]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable-queue.git/commitdiff
4.4-stable patches
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:33:41 +0000 (10:33 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Tue, 18 Jul 2017 08:33:41 +0000 (10:33 +0200)
added patches:
bpf-prevent-leaking-pointer-via-xadd-on-unpriviledged.patch
net-handle-napi_gro_free_stolen_head-case-also-in-napi_frags_finish.patch

queue-4.4/bpf-prevent-leaking-pointer-via-xadd-on-unpriviledged.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-4.4/net-handle-napi_gro_free_stolen_head-case-also-in-napi_frags_finish.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-4.4/series

diff --git a/queue-4.4/bpf-prevent-leaking-pointer-via-xadd-on-unpriviledged.patch b/queue-4.4/bpf-prevent-leaking-pointer-via-xadd-on-unpriviledged.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..dc7cc7d
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 6bdf6abc56b53103324dfd270a86580306e1a232 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 03:04:59 +0200
+Subject: bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged
+
+From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+
+commit 6bdf6abc56b53103324dfd270a86580306e1a232 upstream.
+
+Leaking kernel addresses on unpriviledged is generally disallowed,
+for example, verifier rejects the following:
+
+  0: (b7) r0 = 0
+  1: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400
+  3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r2
+  R2 leaks addr into ctx
+
+Doing pointer arithmetic on them is also forbidden, so that they
+don't turn into unknown value and then get leaked out. However,
+there's xadd as a special case, where we don't check the src reg
+for being a pointer register, e.g. the following will pass:
+
+  0: (b7) r0 = 0
+  1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r0
+  2: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 ; map
+  4: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r1 +48) += r2
+  5: (95) exit
+
+We could store the pointer into skb->cb, loose the type context,
+and then read it out from there again to leak it eventually out
+of a map value. Or more easily in a different variant, too:
+
+   0: (bf) r6 = r1
+   1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
+   2: (bf) r2 = r10
+   3: (07) r2 += -8
+   4: (18) r1 = 0x0
+   6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
+   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3
+   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
+   8: (b7) r3 = 0
+   9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = r3
+  10: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r0 +0) += r6
+  11: (b7) r0 = 0
+  12: (95) exit
+
+  from 7 to 11: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
+  11: (b7) r0 = 0
+  12: (95) exit
+
+Prevent this by checking xadd src reg for pointer types. Also
+add a couple of test cases related to this.
+
+Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
+Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
+Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
+Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+@@ -754,6 +754,11 @@ static int check_xadd(struct verifier_en
+       if (err)
+               return err;
++      if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
++              verbose("R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
++              return -EACCES;
++      }
++
+       /* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
+       err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+                              BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
diff --git a/queue-4.4/net-handle-napi_gro_free_stolen_head-case-also-in-napi_frags_finish.patch b/queue-4.4/net-handle-napi_gro_free_stolen_head-case-also-in-napi_frags_finish.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..1c83b75
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From e44699d2c28067f69698ccb68dd3ddeacfebc434 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= <mkubecek@suse.cz>
+Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2017 11:13:36 +0200
+Subject: net: handle NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD case also in napi_frags_finish()
+
+From: Michal Kubeček <mkubecek@suse.cz>
+
+commit e44699d2c28067f69698ccb68dd3ddeacfebc434 upstream.
+
+Recently I started seeing warnings about pages with refcount -1. The
+problem was traced to packets being reused after their head was merged into
+a GRO packet by skb_gro_receive(). While bisecting the issue pointed to
+commit c21b48cc1bbf ("net: adjust skb->truesize in ___pskb_trim()") and
+I have never seen it on a kernel with it reverted, I believe the real
+problem appeared earlier when the option to merge head frag in GRO was
+implemented.
+
+Handling NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD state was only added to GRO_MERGED_FREE
+branch of napi_skb_finish() so that if the driver uses napi_gro_frags()
+and head is merged (which in my case happens after the skb_condense()
+call added by the commit mentioned above), the skb is reused including the
+head that has been merged. As a result, we release the page reference
+twice and eventually end up with negative page refcount.
+
+To fix the problem, handle NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD in napi_frags_finish()
+the same way it's done in napi_skb_finish().
+
+Fixes: d7e8883cfcf4 ("net: make GRO aware of skb->head_frag")
+Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/core/dev.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/dev.c
++++ b/net/core/dev.c
+@@ -4375,6 +4375,12 @@ struct packet_offload *gro_find_complete
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(gro_find_complete_by_type);
++static void napi_skb_free_stolen_head(struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++      skb_dst_drop(skb);
++      kmem_cache_free(skbuff_head_cache, skb);
++}
++
+ static gro_result_t napi_skb_finish(gro_result_t ret, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+       switch (ret) {
+@@ -4388,12 +4394,10 @@ static gro_result_t napi_skb_finish(gro_
+               break;
+       case GRO_MERGED_FREE:
+-              if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free == NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD) {
+-                      skb_dst_drop(skb);
+-                      kmem_cache_free(skbuff_head_cache, skb);
+-              } else {
++              if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free == NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD)
++                      napi_skb_free_stolen_head(skb);
++              else
+                       __kfree_skb(skb);
+-              }
+               break;
+       case GRO_HELD:
+@@ -4459,10 +4463,16 @@ static gro_result_t napi_frags_finish(st
+               break;
+       case GRO_DROP:
+-      case GRO_MERGED_FREE:
+               napi_reuse_skb(napi, skb);
+               break;
++      case GRO_MERGED_FREE:
++              if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->free == NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD)
++                      napi_skb_free_stolen_head(skb);
++              else
++                      napi_reuse_skb(napi, skb);
++              break;
++
+       case GRO_MERGED:
+               break;
+       }
index 0217eec40bb43330f69626a2d1c6dc5d9982ce30..14b147e0a5f6959c5e23153c490137c670593daa 100644 (file)
@@ -5,3 +5,5 @@ ipv6-avoid-unregistering-inet6_dev-for-loopback.patch
 net-dp83640-avoid-null-pointer-dereference.patch
 tcp-reset-sk_rx_dst-in-tcp_disconnect.patch
 net-prevent-sign-extension-in-dev_get_stats.patch
+bpf-prevent-leaking-pointer-via-xadd-on-unpriviledged.patch
+net-handle-napi_gro_free_stolen_head-case-also-in-napi_frags_finish.patch