=====================================
:Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: October 2024
+:Date: January 2025
The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
A sandboxed process can connect to a non-sandboxed process when its domain is
not scoped. If a process's domain is scoped, it can only connect to sockets
created by processes in the same scope.
-Moreover, If a process is scoped to send signal to a non-scoped process, it can
+Moreover, if a process is scoped to send signal to a non-scoped process, it can
only send signals to processes in the same scope.
A connected datagram socket behaves like a stream socket when its domain is
-scoped, meaning if the domain is scoped after the socket is connected , it can
+scoped, meaning if the domain is scoped after the socket is connected, it can
still :manpage:`send(2)` data just like a stream socket. However, in the same
scenario, a non-connected datagram socket cannot send data (with
:manpage:`sendto(2)`) outside its scope.
* ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
*
* These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of network
- * actions. This is supported since the Landlock ABI version 4.
+ * actions.
+ *
+ * This is supported since Landlock ABI version 4.
*
* The following access rights apply to TCP port numbers:
*
* Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain to forbid
* connections to resources outside the domain.
*
+ * This is supported since Landlock ABI version 6.
+ *
* Scopes:
*
* - %LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET: Restrict a sandboxed process from
* connecting to an abstract UNIX socket created by a process outside the
- * related Landlock domain (e.g. a parent domain or a non-sandboxed process).
+ * related Landlock domain (e.g., a parent domain or a non-sandboxed process).
* - %LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL: Restrict a sandboxed process from sending a signal
* to another process outside the domain.
*/