]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable-queue.git/commitdiff
4.9-stable patches
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 14 Feb 2018 18:58:53 +0000 (19:58 +0100)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 14 Feb 2018 18:58:53 +0000 (19:58 +0100)
added patches:
crypto-cryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch
crypto-hash-introduce-crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey.patch
crypto-hash-prevent-using-keyed-hashes-without-setting-key.patch
crypto-mcryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch
crypto-poly1305-remove-setkey-method.patch

queue-4.9/crypto-cryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-4.9/crypto-hash-introduce-crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-4.9/crypto-hash-prevent-using-keyed-hashes-without-setting-key.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-4.9/crypto-mcryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-4.9/crypto-poly1305-remove-setkey-method.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-4.9/series

diff --git a/queue-4.9/crypto-cryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch b/queue-4.9/crypto-cryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..6bc4a3a
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 841a3ff329713f796a63356fef6e2f72e4a3f6a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 11:16:23 -0800
+Subject: crypto: cryptd - pass through absence of ->setkey()
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit 841a3ff329713f796a63356fef6e2f72e4a3f6a3 upstream.
+
+When the cryptd template is used to wrap an unkeyed hash algorithm,
+don't install a ->setkey() method to the cryptd instance.  This change
+is necessary for cryptd to keep working with unkeyed hash algorithms
+once we start enforcing that ->setkey() is called when present.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ crypto/cryptd.c |    3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/cryptd.c
++++ b/crypto/cryptd.c
+@@ -691,7 +691,8 @@ static int cryptd_create_hash(struct cry
+       inst->alg.finup  = cryptd_hash_finup_enqueue;
+       inst->alg.export = cryptd_hash_export;
+       inst->alg.import = cryptd_hash_import;
+-      inst->alg.setkey = cryptd_hash_setkey;
++      if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(salg))
++              inst->alg.setkey = cryptd_hash_setkey;
+       inst->alg.digest = cryptd_hash_digest_enqueue;
+       err = ahash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
diff --git a/queue-4.9/crypto-hash-introduce-crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey.patch b/queue-4.9/crypto-hash-introduce-crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..7d43c4b
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From cd6ed77ad5d223dc6299fb58f62e0f5267f7e2ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 11:16:22 -0800
+Subject: crypto: hash - introduce crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey()
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit cd6ed77ad5d223dc6299fb58f62e0f5267f7e2ba upstream.
+
+Templates that use an shash spawn can use crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
+to determine whether the underlying algorithm requires a key or not.
+But there was no corresponding function for ahash spawns.  Add it.
+
+Note that the new function actually has to support both shash and ahash
+algorithms, since the ahash API can be used with either.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ crypto/ahash.c                 |   11 +++++++++++
+ include/crypto/internal/hash.h |    2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/crypto/ahash.c
++++ b/crypto/ahash.c
+@@ -625,5 +625,16 @@ struct hash_alg_common *ahash_attr_alg(s
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ahash_attr_alg);
++bool crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey(struct hash_alg_common *halg)
++{
++      struct crypto_alg *alg = &halg->base;
++
++      if (alg->cra_type != &crypto_ahash_type)
++              return crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(__crypto_shash_alg(alg));
++
++      return __crypto_ahash_alg(alg)->setkey != NULL;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey);
++
+ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Asynchronous cryptographic hash type");
+--- a/include/crypto/internal/hash.h
++++ b/include/crypto/internal/hash.h
+@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ static inline bool crypto_shash_alg_has_
+       return alg->setkey != shash_no_setkey;
+ }
++bool crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey(struct hash_alg_common *halg);
++
+ int crypto_init_ahash_spawn(struct crypto_ahash_spawn *spawn,
+                           struct hash_alg_common *alg,
+                           struct crypto_instance *inst);
diff --git a/queue-4.9/crypto-hash-prevent-using-keyed-hashes-without-setting-key.patch b/queue-4.9/crypto-hash-prevent-using-keyed-hashes-without-setting-key.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..db01796
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
+From 9fa68f620041be04720d0cbfb1bd3ddfc6310b24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 11:16:27 -0800
+Subject: crypto: hash - prevent using keyed hashes without setting key
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit 9fa68f620041be04720d0cbfb1bd3ddfc6310b24 upstream.
