infof: consistent capitalization of warning messages

Ensure that all infof calls with a warning message are capitalized
in the same way.  At some point we should probably set up a style-
guide for infof but until then let's aim for a little consistenncy
where we can.

Closes: #8711
Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>

diff --git a/lib/curl_gssapi.c b/lib/curl_gssapi.c
index 8f340562bc156f2a3f33fc2cc5a94f62e68320a7..adaf76a59c7f48de43c5d66648c713b1690ea8cf 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/curl_gssapi.c
+++ b/lib/curl_gssapi.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ OM_uint32 Curl_gss_init_sec_context(
 #ifdef GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG
     req_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG;
 #else
-    infof(data, "warning: support for CURLGSSAPI_DELEGATION_POLICY_FLAG not "
+    infof(data, "WARNING: support for CURLGSSAPI_DELEGATION_POLICY_FLAG not "
         "compiled in");
 #endif
   }

diff --git a/lib/rand.c b/lib/rand.c
index 8f2c1ba29e723afb26b90447ee8b12859f41abcd..31e14d8d69fb942e58f33231144ee61669b09188 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/rand.c
+++ b/lib/rand.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static CURLcode randit(struct Curl_easy *data, unsigned int *rnd)
 
   if(!seeded) {
     struct curltime now = Curl_now();
-    infof(data, "WARNING: Using weak random seed");
+    infof(data, "WARNING: using weak random seed");
     randseed += (unsigned int)now.tv_usec + (unsigned int)now.tv_sec;
     randseed = randseed * 1103515245 + 12345;
     randseed = randseed * 1103515245 + 12345;

diff --git a/lib/vssh/libssh2.c b/lib/vssh/libssh2.c
index db3967f5448c5230eb38d859853211e3088df56f..fd65de77279c529d08c8741b18be2ed179f2dc76 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/vssh/libssh2.c
+++ b/lib/vssh/libssh2.c
@@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_knownhost(struct Curl_easy *data)
                                           LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_KEYENC_RAW|
                                           keybit, NULL);
         if(addrc)
-          infof(data, "Warning adding the known host %s failed!",
+          infof(data, "WARNING: adding the known host %s failed!",
                 conn->host.name);
         else if(rc == CURLKHSTAT_FINE_ADD_TO_FILE ||
                 rc == CURLKHSTAT_FINE_REPLACE) {
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_knownhost(struct Curl_easy *data)
                                         data->set.str[STRING_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS],
                                         LIBSSH2_KNOWNHOST_FILE_OPENSSH);
           if(wrc) {
-            infof(data, "Warning, writing %s failed!",
+            infof(data, "WARNING: writing %s failed!",
                   data->set.str[STRING_SSH_KNOWNHOSTS]);
           }
         }

diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c
index 26e6b48f3fa38c81b173940896193e24c075438b..4d46c90a6566970e7c0e493055e4b5acc0163c1b 100644 (file)
--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c
+++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c
@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static char *dup_nickname(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *str)
   /* search the first slash; we require at least one slash in a file name */
   n = strchr(str, '/');
   if(!n) {
-    infof(data, "warning: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; "
+    infof(data, "WARNING: certificate file name \"%s\" handled as nickname; "
           "please use \"./%s\" to force file name", str, str);
     return strdup(str);
   }
@@ -1748,7 +1748,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_load_ca_certificates(struct Curl_easy *data,
       PR_CloseDir(dir);
     }
     else
-      infof(data, "warning: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)", capath);
+      infof(data, "WARNING: CURLOPT_CAPATH not a directory (%s)", capath);
   }
 
   return CURLE_OK;
@@ -1985,11 +1985,11 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct Curl_easy *data,
   /* unless the user explicitly asks to allow the protocol vulnerability, we
      use the work-around */
   if(SSL_OptionSet(model, SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV, ssl_cbc_random_iv) != SECSuccess)
-    infof(data, "warning: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d",
+    infof(data, "WARNING: failed to set SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV = %d",
           ssl_cbc_random_iv);
 #else
   if(ssl_cbc_random_iv)
-    infof(data, "warning: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in");
+    infof(data, "WARNING: support for SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV not compiled in");
 #endif
 
   if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) {
@@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct Curl_easy *data,
   }
 
   if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))
-    infof(data, "warning: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost");
+    infof(data, "WARNING: ignoring value of ssl.verifyhost");
 
   /* bypass the default SSL_AuthCertificate() hook in case we do not want to
    * verify peer */
@@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct Curl_easy *data,
     const CURLcode rv = nss_load_ca_certificates(data, conn, sockindex);
     if((rv == CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE) && !SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer))
       /* not a fatal error because we are not going to verify the peer */
-      infof(data, "warning: CA certificates failed to load");
+      infof(data, "WARNING: CA certificates failed to load");
     else if(rv) {
       result = rv;
       goto error;