--- /dev/null
+From 3965a5913eb6e9a6017d130104f4cb09d1027e6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 4 Jun 2025 00:55:33 +0000
+Subject: arm64/ptrace: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in
+ regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()
+
+From: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 39dfc971e42d886e7df01371cd1bef505076d84c ]
+
+KASAN reports a stack-out-of-bounds read in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth().
+
+Call Trace:
+[ 97.283505] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0xa8/0xc8
+[ 97.284677] Read of size 8 at addr ffff800089277c10 by task 1.sh/2550
+[ 97.285732]
+[ 97.286067] CPU: 7 PID: 2550 Comm: 1.sh Not tainted 6.6.0+ #11
+[ 97.287032] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
+[ 97.287815] Call trace:
+[ 97.288279] dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
+[ 97.288946] show_stack+0x20/0x38
+[ 97.289551] dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0xc8
+[ 97.290203] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x84/0x3c8
+[ 97.291159] print_report+0xb0/0x280
+[ 97.291792] kasan_report+0x84/0xd0
+[ 97.292421] __asan_load8+0x9c/0xc0
+[ 97.293042] regs_get_kernel_stack_nth+0xa8/0xc8
+[ 97.293835] process_fetch_insn+0x770/0xa30
+[ 97.294562] kprobe_trace_func+0x254/0x3b0
+[ 97.295271] kprobe_dispatcher+0x98/0xe0
+[ 97.295955] kprobe_breakpoint_handler+0x1b0/0x210
+[ 97.296774] call_break_hook+0xc4/0x100
+[ 97.297451] brk_handler+0x24/0x78
+[ 97.298073] do_debug_exception+0xac/0x178
+[ 97.298785] el1_dbg+0x70/0x90
+[ 97.299344] el1h_64_sync_handler+0xcc/0xe8
+[ 97.300066] el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x80
+[ 97.300699] kernel_clone+0x0/0x500
+[ 97.301331] __arm64_sys_clone+0x70/0x90
+[ 97.302084] invoke_syscall+0x68/0x198
+[ 97.302746] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x11c/0x150
+[ 97.303569] do_el0_svc+0x38/0x50
+[ 97.304164] el0_svc+0x44/0x1d8
+[ 97.304749] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130
+[ 97.305500] el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190
+[ 97.306151]
+[ 97.306475] The buggy address belongs to stack of task 1.sh/2550
+[ 97.307461] and is located at offset 0 in frame:
+[ 97.308257] __se_sys_clone+0x0/0x138
+[ 97.308910]
+[ 97.309241] This frame has 1 object:
+[ 97.309873] [48, 184) 'args'
+[ 97.309876]
+[ 97.310749] The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
+[ 97.310749] [ffff800089270000, ffff800089279000) created by:
+[ 97.310749] dup_task_struct+0xc0/0x2e8
+[ 97.313347]
+[ 97.313674] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
+[ 97.314604] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14f69a
+[ 97.315885] flags: 0x15ffffe00000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
+[ 97.316957] raw: 015ffffe00000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
+[ 97.318207] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
+[ 97.319445] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
+[ 97.320371]
+[ 97.320694] Memory state around the buggy address:
+[ 97.321511] ffff800089277b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+[ 97.322681] ffff800089277b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+[ 97.323846] >ffff800089277c00: 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+[ 97.325023] ^
+[ 97.325683] ffff800089277c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
+[ 97.326856] ffff800089277d00: f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+
+This issue seems to be related to the behavior of some gcc compilers and
+was also fixed on the s390 architecture before:
+
+ commit d93a855c31b7 ("s390/ptrace: Avoid KASAN false positives in regs_get_kernel_stack_nth()")
+
+As described in that commit, regs_get_kernel_stack_nth() has confirmed that
+`addr` is on the stack, so reading the value at `*addr` should be allowed.
+Use READ_ONCE_NOCHECK() helper to silence the KASAN check for this case.
+
+Fixes: 0a8ea52c3eb1 ("arm64: Add HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API feature")
+Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda@huaweicloud.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250604005533.1278992-1-wutengda@huaweicloud.com
+[will: Use '*addr' as the argument to READ_ONCE_NOCHECK()]
+Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+index 2f1f86d916129..3025d14c253de 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ unsigned long regs_get_kernel_stack_nth(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int n)
+
+ addr += n;
+ if (regs_within_kernel_stack(regs, (unsigned long)addr))
+- return *addr;
++ return READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*addr);
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+--
+2.39.5
+
--- /dev/null
+From 5c3e334595eca81093303fe014cad4b9c1e00e71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2025 12:31:45 +0200
+Subject: perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()
+
+From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4f6fc782128355931527cefe3eb45338abd8ab39 ]
+
+Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
+synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
+MMIO in bad ways.