+
+Currently, almost none of the keyed hash algorithms check whether a key
+has been set before proceeding.  Some algorithms are okay with this and
+will effectively just use a key of all 0's or some other bogus default.
+However, others will severely break, as demonstrated using
+"hmac(sha3-512-generic)", the unkeyed use of which causes a kernel crash
+via a (potentially exploitable) stack buffer overflow.
+
+A while ago, this problem was solved for AF_ALG by pairing each hash
+transform with a 'has_key' bool.  However, there are still other places
+in the kernel where userspace can specify an arbitrary hash algorithm by
+name, and the kernel uses it as unkeyed hash without checking whether it
+is really unkeyed.  Examples of this include:
+
+    - KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE, via the KDF extension
+    - dm-verity
+    - dm-crypt, via the ESSIV support
+    - dm-integrity, via the "internal hash" mode with no key given
+    - drbd (Distributed Replicated Block Device)
+
+This bug is especially bad for KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE as that requires no
+privileges to call.
+
+Fix the bug for all users by adding a flag CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY to the
+->crt_flags of each hash transform that indicates whether the transform
+still needs to be keyed or not.  Then, make the hash init, import, and
+digest functions return -ENOKEY if the key is still needed.
+
+The new flag also replaces the 'has_key' bool which algif_hash was
+previously using, thereby simplifying the algif_hash implementation.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ crypto/ahash.c         |   22 ++++++++++++++++----
+ crypto/algif_hash.c    |   52 ++++++++++---------------------------------------
+ crypto/shash.c         |   25 +++++++++++++++++++----
+ include/crypto/hash.h  |   34 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ include/linux/crypto.h |    2 +
+ 5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/ahash.c
++++ b/crypto/ahash.c
+@@ -192,11 +192,18 @@ int crypto_ahash_setkey(struct crypto_ah
+                       unsigned int keylen)
+ {
+       unsigned long alignmask = crypto_ahash_alignmask(tfm);
++      int err;
+       if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)
+-              return ahash_setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
++              err = ahash_setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
++      else
++              err = tfm->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
++
++      if (err)
++              return err;
+-      return tfm->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
++      crypto_ahash_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
++      return 0;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_ahash_setkey);
+@@ -369,7 +376,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_ahash_finup);
+ int crypto_ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
+ {
+-      return crypto_ahash_op(req, crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req)->digest);
++      struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
++
++      if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
++              return -ENOKEY;
++
++      return crypto_ahash_op(req, tfm->digest);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_ahash_digest);
+@@ -455,7 +467,6 @@ static int crypto_ahash_init_tfm(struct
+       struct ahash_alg *alg = crypto_ahash_alg(hash);
+       hash->setkey = ahash_nosetkey;
+-      hash->has_setkey = false;
+       hash->export = ahash_no_export;
+       hash->import = ahash_no_import;
+@@ -470,7 +481,8 @@ static int crypto_ahash_init_tfm(struct
+       if (alg->setkey) {
+               hash->setkey = alg->setkey;
+-              hash->has_setkey = true;
++              if (!(alg->halg.base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY))
++                      crypto_ahash_set_flags(hash, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
+       }
+       if (alg->export)
+               hash->export = alg->export;
+--- a/crypto/algif_hash.c
++++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c
+@@ -34,11 +34,6 @@ struct hash_ctx {
+       struct ahash_request req;
+ };
+-struct algif_hash_tfm {
+-      struct crypto_ahash *hash;
+-      bool has_key;
+-};
+-
+ static int hash_alloc_result(struct sock *sk, struct hash_ctx *ctx)
+ {
+       unsigned ds;
+@@ -308,7 +303,7 @@ static int hash_check_key(struct socket
+       int err = 0;
+       struct sock *psk;
+       struct alg_sock *pask;
+-      struct algif_hash_tfm *tfm;
++      struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+       struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
+@@ -322,7 +317,7 @@ static int hash_check_key(struct socket
+       err = -ENOKEY;
+       lock_sock_nested(psk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+-      if (!tfm->has_key)
++      if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
+               goto unlock;
