put_key()
+
+From: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 9aba6c5b49254d5bee927d81593ed4429e91d4ae ]
+
+ovs_ct_put_key() is potentially copying uninitialized kernel stack memory
+into socket buffers, since the compiler may leave a 3-byte hole at the end
+of `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4` and `struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6`. Fix
+it by initializing `orig` with memset().
+
+Fixes: 9dd7f8907c37 ("openvswitch: Add original direction conntrack tuple to sw_flow_key.")
+Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
++++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
+@@ -255,10 +255,6 @@ void ovs_ct_fill_key(const struct sk_buf
+ ovs_ct_update_key(skb, NULL, key, false, false);
+ }
+
+-#define IN6_ADDR_INITIALIZER(ADDR) \
+- { (ADDR).s6_addr32[0], (ADDR).s6_addr32[1], \
+- (ADDR).s6_addr32[2], (ADDR).s6_addr32[3] }
+-
+ int ovs_ct_put_key(const struct sw_flow_key *swkey,
+ const struct sw_flow_key *output, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+@@ -280,24 +276,30 @@ int ovs_ct_put_key(const struct sw_flow_
+
+ if (swkey->ct_orig_proto) {
+ if (swkey->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
+- struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4 orig = {
+- output->ipv4.ct_orig.src,
+- output->ipv4.ct_orig.dst,
+- output->ct.orig_tp.src,
+- output->ct.orig_tp.dst,
+- output->ct_orig_proto,
+- };
++ struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv4 orig;
++
++ memset(&orig, 0, sizeof(orig));
++ orig.ipv4_src = output->ipv4.ct_orig.src;
++ orig.ipv4_dst = output->ipv4.ct_orig.dst;
++ orig.src_port = output->ct.orig_tp.src;
++ orig.dst_port = output->ct.orig_tp.dst;
++ orig.ipv4_proto = output->ct_orig_proto;
++
+ if (nla_put(skb, OVS_KEY_ATTR_CT_ORIG_TUPLE_IPV4,
+ sizeof(orig), &orig))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+ } else if (swkey->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
+- struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6 orig = {
+- IN6_ADDR_INITIALIZER(output->ipv6.ct_orig.src),
+- IN6_ADDR_INITIALIZER(output->ipv6.ct_orig.dst),
+- output->ct.orig_tp.src,
+- output->ct.orig_tp.dst,
+- output->ct_orig_proto,
+- };
++ struct ovs_key_ct_tuple_ipv6 orig;
++
++ memset(&orig, 0, sizeof(orig));
++ memcpy(orig.ipv6_src, output->ipv6.ct_orig.src.s6_addr32,
++ sizeof(orig.ipv6_src));
++ memcpy(orig.ipv6_dst, output->ipv6.ct_orig.dst.s6_addr32,
++ sizeof(orig.ipv6_dst));
++ orig.src_port = output->ct.orig_tp.src;
++ orig.dst_port = output->ct.orig_tp.dst;
++ orig.ipv6_proto = output->ct_orig_proto;
++
+ if (nla_put(skb, OVS_KEY_ATTR_CT_ORIG_TUPLE_IPV6,
+ sizeof(orig), &orig))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 10:41:31 +0800
+Subject: Revert "vxlan: fix tos value before xmit"
+
+From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit a0dced17ad9dc08b1b25e0065b54c97a318e6e8b ]
+
+This reverts commit 71130f29979c7c7956b040673e6b9d5643003176.
+
+In commit 71130f29979c ("vxlan: fix tos value before xmit") we want to
+make sure the tos value are filtered by RT_TOS() based on RFC1349.
+
+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+ | PRECEDENCE | TOS | MBZ |
+ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+
+But RFC1349 has been obsoleted by RFC2474. The new DSCP field defined like
+
+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+ | DS FIELD, DSCP | ECN FIELD |
+ +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+
+So with
+
+IPTOS_TOS_MASK 0x1E
+RT_TOS(tos) ((tos)&IPTOS_TOS_MASK)
+
+the first 3 bits DSCP info will get lost.
+
+To take all the DSCP info in xmit, we should revert the patch and just push
+all tos bits to ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(), which will handling ECN field later.
