]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable-queue.git/commitdiff
3.10-stable patches
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 27 Jan 2015 22:26:58 +0000 (14:26 -0800)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 27 Jan 2015 22:26:58 +0000 (14:26 -0800)
added patches:
kvm-x86-fix-of-previously-incomplete-fix-for-cve-2014-8480.patch
x86-tls-interpret-an-all-zero-struct-user_desc-as-no-segment.patch
x86-tls-ldt-stop-checking-lm-in-ldt_empty.patch

queue-3.10/kvm-x86-fix-of-previously-incomplete-fix-for-cve-2014-8480.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-3.10/series
queue-3.10/x86-tls-interpret-an-all-zero-struct-user_desc-as-no-segment.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-3.10/x86-tls-ldt-stop-checking-lm-in-ldt_empty.patch [new file with mode: 0644]

diff --git a/queue-3.10/kvm-x86-fix-of-previously-incomplete-fix-for-cve-2014-8480.patch b/queue-3.10/kvm-x86-fix-of-previously-incomplete-fix-for-cve-2014-8480.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..75c7223
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 63ea0a49ae0b145b91ff2b070c01b66fc75854b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2015 11:59:03 +0100
+Subject: KVM: x86: Fix of previously incomplete fix for CVE-2014-8480
+
+From: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
+
+commit 63ea0a49ae0b145b91ff2b070c01b66fc75854b9 upstream.
+
+STR and SLDT with rip-relative operand can cause a host kernel oops.
+Mark them as DstMem as well.
+
+Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |    4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+@@ -3808,8 +3808,8 @@ static const struct opcode group5[] = {
+ };
+ static const struct opcode group6[] = {
+-      DI(Prot,        sldt),
+-      DI(Prot,        str),
++      DI(Prot | DstMem,       sldt),
++      DI(Prot | DstMem,       str),
+       II(Prot | Priv | SrcMem16, em_lldt, lldt),
+       II(Prot | Priv | SrcMem16, em_ltr, ltr),
+       N, N, N, N,
index 0a752e8b6a06cc7eb30e4f2b01f0acfd994d26f7..ff53f1d760587e3f3d6fd110847ef749af47135c 100644 (file)
@@ -15,3 +15,6 @@ can-dev-fix-crtlmode_supported-check.patch
 clocksource-exynos_mct-fix-bitmask-regression-for-exynos4_mct_write.patch
 x86-hyperv-mark-the-hyper-v-clocksource-as-being-continuous.patch
 x86-tsc-change-fast-tsc-calibration-failed-from-error-to-info.patch
+kvm-x86-fix-of-previously-incomplete-fix-for-cve-2014-8480.patch
+x86-tls-ldt-stop-checking-lm-in-ldt_empty.patch
+x86-tls-interpret-an-all-zero-struct-user_desc-as-no-segment.patch
diff --git a/queue-3.10/x86-tls-interpret-an-all-zero-struct-user_desc-as-no-segment.patch b/queue-3.10/x86-tls-interpret-an-all-zero-struct-user_desc-as-no-segment.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..64c5477
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From 3669ef9fa7d35f573ec9c0e0341b29251c2734a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 11:27:59 -0800
+Subject: x86, tls: Interpret an all-zero struct user_desc as "no segment"
+
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+
+commit 3669ef9fa7d35f573ec9c0e0341b29251c2734a7 upstream.
+
+The Witcher 2 did something like this to allocate a TLS segment index:
+
+        struct user_desc u_info;
+        bzero(&u_info, sizeof(u_info));
+        u_info.entry_number = (uint32_t)-1;
+
+        syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &u_info);
+
+Strictly speaking, this code was never correct.  It should have set
+read_exec_only and seg_not_present to 1 to indicate that it wanted
+to find a free slot without putting anything there, or it should
+have put something sensible in the TLS slot if it wanted to allocate
+a TLS entry for real.  The actual effect of this code was to
+allocate a bogus segment that could be used to exploit espfix.
+
+The set_thread_area hardening patches changed the behavior, causing
+set_thread_area to return -EINVAL and crashing the game.
+
+This changes set_thread_area to interpret this as a request to find
+a free slot and to leave it empty, which isn't *quite* what the game
+expects but should be close enough to keep it working.  In
+particular, using the code above to allocate two segments will
+allocate the same segment both times.
+
+According to FrostbittenKing on Github, this fixes The Witcher 2.
