--- /dev/null
+From 449052cfebf624b670faa040245d3feed770d22f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 19:00:35 +0800
+Subject: can: flexcan: assert FRZ bit in flexcan_chip_freeze()
+
+From: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
+
+commit 449052cfebf624b670faa040245d3feed770d22f upstream.
+
+Assert HALT bit to enter freeze mode, there is a premise that FRZ bit is
+asserted. This patch asserts FRZ bit in flexcan_chip_freeze, although
+the reset value is 1b'1. This is a prepare patch, later patch will
+invoke flexcan_chip_freeze() to enter freeze mode, which polling freeze
+mode acknowledge.
+
+Fixes: b1aa1c7a2165b ("can: flexcan: fix transition from and to freeze mode in chip_{,un}freeze")
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218110037.16591-2-qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com
+Signed-off-by: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
+Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c
+@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ static int flexcan_chip_freeze(struct fl
+ u32 reg;
+
+ reg = flexcan_read(®s->mcr);
+- reg |= FLEXCAN_MCR_HALT;
++ reg |= FLEXCAN_MCR_FRZ | FLEXCAN_MCR_HALT;
+ flexcan_write(reg, ®s->mcr);
+
+ while (timeout-- && !(flexcan_read(®s->mcr) & FLEXCAN_MCR_FRZ_ACK))
--- /dev/null
+From ec15e27cc8904605846a354bb1f808ea1432f853 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 19:00:36 +0800
+Subject: can: flexcan: enable RX FIFO after FRZ/HALT valid
+
+From: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
+
+commit ec15e27cc8904605846a354bb1f808ea1432f853 upstream.
+
+RX FIFO enable failed could happen when do system reboot stress test:
+
+[ 0.303958] flexcan 5a8d0000.can: 5a8d0000.can supply xceiver not found, using dummy regulator
+[ 0.304281] flexcan 5a8d0000.can (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): Could not enable RX FIFO, unsupported core
+[ 0.314640] flexcan 5a8d0000.can: registering netdev failed
+[ 0.320728] flexcan 5a8e0000.can: 5a8e0000.can supply xceiver not found, using dummy regulator
+[ 0.320991] flexcan 5a8e0000.can (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): Could not enable RX FIFO, unsupported core
+[ 0.331360] flexcan 5a8e0000.can: registering netdev failed
+[ 0.337444] flexcan 5a8f0000.can: 5a8f0000.can supply xceiver not found, using dummy regulator
+[ 0.337716] flexcan 5a8f0000.can (unnamed net_device) (uninitialized): Could not enable RX FIFO, unsupported core
+[ 0.348117] flexcan 5a8f0000.can: registering netdev failed
+
+RX FIFO should be enabled after the FRZ/HALT are valid. But the current
+code enable RX FIFO and FRZ/HALT at the same time.
+
+Fixes: e955cead03117 ("CAN: Add Flexcan CAN controller driver")
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218110037.16591-3-qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com
+Signed-off-by: Joakim Zhang <qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com>
+Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c
+@@ -1098,10 +1098,14 @@ static int register_flexcandev(struct ne
+ if (err)
+ goto out_chip_disable;
+
+- /* set freeze, halt and activate FIFO, restrict register access */
++ /* set freeze, halt */
++ err = flexcan_chip_freeze(priv);
++ if (err)
++ goto out_chip_disable;
++
++ /* activate FIFO, restrict register access */
+ reg = flexcan_read(®s->mcr);
+- reg |= FLEXCAN_MCR_FRZ | FLEXCAN_MCR_HALT |
+- FLEXCAN_MCR_FEN | FLEXCAN_MCR_SUPV;
++ reg |= FLEXCAN_MCR_FEN | FLEXCAN_MCR_SUPV;
+ flexcan_write(reg, ®s->mcr);
+
+ /* Currently we only support newer versions of this core
--- /dev/null
+From e940e0895a82c6fbaa259f2615eb52b57ee91a7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
+Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2021 10:24:56 +0100
+Subject: can: skb: can_skb_set_owner(): fix ref counting if socket was closed before setting skb ownership
+
+From: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
+
+commit e940e0895a82c6fbaa259f2615eb52b57ee91a7e upstream.