+
+The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
+exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
+space it is trying to access.
+
+It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
+receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
+various reasons.
+
+Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().
+
+Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
+to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
+sure to set current->mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
+teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.
+
+Fixes: c5ebcedb566e ("perf: Add ability to attach user stack dump to sample")
+Reported-by: Baisheng Gao <baisheng.gao@unisoc.com>
+Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250605110815.GQ39944@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ kernel/events/core.c | 7 +++++++
+ kernel/exit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
+index 25df8971a56ed..2761db0365ddc 100644
+--- a/kernel/events/core.c
++++ b/kernel/events/core.c
+@@ -6800,6 +6800,10 @@ perf_sample_ustack_size(u16 stack_size, u16 header_size,
+ if (!regs)
+ return 0;
+
++ /* No mm, no stack, no dump. */
++ if (!current->mm)
++ return 0;
++
+ /*
+ * Check if we fit in with the requested stack size into the:
+ * - TASK_SIZE
+@@ -7485,6 +7489,9 @@ perf_callchain(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs)
+ const u32 max_stack = event->attr.sample_max_stack;
+ struct perf_callchain_entry *callchain;
+
++ if (!current->mm)
++ user = false;
++
+ if (!kernel && !user)
+ return &__empty_callchain;
+
+diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
+index 156283b3c1bf6..10af26a4ab010 100644
+--- a/kernel/exit.c
++++ b/kernel/exit.c
+@@ -855,6 +855,15 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
+ tsk->exit_code = code;
+ taskstats_exit(tsk, group_dead);
+
++ /*
++ * Since sampling can touch ->mm, make sure to stop everything before we
++ * tear it down.
++ *
++ * Also flushes inherited counters to the parent - before the parent
++ * gets woken up by child-exit notifications.
++ */
++ perf_event_exit_task(tsk);
++
+ exit_mm();
+
+ if (group_dead)
+@@ -871,14 +880,6 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
+ exit_task_work(tsk);
+ exit_thread(tsk);
+
+- /*
+- * Flush inherited counters to the parent - before the parent
+- * gets woken up by child-exit notifications.
+- *
+- * because of cgroup mode, must be called before cgroup_exit()
+- */
+- perf_event_exit_task(tsk);
+-
+ sched_autogroup_exit_task(tsk);
+ cgroup_exit(tsk);
+
+--
+2.39.5
+
--- /dev/null
+From 801132cd9c523f8d3b99da95162279cc797cd994 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2025 11:44:47 +0530
+Subject: RISC-V: KVM: Don't treat SBI HFENCE calls as NOPs
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 2e7be162996640bbe3b6da694cc064c511b8a5d9 ]
+
+The SBI specification clearly states that SBI HFENCE calls should
+return SBI_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED when one of the target hart doesn’t
+support hypervisor extension (aka nested virtualization in-case
+of KVM RISC-V).
+
+Fixes: c7fa3c48de86 ("RISC-V: KVM: Treat SBI HFENCE calls as NOPs")
+Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
+Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605061458.196003-3-apatel@ventanamicro.com
+Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c
+index 304d29383e6c0..1b8b3fa5f74ab 100644
+--- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c
++++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c
+@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ static int kvm_sbi_ext_rfence_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run
+ case SBI_EXT_RFENCE_REMOTE_HFENCE_VVMA_ASID:
+ /*
+ * Until nested virtualization is implemented, the
+- * SBI HFENCE calls should be treated as NOPs
++ * SBI HFENCE calls should return not supported
++ * hence fallthrough.
+ */
+- break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+--
+2.39.5
+
--- /dev/null
+From 860e503d6fa707fda870158b8495fb62248fb836 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2025 11:44:46 +0530
+Subject: RISC-V: KVM: Fix the size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls
+
+From: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6aba0cb5bba6141158d5449f2cf53187b7f755f9 ]
+
+As-per the SBI specification, an SBI remote fence operation applies
+to the entire address space if either:
+1) start_addr and size are both 0
+2) size is equal to 2^XLEN-1
+
+>From the above, only #1 is checked by SBI SFENCE calls so fix the
+size parameter check in SBI SFENCE calls to cover #2 as well.