+
+Fixes: 71130f29979c ("vxlan: fix tos value before xmit")
+Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/vxlan.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c
+@@ -2222,7 +2222,7 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buf
+ skb_dst_update_pmtu(skb, mtu);
+ }
+
+- tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(RT_TOS(tos), old_iph, skb);
++ tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(tos, old_iph, skb);
+ ttl = ttl ? : ip4_dst_hoplimit(&rt->dst);
+ err = vxlan_build_skb(skb, ndst, sizeof(struct iphdr),
+ vni, md, flags, udp_sum);
+@@ -2263,7 +2263,7 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buf
+ skb_dst_update_pmtu(skb, mtu);
+ }
+
+- tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(RT_TOS(tos), old_iph, skb);
++ tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(tos, old_iph, skb);
+ ttl = ttl ? : ip6_dst_hoplimit(ndst);
+ skb_scrub_packet(skb, xnet);
+ err = vxlan_build_skb(skb, ndst, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr),
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:13:13 PM CEST
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 00:03:56 +0100
+Subject: rxrpc: Fix race between recvmsg and sendmsg on immediate call failure
+
+From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 65550098c1c4db528400c73acf3e46bfa78d9264 ]
+
+There's a race between rxrpc_sendmsg setting up a call, but then failing to
+send anything on it due to an error, and recvmsg() seeing the call
+completion occur and trying to return the state to the user.
+
+An assertion fails in rxrpc_recvmsg() because the call has already been
+released from the socket and is about to be released again as recvmsg deals
+with it. (The recvmsg_q queue on the socket holds a ref, so there's no
+problem with use-after-free.)
+
+We also have to be careful not to end up reporting an error twice, in such
+a way that both returns indicate to userspace that the user ID supplied
+with the call is no longer in use - which could cause the client to
+malfunction if it recycles the user ID fast enough.
+
+Fix this by the following means:
+
+ (1) When sendmsg() creates a call after the point that the call has been
+ successfully added to the socket, don't return any errors through
+ sendmsg(), but rather complete the call and let recvmsg() retrieve
+ them. Make sendmsg() return 0 at this point. Further calls to
+ sendmsg() for that call will fail with ESHUTDOWN.
+
+ Note that at this point, we haven't send any packets yet, so the
+ server doesn't yet know about the call.
+
+ (2) If sendmsg() returns an error when it was expected to create a new
+ call, it means that the user ID wasn't used.
+
+ (3) Mark the call disconnected before marking it completed to prevent an
+ oops in rxrpc_release_call().
+
+ (4) recvmsg() will then retrieve the error and set MSG_EOR to indicate
+ that the user ID is no longer known by the kernel.
+
+An oops like the following is produced:
+
+ kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:605!
+ ...
+ RIP: 0010:rxrpc_recvmsg+0x256/0x5ae
+ ...
+ Call Trace:
+ ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x2f/0x2f
+ ____sys_recvmsg+0x8a/0x148
+ ? import_iovec+0x69/0x9c
+ ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x86
+ ___sys_recvmsg+0x72/0xaa
+ ? __fget_files+0x22/0x57
+ ? __fget_light+0x46/0x51
+ ? fdget+0x9/0x1b
+ do_recvmmsg+0x15e/0x232
+ ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xa/0xb
+ ? vtime_delta+0xf/0x25
+ __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x2c/0x2f
+ do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x78
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+
+Fixes: 357f5ef64628 ("rxrpc: Call rxrpc_release_call() on error in rxrpc_new_client_call()")
+Reported-by: syzbot+b54969381df354936d96@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
+ net/rxrpc/conn_object.c | 8 +++++---
+ net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 2 +-
+ net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 3 +++
+ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c
+@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_client_call
+ */
+ ret = rxrpc_connect_call(call, cp, srx, gfp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+- goto error;
++ goto error_attached_to_socket;
+
+ trace_rxrpc_call(call, rxrpc_call_connected, atomic_read(&call->usage),
+ here, NULL);
+@@ -295,18 +295,29 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_client_call
+ error_dup_user_ID:
+ write_unlock(&rx->call_lock);
+ release_sock(&rx->sk);
+- ret = -EEXIST;
+-
+-error:
+ __rxrpc_set_call_completion(call, RXRPC_CALL_LOCAL_ERROR,
+- RX_CALL_DEAD, ret);
++ RX_CALL_DEAD, -EEXIST);
+ trace_rxrpc_call(call, rxrpc_call_error, atomic_read(&call->usage),
+- here, ERR_PTR(ret));
++ here, ERR_PTR(-EEXIST));
+ rxrpc_release_call(rx, call);
+ mutex_unlock(&call->user_mutex);
+ rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put);
+- _leave(" = %d", ret);
+- return ERR_PTR(ret);
++ _leave(" = -EEXIST");
++ return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
++
++ /* We got an error, but the call is attached to the socket and is in
++ * need of release. However, we might now race with recvmsg() when
++ * completing the call queues it. Return 0 from sys_sendmsg() and
++ * leave the error to recvmsg() to deal with.