+
+There are two ref count variables controlling the free()ing of a socket:
+- struct sock::sk_refcnt - which is changed by sock_hold()/sock_put()
+- struct sock::sk_wmem_alloc - which accounts the memory allocated by
+ the skbs in the send path.
+
+In case there are still TX skbs on the fly and the socket() is closed,
+the struct sock::sk_refcnt reaches 0. In the TX-path the CAN stack
+clones an "echo" skb, calls sock_hold() on the original socket and
+references it. This produces the following back trace:
+
+| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 280 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x114/0x134
+| refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
+| Modules linked in: coda_vpu(E) v4l2_jpeg(E) videobuf2_vmalloc(E) imx_vdoa(E)
+| CPU: 0 PID: 280 Comm: test_can.sh Tainted: G E 5.11.0-04577-gf8ff6603c617 #203
+| Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree)
+| Backtrace:
+| [<80bafea4>] (dump_backtrace) from [<80bb0280>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) r7:00000000 r6:600f0113 r5:00000000 r4:81441220
+| [<80bb0260>] (show_stack) from [<80bb593c>] (dump_stack+0xa0/0xc8)
+| [<80bb589c>] (dump_stack) from [<8012b268>] (__warn+0xd4/0x114) r9:00000019 r8:80f4a8c2 r7:83e4150c r6:00000000 r5:00000009 r4:80528f90
+| [<8012b194>] (__warn) from [<80bb09c4>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x88/0xc8) r9:83f26400 r8:80f4a8d1 r7:00000009 r6:80528f90 r5:00000019 r4:80f4a8c2
+| [<80bb0940>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<80528f90>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x114/0x134) r8:00000000 r7:00000000 r6:82b44000 r5:834e5600 r4:83f4d540
+| [<80528e7c>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<8079a4c8>] (__refcount_add.constprop.0+0x4c/0x50)
+| [<8079a47c>] (__refcount_add.constprop.0) from [<8079a57c>] (can_put_echo_skb+0xb0/0x13c)
+| [<8079a4cc>] (can_put_echo_skb) from [<8079ba98>] (flexcan_start_xmit+0x1c4/0x230) r9:00000010 r8:83f48610 r7:0fdc0000 r6:0c080000 r5:82b44000 r4:834e5600
+| [<8079b8d4>] (flexcan_start_xmit) from [<80969078>] (netdev_start_xmit+0x44/0x70) r9:814c0ba0 r8:80c8790c r7:00000000 r6:834e5600 r5:82b44000 r4:82ab1f00
+| [<80969034>] (netdev_start_xmit) from [<809725a4>] (dev_hard_start_xmit+0x19c/0x318) r9:814c0ba0 r8:00000000 r7:82ab1f00 r6:82b44000 r5:00000000 r4:834e5600
+| [<80972408>] (dev_hard_start_xmit) from [<809c6584>] (sch_direct_xmit+0xcc/0x264) r10:834e5600 r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:82b44000 r6:82ab1f00 r5:834e5600 r4:83f27400
+| [<809c64b8>] (sch_direct_xmit) from [<809c6c0c>] (__qdisc_run+0x4f0/0x534)
+
+To fix this problem, only set skb ownership to sockets which have still
+a ref count > 0.
+
+Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs")
+Cc: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+Cc: Andre Naujoks <nautsch2@gmail.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210226092456.27126-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
+Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/can/skb.h | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/can/skb.h
++++ b/include/linux/can/skb.h
+@@ -48,8 +48,12 @@ static inline void can_skb_reserve(struc
+
+ static inline void can_skb_set_owner(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
+ {
+- if (sk) {
+- sock_hold(sk);
++ /* If the socket has already been closed by user space, the
++ * refcount may already be 0 (and the socket will be freed
++ * after the last TX skb has been freed). So only increase
++ * socket refcount if the refcount is > 0.
++ */
++ if (sk && atomic_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt)) {
+ skb->destructor = sock_efree;
+ skb->sk = sk;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 8e24edddad152b998b37a7f583175137ed2e04a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
+Date: Sat, 27 Feb 2021 11:27:45 +0300
+Subject: netfilter: x_tables: gpf inside xt_find_revision()
+
+From: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
+
+commit 8e24edddad152b998b37a7f583175137ed2e04a5 upstream.