+       if (!pask->refcnt++)
+@@ -413,41 +408,17 @@ static struct proto_ops algif_hash_ops_n
+ static void *hash_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
+ {
+-      struct algif_hash_tfm *tfm;
+-      struct crypto_ahash *hash;
+-
+-      tfm = kzalloc(sizeof(*tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+-      if (!tfm)
+-              return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+-
+-      hash = crypto_alloc_ahash(name, type, mask);
+-      if (IS_ERR(hash)) {
+-              kfree(tfm);
+-              return ERR_CAST(hash);
+-      }
+-
+-      tfm->hash = hash;
+-
+-      return tfm;
++      return crypto_alloc_ahash(name, type, mask);
+ }
+ static void hash_release(void *private)
+ {
+-      struct algif_hash_tfm *tfm = private;
+-
+-      crypto_free_ahash(tfm->hash);
+-      kfree(tfm);
++      crypto_free_ahash(private);
+ }
+ static int hash_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+ {
+-      struct algif_hash_tfm *tfm = private;
+-      int err;
+-
+-      err = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm->hash, key, keylen);
+-      tfm->has_key = !err;
+-
+-      return err;
++      return crypto_ahash_setkey(private, key, keylen);
+ }
+ static void hash_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
+@@ -462,11 +433,10 @@ static void hash_sock_destruct(struct so
+ static int hash_accept_parent_nokey(void *private, struct sock *sk)
+ {
+-      struct hash_ctx *ctx;
++      struct crypto_ahash *tfm = private;
+       struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
+-      struct algif_hash_tfm *tfm = private;
+-      struct crypto_ahash *hash = tfm->hash;
+-      unsigned len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ahash_reqsize(hash);
++      struct hash_ctx *ctx;
++      unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm);
+       ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!ctx)
+@@ -479,7 +449,7 @@ static int hash_accept_parent_nokey(void
+       ask->private = ctx;
+-      ahash_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, hash);
++      ahash_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, tfm);
+       ahash_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+                                  af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
+@@ -490,9 +460,9 @@ static int hash_accept_parent_nokey(void
+ static int hash_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
+ {
+-      struct algif_hash_tfm *tfm = private;
++      struct crypto_ahash *tfm = private;
+-      if (!tfm->has_key && crypto_ahash_has_setkey(tfm->hash))
++      if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
+               return -ENOKEY;
+       return hash_accept_parent_nokey(private, sk);
+--- a/crypto/shash.c
++++ b/crypto/shash.c
+@@ -57,11 +57,18 @@ int crypto_shash_setkey(struct crypto_sh
+ {
+       struct shash_alg *shash = crypto_shash_alg(tfm);
+       unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
++      int err;
+       if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)
+-              return shash_setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
++              err = shash_setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
++      else
++              err = shash->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
++
++      if (err)
++              return err;
+-      return shash->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
++      crypto_shash_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
++      return 0;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_shash_setkey);
+@@ -180,6 +187,9 @@ int crypto_shash_digest(struct shash_des
+       struct shash_alg *shash = crypto_shash_alg(tfm);
+       unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
++      if (crypto_shash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
++              return -ENOKEY;
++
+       if (((unsigned long)data | (unsigned long)out) & alignmask)
+               return shash_digest_unaligned(desc, data, len, out);
+@@ -359,7 +369,8 @@ int crypto_init_shash_ops_async(struct c
+       crt->digest = shash_async_digest;
+       crt->setkey = shash_async_setkey;
+-      crt->has_setkey = alg->setkey != shash_no_setkey;
++      crypto_ahash_set_flags(crt, crypto_shash_get_flags(shash) &
++                                  CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
+       if (alg->export)
+               crt->export = shash_async_export;
+@@ -374,8 +385,14 @@ int crypto_init_shash_ops_async(struct c
+ static int crypto_shash_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+ {
+       struct crypto_shash *hash = __crypto_shash_cast(tfm);
++      struct shash_alg *alg = crypto_shash_alg(hash);
++
++      hash->descsize = alg->descsize;
++
++      if (crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey(alg) &&
++          !(alg->base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY))
++              crypto_shash_set_flags(hash, CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY);