++ */
++error_attached_to_socket:
++ trace_rxrpc_call(call, rxrpc_call_error, atomic_read(&call->usage),
++ here, ERR_PTR(ret));
++ set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags);
++ __rxrpc_set_call_completion(call, RXRPC_CALL_LOCAL_ERROR,
++ RX_CALL_DEAD, ret);
++ _leave(" = c=%08x [err]", call->debug_id);
++ return call;
+ }
+
+ /*
+--- a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c
+@@ -196,9 +196,11 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrpc_
+
+ call->peer->cong_cwnd = call->cong_cwnd;
+
+- spin_lock_bh(&conn->params.peer->lock);
+- hlist_del_init(&call->error_link);
+- spin_unlock_bh(&conn->params.peer->lock);
++ if (!hlist_unhashed(&call->error_link)) {
++ spin_lock_bh(&conn->params.peer->lock);
++ hlist_del_init(&call->error_link);
++ spin_unlock_bh(&conn->params.peer->lock);
++ }
+
+ if (rxrpc_is_client_call(call))
+ return rxrpc_disconnect_client_call(call);
+--- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
+@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ try_again:
+ goto error_unlock_call;
+ }
+
+- if (msg->msg_name) {
++ if (msg->msg_name && call->peer) {
+ struct sockaddr_rxrpc *srx = msg->msg_name;
+ size_t len = sizeof(call->peer->srx);
+
+--- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c
+@@ -579,6 +579,9 @@ int rxrpc_do_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *
+ if (IS_ERR(call))
+ return PTR_ERR(call);
+ /* ... and we have the call lock. */
++ ret = 0;
++ if (READ_ONCE(call->state) == RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE)
++ goto out_put_unlock;
+ } else {
+ switch (READ_ONCE(call->state)) {
+ case RXRPC_CALL_UNINITIALISED:
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 04:40:45 -0400
+Subject: selftests/net: relax cpu affinity requirement in msg_zerocopy test
+
+From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 16f6458f2478b55e2b628797bc81a4455045c74e ]
+
+The msg_zerocopy test pins the sender and receiver threads to separate
+cores to reduce variance between runs.
+
+But it hardcodes the cores and skips core 0, so it fails on machines
+with the selected cores offline, or simply fewer cores.
+
+The test mainly gives code coverage in automated runs. The throughput
+of zerocopy ('-z') and non-zerocopy runs is logged for manual
+inspection.
+
+Continue even when sched_setaffinity fails. Just log to warn anyone
+interpreting the data.
+
+Fixes: 07b65c5b31ce ("test: add msg_zerocopy test")
+Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+Acked-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ tools/testing/selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c | 5 ++---
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c
++++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/msg_zerocopy.c
+@@ -121,9 +121,8 @@ static int do_setcpu(int cpu)
+ CPU_ZERO(&mask);
+ CPU_SET(cpu, &mask);
+ if (sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(mask), &mask))
+- error(1, 0, "setaffinity %d", cpu);
+-
+- if (cfg_verbose)
++ fprintf(stderr, "cpu: unable to pin, may increase variance.\n");
++ else if (cfg_verbose)
+ fprintf(stderr, "cpu: %u\n", cpu);
+
+ return 0;
tools-lib-traceevent-fix-memory-leak-in-process_dyna.patch
drivers-hv-vmbus-ignore-channelmsg_tl_connect_result.patch
xattr-break-delegations-in-set-remove-xattr.patch
+ipv4-silence-suspicious-rcu-usage-warning.patch
+ipv6-fix-memory-leaks-on-ipv6_addrform-path.patch
+net-ethernet-mtk_eth_soc-fix-mtu-warnings.patch
+vxlan-ensure-fdb-dump-is-performed-under-rcu.patch
+net-lan78xx-replace-bogus-endpoint-lookup.patch
+hv_netvsc-do-not-use-vf-device-if-link-is-down.patch
+net-gre-recompute-gre-csum-for-sctp-over-gre-tunnels.patch
+openvswitch-prevent-kernel-infoleak-in-ovs_ct_put_key.patch
+revert-vxlan-fix-tos-value-before-xmit.patch
+selftests-net-relax-cpu-affinity-requirement-in-msg_zerocopy-test.patch
+usb-hso-check-for-return-value-in-hso_serial_common_create.patch
+rxrpc-fix-race-between-recvmsg-and-sendmsg-on-immediate-call-failure.patch
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 23:42:17 -0700
+Subject: usb: hso: check for return value in hso_serial_common_create()
+
+From: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit e911e99a0770f760377c263bc7bac1b1593c6147 ]