+
+Fixes: 13acfec2dbcc ("RISC-V: KVM: Add remote HFENCE functions based on VCPU requests")
+Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
+Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605061458.196003-2-apatel@ventanamicro.com
+Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c
+index 4c034d8a606a1..304d29383e6c0 100644
+--- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c
++++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_replace.c
+@@ -91,14 +91,14 @@ static int kvm_sbi_ext_rfence_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run
+ kvm_riscv_fence_i(vcpu->kvm, hbase, hmask);
+ break;
+ case SBI_EXT_RFENCE_REMOTE_SFENCE_VMA:
+- if (cp->a2 == 0 && cp->a3 == 0)
++ if ((cp->a2 == 0 && cp->a3 == 0) || cp->a3 == -1UL)
+ kvm_riscv_hfence_vvma_all(vcpu->kvm, hbase, hmask);
+ else
+ kvm_riscv_hfence_vvma_gva(vcpu->kvm, hbase, hmask,
+ cp->a2, cp->a3, PAGE_SHIFT);
+ break;
+ case SBI_EXT_RFENCE_REMOTE_SFENCE_VMA_ASID:
+- if (cp->a2 == 0 && cp->a3 == 0)
++ if ((cp->a2 == 0 && cp->a3 == 0) || cp->a3 == -1UL)
+ kvm_riscv_hfence_vvma_asid_all(vcpu->kvm,
+ hbase, hmask, cp->a4);
+ else
+--
+2.39.5
+
--- /dev/null
+From a4e12cea1992238962763cd6e066dfaf96396087 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 12 Jun 2025 21:35:18 +0500
+Subject: scsi: elx: efct: Fix memory leak in efct_hw_parse_filter()
+
+From: Vitaliy Shevtsov <v.shevtsov@mt-integration.ru>
+
+[ Upstream commit 2a8a5a5dd06eef580f9818567773fd75057cb875 ]
+
+strsep() modifies the address of the pointer passed to it so that it no
+longer points to the original address. This means kfree() gets the wrong
+pointer.
+
+Fix this by passing unmodified pointer returned from kstrdup() to
+kfree().
+
+Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
+
+Fixes: 4df84e846624 ("scsi: elx: efct: Driver initialization routines")
+Signed-off-by: Vitaliy Shevtsov <v.shevtsov@mt-integration.ru>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250612163616.24298-1-v.shevtsov@mt-integration.ru
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/scsi/elx/efct/efct_hw.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/scsi/elx/efct/efct_hw.c b/drivers/scsi/elx/efct/efct_hw.c
+index 5a5525054d71c..5b079b8b7a082 100644
+--- a/drivers/scsi/elx/efct/efct_hw.c
++++ b/drivers/scsi/elx/efct/efct_hw.c
+@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ int
+ efct_hw_parse_filter(struct efct_hw *hw, void *value)
+ {
+ int rc = 0;
+- char *p = NULL;
++ char *p = NULL, *pp = NULL;
+ char *token;
+ u32 idx = 0;
+
+@@ -1132,6 +1132,7 @@ efct_hw_parse_filter(struct efct_hw *hw, void *value)
+ efc_log_err(hw->os, "p is NULL\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
++ pp = p;
+
+ idx = 0;
+ while ((token = strsep(&p, ",")) && *token) {
+@@ -1144,7 +1145,7 @@ efct_hw_parse_filter(struct efct_hw *hw, void *value)
+ if (idx == ARRAY_SIZE(hw->config.filter_def))
+ break;
+ }
+- kfree(p);
++ kfree(pp);
+
+ return rc;
+ }
+--
+2.39.5
+
smb-client-fix-first-command-failure-during-re-negotiation.patch
platform-loongarch-laptop-add-backlight-power-control-support.patch
s390-pci-fix-__pcilg_mio_inuser-inline-assembly.patch
+perf-fix-sample-vs-do_exit.patch
+arm64-ptrace-fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-regs_ge.patch
+scsi-elx-efct-fix-memory-leak-in-efct_hw_parse_filte.patch
+risc-v-kvm-fix-the-size-parameter-check-in-sbi-sfenc.patch
+risc-v-kvm-don-t-treat-sbi-hfence-calls-as-nops.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
