Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to
directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check
which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that
skb->len fits the interface's MTU.
Unfortunately, because the etas_es58x driver does not populate its
net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to
configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example:
$ ip link set can0 mtu 9999
After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the
ETH_P_CANXL protocol:
socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL));
to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example:
struct canxl_frame frame = {
.flags = 0xff,
.len = 2048,
};
The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to
check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the
malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks:
1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the
function does not check the actual device capabilities).
2. the length is a valid CAN XL length.
And so, es58x_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not
able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN(FD)
frame.
This can result in a buffer overflow. For example, using the es581.4
variant, the frame will be dispatched to es581_4_tx_can_msg(), go
through the last check at the beginning of this function:
if (can_is_canfd_skb(skb))
return -EMSGSIZE;
and reach this line:
memcpy(tx_can_msg->data, cf->data, cf->len);
Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In
our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the
maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs!
Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the
interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU or
CANFD_MTU (depending on the device capabilities). By fixing the root
cause, this prevents the buffer overflow.
Fixes: 8537257874e9 ("can: etas_es58x: add core support for ETAS ES58X CAN USB interfaces")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-1-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>