lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid

Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure
instead of a u32 secid.  Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible security data for possible reporting.

Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 6ef2a345ea034ced28362d0a6e47a6b5e070298c..8a90fd9ff3c83b976b6d316e9dc3cf47824fea60 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgroups, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getsecid_subj, u32 *secid)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
-        struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getlsmprop_subj, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getlsmprop_obj,
+        struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 15aef5f68e7751ba613db41c65275a8be5c112fa..9bc8153f4e8b993ab70c165a49eda0414046821c 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop);
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop);
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1305,14 +1305,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
        return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-       *secid = 0;
+       lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+                                               struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-       *secid = 0;
+       lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 47c41e6f9ea99b5a507343c227c768581d6f7a0a..d2797e8fe1829b5c2b1513698df524975aed0b43 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -2179,16 +2179,16 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 
 int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
        char *ctx = NULL;
        unsigned len;
        int error;
-       u32 sid;
 
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
-       if (!sid)
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+       if (!lsmprop_is_set(&prop))
                return 0;
 
-       error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+       error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, &len);
        if (error) {
                if (error != -EINVAL)
                        goto error_path;
@@ -2405,8 +2405,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
                        audit_sig_uid = auid;
                else
                        audit_sig_uid = uid;
-               /* scaffolding */
-               security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm.scaffold.secid);
+               security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
        }
 
        return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);

diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 288a2092fd0dbf26ce798a1f5d40dabeebd823fe..a7de3dabe6e16aac434c8fee5496285a4a1a9f7d 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1371,8 +1371,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
                        case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                                if (f->lsm_rule) {
                                        /* scaffolding */
-                                       security_current_getsecid_subj(
-                                                       &prop.scaffold.secid);
+                                       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
                                        result = security_audit_rule_match(
                                                   &prop, f->type, f->op,
                                                   f->lsm_rule);

diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 5019eb32a97f63d296fce5b39e043714a25b2d5b..6b2b2a8d564785fff63d58efe07c29cb4da41311 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
        const struct cred *cred;
        int i, need_sid = 1;
-       u32 sid;
        struct lsm_prop prop = { };
        unsigned int sessionid;
 
@@ -675,15 +674,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
                                         * fork()/copy_process() in which case
                                         * the new @tsk creds are still a dup
                                         * of @current's creds so we can still
-                                        * use security_current_getsecid_subj()
+                                        * use
+                                        * security_current_getlsmprop_subj()
                                         * here even though it always refs
                                         * @current's creds
                                         */
-                                       security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+                                       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
                                        need_sid = 0;
                                }
-                               /* scaffolding */
-                               prop.scaffold.secid = sid;
                                result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop,
                                                                   f->type,
                                                                   f->op,
@@ -2730,12 +2728,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 {
        struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
 
        context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
        context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
        context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
        context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-       security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+       security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+       /* scaffolding */
+       context->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid;
        memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
@@ -2751,6 +2752,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
        struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
        struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
        kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
 
        if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
                return 0;
@@ -2762,7 +2764,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
                ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
                ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
                ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-               security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+               security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+               /* scaffolding */
+               ctx->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid;
                memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
                return 0;
        }
@@ -2783,7 +2787,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
        axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
        axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
        axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-       security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+       security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+       /* scaffolding */
+       axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = prop.scaffold.secid;
        memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
        axp->pid_count++;
 

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 9996883bf2b78d3ca0399fc622679e4bb04d5541..5925f48a3ade91e70f56405c42091e5930c4101d 100644 (file)
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1534,11 +1534,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
        int ret_val;
        struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
        struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
 
        /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
         * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
         * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+       /* scaffolding */
+       audit_info.secid = prop.scaffold.secid;
        audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
        audit_info.sessionid = 0;
 

diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index d6c5b31eb4eb8dfa693bf63590081614540cb9ff..39f4f6df5f5188d451c4255a753317f84c636ea4 100644 (file)
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
  */
 static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+       /* scaffolding */
+       audit_info->secid = prop.scaffold.secid;
        audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
        audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 }

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index a58b72ed246cac7f6551de4e07c7aad7d42f2be6..6331bcb35ec0a34048e2e5e17a4a9a28a6fe7709 100644 (file)
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -982,17 +982,24 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        return;
 }
 
-static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
        struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-       *secid = label->secid;
+
+       prop->apparmor.label = label;
+       /* scaffolding */
+       prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid;
        __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 }
 
-static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+                                         struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
        struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
-       *secid = label->secid;
+
+       prop->apparmor.label = label;
+       /* scaffolding */
+       prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid;
        aa_put_label(label);
 }
 
@@ -1503,8 +1510,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
-       LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj),
-       LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj,
+                     apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cdfe8c8c7bac980e9cec9c4472120e2487d5e867..c0d3b716d11fac90249193181de2d4f87d7deb61 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-                  const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+                  const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
                   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
                   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
                   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-                    const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-                    int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+                    const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+                    enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
                     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
                     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
 void ima_init_policy(void);

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 984e861f6e3328290de2aee4cbd5ba30cf8dd5cf..c35ea613c9f8d404ba4886e3b736c3bab29d1668 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ err_out:
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @prop: properties of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ err_out:
  *
  */
 int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-                  const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+                  const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
                   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
                   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
                   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 
        flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-       return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+       return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask,
                                flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
                                allowed_algos);
 }

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 656c709b974fdff3d1a26fd08684ea1ca1691567..884a3533f7af21b1f8dc2716fe67c6906b6bad70 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
 int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
                      int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
-       u32 secid;
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
 
        if (!ima_appraise)
                return 0;
 
