3.13-stable patches

added patches:
	selinux-fix-kernel-bug-on-empty-security-contexts.patch

diff --git a/queue-3.13/selinux-fix-kernel-bug-on-empty-security-contexts.patch b/queue-3.13/selinux-fix-kernel-bug-on-empty-security-contexts.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..67938c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-3.13/selinux-fix-kernel-bug-on-empty-security-contexts.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+From 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2014 11:26:59 -0500
+Subject: SELinux:  Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
+
+From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+
+commit 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 upstream.
+
+Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
+lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
+of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
+As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
+all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
+via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
+request by SELinux.
+
+Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
+SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
+(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
+if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
+to the domain by policy.  In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
+specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
+that are not defined in the build host policy.
+
+Reproducer:
+su
+setenforce 0
+touch foo
+setfattr -n security.selinux foo
+
+Caveat:
+Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
+without booting with SELinux disabled.  Any subsequent access to foo
+after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
+
+BUG output from Matthew Thode:
+[  473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
+[  473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
+[  473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
+[  474.027196] Modules linked in:
+[  474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G      D   I
+3.13.0-grsec #1
+[  474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
+07/29/10
+[  474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
+ffff8805f50cd488
+[  474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>]  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
+context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
+[  474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38  EFLAGS: 00010246
+[  474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
+0000000000000100
+[  474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
+ffff8805e8aaa000
+[  474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
+0000000000000006
+[  474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
+0000000000000006
+[  474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
+0000000000000000
+[  474.453816] FS:  00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
+knlGS:0000000000000000
+[  474.489254] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+[  474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
+00000000000207f0
+[  474.556058] Stack:
+[  474.584325]  ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
+ffff8805f1190a40
+[  474.618913]  ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
+ffff8805e8aac860
+[  474.653955]  ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
+ffff8805c0ac3d94
+[  474.690461] Call Trace:
+[  474.723779]  [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
+[  474.778049]  [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
+[  474.811398]  [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
+[  474.843813]  [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
+[  474.875694]  [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
+[  474.907370]  [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
+[  474.938726]  [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
+[  474.970036]  [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
+[  475.000618]  [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
+[  475.030402]  [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
+[  475.061097]  [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
+[  475.094595]  [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
+[  475.148405]  [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
+[  475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
+8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
+75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
+[  475.255884] RIP  [<ffffffff814681c7>]
+context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
+[  475.296120]  RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
+[  475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
+
+Reported-by:  Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
+Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/selinux/ss/services.c |    4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
++++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+@@ -1232,6 +1232,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(
+       struct context context;
+       int rc = 0;
+ 
++      /* An empty security context is never valid. */
++      if (!scontext_len)
++              return -EINVAL;
++
+       if (!ss_initialized) {
+               int i;
+ 

diff --git a/queue-3.13/series b/queue-3.13/series
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..28db5b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-3.13/series
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+selinux-fix-kernel-bug-on-empty-security-contexts.patch