+
+nested target/match_revfn() calls work with xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC] lists
+without taking xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].mutex. This can race with module unload
+and cause host to crash:
+
+general protection fault: 0000 [#1]
+Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: xt_cluster]
+CPU: 0 PID: 542455 Comm: iptables
+RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8ffbd518>] [<ffffffff8ffbd518>] strcmp+0x18/0x40
+RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffff9a5a5d9abe10 RDI: dead000000000111
+R13: ffff9a5a5d9abe10 R14: ffff9a5a5d9abd8c R15: dead000000000100
+(VvS: %R15 -- &xt_match, %RDI -- &xt_match.name,
+xt_cluster unregister match in xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].match list)
+Call Trace:
+ [<ffffffff902ccf44>] match_revfn+0x54/0xc0
+ [<ffffffff902ccf9f>] match_revfn+0xaf/0xc0
+ [<ffffffff902cd01e>] xt_find_revision+0x6e/0xf0
+ [<ffffffffc05a5be0>] do_ipt_get_ctl+0x100/0x420 [ip_tables]
+ [<ffffffff902cc6bf>] nf_getsockopt+0x4f/0x70
+ [<ffffffff902dd99e>] ip_getsockopt+0xde/0x100
+ [<ffffffff903039b5>] raw_getsockopt+0x25/0x50
+ [<ffffffff9026c5da>] sock_common_getsockopt+0x1a/0x20
+ [<ffffffff9026b89d>] SyS_getsockopt+0x7d/0xf0
+ [<ffffffff903cbf92>] system_call_fastpath+0x25/0x2a
+
+Fixes: 656caff20e1 ("netfilter 04/09: x_tables: fix match/target revision lookup")
+Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
+Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ static int match_revfn(u8 af, const char
+ const struct xt_match *m;
+ int have_rev = 0;
+
++ mutex_lock(&xt[af].mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry(m, &xt[af].match, list) {
+ if (strcmp(m->name, name) == 0) {
+ if (m->revision > *bestp)
+@@ -280,6 +281,7 @@ static int match_revfn(u8 af, const char
+ have_rev = 1;
+ }
+ }
++ mutex_unlock(&xt[af].mutex);
+
+ if (af != NFPROTO_UNSPEC && !have_rev)
+ return match_revfn(NFPROTO_UNSPEC, name, revision, bestp);
+@@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ static int target_revfn(u8 af, const cha
+ const struct xt_target *t;
+ int have_rev = 0;
+
++ mutex_lock(&xt[af].mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry(t, &xt[af].target, list) {
+ if (strcmp(t->name, name) == 0) {
+ if (t->revision > *bestp)
+@@ -300,6 +303,7 @@ static int target_revfn(u8 af, const cha
+ have_rev = 1;
+ }
+ }
++ mutex_unlock(&xt[af].mutex);
+
+ if (af != NFPROTO_UNSPEC && !have_rev)
+ return target_revfn(NFPROTO_UNSPEC, name, revision, bestp);
+@@ -313,12 +317,10 @@ int xt_find_revision(u8 af, const char *
+ {
+ int have_rev, best = -1;
+
+- mutex_lock(&xt[af].mutex);
+ if (target == 1)
+ have_rev = target_revfn(af, name, revision, &best);
+ else
+ have_rev = match_revfn(af, name, revision, &best);
+- mutex_unlock(&xt[af].mutex);
+
+ /* Nothing at all? Return 0 to try loading module. */
+ if (best == -1) {
ath9k-fix-transmitting-to-stations-in-dynamic-smps-mode.patch
net-fix-gro-aggregation-for-udp-encaps-with-zero-csum.patch
net-avoid-infinite-loop-in-mpls_gso_segment-when-mpls_hlen-0.patch
+can-skb-can_skb_set_owner-fix-ref-counting-if-socket-was-closed-before-setting-skb-ownership.patch
+can-flexcan-assert-frz-bit-in-flexcan_chip_freeze.patch
+can-flexcan-enable-rx-fifo-after-frz-halt-valid.patch
+netfilter-x_tables-gpf-inside-xt_find_revision.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