+-      hash->descsize = crypto_shash_alg(hash)->descsize;
+       return 0;
+ }
+--- a/include/crypto/hash.h
++++ b/include/crypto/hash.h
+@@ -205,7 +205,6 @@ struct crypto_ahash {
+                     unsigned int keylen);
+       unsigned int reqsize;
+-      bool has_setkey;
+       struct crypto_tfm base;
+ };
+@@ -399,11 +398,6 @@ static inline void *ahash_request_ctx(st
+ int crypto_ahash_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
+                       unsigned int keylen);
+-static inline bool crypto_ahash_has_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
+-{
+-      return tfm->has_setkey;
+-}
+-
+ /**
+  * crypto_ahash_finup() - update and finalize message digest
+  * @req: reference to the ahash_request handle that holds all information
+@@ -475,7 +469,12 @@ static inline int crypto_ahash_export(st
+  */
+ static inline int crypto_ahash_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in)
+ {
+-      return crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req)->import(req, in);
++      struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
++
++      if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
++              return -ENOKEY;
++
++      return tfm->import(req, in);
+ }
+ /**
+@@ -492,7 +491,12 @@ static inline int crypto_ahash_import(st
+  */
+ static inline int crypto_ahash_init(struct ahash_request *req)
+ {
+-      return crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req)->init(req);
++      struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
++
++      if (crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
++              return -ENOKEY;
++
++      return tfm->init(req);
+ }
+ /**
+@@ -845,7 +849,12 @@ static inline int crypto_shash_export(st
+  */
+ static inline int crypto_shash_import(struct shash_desc *desc, const void *in)
+ {
+-      return crypto_shash_alg(desc->tfm)->import(desc, in);
++      struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
++
++      if (crypto_shash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
++              return -ENOKEY;
++
++      return crypto_shash_alg(tfm)->import(desc, in);
+ }
+ /**
+@@ -861,7 +870,12 @@ static inline int crypto_shash_import(st
+  */
+ static inline int crypto_shash_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+ {
+-      return crypto_shash_alg(desc->tfm)->init(desc);
++      struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
++
++      if (crypto_shash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY)
++              return -ENOKEY;
++
++      return crypto_shash_alg(tfm)->init(desc);
+ }
+ /**
+--- a/include/linux/crypto.h
++++ b/include/linux/crypto.h
+@@ -105,6 +105,8 @@
+ /*
+  * Transform masks and values (for crt_flags).
+  */
++#define CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY           0x00000001
++
+ #define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK           0x000fff00
+ #define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK           0xfff00000
diff --git a/queue-4.9/crypto-mcryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch b/queue-4.9/crypto-mcryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..204c10c
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From fa59b92d299f2787e6bae1ff078ee0982e80211f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 11:16:24 -0800
+Subject: crypto: mcryptd - pass through absence of ->setkey()
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit fa59b92d299f2787e6bae1ff078ee0982e80211f upstream.
+
+When the mcryptd template is used to wrap an unkeyed hash algorithm,
+don't install a ->setkey() method to the mcryptd instance.  This change
+is necessary for mcryptd to keep working with unkeyed hash algorithms
+once we start enforcing that ->setkey() is called when present.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ crypto/mcryptd.c |    3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/mcryptd.c
++++ b/crypto/mcryptd.c
+@@ -534,7 +534,8 @@ static int mcryptd_create_hash(struct cr
+       inst->alg.finup  = mcryptd_hash_finup_enqueue;
+       inst->alg.export = mcryptd_hash_export;
+       inst->alg.import = mcryptd_hash_import;
+-      inst->alg.setkey = mcryptd_hash_setkey;
++      if (crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey(halg))
++              inst->alg.setkey = mcryptd_hash_setkey;
+       inst->alg.digest = mcryptd_hash_digest_enqueue;
+       err = ahash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
diff --git a/queue-4.9/crypto-poly1305-remove-setkey-method.patch b/queue-4.9/crypto-poly1305-remove-setkey-method.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..38723f8
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+From a16e772e664b9a261424107784804cffc8894977 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 11:16:25 -0800
+Subject: crypto: poly1305 - remove ->setkey() method
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit a16e772e664b9a261424107784804cffc8894977 upstream.
