]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/linux.git/commitdiff
ocfs2: validate inline xattr size and entry count in ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list
authorDeepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Thu, 20 Nov 2025 04:11:45 +0000 (09:41 +0530)
committerAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Thu, 11 Dec 2025 00:07:42 +0000 (16:07 -0800)
Add comprehensive validation of inline xattr metadata in
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list() to prevent out-of-bounds access and
use-after-free bugs when processing corrupted inline xattrs.

The patch adds two critical validations:

1. Validates i_xattr_inline_size before use:
   - Ensures it does not exceed block size
   - Ensures it is at least large enough for xattr header
   - Prevents pointer arithmetic with corrupted size values that could
     point outside the inode block

2. Validates xattr entry count (xh_count):
   - Calculates maximum entries that can fit in the inline space
   - Rejects counts that exceed this limit
   - Prevents out-of-bounds array access in subsequent code

Without these checks, a corrupted filesystem with invalid inline xattr
metadata can cause the code to access memory beyond the allocated space.
For example:
- A corrupted i_xattr_inline_size of 0 would cause header pointer
  calculation to point past the end of the block
- A corrupted xh_count of 22 with inline_size of 256 would cause
  array access 7 entries beyond the 15 that actually fit (the syzbot
  reproducer used xh_count of 20041), leading to use-after-free when
  accessing freed memory pages

The validation uses the correct inline_size (from di->i_xattr_inline_size)
rather than block size, ensuring accurate bounds checking for inline
xattrs specifically.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251120041145.33176-1-kartikey406@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251111073831.2027072-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251117063217.5690-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251117114224.12948-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ab0ad25088673470d2d9
Tested-by: syzbot+ab0ad25088673470d2d9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c

index 73c028f452aca5d4f7fc80b0c38c35fda87e6dd1..610f1a89d9628d9b6a136c647d202442f8a09f2a 100644 (file)
@@ -971,13 +971,39 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_list(struct inode *inode,
        struct ocfs2_xattr_header *header = NULL;
        struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
        int ret = 0;
+       u16 xattr_count;
+       size_t max_entries;
+       u16 inline_size;
 
        if (!(oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL))
                return ret;
 
+       inline_size = le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size);
+
+       /* Validate inline size is reasonable */
+       if (inline_size > inode->i_sb->s_blocksize ||
+           inline_size < sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) {
+               ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb,
+                           "Invalid xattr inline size %u in inode %llu\n",
+                           inline_size,
+                           (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno);
+               return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+       }
+
        header = (struct ocfs2_xattr_header *)
-                ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
-                le16_to_cpu(di->i_xattr_inline_size));
+                ((void *)di + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - inline_size);
+
+       xattr_count = le16_to_cpu(header->xh_count);
+       max_entries = (inline_size - sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_header)) /
+                      sizeof(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry);
+
+       if (xattr_count > max_entries) {
+               ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb,
+                           "xattr entry count %u exceeds maximum %zu in inode %llu\n",
+                           xattr_count, max_entries,
+                           (unsigned long long)OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno);
+               return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+       }
 
        ret = ocfs2_xattr_list_entries(inode, header, buffer, buffer_size);