Rename DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED to TLS_AUTHENTICATED

The macro's name suggests that the key is enabled and being used. But
the macro actually something different but similar enough that the name
was probably right at some point.

Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <20201023120259.29783-5-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg21221.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
index d427ec401ac276607dc7e498b5ff7dc5d46d0d15..950bf4214c2b9fe22d52b966a2e57314e0c8dddc 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
@@ -3186,7 +3186,7 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi,
      * verification failed.  A semi-trusted session can forward data on the
      * TLS control channel but not on the tunnel channel.
      */
-    if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED].key[KS_PRIMARY]))
+    if (TLS_AUTHENTICATED(multi, &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED].key[KS_PRIMARY]))
     {
         move_session(multi, TM_ACTIVE, TM_UNTRUSTED, true);
         msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "TLS: tls_multi_process: untrusted session promoted to %strusted",
@@ -3271,7 +3271,7 @@ handle_data_channel_packet(struct tls_multi *multi,
          * passive side is the server which only listens for the connections, the
          * active side is the client which initiates connections).
          */
-        if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks)
+        if (TLS_AUTHENTICATED(multi, ks)
             && key_id == ks->key_id
             && (ks->authenticated == KS_AUTH_TRUE)
             && (floated || link_socket_actual_match(from, &ks->remote_addr)))
@@ -3598,7 +3598,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,
          * Remote is requesting a key renegotiation
          */
         if (op == P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1
-            && DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks))
+            && TLS_AUTHENTICATED(multi, ks))
         {
             if (!read_control_auth(buf, &session->tls_wrap, from,
                                    session->opt))

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
index e47d026bc48aa8da50011666cbd3117aeeb37240..43e48adb4283b72b1df493bbb45156323785c39c 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ tls_authentication_status(struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency)
     for (int i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i)
     {
         struct key_state *ks = get_key_scan(multi, i);
-        if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks))
+        if (TLS_AUTHENTICATED(multi, ks))
         {
             active++;
             if (ks->authenticated > KS_AUTH_FALSE)

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h
index b3fe25d2f2513e4d8dc35f0d4ee6cb361d1ca00c..7e8b9710c2a21de44c6ddb8843b260db1d818dd6 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h
@@ -95,15 +95,22 @@ enum tls_auth_status
 enum tls_auth_status
 tls_authentication_status(struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency);
 
-/** Check whether the \a ks \c key_state is ready to receive data channel
- *   packets.
+/** Check whether the \a ks \c key_state has finished the key exchange part
+ *  of the OpenVPN hand shake. This is that the key_method_2read/write
+ *  handshakes have been completed and certificate verification have
+ *  been completed.
+ *
+ * connect/deferred auth might still pending. Also data-channel keys might
+ * not have been created since they are delayed until PUSH_REPLY for NCP
+ * clients.
+ *
  *   @ingroup data_crypto
  *
  *   If true, it is safe to assume that this session has been authenticated
  *   by TLS.
  *
  *   @note This macro only works if S_SENT_KEY + 1 == S_GOT_KEY. */
-#define DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks) ((ks)->state >= (S_GOT_KEY - (multi)->opt.server))
+#define TLS_AUTHENTICATED(multi, ks) ((ks)->state >= (S_GOT_KEY - (multi)->opt.server))
 
 /**
  * Remove the given key state's auth control file, if it exists.