+
+If this somehow still causes problems, we could instead allocate
+a limit==0 32-bit data segment, but that seems rather ugly to me.
+
+Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
+Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0cb251abe1ff0958b8e468a9a9a905b80ae3a746.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h |   13 +++++++++++++
+ arch/x86/kernel/tls.c       |   25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
+@@ -262,6 +262,19 @@ static inline void native_load_tls(struc
+        (info)->seg_not_present        == 1    &&      \
+        (info)->useable                == 0)
++/* Lots of programs expect an all-zero user_desc to mean "no segment at all". */
++static inline bool LDT_zero(const struct user_desc *info)
++{
++      return (info->base_addr         == 0 &&
++              info->limit             == 0 &&
++              info->contents          == 0 &&
++              info->read_exec_only    == 0 &&
++              info->seg_32bit         == 0 &&
++              info->limit_in_pages    == 0 &&
++              info->seg_not_present   == 0 &&
++              info->useable           == 0);
++}
++
+ static inline void clear_LDT(void)
+ {
+       set_ldt(NULL, 0);
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+@@ -29,7 +29,28 @@ static int get_free_idx(void)
+ static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
+ {
+-      if (LDT_empty(info))
++      /*
++       * For historical reasons (i.e. no one ever documented how any
++       * of the segmentation APIs work), user programs can and do
++       * assume that a struct user_desc that's all zeros except for
++       * entry_number means "no segment at all".  This never actually
++       * worked.  In fact, up to Linux 3.19, a struct user_desc like
++       * this would create a 16-bit read-write segment with base and
++       * limit both equal to zero.
++       *
++       * That was close enough to "no segment at all" until we
++       * hardened this function to disallow 16-bit TLS segments.  Fix
++       * it up by interpreting these zeroed segments the way that they
++       * were almost certainly intended to be interpreted.
++       *
++       * The correct way to ask for "no segment at all" is to specify
++       * a user_desc that satisfies LDT_empty.  To keep everything
++       * working, we accept both.
++       *
++       * Note that there's a similar kludge in modify_ldt -- look at
++       * the distinction between modes 1 and 0x11.
++       */
++      if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info))
+               return true;
+       /*
+@@ -71,7 +92,7 @@ static void set_tls_desc(struct task_str
+       cpu = get_cpu();
+       while (n-- > 0) {
+-              if (LDT_empty(info))
++              if (LDT_empty(info) || LDT_zero(info))
+                       desc->a = desc->b = 0;
+               else
+                       fill_ldt(desc, info);
diff --git a/queue-3.10/x86-tls-ldt-stop-checking-lm-in-ldt_empty.patch b/queue-3.10/x86-tls-ldt-stop-checking-lm-in-ldt_empty.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..9cc6f6a
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From e30ab185c490e9a9381385529e0fd32f0a399495 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 11:27:58 -0800
+Subject: x86, tls, ldt: Stop checking lm in LDT_empty
+
+From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+
+commit e30ab185c490e9a9381385529e0fd32f0a399495 upstream.
+
+32-bit programs don't have an lm bit in their ABI, so they can't
+reliably cause LDT_empty to return true without resorting to memset.
+They shouldn't need to do this.
+
+This should fix a longstanding, if minor, issue in all 64-bit kernels
+as well as a potential regression in the TLS hardening code.
+
+Fixes: 41bdc78544b8 x86/tls: Validate TLS entries to protect espfix
+Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/72a059de55e86ad5e2935c80aa91880ddf19d07c.1421954363.git.luto@amacapital.net
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h |    9 ++-------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h
+@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ static inline void native_load_tls(struc
+               gdt[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + i] = t->tls_array[i];
+ }
+-#define _LDT_empty(info)                              \
++/* This intentionally ignores lm, since 32-bit apps don't have that field. */
++#define LDT_empty(info)                                       \
+       ((info)->base_addr              == 0    &&      \
+        (info)->limit                  == 0    &&      \
+        (info)->contents               == 0    &&      \
+@@ -261,12 +262,6 @@ static inline void native_load_tls(struc
+        (info)->seg_not_present        == 1    &&      \
+        (info)->useable                == 0)
+-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+-#define LDT_empty(info) (_LDT_empty(info) && ((info)->lm == 0))
+-#else
+-#define LDT_empty(info) (_LDT_empty(info))
+-#endif
+-
+ static inline void clear_LDT(void)
+ {
+       set_ldt(NULL, 0);