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-       return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+       return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop,
                                func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
                                NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 06132cf47016da1da2122cb8f918e2266330849a..553a6f54a1e205a90e7e6534ce67eed0885d7cc6 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
-                              u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
-                              enum ima_hooks func)
+                              struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size,
+                              int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
        struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
        struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
         * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
         * Included is the appraise submask.
         */
-       action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid,
+       action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop,
                                mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
                                &allowed_algos);
        violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
@@ -443,23 +443,23 @@ out:
 static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
                         unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
-       u32 secid;
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
        int ret;
 
        if (!file)
                return 0;
 
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 
        if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
-               ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+               ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
                                          0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT);
                if (ret)
                        return ret;
        }
 
        if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
-               return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+               return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
                                           0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 
        return 0;
@@ -488,9 +488,9 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
        char *pathbuf = NULL;
        const char *pathname = NULL;
        struct inode *inode;
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
        int result = 0;
        int action;
-       u32 secid;
        int pcr;
 
        /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
            !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
                return 0;
 
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
        inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
        action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
-                               current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+                               current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
                                &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
        action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
-                                current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
+                                current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC,
                                 MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL,
                                 NULL);
 
@@ -542,15 +542,18 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
        int ret;
        u32 secid;
+       struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-       ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
-                                 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+       ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+                                 &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
 
        security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
-       return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+       /* scaffolding */
+       prop.scaffold.secid = secid;
+       return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0,
                                   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
 }
 
@@ -566,10 +569,10 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-       u32 secid;
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
 
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-       return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+       return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
                                   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
                                           MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
@@ -768,7 +771,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
                         bool contents)
 {
        enum ima_hooks func;
-       u32 secid;
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
 
        /*
         * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -788,9 +791,9 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 
        /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
        func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-       return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
-                                  0, MAY_READ, func);
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+       return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
+                                  MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -818,7 +821,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
                              enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
        enum ima_hooks func;
-       u32 secid;
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
 
        /* permit signed certs */
        if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -831,8 +834,8 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
        }
 
        func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-       security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-       return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+       security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+       return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size,
                                   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
@@ -967,7 +970,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
        int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
        int violation = 0;
        int action = 0;
-       u32 secid;
+       struct lsm_prop prop;
 
        if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
                return -EINVAL;
@@ -990,9 +993,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
         * buffer measurements.
         */
        if (func) {
-               security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+               security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
                action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(),
-                                       secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+                                       &prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
                                        func_data, NULL);
                if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
                        return -ENOENT;

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 22a62e675ebc58e309b64831773f85412fa36131..a96dc3ff6aa079f35cb2df7fe56b817a7dec5439 100644 (file)
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
  * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
  * @func: LIM hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
                            struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
                            struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
-                           u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+                           struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
                            const char *func_data)
 {
        int i;
@@ -658,8 +658,6 @@ retry:
                case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
                case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
                case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-                       /* scaffolding */
-                       prop.scaffold.secid = secid;
                        rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
                                                   Audit_equal,
                                                   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -723,7 +721,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
  * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
  *        being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE)
@@ -740,8 +738,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-                    const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-                    int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+                    const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+                    enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
                     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
                     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
 {
@@ -759,7 +757,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
                if (!(entry->action & actmask))
                        continue;
 
-               if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, secid,
+               if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop,
                                     func, mask, func_data))
                        continue;
 

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f269421c2d7267fa875e8a518818c93aeb247869..5cdb5b171ff203645332f3a86e290d1d11907118 100644 (file)
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -3492,33 +3492,33 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 /**
- * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid
- * @secid: secid value
+ * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() - Current task's subjective LSM data
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
  *
  * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return
- * it in @secid.  In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * it in @prop.
  */
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-       *secid = 0;
-       call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+       lsmprop_init(prop);
+       call_void_hook(current_getlsmprop_subj, prop);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getlsmprop_subj);
 
 /**
- * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid
+ * security_task_getlsmprop_obj() - Get a task's objective LSM data
  * @p: target task
- * @secid: secid value
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
  *
  * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and
- * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * return it in @prop.
  */
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-       *secid = 0;
-       call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+       lsmprop_init(prop);
+       call_void_hook(task_getlsmprop_obj, p, prop);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getlsmprop_obj);
 
 /**
  * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d43367009ed6fc33b6297eb286e6af5715b5984..7d6ffd3483a80bb4eb4c85025dbaba4b6423ad44 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4169,14 +4169,19 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
                            PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
 }
 
-static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-       *secid = current_sid();
+       prop->selinux.secid = current_sid();
+       /* scaffolding */
+       prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid;
 }
 
-static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+                                       struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-       *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+       prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+       /* scaffolding */
+       prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid;
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -7203,8 +7208,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
-       LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
-       LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fed44b4fc73d0c3457184d64c8c2a2b8a43c2bdc..e74e22c4232fe3d0d9e69fcd5deb772694647eb0 100644 (file)
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2239,30 +2239,35 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_current_getsecid_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
- * @secid: where to put the result
+ * smack_current_getlsmprop_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
+ * @prop: where to put the result
  *
  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label.
  */
-static void smack_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-       *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+       prop->smack.skp = skp;
+       /* scaffolding */
+       prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_task_getsecid_obj - get the objective secid of the task
+ * smack_task_getlsmprop_obj - get the objective data of the task
  * @p: the task
- * @secid: where to put the result
+ * @prop: where to put the result
  *
  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label.
  */
-static void smack_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+                                     struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
 
-       *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+       prop->smack.skp = skp;
+       /* scaffolding */
+       prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5130,8 +5135,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
-       LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, smack_current_getsecid_subj),
-       LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid_obj),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, smack_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, smack_task_getlsmprop_obj),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),