3.12-stable patches

added patches:
	tracing-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-in-trace_get_user.patch

diff --git a/queue-3.12/series b/queue-3.12/series
index ee0a8d1e62309ef2cae8368ff5b2bb20534460ac..b8c9dd282c3f84d001e3eb225fc07035f4ebe356 100644 (file)
--- a/queue-3.12/series
+++ b/queue-3.12/series
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ ipv6-reset-dst.expires-value-when-clearing-expire-flag.patch
 hyperv-fb-add-pci-stub.patch
 usb-add-new-zte-3g-dongle-s-pid-to-option.c.patch
 alsa-hda-hdmi-fix-reported-channel-map-on-common-default-layouts.patch
+tracing-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-in-trace_get_user.patch

diff --git a/queue-3.12/tracing-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-in-trace_get_user.patch b/queue-3.12/tracing-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-in-trace_get_user.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..c23bf64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-3.12/tracing-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-in-trace_get_user.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+From 057db8488b53d5e4faa0cedb2f39d4ae75dfbdbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2013 22:23:23 -0400
+Subject: tracing: Fix potential out-of-bounds in trace_get_user()
+
+From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+
+commit 057db8488b53d5e4faa0cedb2f39d4ae75dfbdbb upstream.
+
+Andrey reported the following report:
+
+ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address ffff8800359c99f3
+ffff8800359c99f3 is located 0 bytes to the right of 243-byte region [ffff8800359c9900, ffff8800359c99f3)
+Accessed by thread T13003:
+  #0 ffffffff810dd2da (asan_report_error+0x32a/0x440)
+  #1 ffffffff810dc6b0 (asan_check_region+0x30/0x40)
+  #2 ffffffff810dd4d3 (__tsan_write1+0x13/0x20)
+  #3 ffffffff811cd19e (ftrace_regex_release+0x1be/0x260)
+  #4 ffffffff812a1065 (__fput+0x155/0x360)
+  #5 ffffffff812a12de (____fput+0x1e/0x30)
+  #6 ffffffff8111708d (task_work_run+0x10d/0x140)
+  #7 ffffffff810ea043 (do_exit+0x433/0x11f0)
+  #8 ffffffff810eaee4 (do_group_exit+0x84/0x130)
+  #9 ffffffff810eafb1 (SyS_exit_group+0x21/0x30)
+  #10 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)
+
+Allocated by thread T5167:
+  #0 ffffffff810dc778 (asan_slab_alloc+0x48/0xc0)
+  #1 ffffffff8128337c (__kmalloc+0xbc/0x500)
+  #2 ffffffff811d9d54 (trace_parser_get_init+0x34/0x90)
+  #3 ffffffff811cd7b3 (ftrace_regex_open+0x83/0x2e0)
+  #4 ffffffff811cda7d (ftrace_filter_open+0x2d/0x40)
+  #5 ffffffff8129b4ff (do_dentry_open+0x32f/0x430)
+  #6 ffffffff8129b668 (finish_open+0x68/0xa0)
+  #7 ffffffff812b66ac (do_last+0xb8c/0x1710)
+  #8 ffffffff812b7350 (path_openat+0x120/0xb50)
+  #9 ffffffff812b8884 (do_filp_open+0x54/0xb0)
+  #10 ffffffff8129d36c (do_sys_open+0x1ac/0x2c0)
+  #11 ffffffff8129d4b7 (SyS_open+0x37/0x50)
+  #12 ffffffff81928782 (system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b)
+
+Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
+  ffff8800359c9700: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
+  ffff8800359c9780: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+  ffff8800359c9800: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+  ffff8800359c9880: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+  ffff8800359c9900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+=>ffff8800359c9980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[03]fb
+  ffff8800359c9a00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+  ffff8800359c9a80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+  ffff8800359c9b00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+  ffff8800359c9b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
+  ffff8800359c9c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
+Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
+  Addressable:           00
+  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
+  Heap redzone:          fa
+  Heap kmalloc redzone:  fb
+  Freed heap region:     fd
+  Shadow gap:            fe
+
+The out-of-bounds access happens on 'parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;'
+
+Although the crash happened in ftrace_regex_open() the real bug
+occurred in trace_get_user() where there's an incrementation to
+parser->idx without a check against the size. The way it is triggered
+is if userspace sends in 128 characters (EVENT_BUF_SIZE + 1), the loop
+that reads the last character stores it and then breaks out because
+there is no more characters. Then the last character is read to determine
+what to do next, and the index is incremented without checking size.
+
+Then the caller of trace_get_user() usually nulls out the last character
+with a zero, but since the index is equal to the size, it writes a nul
+character after the allocated space, which can corrupt memory.
+
+Luckily, only root user has write access to this file.
+
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131009222323.04fd1a0d@gandalf.local.home
+
+Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ kernel/trace/trace.c |    5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
+@@ -843,9 +843,12 @@ int trace_get_user(struct trace_parser *
+       if (isspace(ch)) {
+               parser->buffer[parser->idx] = 0;
+               parser->cont = false;
+-      } else {
++      } else if (parser->idx < parser->size - 1) {
+               parser->cont = true;
+               parser->buffer[parser->idx++] = ch;
++      } else {
++              ret = -EINVAL;
++              goto out;
+       }
+ 
+       *ppos += read;