+
+in case of an error tty_register_device_attr() returns ERR_PTR(),
+add IS_ERR() check
+
+Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+67b2bd0e34f952d0321e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=67b2bd0e34f952d0321e
+Signed-off-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/usb/hso.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/usb/hso.c
++++ b/drivers/net/usb/hso.c
+@@ -2272,12 +2272,14 @@ static int hso_serial_common_create(stru
+
+ minor = get_free_serial_index();
+ if (minor < 0)
+- goto exit;
++ goto exit2;
+
+ /* register our minor number */
+ serial->parent->dev = tty_port_register_device_attr(&serial->port,
+ tty_drv, minor, &serial->parent->interface->dev,
+ serial->parent, hso_serial_dev_groups);
++ if (IS_ERR(serial->parent->dev))
++ goto exit2;
+ dev = serial->parent->dev;
+
+ /* fill in specific data for later use */
+@@ -2323,6 +2325,7 @@ static int hso_serial_common_create(stru
+ return 0;
+ exit:
+ hso_serial_tty_unregister(serial);
++exit2:
+ hso_serial_common_free(serial);
+ return -1;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Mon 10 Aug 2020 03:21:37 PM CEST
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 11:34:36 +0300
+Subject: vxlan: Ensure FDB dump is performed under RCU
+
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit b5141915b5aec3b29a63db869229e3741ebce258 ]
+
+The commit cited below removed the RCU read-side critical section from
+rtnl_fdb_dump() which means that the ndo_fdb_dump() callback is invoked
+without RCU protection.
+
+This results in the following warning [1] in the VXLAN driver, which
+relied on the callback being invoked from an RCU read-side critical
+section.
+
+Fix this by calling rcu_read_lock() in the VXLAN driver, as already done
+in the bridge driver.
+
+[1]
+WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
+5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Not tainted
+-----------------------------
+drivers/net/vxlan.c:1379 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
+
+other info that might help us debug this:
+
+rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
+1 lock held by bridge/166:
+ #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xea/0x1090
+
+stack backtrace:
+CPU: 1 PID: 166 Comm: bridge Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
+Call Trace:
+ dump_stack+0x100/0x184
+ lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d
+ vxlan_fdb_dump+0x51e/0x6d0
+ rtnl_fdb_dump+0x4dc/0xad0
+ netlink_dump+0x540/0x1090
+ __netlink_dump_start+0x695/0x950
+ rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x802/0xbd0
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480
+ rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30
+ netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40
+ __sys_sendto+0x279/0x3b0
+ __x64_sys_sendto+0xe6/0x1a0
+ do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+RIP: 0033:0x7fe14fa2ade0
+Code: Bad RIP value.
+RSP: 002b:00007fff75bb5b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005614b1ba0020 RCX: 00007fe14fa2ade0
+RDX: 000000000000011c RSI: 00007fff75bb5b90 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 00007fff75bb5b90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005614b1b89160
+R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
+
+Fixes: 5e6d24358799 ("bridge: netlink dump interface at par with brctl")
+Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/vxlan.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c
+@@ -974,6 +974,7 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff
+ for (h = 0; h < FDB_HASH_SIZE; ++h) {
+ struct vxlan_fdb *f;
+
++ rcu_read_lock();
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(f, &vxlan->fdb_head[h], hlist) {
+ struct vxlan_rdst *rd;
+
+@@ -986,12 +987,15 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff
+ cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
+ RTM_NEWNEIGH,
+ NLM_F_MULTI, rd);
+- if (err < 0)
++ if (err < 0) {
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto out;
++ }
+ skip:
+ *idx += 1;
+ }
+ }
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ }
+ out:
+ return err;
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