+
+Since Poly1305 requires a nonce per invocation, the Linux kernel
+implementations of Poly1305 don't use the crypto API's keying mechanism
+and instead expect the key and nonce as the first 32 bytes of the data.
+But ->setkey() is still defined as a stub returning an error code.  This
+prevents Poly1305 from being used through AF_ALG and will also break it
+completely once we start enforcing that all crypto API users (not just
+AF_ALG) call ->setkey() if present.
+
+Fix it by removing crypto_poly1305_setkey(), leaving ->setkey as NULL.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c |    1 -
+ crypto/poly1305_generic.c       |   17 +++++------------
+ include/crypto/poly1305.h       |    2 --
+ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
++++ b/arch/x86/crypto/poly1305_glue.c
+@@ -164,7 +164,6 @@ static struct shash_alg alg = {
+       .init           = poly1305_simd_init,
+       .update         = poly1305_simd_update,
+       .final          = crypto_poly1305_final,
+-      .setkey         = crypto_poly1305_setkey,
+       .descsize       = sizeof(struct poly1305_simd_desc_ctx),
+       .base           = {
+               .cra_name               = "poly1305",
+--- a/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
++++ b/crypto/poly1305_generic.c
+@@ -51,17 +51,6 @@ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_de
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_init);
+-int crypto_poly1305_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+-                         const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+-{
+-      /* Poly1305 requires a unique key for each tag, which implies that
+-       * we can't set it on the tfm that gets accessed by multiple users
+-       * simultaneously. Instead we expect the key as the first 32 bytes in
+-       * the update() call. */
+-      return -ENOTSUPP;
+-}
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_poly1305_setkey);
+-
+ static void poly1305_setrkey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx, const u8 *key)
+ {
+       /* r &= 0xffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff */
+@@ -80,6 +69,11 @@ static void poly1305_setskey(struct poly
+       dctx->s[3] = le32_to_cpuvp(key + 12);
+ }
++/*
++ * Poly1305 requires a unique key for each tag, which implies that we can't set
++ * it on the tfm that gets accessed by multiple users simultaneously. Instead we
++ * expect the key as the first 32 bytes in the update() call.
++ */
+ unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
+                                       const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen)
+ {
+@@ -285,7 +279,6 @@ static struct shash_alg poly1305_alg = {
+       .init           = crypto_poly1305_init,
+       .update         = crypto_poly1305_update,
+       .final          = crypto_poly1305_final,
+-      .setkey         = crypto_poly1305_setkey,
+       .descsize       = sizeof(struct poly1305_desc_ctx),
+       .base           = {
+               .cra_name               = "poly1305",
+--- a/include/crypto/poly1305.h
++++ b/include/crypto/poly1305.h
+@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ struct poly1305_desc_ctx {
+ };
+ int crypto_poly1305_init(struct shash_desc *desc);
+-int crypto_poly1305_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+-                         const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen);
+ unsigned int crypto_poly1305_setdesckey(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *dctx,
+                                       const u8 *src, unsigned int srclen);
+ int crypto_poly1305_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
index a2ff7b54f373e29a50ded3eb6522bf62afb1835c..213cba53e72a423282905e9a7123a33522ef0a7c 100644 (file)
@@ -28,3 +28,8 @@ kernfs-fix-regression-in-kernfs_fop_write-caused-by-wrong-type.patch
 ahci-annotate-pci-ids-for-mobile-intel-chipsets-as-such.patch
 ahci-add-pci-ids-for-intel-bay-trail-cherry-trail-and-apollo-lake-ahci.patch
 ahci-add-intel-cannon-lake-pch-h-pci-id.patch
+crypto-hash-introduce-crypto_hash_alg_has_setkey.patch
+crypto-cryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch
+crypto-mcryptd-pass-through-absence-of-setkey.patch
+crypto-poly1305-remove-setkey-method.patch
+crypto-hash-prevent-using-keyed-hashes-without-setting-key.patch